THE UNEVENNESS OF DEMOCRACY
AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
Provincial Closed Games in Argentina

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Abstract: Democratization studies initially focused on processes at the national level, but in recent years, there has been a growing interest in the spatially uneven nature of democracy at the subnational level. This article draws on examples from Argentina and develops an analytical framework of closed games to analyze the functioning of subnational democracy. It argues that the less democratic provinces or states of nationally democratic countries are not necessarily authoritarian and that the concept of subnational authoritarianism prevents us from seeing political dynamics that may arise in the context of a reasonably well-functioning electoral democracy and may result in subnational closed games. The article takes into account the role of political families, media ownership, control of access to business opportunities, and control of the provincial state.

INTRODUCTION

In 1983, Argentina held elections that heralded the end of seven years of military dictatorship. Democracy was reestablished, and a president, governors, legislators, mayors, and councilors were elected across all provinces. Yet the way politics was organized and practiced across the country varied greatly, and in many provinces, continuity was more frequent than change. Members of the families that had controlled provincial politics for much of the twentieth century returned to the governorship in several provinces.

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Democratization studies initially focused on processes at the national level, but in recent years, there has been a growing interest in the remarkable variation and the spatially uneven nature of democracy at the subnational level (one of the first to point to the regional variation of democratization was O’Donnell 1993). The importance of scaling down (Snyder 2001) has become more evident in the democratization literature, and a growing number of scholars have turned their attention to the persistence of less democratic, authoritarian, or semiauthoritarian subnational units in nationally democratic countries (Behrend 2008; Benton, forthcoming; Cornelius 1999; Durazo Herrmann 2009; Gervasoni 2010; Gibson 2005, 2009; Giraudy 2009; Hagopian 1996; Montero 2007). Yet, with few exceptions, most scholars have analyzed problems of subnational democratization through the lens of subnational authoritarianism (Cornelius et al. 1999; Gibson 2005, 2009). This article argues that the less democratic provinces or states of a nationally democratic country are not necessarily authoritarian and that the concept of subnational authoritarianism prevents us from seeing political dynamics that may arise in the context of a reasonably well-functioning electoral democracy. The article builds on a growing literature on subnational politics by developing the concept of closed game (game is used here as a metaphor and does not refer to game theory) and building an analytical framework that explains the persistence of relatively closed and less democratic subnational regimes in nationally democratic countries (Behrend 2008). The framework takes into account the role of political families, media ownership, control of access to business opportunities and control of the provincial state. In closed games, the elite has subtler forms of control grounded in socioeconomic practices that enable it to reproduce itself over time.

Studies of subnational politics have explained the persistence of less democratic or hybrid subnational regimes as a result of federal dynamics (Gibson 2005; Giraudy 2009), electoral rules (Calvo and Escolar 2005; Calvo and Micozzi 2005), and rentierism (Gervasoni 2010) but have largely ignored the endogenous dynamics that give rise to closed games and enable their reproduction. The analytical framework of the closed game contributes to the existing literature on subnational democratization by focusing on the logic of continuity of less competitive subnational regimes and explaining how provincial elites are able to remain in power with the consent and support of the population. This does not mean that national-provincial dynamics do not play an important role in sustaining these games. Closed games do not necessarily function in opposition to the national political regime, but they may be functional to it and important in coalition building (Gibson and Calvo 2000).

The article is organized as follows. I first review the literature on hybrid regimes and contextualize closed games as a type of hybrid regime (Behrend 2008). I then present the framework of the closed game in the second
section. In the third section, I use original empirical research to apply the framework to two Argentine provinces: Corrientes and San Luis. Then, I look at national-provincial relations. I conclude by analyzing possible paths for subnational democratization.

HYBRID REGIMES AND THE UNEVENNESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Democratic regimes may develop in different and varied ways, and this is also true at the subnational level. Yet the different ways subnational democracy unfolds do not necessarily mean that the least democratic provinces in a country are authoritarian (Behrend 2008; Gervasoni 2010). In this article, I use O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) definition of political democracy, which encompasses free and fair elections, universal suffrage, and broad protections of political and civil liberties.

The category of “subnational authoritarianism” has been used to describe provinces or states in which governors exert tight control over the state legislature, the law enforcement system, and the media, usually through coercive means (Cornelius 1999; Gibson 2005). This literature stresses the ways subnational democratization or lack thereof may effectively constrain national democratization processes. However, national politics also functions as a constraint on subnational politics. The subnational regimes this article deals with are embedded in nationally democratic regimes, which limits what subnational rulers can and cannot do. It means that local rulers cannot govern in isolation from the national democratic polity and that they cannot sustain conventionally authoritarian regimes.

Even if the press is controlled at the local level, there is national media. Moreover, there are geographical constraints: people can move from one province to another and are in contact with other provincial regimes and with the national political regime, and they are not forced to remain in their provinces. The rules that govern the nation as a whole also constrain subnational politics (Behrend 2008; Gervasoni 2010). All of this puts a limit to local elites’ attempts to maintain politics in their provinces insulated from the national polity. Subnational leaders may not want to keep their regional bastions isolated, because governors often have national political ambitions. In a context of national democracy, it is therefore unlikely that subnational units will be authoritarian in a conventional way. The emergence of hybrid subnational regimes is a more likely possibility (Behrend 2008).

