ADJECTIVES, ASTERISKS AND QUALIFICATIONS, OR HOW TO ADDRESS DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

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DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY. By Howard J. Wiarda with the assistance of Esther M. Skelley. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. Pp. 256. $75.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.)
In 1997, David Collier and Steven Levitsky wrote an important article on conceptual innovation and the proliferation of adjectives in front of the word ‘democracy’, second-guessing the utility and motivation for the hyphenated terms that were being conceived at breakneck speed (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). Nearly a decade later, research continues to modify the word democracy or redefine it altogether. The books included in this review make an argument that this trend is likely to continue so long as the gap between Latin American reality and democratic modeling continues. After reviewing eight different books focusing on diverse subjects, it is evident that the field of democratization must reconsider how it defines democracy, when such a democracy is consolidated, and how to identify regimes that are not quite democratic. In the end, the issue may best be resolved by identifying a small number of basic types of electoral government, for the sake of quantitative and large n-comparative studies, and then modifying these particular types with whatever adjectives are appropriate in more qualitative and case study approaches.

In Dilemmas of Democracy in Latin America: Crisis and Opportunity, Howard J. Wiarda (with Esther Skelley) presents a collection of updated and new articles containing a resounding criticism of democratization literature and foreign policy from one of the earliest critics of developmentalism and the ideas of democracy that it included (Wiarda, 1981, 1985). Unlike so many scholars in recent generations, Wiarda’s book deals with theory and grand theory and he remains convinced after four decades of globe-trotting that the U.S. government, Latin Americanists, and even Latin Americans do not really ‘get’ Latin America. The tendency has been, and remains, for Latin America to be seen either as more ‘undeveloped’ or ‘developed’ than it is. The reality, as Wiarda sees it, is that Latin America is far more democratic than critics think, but Latin Americanists must be willing to understand non-democratic adventures in a non-Manichean way. The metaphor that Wiarda resorts to throughout the essays in the book is that Latin American socio-political reality is like a ‘crazy-quilt’ with multiple levels and influences. There is a presence of what he considers the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, Liberal, Jeffersonian, Madisonian democracy, which is the fundamental model that scholars use to understand Latin America. But there is also a Bolivarian, Rousseauian, Roman Catholic, Organicist tradition that is more important historically and is still very influential. Latin American democracy, Wiarda asserts provocatively, is a synthesis of these influences and though there does seem to be a genuine preference for democracy, the desire for a democracy with a strong president is equally genuine, whether one looks at nineteenth century constitutions or figures like Fujimori, Menem, and Chávez.

This leads Wiarda to several controversial, but not unfounded, claims. The first is that former Dominican Republic perennial president ‘Joaquín Balaguer’s long political career . . . is at some level a metaphor for
of Latin America’s ambivalence toward, conflict over, and (even now) limited and partial commitment to political democracy” (95). This is followed by an equally provocative position on Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez: “He may not be our kind of democrat, but he is very much a Venezuelan and Latin American one” (109). Not only that, but given the low-growth associated with liberal economics, the petroleum bonanza that has given President Chávez more influence, indigenous and public protests—especially in the Andes, and a rise of Leftist and/or anti-political candidates and parties in Latin America, Wiarda sees Chávez as the first of several ”Bolivarian democrats” with which U.S. foreign policy may have to contend. The message of the book is that scholars and foreign policy-makers are going to have to recognize this reality and deal with it by reassessing their concept of democracy and how the U.S. tries to promote democracy.

