THE EXECUTIVE CONNECTION: EXPLAINING THE PUZZLES OF PARTY COHESION IN BRAZIL

by

Octavio Amorim Neto                  Fabiano G. M. Santos
University of California, San Diego  IUPERJ
Department of Political Science       Rua da Matriz 82
9500 Gilman Drive                    Botafogo
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521               Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22260-100
USA                                  Brazil
FAX: (+619) 534-7130                  FAX: (+5521) 286-7146
E-mail: oamorimn@weber.ucsd.edu       E-mail: iuperj@omega.lncc.br

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Octavio Amorim Neto and Fabiano G. M. Santos

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1. Introduction

Some recent comparative analyses of democratic assemblies posit a two-step relationship between electoral competition and legislative behavior (Ames 1995; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Cox 1987; Lancaster 1986; Mainwaring 1991; Morgenstern 1996; Shugart and Carey 1992). The first step relates electoral institutions to the type of vote cultivated by candidates. Two types of votes are identified: a personal and a partisan vote. Electoral institutions such as nomination rules, seat allocation formulas, and district magnitude are expected to play a key role in determining the prevalent type of vote in a given polity (Carey and Shugart 1995). The second step links type of vote to legislative behavior. Here the key hypothesis is that the more personal the vote, the more individualistic legislators’ behavior. Conversely, the more partisan the vote, the more partisan legislative behavior.

Let us broadly consider two relevant cases. A combination of primaries as the nomination mechanism with a simple plurality single-member system, as in the US, favors a personal vote rather than a partisan one. In such an institutional setting, electoral contests are won by those candidates who have the best personal reputation before voters. Once in the legislative arena, these politicians will likely defect from the party line if it conflicts with the majority preference in their districts. Hence the relatively low rates of party cohesion witnessed in the US Congress. In contrast, a combination of closed party list with proportional representation, as in some European and Latin American countries, generates incentives for a partisan vote. In this case, electoral races are mainly won by party organizations, not candidates. The fate of individual candidates depends on the electoral success of their party label, and on their place on the party list. With regards to the latter, the better the reputation of a candidate vis-à-vis his or her party leadership, the higher his or her position on the list. This dependence on the party leadership will, in turn, foster a thoroughly partisan behavior on the part of individual legislators. Hence the high rates of party cohesion observed in these countries.

Most of these works relating candidates’ strategies to legislative behavior implicitly or explicitly apply Mayhew’s (1974) notion of electoral connection to countries other than the US. This generalized electoral connection model, to borrow an expression coined by Morgenstern (1996), offers us a good tool to hypothesize on the central trend relating to party cohesion of any democratic system. Of course, we should not expect that the generalized model will explain significant across and within party variation that may possibly occur in the cohesion rates within one country. The reason is simply that electoral systems are constant within countries at any given time.

Yet some works have tried to deal with this problem for developed democracies (on Finland, see Pesonen 1972; Sankiaho 1970; on France, see MacRae 1967; Wilson and
Wiste 1976; on Germany, see Saalfeld 1990; on Sweden, see Stjernquist and Bjurulf 1970; on the UK, see Rose 1983; and on the US, see, among many others, Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1987; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Crook and Hibbing 1985; Sinclair 1981). Although there are works that tackle the question of party cohesion in some Latin American countries (on Argentina, see Smith 1974; on Brazil, see Carvalho 1977; Limongi and Figueiredo 1995; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan 1996; Samuels 1996; Santos 1986; on Chile, see Hughes and Mijeski 1973; and on Uruguay, see Morgenstern 1996), they only cover a short period of time. We know of no comprehensive study of party cohesion for any Latin American regime. Our purpose in this paper is to report on a research in progress that strives to fill this gap. We analyze cohesion rates on all the relevant roll calls that took place in Brazil’s lower chamber during its first democratic experience between 1946 and 1964.

The paper will proceed as follows. In section two we present data on party cohesion for the main parties of the period. We will argue that though the central trend as to party cohesion in Brazil is relatively low, as expected by the generalized electoral connection model, variation in cohesion rates within a same country begs an explanation not found in the bulk of comparative theories. In section three we identify three puzzles: (1) impressive variation in cohesion rates over time; (2) the higher cohesion of governing parties, and (3) the relatively high cohesion of the largest party. In section four we propose some hypotheses derived from the notion of executive connection that may help us understand these puzzles. Section five concludes.