The category of hybrid regimes has been used to describe regimes that are mixed and contain both democratic and authoritarian elements (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Karl 1995; Morlino 2009). The notion of hybridity illustrates the fact that democratization is not “a cut-and-dried one step shift to a new equilibrium” (Whitehead 2002, 246).

Even if there are occasional episodes of repression or outbreaks of violence, it is fair to say that all Argentine provinces have reasonably
democratic regimes according to the definition outlined previously: they hold regular and clean elections; there is universal adult suffrage, freedom of speech, and freedom to organize public protests; there are opposition parties that win legislative seats or municipalities; no political parties are banned; and the media is not subject to censorship or totalitarian control. Winning elections, and winning them fairly, is important in these regimes, and the local elite's legitimacy at the provincial level and its leverage at the national level hinges on this (Behrend 2008). Elections are far from being a farce, and these regimes are not examples of electoral or competitive authoritarianism, where electoral results may be manipulated, the opposition harassed, threatened, arrested, and even assaulted (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2006). Aside from exceptional cases, this is not common practice in most Argentine provinces.

THE CLOSED GAME OF PROVINCIAL POLITICS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Closed games are subnational political regimes in which a family, or a reduced group of families, dominates politics in a province, controlling access to top government positions, the provincial state, the media, and business opportunities. The framework of the closed game includes the following dimensions, which occur in a context of national democracy:

1. Free, fair and regular elections
2. Family politics: control of access to top government positions
3. Control of the media
4. Control of the provincial state, distribution of public resources, and clientelism
5. Control of business opportunities
6. Control of the judiciary

In closed games, institutional rules are obeyed. Family politics takes place in an institutional setting and in established political parties. Closed games are strongly based on popular electoral preferences: elections are not subject to manipulation nor a farce but reflect the support the elite elicits through other forms of control grounded in cultural practices and economic processes. Voters vote for the families because it makes sense to do so: provinces with closed games tend not to have a strong economic structure, and voters know through experience that the ruling elite delivers—even if what it delivers is not all that much—and they cannot be certain that the opposition will do the same. The elite has often reformed electoral legislation or provincial constitutions to make it easier to remain in power (Calvo and Escolar 2005) but generally has done so through legal means. Fundamentally, it has remained in power with the consent of the population.
I use the concept of closed games and not neopatrimonialism because the latter involves the coexistence of two distinct legitimacy logics: traditional and legal rational (Eisenstadt 1973; Hartyln 1994). In closed games, families do not persist in power for “traditional” reasons, but because well-organized political systems with stable institutions, highly structured political practices, newspapers, voters, and a judicial system sustain them (for a classification of Argentine provinces as neopatrimonial or bureaucratic, see Giraudy 2009).

Political families are important because of the structure of control they develop. *Family* is understood here in broad terms, as a political and not a legal construct. These are families with social prestige, political authority, and economic power, although their economic resources may be quite heterogeneous (Balmori, Voss, and Wortman 1984; Vilas 1992). Although kinship relations tend to predominate, the family network may include friends and business associates with business or media interests in the province. These members enjoy the full trust of the predominant family and function as extended family; the condition of their permanence in the game is loyalty to the governor. Members of the family network may belong to different political parties and may be in the ruling group, the opposition, or different factions. Family structures vary across different closed games. In some provinces, there are families that have exercised political and economic control over several decades (Corrientes until 1999, San Luis and Neuquén until the present, Catamarca until 1991 and to a lesser extent thereafter, and Santiago del Estero until 2004); in some cases, new family networks developed in party structures after the transition to democracy (the Kirchners in Santa Cruz); in other cases, a family replaced the predominant family following a federal intervention (Corrientes after 2001; Catamarca after 1991). Being governor of a province may enable a member of these families to aspire to the largest prize of all: running for president.

Closed games usually arise in provinces with a limited economic structure, a small population, and limited business opportunities. The political elite’s families use the state to promote their economic interests and control access to business opportunities (companies owned by the political elite benefit from state contracts, its newspapers receive state advertisement, members of the economic elite hold government positions and control which industries receive tax benefits, subsidies, industrial promotion schemes or favorable loans from the provincial bank).

Control of the media tends not to be coercive. The political families own the most important provincial media and control the public television channel. But state advertising is usually discretionary. Control of the judiciary is related to the fact that provincial judges are family members or belong to the elite, although in extreme cases, the governor may harass judges until they resign and fill the vacancies with family or friends.
Although participation outside elections is low, there are occasional outbursts of social protest. The protests at times become relevant, as the case studies here show. Political crises may ensue, and even if in the end the elite succeeds in recomposing the game, the protests show that control of the closed game is never absolute.

Yet not all closed games are the same; the differences lie in how the elite controls each dimension. Structural conditions, solvency of the provincial state, dependence on federal funding, the strength of political parties and factionalism, and political history also explain variation. Table 1 illustrates the different mechanisms provincial elites use to control each dimension of the closed game and the different possible outcomes.