While Wiarda roots his multi-adjectival democracy in historical (Iberian tradition, corporatism, Hispanismo), cultural (Roman Catholicism, hierarchy, feudalism), and theoretical (Sarmiento, positivism) influences, David Close and Kalowatie Deonandan’s edited Undoing Democracy: The Politics of Electoral Caudillismo, looks at the centralization, hyperpresidentialism, and corruption from a more empirical direction. They introduce two concepts to democratization literature: ‘electoral caudillismo’ and ‘undoing democracy,’ and the empirical chapters in the book demonstrate how the Arnaldo Alemán presidency in Nicaragua undid democracy and was an electoral caudillist regime. In Close’s first chapter, he contrasts ‘undoing democracy’ with democratic consolidation, writing that the latter “institutionalizes democratic rules and processes . . . [whereas the former] returns them to the status of instruments to be kept or discarded depending on their usefulness to the powerful” (3). The book as a whole argues that undoing democracy is precisely what occurred in Nicaragua under the government of President Arnaldo Alemán (1996–2001). It is hardly novel to argue that democratization is not unidirectional (Huntington 1991 includes ‘reverse’ waves; Linz and Stepan 1978 wrote about democratic ‘breakdown’) and there is a risk of accusing any president or government with whom scholars disagree as ‘undoing’ democracy. Nevertheless, Close is correct to point out—and this is filled out by the more empirical chapters—the need to add a more theoretical element to why and how consolidation gets slowed or reversed, particularly when the reversal comes not as a result of a coup but as the result of gradual decomposition. Statistically, there might be indicators that, when achieved, make democracy ‘impregnable’ (Przeworski et al., 1996), but those same impregnable democracies might bear half a dozen adjectives. The problem is that democratic consolidation scholarship is ambiguous since it aims at both consolidation of a regime—electoral and institutional processes as a means to contest and attain political authority—and a type
of political behavior—relations within society should be ‘democratic’, a president should not behave in an ‘authoritarian’ manner, and so on. The Close and Deonandan book is important because it shows both how undertheorized the former is within democratization studies, while also showing how the former might be achieved while undermining the latter. It does this by examining ‘electoral caudillism.’

Close defines an ‘electoral caudillo’ as someone who enters office through elections but consolidates power in the office of the president, weakens other institutions, and contributes to a system in which he or she can remain in power or choose a successor with less politically competitive conditions than the election which brought him or her to power (4). The empirical chapters provide evidence of how elections can aid non-democratic actors enter into office and how these actors, once in power, can manipulate politics to a disturbing degree. The new term, however, is not contrasted to the extant ‘delegative democracy’ (in O’Donnell, 1999). Certainly the terms are explained in highly different ways, but the fundamentals—disregard for rule of law, hyperpresidentialism, anti-institutionalism—seem to be very similar. Perhaps the difference is that citizens in a delegative democracy willingly cede power to the president, whereas electoral caudillism involves the president seizing the initiative. This may be the case, since the chapters on women’s groups and civil society support the idea that political elites tried to limit discourse and certain groups in society did fight back.

On this, and perhaps only this, Leslie Anderson and Lawrence Dodd’s Learning Democracy: Civic Engagement and Electoral Choice in Nicaragua, 1990–2001 would agree. Although the Alemán regime might have looked like ‘traditional caudillo’ rule, both Undoing Democracy and Learning Democracy argue that the people under his government were far more politically savvy, mobilized, and engaged than ‘delegative democracy’ would lead one to believe. Learning Democracy offers its own descriptive term, ‘democratic conservatism’, for Nicaragua. Unlike the Close and Deonandan volume that focuses on Alemán’s government, it uses its adjectival democracy to address all of Nicaragua’s post-Sandinista governments (1990 to the present). Democratic conservatism involves support of neoliberal economics, minimal state welfare, a commitment to elections, civil liberties and human rights, and friendly relations with other capitalist states, particularly the United States (2, n. 3). As opposed to Close and Deonandan et al.’s ‘electoral caudillism,’ which leads to ‘undoing’ democracy, democratic conservatism is clearly democratic without being especially democratic. This is agnostic as far as further democratization goes and its agnosticism makes it a better tool for understanding Nicaragua. For all of the caudillismo and corruption of the Alemán government, the institutional structure of democracy facilitated the process by which he was stripped
of his rights. If democracy had been so undone, it is hard to see how it could de-compose so quickly. Democratic conservatism explains far better the lethargy with which new claims are advanced and social-economic rights are expanded in the new democratic framework, and how, although flawed, that framework is auto-corrective and not wholly alienated from people, processes, and ideas.

Democratic conservatism is not proposed as a modeling term for other scholars to use, but as a choice that Nicaraguan voters consistently faced and supported in elections. The Anderson and Dodd book attempts to explain why voters who had supported the Sandinista revolution and had so many reasons to vote for a democratic model that was more concerned with economic and social rights chose democratic conservatism. In doing so, they challenge prospective and retrospective voting theories—such as that established democracies have more retrospective voting while new democracies are more prospective. They produce a ‘reflective theory of evolving vote choice’ where voters involve multiple means of coming to decisions, highlighting, among other things, how consciously the Nicaraguan electorate, despite the expected obstacles (low levels of education, wealth, etc.), was able to come to a reasoned choice for democratic conservative government in three separate elections under quite different conditions.