2. Party Cohesion in Brazil: 1946-1964

Following Carey and Shugart (1995), three features of Brazil’s electoral system used between 1946 and 1964 are decisive to understand the type of vote cultivated by politicians: (1) open-list formula, (2) open endorsement, and (3) single vote. According to these authors, in Brazil

... once a politician is elected under a party label, he or she cannot be denied access to the party list in subsequent elections ... . With this formula, the only factor contributing to the value of party reputation at all is the fact that votes are still pooled across all lists or candidates from the party. However, leaders have no formal sanctions to encourage cooperation and maintaining party reputations. The value of personal reputation is thus high. (p.428)

That is, Brazil, despite using proportional representation, ends up having the type of vote found in plurality single-member systems -- a personal one. Morgenstern (1996) takes a step further by relating the incentives generated by a personal vote and open endorsement to patterns of legislative behavior. In his words,

Where leaders are little more than opinion leaders ..., the cost of dissension may be low. But, where leaders are more powerful, as they are where they control the path to some sought-after goal, the cost of dissenting skyrockets. ... it is the lack of such powers that explains the unstable nature of voting blocs in the Brazilian and Colombian legislatures. (ch.3)
The generalized electoral connection model thus predicts a relatively low rate of party cohesion for Brazil between 1946 and 1964. Let us now check whether our evidence corroborates this prediction.

We define party cohesion as the degree of party unity on voting decisions. As an operational indicator, we use the conventional Rice index, the formula of which is $R_{i,x} = |\% \text{ of yes votes} - \% \text{ of no votes}|$. So for party $i$ on roll call $x$ we subtract the percent of members who have voted no from the percent of members who have voted yes, and take the absolute value of the subtraction. For example, if a party scores 70% on the Rice index, it means that on a roll call a party majority of 85% was pitted against a minority of 15%. If on a roll call a party splits exactly in two halves of 50% each, its Rice index will plummet to 0%. However, as many authors have emphasized (Bond and Fleisher 1991; Limongi and Figueiredo 1995; Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán 1996; Riker 1959) not all roll calls that take place on the floor of a legislative chamber are meaningful for party conflict. As a criterion of roll call relevance, we establish a 10% cutoff point of party conflict. That is, we include only roll calls on which at least 10% of legislators dissent from the majority.\(^1\)

We have found a total of 1,328 roll calls taken on the floor of the Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies) between 1946 and 1964 in the Diário do Congresso Nacional, the official gazette of the Brazilian Congress. These roll calls span over 5 legislatures (1946-1950, 1951-1954, 1955-1958, 1959-1962, and 1963-1964).\(^2\) By applying a 10% cutoff point, our sample was reduced to 982 meaningful roll calls. We calculated the Rice index only for the largest and most relevant parties of the 1946-1964 period, namely PSD, UDN, PTB, PR, and PSP.\(^3\) Together these parties held approximately 90% of the whole period’s Chamber of Deputies seats (see table 1 below), and 77.2% of the cabinet posts (Amorim Neto 1991).

\(^1\) This is the same cutoff applied by Limongi and Figueiredo (1995) in their pioneering study of party cohesion in Brazil between 1989 and 1994. By adopting this same cutoff, we will be able to compare our findings with those of these authors. The comparability between the 1946-1964 and 1989-1994 periods will be further enhanced by the fact that the electoral systems used in both regimes display the same key institutional features.
\(^2\) The term of the first legislature was exceptionally 5 years because it consumed its first year drafting a new Constitution. The other legislatures’ term was 4 years, beginning on January 31st. The legislature initiated in 1963 was interrupted by the military coup staged on March 31st, 1964.
\(^3\) For PSP we provide cohesion rates only from the second legislature on because in the first legislature this party was insignificant, holding only 1% of the lower chamber seats.
Before we move on, some observations about the rules governing roll calls in the 1946-1964 period are in order. According to the internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies, motions could be decided by three kinds of voting procedures: secret vote; voice vote, and roll call vote. A secret vote required a 2/3 quorum, and was designed to decide only on the establishment of investigation committees. Voice vote was the most frequently employed decision rule. For a voice to be valid, a minimum of 50% + 1 of deputies should be present on the floor. But voice votes could be taken without the lower chamber’s steering body checking whether a majority was present. However, if after a voice vote any member considered the minimum quorum required for it to be valid had not been met, he or she could request a quorum counting. If this request was supported by at least 20 deputies, the chair of the Chamber of Deputies would have to count the number of deputies present on the floor. If the chair found that a majority of deputies was present, the voice vote’s result was confirmed, otherwise a roll call with a full quorum would have to be taken to decide the issue. This procedure was called *verificação de voto* (quorum counting request). Additionally, roll calls had to be taken to vote constitutional amendments, and if a majority requested it by a voice vote.