The closure of the game operates on two levels. The first and most important is that the game is closed with regard to who can realistically aspire to holding political office in a province. It refers to the concentration of political, economic, media, and symbolic power in the hands of a few families. The second type of closure, which also constitutes a limit to the closed game, lies in national politics. Governors engage in “boundary control” (Gibson 2005, 108) to maintain the political game in their provinces closed and insulated from national politics, and to strengthen control of their geographical domain. This is possible because governors have a great deal of political and, to a lesser extent, financial autonomy. Governors are usually the head of their party at the provincial level and control the design of electoral lists; if their party is a national party, they have influence in national parties. They also have loyal voters. However, national and provincial politics interact continuously. As Gibson and Suárez Cao (forthcoming) argue, Argentina has a federalized party system, in which subnational party systems shape power in local politics and affect outcomes in national party politics. Governors’ support is needed to approve legislation in Congress, implement federal policies, and deliver votes in presidential elections. Smaller provinces, which are overrepresented in Congress, are often part of government coalitions (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Jones and Hwang 2005). The institutional characteristics of Argentine federalism mean that the governor of a province with a small population and scarce participation in national gross domestic product (GDP) can become president. Indeed, most presidents since 1983 have been former provincial governors. Closed games therefore have an impact on national democracy.

The focus on families does not mean that political parties are not important. Closed games may develop in provinces with a predominant party, as the case of San Luis illustrates, or in provinces where, at first glance, there is limited pluralism (Sartori 1976), as the case of Corrientes illustrates. Political parties have weight because they enable provincial elites to have national leverage and resolve factional disputes. Greater factionalism may result in greater competition within the elite, but the particularity of the closed game is not merely the existence of political families but the
Table 1  The Framework of the Closed Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free, fair, and regular elections</td>
<td>No direct interference in the electoral process.</td>
<td>Not contested: opposition sees no point in participating. Low contestation: more than one candidate, but only one has real chance of winning. Highly contested: more than one candidate has chance of winning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family politics: Control of access to top government positions</td>
<td>Only members of families are nominated for top government positions.</td>
<td>Governor always belongs to same family. Governor belongs to a group of notable families. Alternation between parties, dominated by few families. Predominant party with alternation between families belonging to the same party. Non-family members are nominated or designated on condition of loyalty to political families but cannot realistically aspire to be governor. Non-family members become cabinet members, mayors, legislators, but are not allowed to escalate. Non-family members develop political ambitions and a political crisis ensues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of the media</td>
<td>Newspaper ownership.</td>
<td>There is only one newspaper and the elite owns it. There is more than one newspaper, but political families own them all. Ownership/control of television channels. Elite controls the public television channel. Elite owns cable television channel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Closed Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control of the media</strong></td>
<td>Withholding state advertisement.</td>
<td>Small independent newspapers exist but receive no state advertising. There is at least one independent cable television channel, but it receives no state advertising. Small independent radio stations exist, but receive no state advertising. Journalists are harassed. Independent journalists are afraid to publish/air critical news items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control of business opportunities</strong></td>
<td>Allocation of state contracts.</td>
<td>Elite’s companies benefit from state contracts (e.g., construction, printing, services). Subsidies awarded to industries linked to the elite. Corruption, bribes, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control of the judiciary</strong></td>
<td>Judges are members of the family network. Designation of judges. Judges/prosecutors are harassed.</td>
<td>Friendly courts. Resignation of independent judges, leaving vacancies for new designations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
structure of control that these families develop. Even if there is alternation between parties, the main political parties in the province reproduce the dynamics of the closed game when they reach power.

TWO PROVINCIAL CLOSED GAMES: CORRIENTES AND SAN LUIS

In 1983, José Antonio “Pocho” Romero Feris was elected governor of the northeastern province of Corrientes. Ten years later, his younger brother Raúl (known as “Tato”) was elected. Tato had been mayor of the provincial capital from 1987 to 1991 and was elected mayor again after his term as governor ended. The Romero Feris brothers, who belonged to the provincial Partido Autonomista, came from a family that had been active in politics in Corrientes since the mid-twentieth century.

In San Luis, the Peronist Adolfo Rodríguez Saá was elected governor in 1983. His family had been involved in provincial politics since the nineteenth century. Rodríguez Saá was uninterruptedly governor of San Luis for a record nineteen years until he resigned in 2001 to become president of Argentina for seven days (after President Fernando de la Rúa resigned amid protests and a political crisis). His brother Alberto was elected governor in 2003 and reelected in 2007 while Adolfo was elected to the Lower House.

The Romero Ferises and the Rodríguez Saás are examples of provincial political families that developed closed games. They are exemplary but not unique in Argentine politics. The selection of these two cases is based on criteria of similarities and differences. Families that achieved political, media, and economic control, albeit varying, governed both provinces. The main differences lie in the provincial party system, socioeconomic characteristics, and fiscal solvency of the provincial state. Corrientes was traditionally governed by provincial parties (but since 2001 has been governed by a coalition of parties headed by the Unión Cívica Radical [UCR]), is heavily dependent on federal transfers, and has a limited economic structure. San Luis is governed by a national party, the Partido Justicialista (PJ, also known as the Peronist Party), has fiscal autonomy, and underwent an important process of state-led industrialization.

CONTROLLED ALTERNATION: THE CLOSED GAME IN CORRIENTES

Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Autonomista and the Liberal Parties, which alternated in power, ruled Corrientes, and after 1961, the Autonomista-Liberal Pact (the Pact), an alliance whereby the two

1. This section is based on extensive fieldwork in the province of Corrientes carried out in 2003 and on more than thirty personal interviews with provincial politicians from all major parties, union leaders, civil society organizations, protesters, and supporters of the regime.
parties shared power. The parties, which are heirs to the two national conservative parties created in the nineteenth century (Partido Autonomista Nacional and Partido Liberal), subsisted as provincial parties in Corrientes despite their disappearance in the rest of the country. Until 2001, Corrientes was one of the few Argentine provinces where, after 1983, the provincial instead of the national parties continued to dominate the provincial political system.