The two volumes on Nicaragua are positive about the country’s civil society and its contribution to democracy, an assumption shared by much of the democratization literature. Ariel Armony’s The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization takes this issue head-on by offering a serious critique of civil society research. Following Caldeira and Holston (1999) and other maximalist/substantivist versions of democracy (Yashar, 1999), he argues that “democratization of state institutions is reciprocal to the democratization of social relations” (13; see Caldeira and Holston 1999, 719). The idea that relations between people in a country be democratic may be at once both too demanding and vague, but it is appealing especially in a region of the world where so much attention has been paid to clientelism, patronage, political culture and civil society. This recalls early political cultural studies like Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture, which looked at deferential attitudes towards authority as making democracy less tenable (1963), and Putnam’s writings on social capital (1993, 2000). But this is very much not what Armony aims to do; indeed, his book presents considerable evidence against Putnam and other civil society/public space advocates. His examination of civil society toward the end of the Weimar Republic, segregation-era United States, and right-wing groups in post-transition Argentina—a careful selection of cases, no doubt—highlights that civil society can be very dangerous and anti-democratic. As such, concepts of democracy cannot include terms like ‘vibrant civil society’ without specifying that the
groups within civil society advocate and practice democratizing values, which suggests giving even civil society its own set of adjectives.

Civil society and values are always contested and contestable, but they should be more thoroughly evaluated given Carlos Forment’s *Democracy in Latin America 1760–1900: Volume I, Civic Selfhood and Public Life in Mexico and Peru*. Forment begins from the very controversial perspective that unlike previous democratic moments in Latin America, the current one “has not been accompanied by a renascence in democratic practice or thought” (3–4). *Democracy in Latin America* does not offer evidence comparing the nineteenth with the twentieth century, but it is full of data about democratic practice in Mexico and Peru from 1760–1900. During this period, Latin Americans did participate in many spheres of society, but, and this is crucial for the development of democracy, they “were more inclined to practice democracy more readily and intensely . . . [in some ]” (20). Indeed, participation was far more significant in economic and civil than political society, and Mexicans were more ‘active’ than Peruvians (99).

Forment introduces the concept of ‘Civic Catholicism,’ which is so different from Protestant, Tocquevillian concepts of civil society that it might explain why so many scholars have written off democratic practice in the nineteenth century in Latin America. His concern is formation of the subject—reflecting the influence of and his desire to contribute to post-colonial literature—of the citizen and the nation in Mexico and Peru, and the Roman Catholic Church was fundamental in this area (F64–65). Much of his attention is given to the idea of colonial subjects as ‘minors’ who are by nature ‘irrational’, linking various discriminatory and hierarchical discourses commonly used by colonial authorities and subjects alike. Independence efforts and participation in the various spheres of public life (economic, political, civil society, and public space) required the self-assertion of maturity/adulthood and the recognition of this on the part of the colonial elite. While Fanon’s self-assertion and recognition is linked to violence and race (1991), Forment finds that the discursive development of the nation took place within the confines of Civic Catholicism, which encouraged participation and corporate membership but also supported hierarchy, inequality, and racial-ethnic castes.

Forment’s book is a first volume only and it promises nothing beyond the nineteenth century, but it would be fascinating to see a comparison between nineteenth and twenty-first century democratic practices in Latin America. Clearly relationships between Latin America and the United States and/or international financial institutions share colonial discursive issues of self-assertion, recognition of the empowered, and needing to fit into the latter’s taxonomies (the example of ‘emerging’ versus ‘mature’ markets most emblematic of this), but Forment, a careful historian, would
probably need to adjust his ‘Civic Catholicism’ given post-Vatican II, the rise of Protestantism in Latin America, and the socio-economic developments that Latin America has witnessed in the past century. With or without updating, ‘Civic Catholicism’ remains a useful meta-theoretical framework with which to understand the ideas of Arielism, Hispanismo, positivism, liberalism, civilization versus barbarism, how these differed so significantly from ostensibly similar ideas in North America, and how they might be similar to ideas in Roman Catholic Europe. In either case, by clarifying the Protestant and Anglo-American bias of readings of political subjectivity and civil society, it can also be useful to scholars who study other regions of the world, even those areas where neither Protestantism nor Roman Catholicism has had much influence. The most obvious consequence of emphasizing a bias, which echoes Wiarda’s critique of ‘ethnocentrism’ in foreign policy and democratization literature, is that either ‘democracy’ is subject to local interpretation or it is a highly imprecise term.