From the outside, Corrientes appeared to have a party system of alternation. Yet power alternated between two parties that were part of an alliance and dominated by a reduced group of political families, with the predominance of the Romero Feris family. In 1992, after a stalemate in the electoral college over the election of governor and an ensuing political crisis, the federal government intervened in the province. However, the closed game proved resilient.

**Free, Fair, and Regular Elections**

Politics in Corrientes functioned smoothly during the first decade after national democratization. The elite created a stable political regime in which members of certain families and the two parties in the Pact peacefully alternated in power until the mid-1990s. The Pact won every election without major challenges. In 1995, Governor Raúl Romero Feris created a new political party, the Partido Nuevo (PaNu), an offspring of the Pact and the result of a factional dispute with his brother and an alliance with President Carlos Menem. Hereafter, the PaNu began to win elections in the province. As table 3 shows, after 1983, the Pact was the strongest electoral force until the appearance of the PaNu.

**Family Politics: Control of Access to Top Government Positions**

The Romero Feris family was the dominant political family within the provincial family network from the early 1970s until the turn of the twenty-first century; three governors and one deputy governor elected after 1973 (there was no reelection in Corrientes until 2007) belonged to

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**Table 2. Corrientes: Socioeconomic Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (2001)</td>
<td>930,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population below the poverty line (2001)</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (2001)</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed population in the public sector (2001)</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in national GDP (1998)</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAL</td>
<td>46.61</td>
<td>45.56</td>
<td>49.81</td>
<td>44.35</td>
<td>44.21</td>
<td>40.49</td>
<td>43.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>22.94</td>
<td>23.10</td>
<td>18.87</td>
<td>18.44</td>
<td>18.60</td>
<td>32.75</td>
<td>33.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>20.70</td>
<td>21.01</td>
<td>24.04</td>
<td>24.85</td>
<td>24.83</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>17.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>10.33</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>12.36</td>
<td>10.85</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANU</td>
<td>48.49</td>
<td>70.34</td>
<td>47.44</td>
<td>28.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PAL</td>
<td>19.67</td>
<td>29.66</td>
<td>19.91</td>
<td>20.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>18.23</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18.11</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>13.27</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>14.18</td>
<td>23.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>8.30</td>
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<td></td>
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1997

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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gov.</th>
<th>Leg.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st round</td>
<td>2nd round</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANU</td>
<td>48.49</td>
<td>70.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAL</td>
<td>19.67</td>
<td>29.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>18.23</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>13.27</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>—</td>
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</table>

2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gov.</th>
<th>Leg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st round</td>
<td>2nd round</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR/Lib.</td>
<td>40.94</td>
<td>51.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANU/PJ</td>
<td>43.04</td>
<td>48.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auton./allies</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Leg.</td>
<td>Gov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>52.03</td>
<td>23.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>60.56</td>
<td>63.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>37.88</td>
<td>27.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interior Ministry.

*UCR/Frepaso alliance.
**The UCR faction that supported Governor Arturo Colombi.
***The UCR faction that supported former governor Ricardo Colombi.
the family (the other governors elected after 1983, Ricardo Leconte and Pedro Braillard Poccard, also belonged to the provincial family network; Jaime 2002). Even when it was not at the helm of the province, the family continued to hold political office.

Not all members of the Romero Feris family were in the same political party. The Romero side is Peronist. The Ferises and the Romero Ferises are Autonomistas. And Raúl Romero Feris created and dominated the PaNu. The family was also related by marriage to members of the Liberal Party, and its kinship relations spanned most of the provincial political spectrum.

**Control of the Media**

Corrientes has three provincial newspapers: *El Litoral*, with the largest circulation; *Época*; and *El Libertador*. Political families own all three. *El Litoral* belongs to the Romero Feris family. *Época* belongs to their Peronist cousins, the Romeros. The Peronist strongman Rodolfo Martínez Llano owns *El Libertador*. Although all three newspapers belong to political families, they are aligned to two different parties. The structure of print media ownership is part of the closed game, but it also reflects the factionalism in the elite and of provincial politics. This means that, to a certain extent, competing views of events are reported, even if they only reflect the political elite’s factionalism. These families own local radio stations, and the provincial government controls the local public television channel.

**Control of the Provincial State, Distribution of Public Resources, and Clientelism**

In Corrientes, 26.8 percent of the economically active population was employed in the public sector in 2001 (UN Development Programme [UNDP] 2005). The political elite derived its legitimacy from delivering public works, jobs, and goods to voters. Public works were the sign of a good government, and in a province with few industries and job opportunities, the state was an important source of employment. Between 1987 and 1999, the number of state employees increased from 35,843 to 41,401 (not including public-sector employees like teachers and doctors; Economy Ministry n.d.).

Although clientelism is difficult to quantify, public-sector jobs and the distribution of food or housing material before elections was common practice in Corrientes, according to politicians from the Pact. Unemployment plans became an important source of income for many households in the 1990s. Most of these plans were federally funded but administrated

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The number of beneficiaries of federally funded unemployment plans increased from 2,750 in 1994 to 58,731 in 1998 in a province with a population of 930,991 (Universidad Nacional del Nordeste 2000).

Provincial governments built cheap subsidized homes with federal funding from the Fondo Nacional para la Vivienda (FONAVI) housing program. The former governor J. A. Romero Feris said his government (1983–1987) built around twenty-four thousand housing units with FONAVI funds. Between 1992 and 1998, 34,889 housing units were built (Ministerio de Economía, Dirección de Gastos Sociales Consolidados 2000).

**Control of Business Opportunities**

Control of access to business opportunities played a central role in Corrientes, which has very little industry. In 2001, there were only four large firms in the province and forty-three small and medium-sized businesses (UNDP 2005). Most of the provincial political families belong to a landed oligarchy and own agribusinesses. But the Romero Feris family set up companies and began to do business with the provincial state.

The Romero Feris family’s construction company, EACSA, undertook state contracts. In 1993, the federal intervention initiated lawsuits against EACSA for fraud against the provincial housing institute in the construction of FONAVI housing and for fraud against the provincial water company for construction work the company undertook. Former directors of the provincial bank were also accused of fraudulent management and of allegedly giving easy loans to companies the political elite owned. Lawsuits were filed against the provincial energy body and the provincial road-building institution, all of which involved members of the Romero Feris family (El Litoral 1992).

In addition, the newspaper owned by the Romero Feris family received state advertising, and most of its large-scale advertising came from the provincial state (based on an analysis of El Litoral in 1992, 1993, and 1999).

**Control of the Judiciary**

The 1992 federal intervention accused the provincial Supreme Court of “responding to the political interests of the ruling ‘families’” (El Litoral 1992, my translation).

There was no evidence of direct attempts by the elite to control the courts or force the resignation of judges through intimidation or other maneuvers in Corrientes. However, this was probably because of the province’s social

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3. Interview with J. A. Romero Feris.
structure: many judges were members of the provincial family network and were inclined to sympathize with their relatives and friends.

Crisis, Protest, Intervention, and a New Family Politics

In 1999, there were mobilizations in the provincial capital. The provincial state was in paralysis and unable to fulfill its basic functions or pay its employees; there was also an intraelite crisis. The protest, which lasted nine months, and the political crisis that ensued had little national media coverage until December 1999, when, less than a week after taking office, President de la Rúa ordered its brutal repression (the *gendarmería* killed two people and injured twenty-five). In the context of the protest, the governor and the mayor of the provincial capital were impeached. The federal intervention lasted two years, and in 2001, a new family, the Colombi family, from another party, the UCR (the president’s party), was elected. The dynamics of family politics, elite agreements, and factionalism, however, continued after the election of Governor Ricardo Colombi. His cousin Arturo Colombi succeeded him as governor in 2005. The Colombi family does not own any print media, but Arturo Colombi’s “extended” family created an Internet news agency that transmitted the governor’s viewpoint and controlled the distribution of state advertising. In 2009, the two cousins competed for the governorship, and Ricardo won the elections. A different Romero Feris brother backed each Colombi, which evidences the family’s continuing political weight (Arturo Colombi allied with Tato Romero Feris and Ricardo Colombi with J. A. Romero Feris; *Perfil* 2009). The party in power had changed, but yet another family had reached power and was renewing the provincial tradition of family politics, elite settlements, and factional disputes.

THE ALL-POWERFUL FAMILY: THE CLOSED GAME IN SAN LUIS

Members of the Rodríguez Saá family enrolled in the Peronist Party have governed the province of San Luis since 1983. The Rodríguez Saá family created one of the most closed provincial political regimes in Argentina, where in a period of twenty-six years, alternation occurred only between two brothers. Their use of a provincial industrial promotion scheme and sound financial management of provincial accounts enabled them to achieve economic independence from the federal government and to have greater scope for political maneuvers.

4. This section is based on extensive fieldwork carried out in San Luis in 2005 and more than thirty personal interviews with local politicians, opposition leaders, university lecturers, union leaders, church hierarchy, civil society organisations, protesters, and provincial residents.
Free, Fair, and Regular Elections

When Adolfo Rodríguez Saá was elected governor in 1983, he won with only a handful more votes (3,873 according to the Interior Ministry) than his main contender from the UCR. But by the early 1990s, he was winning elections with an ever-increasing majority of votes. Adolfo, and after 2003, his brother Alberto Rodríguez Saá, consistently won elections in the province; by 2003, the brothers were winning elections with 90 percent of votes (see table 5). A 1987 constitutional reform enabled the indefinite reelection of governors, allowing Adolfo to run for five consecutive terms.

Family Politics: Control of Access to Top Government Positions

The Rodríguez Saá family was not new to politics in San Luis; its involvement can be traced back to the independence wars of the nineteenth century. Members of the family were among the founders of the local UCR in the late nineteenth century and in the provincial Liberal Party. There were a remarkable number of Rodriguez Saá family members in high positions—including eight governors—after 1860 and until the rise of Peronism in the mid-1940s (I include direct relations who share the surname and relatives on their maternal side; see Núñez 1980). From then on, the family appeared only sporadically in politics and returned with Adolfo and Alberto Rodríguez Saá’s conversion to Peronism in the early 1970s.