Guillermo O’Donnell, known for giving comparativists ‘bureaucratic-authoritarianism’ and ‘delegative democracy,’ is no stranger to naming regimes and their derivatives (in O’Donnell, 1999) but his lengthy essay in Guillermo O’Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullell and Osvaldo M. Iazzetta’s The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications avoids any adjective. Instead, he fundamentally re-visions the term ‘democracy’, no longer the once ubiquitous—now automatically assumed—polyarchy, but something that draws on literature on democracy, human development, and human rights to produce a radically new definition. Each of these areas, O’Donnell argues, bases its claims on the idea of human agency. Before Marshall’s classic taxonomy of political, civil and social/economic rights may exist (Marshall, 1963), there must be agents to claim and dispute rights, to participate in markets, governments and military adventures, to compel, obey and protest, and so on. Following Amartya Sen, O’Donnell sees democracy as the form of government that improves human development better than any other. It is impossible to put together a list of requirements for human or political rights, he argues, but ‘basic rights and capabilities’ are universal and the claims on such rights and capabilities must be legally enshrined in a democracy. As in other writings, he emphasizes the importance of rule of law (O’Donnell, 2004) in establishing a universal and egalitarian concept of citizenship and protecting altern or not-yet full citizens as they use their agency to expand the concept of democracy and broaden the value of democracy. O’Donnell favors a civic and participatory democracy but one that is also liberal to protect minority groups. Of course, this is not unproblematic: 1) not all groups expanding their rights/capability base are liberal; 2) not all governments can accommodate a multiplicity of competing and contradictory claims; and 3) it is possible the rights/capabilities of ‘out’ groups will threaten the citizenship of the ‘in’ group. Armony’s
work on civil society (2004), O’Donnell’s analysis of the experiences that led to the bureaucratic-authoritarian governments of the 1970s (1999), and that of Rwanda’s Hutus asserting their rights/capabilities relative to Tutsis (see Gourevitch, 1994) caution against the first, second and last of these, respectively. Of course, in each case, one can say that rule of law was non-existent and that minority rights were not protected. But, for elites and masses in countries in the process of democratization (or not), it is easy to see how the causal arrow could be inverted and the argument could be that agency can be perceived as risky, if not revolutionary, in the absence of rule of law and minority rights.

In one of the more brilliant critiques of O’Donnell’s paper contained in the volume, Norbert Lechner suggests that a ‘community of meaning’ precedes the application of the ‘rule of law’ (206). Rule of law is most effective within socio-cultural contexts where there exist consensual norms, beliefs, and behavior that support the idea of universal applicability and accountability for individual or collective action. This retrieves the ideas behind Forment’s analysis of Civic Catholicism and Wiarda’s Bolivarian, Rousseauean, et al., model. Clearly, culture is neither unchanging nor is it the only factor determining behavior, but rules-based systems seem to fit better with certain cultural conditions. At the same time, rule of law is also most commonly found in economically developed countries, which are also countries with lower levels of economic inequality. Perhaps the most striking finding of the Armony book is that although social capital is a good predictor of quality of democracy, civil society neither determines social capital nor does it predict institutional performance. Through quantitative analysis, Armony shows that economic inequality was robust in these areas (178–179). In other words, rule of law and the performance of democratic institutions may very well presume certain distributions of wealth and cultural norms. Another problem with rule of law, as Terry Lynn Karl argues in her contribution, is that it can produce a vicious rather than virtuous cycle, particularly when the law is unjust or if there is “‘too much’ rule of law” (188–189). Nevertheless, O’Donnell’s conceptualization of ‘democracy’ is perhaps the best and most theoretically interesting since polyarchy’s adoption. Moreover, it offers scholars an elegant yet substantivist concept of democracy that centers on the individual citizen while still emphasizing collective struggles and rights. Furthermore, it links democratization literature more clearly to development literature and professionals and policy-makers in that area.