In his youth, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá had been a member of the Liberal Party and a virulent anti-Peronist. But when he and his brother returned to San Luis after earning law degrees in Buenos Aires in 1971, they became members of the provincial Peronist Party and quickly escalated in the party ranks. The constitutional reforms of 1987 ensured the family’s continuity in power. Adolfo sought to curb the political ambitions of many of his collaborators and was successful to a great extent, except in the capital city of San Luis, where Peronist mayors increasingly distanced themselves from his control toward the end of the 1990s.
Table 5  San Luis: Electoral Results for Governor and Provincial Deputies, 1983–2007 (% of votes)

<table>
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<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
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<td>37.29</td>
<td>49.08</td>
<td>32.87</td>
<td>33.73</td>
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<td>5.42</td>
<td>15.00</td>
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<td>PJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
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<td>PJ/FV**</td>
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<td>UCR</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24.81</td>
<td>13.74</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Interior Ministry.

Notes: PUL is Alberto Rodríguez Saá’s Partido Unión y Libertad.
*In alliance with Frepaso.
**Dissident Peronists allied with President Kirchner.
Control of the Media

In the beginning of the 1980s, San Luis had two newspapers: El Diario de San Luis, a morning daily with the highest circulation, and La Opinión. In 1984, close collaborators of the governor purchased El Diario de San Luis (many properties that allegedly belong to the Rodríguez Saá family are registered under the names of front men; Wiñazki 2002). A few years later, Rodríguez Saá’s collaborators acquired La Opinión, which was managed by a relative and shut down in 2004. Allegations of fraudulent maneuvers, including withdrawal of state advertisement, surrounded the purchase of the two newspapers (Wiñazki 2002). After 1984, the directors of El Diario de San Luis were people who had occupied or would occupy key government positions; since 1996, the director of the newspaper has been the Rodríguez Saá brothers’ sister, Zulema Rodríguez Saá de Divizia (Arias 1998). Democratization in San Luis, far from meaning pluralism and open debate in the media, involved the creation of a media conglomerate owned by the family that controlled politics.

Apart from the structure of media ownership, what made the boundaries between the state and private business interests unclear was the family’s use of the newspaper. El Diario de la República, as it came to be called, achieved a monopoly of state advertising, a source of income that should not be underestimated for any media, particularly in a province with few large-scale advertisers. Similarly, television ownership also shows a remarkable degree of concentration in the Rodríguez Saá family and extended family. The provincial government runs the provincial open-air channel. The provincial cable television channel was independent until 1991, when the owner decided to sell, allegedly because of government pressure. A close collaborator of Rodríguez Saá bought it. Alberto Rodríguez Saá’s former wife is the director of a radio station.

Control of the Provincial State, Distribution of Public Resources, and Clientelism

As governor, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá developed the image of someone who delivered: a governor who industrialized the province, provided employment opportunities linked to industrialization, undertook public works, and built cheap housing with FONAVI federal funds.

The regime developed a clientele that was further strengthened after 2003 with the creation of the provincial Social Inclusion Plan, which initially benefited around forty-eight thousand unemployed adults over

5. Author’s interview with a San Luis journalist.
age eighteen (roughly 31 percent of the economically active population).\textsuperscript{6} Twenty-five percent of the provincial budget was allocated to this program.\textsuperscript{7}

Control of Business Opportunities

After 1983, San Luis underwent a process of rapid industrialization with the aid of an industrial promotion law, which awarded tax cuts to industries that settled in the province. The exemptions and deferrals were for federal taxes, so the province had everything to gain from the scheme and nothing to lose. Adolfo Rodríguez Saá created a populist, yet modernizing regime (Guiñazú 2003). He used provincial revenue astutely, maintained fiscal discipline, and built infrastructure to promote the settlement of industries in San Luis. At the same time, the brothers began to do business with the provincial state. Companies owned by the family or front men were given construction and printing contracts. Because the application of the industrial promotion scheme was in the hands of provincial and not national authorities, Rodríguez Saá was able to effectively control access to business opportunities in the province by deciding which companies would receive tax benefits (Guiñazú 2003). Many companies denounced having been asked for bribes in exchange for tax benefits.

Industrial promotion dramatically changed the province of San Luis in more than one respect. First, it changed its economic and social structure: in 1980, the industrial sector accounted for 21.8 percent of provincial gross regional product (GRP); by 1997, it accounted for 57.76 percent. Second, industrial promotion gave Adolfo Rodríguez Saá control over material and symbolic resources that enabled him to expand his power base, be reelected for five consecutive terms, project himself at the national level, and become hegemonic in his province. He came to be seen as the man who had industrialized San Luis.

Control of the Judiciary

In San Luis, the Rodríguez Saá family began to exert greater control over the courts and interfere with the judiciary’s independence from 1995 onward, when a series of laws aimed at controlling the judiciary were enacted (Cieza, Menéndez, and Aragón 2005). The laws sought to under-

\textsuperscript{6} Official statistics about the plan’s beneficiaries are not publicly available. Officials gave numbers ranging from forty thousand to forty-eight thousand beneficiaries; however, authorities claimed that between thirty thousand and thirty-five thousand remained in the plan in 2005.

\textsuperscript{7} Author’s interview with Deputy Minister for Work Culture Vilma Carossia, July 14, 2005.
mine judicial independence, limit the judiciary’s control over other state powers, impose obedience to the executive, expel those who were reluctant to comply with the executive, and incorporate docile judges (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales [CELS] 2002; Bill Chávez 2003; Trocello 2008). The approval of this legislation was accompanied by a fierce slander campaign against judges in *El Diario de la República*, which ended with the resignation en masse of all provincial Supreme Court justices except one in December 1996. This enabled the provincial government to designate new judges with close links to the government, many of whom had held key positions in the executive or legislative branch (CELS 2002).

**Crisis, Protest, and Recomposition**

In 2004, a series of protests broke out in the provincial capital after the government intervened in church-run institutes for minors and state schools. Weekly multitudinous marches began to be held. Opposition also arose in the local Peronist Party: the elite was divided and two different persons claimed to be the legitimate mayor of the capital. In addition, two prosecutors and judges from San Luis denounced that they had been forced to sign resignation letters before accepting their positions.

The national government contemplated the possibility of a federal intervention, but President Néstor Kirchner’s recent experience with an intervention in Santiago del Estero had shown him that the electoral outcome might not benefit the national government. Despite opposition in the provincial capital, the Rodríguez Saá brothers had a large constituency; they had been winning elections with an overwhelming majority for years, and it was likely that they would continue winning elections after an intervention. The national government therefore chose an electoral strategy. Kirchner put his weight behind the municipal government and encouraged the mayor to run for the Senate. Peronism was electorally divided in the province and the dissident Peronists won a Senate seat and representation in the Lower House.

The Rodríguez Saá brothers let the conflicts die out and negotiated separately with each sector, thus dividing the movement. After a while, the regime recomposed itself and the brothers continued winning elections: Alberto Rodríguez Saá was reelected in 2007 with more than 80 percent of the vote, and the protest movement became a story of the past.

**NATIONAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF CLOSED GAMES**

This article has focused on the internal dynamics of closed games to explain how the closure of provincial politics is maintained. But, as mentioned earlier, political elites seek to keep the game of politics in their provinces closed in two respects: internally, in terms of who can access
power and how power is exercised; and externally, through boundary control. This is not always possible because national and provincial politics are inextricably linked and mutually influence each other. Moreover, federal governments often contribute to the persistence and reproduction of closed games. At times, nonintervention or active support by the national government enabled the ruling families in Corrientes and San Luis to maintain the closure of the game. At other times, the closed game persisted despite national government involvement. The persistence and reproduction of closed games is not explained by a single variable, but by a combination of internal and external dynamics of both local politics and federal strategies.

In general, if provincial governments are not openly authoritarian or flagrantly violate human rights, the national government is not concerned with the level of democracy in provinces with closed games and does not get involved. It will mostly focus on securing support for elections, policy implementation, and the approval of legislation. Closed games are less democratic than the national political regime, but they play an important part in national representative politics, and presidents need the support of political elites that run provincial closed games because of malapportionment and the overrepresentation of peripheral provinces in Congress (Gibson and Calvo 2000; Jones and Hwang 2005). How much leverage provinces have when negotiating with the national government depends on their economic structure, fiscal situation, and electoral weight. Provinces with debts and a limited economic structure, like Corrientes, rely heavily on discretionary and non-discretionary federal transfers. The result is usually the exchange of congressional support for discretionary transfers, tax cuts for industries, and so on. Provinces with a more solvent state, like San Luis, tend to have greater independence from the national government and are able to keep their closed games more insulated. As long as alliances between national and provincial governments function smoothly, the national government will tend not to get involved in provincial affairs.

But it may get involved if a governor opposes the national government or confronts the president—for example, by seeking to run for president or pursuing national party leadership. In this case, the province will face increasing hostility from the national government. The national government may also get involved in elections in which it stands to lose provincial support or that the rest of the country considers a test. Finally, it may get involved if there is a political crisis that the local elite is incapable of handling smoothly.

Situations of local mobilization and political conflict provide a window into the dynamics of interaction between local and national politics. When confronted with local challenges, the provincial elite will seek to “fence in” (an expression used by Adolfo Rodríguez Saá) and keep the conflict localized. Nationalization of conflict evidences a fissure in the closed game
and is likely to favor the provincial opposition (Gibson 2009). Two factors may interfere with the elite’s boundary control strategy: national media attention and national government involvement. National media attention will bring a local conflict to the national arena and may put pressure on the national government to act at the local level (Behrend 2006, 2008). The national government may get involved through: party politics (e.g., supporting rival factions or opposition parties), fiscal mechanisms, (e.g., withholding or increasing discretionary transfers; Giraudy 2009), and federal intervention.

The most extreme form of national involvement is a federal intervention, when federal authorities replace provincial authorities. Federal interventions are, however, exceptional. In some cases, interventions succeeded in democratizing local politics, but in others, they were unable to put an end to the closed game. The two cases presented here provide insights in this regard. Corrientes suffered two federal interventions during the 1990s. In the first, the national government explicitly sought to put an end to family politics and achieve the election of a candidate from the same political party as the president. Despite the flow of federal funds and reform of electoral rules, a member of the Romero Feris family was again elected following the intervention. In the 1999 intervention, the political elite was divided and in crisis. After a two-year intervention, the national government achieved its implicit objective of overseeing the election of a governor from the same party as the president. Alternation occurred, but the logic of the closed game proved resilient. The experience of other provinces with federal interventions is also ambiguous. In Santiago del Estero, after an intervention in 1991, the same family was voted back to power. But after a second intervention, the game began to open in 2005, when the national government’s strategy to maximize its hegemony failed and the candidate it supported lost the elections (Ortiz de Rozas 2009). In Catamarca, the Saadi family lost elections after the 1991 intervention, but was replaced by the Castillo family, which remained in power for three consecutive terms. It is too early to tell whether the current governor, Eduardo Brizuela del Moral, elected in 2003 and reelected until 2011, will follow a similar pattern of closing the game.