The other major essay in The Quality of Democracy is Jorge Vargas Cullell’s “Democracy in the Quality of Democracy: Empirical Findings and Methodological and Theoretical Issues Drawn from the Citizen Audit of the Quality of Democracy in Costa Rica.” This work addresses a major gap within democratization literature. While theoretical literature
debates how deep democracy need be and what adjectives to use until that depth is reached, there has been little in the way of comprehensive empirical quantitative work on the subject. Cullell’s essay on the Citizen Audit addresses this question by trying to provide some framework for measuring levels of quality in a democracy, looking at the rule of law, decision-making in public policy, the electoral system, how public institutions treat citizens, ratings of political parties, civil society, how participatory public policy-making is, public opinion, and civic culture (146–149). Evaluations of these broad-ranging issues were done by 35 analysts looking at 4800 responses (0.2 percent of the citizenry of Costa Rica) (100). An important finding is that polyarchy is not enough and that “democratization of political regimes does not necessarily lead to improvement in the quality of democracy” (145), something that confirms what has already been argued by numerous scholars (including many of the ones reviewed here). The contribution is not necessarily in the conclusion but in the method by which that conclusion is made and the possibility of repeating this audit in other countries.

Peter Smith’s *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective* compares the nature of democracy and democratization of third-wave Latin American democracies with earlier waves. He begins by identifying democracy as having participation, competition, and accountability (7) and shortly thereafter speaks of electoral governments that fall short, citing Zakaria’s ‘illiberal democracy’ (1997) and O’Donnell’s delegative democracy. His comparative analysis of the three waves of democratization compares democracies to non-democracies, competitive oligarchies, semi-democracies and liberal democracies. Among the many things he finds is that liberal democracy seems no better or worse than other forms of government in terms of economic growth. It is somewhat better in terms of distribution, but not in terms of unemployment. Through analysis of international influences, media, rule of law, and egalitarian policies in Latin America, he finds that most actual governments in Latin America are not liberal but illiberal democracies (263).

In the end, he produces a powerful analysis of the concept of democracy within democratization and, although he does not propose a new ‘adjective’, his work demands one. Smith wonders why the current wave of democratization has lasted longer than previous waves. Although he cites many factors, international and domestic, he concludes that it is because democracy has been thoroughly ‘domesticated.’ The fear or the promise that it offered in previous waves has been tempered. The Left accepts capitalism and electoral processes while the Right is willing to countenance political activism provided there is no extremism. Labor unions and collective actions are far less threatening than they once were. The recent experience of the Andean countries, where
collective action has been most ‘threatening,’ is instructive. For all the pressure placed upon civilian democratic regimes, not one has been replaced. That is, presidents have been removed from office, but there has been no attempt to replace the regime itself. The United States, the formerly and still Communist world, the UN, IMF, World Bank, and most transnational NGOs all agree that democracy is the best form of government. There is, as the previous several pages suggest, debate over how to characterize that democracy and how much democracy each group favors and under what conditions it is willing to sacrifice a little (or a lot) of democracy, but there is consensus that democracy is good. Economic liberalism and fewer efforts at redistribution of wealth and expropriation of land and capital assets helped firm up business support, but it also places a limit on demands placed on the government by ‘outside’ groups.