In San Luis, the national government decided against intervening because polls showed that the Rodríguez Saá family would continue winning elections after a federal intervention. Many presidents are former governors who ran provincial bastions of their own, and they are unlikely to feel inclined to dismantle other governors’ closed games. Dismantling a closed game may also prove a challenging task. National governments tend to intervene in provincial affairs only when they are certain that the outcome will benefit them or help an ally reach power. Even then, their motives might not be entirely democratic or result in provincial democratization.
This article has aimed to conceptualize one type of hybrid subnational regime and to take a step in the direction of furthering our understanding of the unevenness of democracy across a national territory through case studies of two Argentine provinces.

The analytical framework of the closed game does not explain politics in all Argentine provinces. Subnational democracy in Argentina is varied, and different provinces have various degrees of closure or openness, family politics, contestation, alternation, checks and balances, press freedom, and economic diversification (Behrend 2008; Gervasoni 2009; Giraudy 2009). About one-third of provinces have different versions of closed games (Corrientes, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, Neuquén, and La Rioja, to name a few). In provinces like Santa Cruz, families have become important in recent years, and closed games appear to be developing. Other provinces show little alternation among parties but do not exhibit closed games (e.g., Río Negro). In contrast, provinces like Buenos Aires, the Federal Capital, Córdoba, Mendoza, and Santa Fe have more open and competitive regimes, alternation, economic diversification, and elite circulation, and families do not play an important role.

Although I do not consider closed games openly undemocratic or authoritarian, if we adopt a broader conception of democracy than the one outlined at the beginning of this article and consider democracy not only a political regime but also “a particular mode of relationship between states and citizens” (O’Donnell 1999, 321), then closed games have serious democratic failings. This raises questions about how further subnational democratization may be achieved, particularly when formal democratic institutions are already in place and elections are reasonably clean and fair. As Gibson (2009) argues, the interaction between different levels of government makes subnational democratization far more complex than national democratization.

The examples of Corrientes and San Luis show that closed games may develop in provinces with hegemonic party rule and in provinces with slightly more competitive party systems, in provinces with a stronger and more solvent provincial state, and in provinces that are fiscally dependent on the national government. The framework of the closed game puts the focus on the various mechanisms provincial families use to effectively close the game of politics and maintain power, but it also emphasizes the relationship of the provincial regimes to national politics and points to the need to look at the interaction between different dynamics—internal and external—in the analysis of subnational democracy.

Interaction with national politics and the support traded between national and provincial governments plays an important role in the preservation of subnational closed games. How can further democratization
therefore occur at the provincial level? Gibson (2009) identifies two likely paths of democratic transition at the subnational level: party-led transitions and center-led transitions. In the former, democratization occurs via party competition in the existing local rules of the game; in the latter, democratization is initiated by intervention from national authorities, which transforms the local rules of the game. Both paths award a significant role to national actors. In the party-led transition, the local opposition is strengthened by its alliance with national party authorities; in the center-led transition, national actors directly intervene in the process.

The evidence from the two case studies presented in this article poses some problems to how far this interpretation may be applied. The first is that the election of an opposition party does not guarantee democratization, as the case of Corrientes shows. The local political opposition is not necessarily more democratic than the incumbents. It may simply want to be where the incumbents are. The logic of the closed game is so strong that it is reproduced in both the ruling party and the opposition. The second point is that national government intervention is not necessarily democratizing. It may simply aim to achieve the election of a political ally. Although change may in some cases occur from above, it is important to bear in mind that, in their intervention in provincial politics, national governments have partisan interests. In Argentina, the incentives are not there for nonpartisan change from above. The incentives and history lead to partisan thinking that maximizes the hegemony of the national ruling party. Moreover, the practice of federal intervention, albeit legal and constitutionally grounded, has been much abused, and there is an argument to be made that the removal of elected provincial authorities by the national government is not altogether democratic. Finally, if the local population overwhelmingly votes for these families, as occurs in San Luis, why would national government intervention be more democratic than the popular vote? For a center-led transition to take place, we would have to imagine a national government with no partisan thinking underlying its involvement or a scenario in which the center’s strategies to maximize hegemony fail. The question is also whether local informal institutions can be dismantled using national leverage.

In a context of national democracy where democratic institutions are in place, the type of national intervention that is most likely to lead to subnational democratization is one that erodes the economic base of the local elite’s power and makes the electorate less dependent on the provincial government for its subsistence. That is, federal policies that create conditions in which a different kind of politics may arise or in which voters are persuaded that a different kind of politics will also benefit them. The Brazilian case shows that one possibility for achieving this is through federal social policies that create vertical competition between national and state-level governments (Borges 2007; Souza 2009) or through economic
transformations that have an impact on a state’s population (Montero 2007, 2009). In closed games, the population votes for the incumbent families because it makes sense for them to do so. For change to occur, there has to be an alternative that is not part of the closed game. Voters need to see that there are reasons not to vote for the incumbent elite and that the political opposition is not simply another family that wishes to install its own version of the closed game.

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