Smith’s domesticated democracy and O’Donnell’s Superman-like invigorated, progressive democracy are hard to reconcile. Smith’s democracy is the result of mutual disappointment in which all parties lost a war of attrition, while O’Donnell’s is a concept of democracy with permanently expanding rights and capabilities as the results of the dynamic demands and activities of citizens and their networks and advocates. Nicholas Guilhot’s The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order does not simply reconcile these two ideas, but also explains how radical Left-leaning socialists became neo-conservatives or, at least, part of an hegemonic project that, since at least September 11, 2001, is considered to be neo-conservative: democracy promotion. Equally compelling is how democracy and human rights go from being part of counter-hegemonic, anti-dictatorial strategies to “part of the arsenal of power itself . . . Democracy and human rights have come to represent . . . an instrumental rationality geared toward the consolidation of power” (8). The book itself contains several mini-genealogies that examine how public intellectuals (like Seymour Martin Lipsett, Jean Kirkpatrick, and Guillermo O’Donnell) and institutions (like the World Bank) moved towards adopting democracy. In the case of intellectuals, the anti-communist Left, through its critical position on the Soviet Union, became increasingly part of a global critical position against authoritarianism, a position that eventually supported the foreign policy efforts of the Reagan administration and his National Endowment of Democracy. Though earlier presidents had used ‘democracy’ as the Other of Soviet totalitarian-communism—hence the emphasis on the liberal and free-market aspects of democracy—it was under Reagan’s administration that the promotion of democracy entered much more powerfully into the mainstream of American policy, particularly as the academic Left and policy-making Right were brought closer together.

Guilhot also provides genealogies for the shift in the World Bank: from a small-scale institution whose lending decisions were based on
economic criteria to a major factor in international relations, making lending conditional upon increasingly political decisions; from an institution staffed with a mixture of professionals to a thoroughly monetarist group of mathematically oriented economists; and from an institution favoring authoritarian developmentalist governments to a government that lends widely to non-governmental organizations and promotes democracy and decentralization. Guilhot’s writing on democratization shows how the failure of modernization theory’s efforts to produce an enduring scientific explanation inadvertently created an elite, academic community that became increasingly less threatening to capitalism and economic elites, particularly once democratization began. As in other areas of democracy promotion presented in his book, democratization studies follow a similar pattern whereby Left-leaning academics eventually find themselves not only within the status quo, but as defenders of such.

Democratization, then, has a contestatory element even as it has become conservative and non-threatening. It can be said to be consolidated when the removal and replacement of democratically elected governments by non-democratic ones is no longer a viable and desirable option for political elites. But this hardly means that either government or society is democratic, or even that most relationships in those areas are democratic in nature. Moreover, while presidentialism is quite powerful in Latin America, it takes different forms and it is not always and necessarily inimical to elected government. At the same time, while civil society and the public sphere is a rather crucial area for the expression, definition and contestation of recognition, rights and membership, it can undermine as well as strengthen democratic government. Scholars need to consider how to differentiate between democracy-enhancing and democracy-threatening civil society, presidentialism, economic programs, and so on. Adjectival democracy (and civil society, presidentialism, etc.) seems to be the most obvious choice.

Adjectives should be most welcome in single country case studies, small n-comparative and interpretive social science that can incorporate highly descriptive accounts of the various salient aspects of politics, broadly defined, that contribute to the type and quality of democracy within a given territory. Larger n- and quantitative studies, however, require more parsimony. If two books on Nicaragua looking at the same time period produce different conceptual models, it is quite possible to imagine a study of twenty Latin American countries having fifty case-specific codings as well as fifteen that are applied to the region more generally, and another five or six that have been used for the developing world. A better way to go, following Smith, might be to identify three to four types. The problem is identifying which types, and that may be quite difficult to systematize because the degree to which civil rights are protected may be telling to determine quality of democracy in certain
areas, but it may not be a useful indicator when comparing economic policies. Degree of state autonomy might work in that regard, though it may say little to nothing about civil rights. Parsimony is certainly desirable but it would seem that the three or four subtypes will have to be tailored to the particular area of inquiry. This may make it more difficult to produce large n-studies and the proliferation of adjectives in case-study approaches may seem to produce ‘academic noise’, but there may not be much of an alternative. O’Donnell’s revision of ‘democracy’ is an excellent step towards making a clearer concept of democracy, but no country would qualify as democratic and scholars would have to explain how countries and regions fall short, which would require descriptive terms to explain when rule of law was present but citizens did not engage in collective action, and so on.

The inevitability of adjectival democracy and qualifications on democratization is not only linked to Latin America’s development of ‘subtypes’ but the fact that these terms are imprecise, bound to be interpreted through local politico-cultural lenses, and that they do not mean nearly as much as people assume. The fact is that even the U.S. government is not a ‘democracy’ but a liberal, capitalist, republic, with a tradition of civil society and a profound individualism, where Protestantism has had tremendous influence on political culture and where the Constitution was deliberately designed to prevent giving too much agency to ‘the people.’

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