Roll calls provided legislators with an opportunity to make decisions by majorities more costly because preferences would have to be publicly disclosed, which was not the case with voice votes. So roll calls constituted an important obstructionist tool in the hands of the opposition. According to Carvalho (1977), from 1956 to 1960, 95% of all
roll calls ensued from recounting requests. This means that roll calls are a good site to observe party conflict and behavior in the 1946-64 period.

**Background of the Party System**

From 1946 to 1960 Brazil had a multiparty system that can be classified as belonging to Sartori’s (1976) category of moderate pluralism. Beginning in 1960 a process of radicalization turned the system into one of polarized pluralism (Santos 1986). **Partido Social Democrático** (PSD - Social Democratic Party), **União Democrática Nacional** (UDN - National Democratic Union), and **Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro** (PTB - Brazilian Labor Party) were the largest legislative parties between 1946 and 1964. Together they held approximately 80% of the lower chamber seats of this period. PSD was the largest, and the most relevant party. Despite its label, it was a right-to-the-center party, whose social support was the agrarian elites. Two of the four presidents elected in the period ran on the PSD ticket (Eurico Dutra, 1946-1951; and Juscelino Kubitscheck, 1956-1961). Due to its size, PSD managed to dominate the legislative arena. According to Hippolito (1985), PSD’s dominance was an important factor in sustaining the moderate character of the multiparty system up to the late 1950s. PSD leaders were able to take advantage of their position to induce more radical parties to a politics of compromise in the legislature. In the early 1960s, however, PSD’s position was severely weakened by internal disputes and electoral losses. The collapse of PSD was soon followed by the demise of the democratic regime.

UDN, a right-wing party, was the second largest party throughout all but the last legislature (1963-1964). This party endorsed the winning presidential candidacy of Jânio Quadros in 1960. It was the main opposition party, and its social basis included sectors of the agrarian elites and important urban middle class groups. PTB, a leftist group, was the third largest party from 1946 to 1962, having risen to the rank of second largest in 1963. Two presidents were PTB members, Vargas (1951-1954), and João Goulart (1961-1964). It stood for radical nationalism, and represented the then-emerging urban proletariat.

As for the smaller parties, **Partido Social Progressista** (PSP - Social Progressive Party) was a left-wing populist party that relied heavily on the charisma of its founder and main leader, Ademar de Barros. On average, it was the fourth largest party, and held cabinet posts under Vargas, Kubitscheck, Quadros, and Goulart. **Partido Republicano** (PR - Republican Party), the fifth largest, was a Minas Gerais state-based right-wing party. However, it was an important ally of PSD, and held cabinet posts under Dutra, Café Filho (1954-1955), Kubitscheck, Quadros, and under the first cabinet of the short experience with semi-presidentialism between 1961 and 1963.

In terms of their organizational structure and behavior, the secondary literature supports the view that Brazilian parties were little more than aggregations of local organizations (on PSD, see Hippolito 1985; on UDN, see Benevides 1981; on PTB, see Araújo 1996). According to this literature, the source of such organizational pattern was open-list PR operationalized through electoral districts that coincided geographically with states. State politics formed the political backdrop against which the members of the
Chamber of Deputies were elected (Lima Júnior 1983). Consequently, these members responded first and foremost to the interests of state-level electoral clienteles (Ames 1986; Lamounier and Meneguelo 1986, 59-62). For Lavareda (1991, 97-120), with the end of concurrent presidential and lower chamber elections in 1950, the latter races became more and more strongly linked to state elections. Coalitions formed to elect deputies tended to be the same ones that disputed gubernatorial races, thereby binding members of the Chamber more tightly to state politics. Given the lack of legal institutions which would allow the enforcement of party discipline plus the weak power that national leaders of major parties wielded over their state sections, the parties of that period are almost unanimously characterized as coalitions of state factions, each with its own identity and specific interests. Plausible though this view might be, it identifies only part of the factors that impinged upon legislators’ behavior. This view is essentially correct as far as the electoral arena is concerned. However, when it came to the legislative arena, other elements contributed to shape legislative behavior. In section 4 we will argue that presidential agency was also an important influence over the life of parties.

Aggregate Data on Party Cohesion

Table 2 shows the average cohesion rates per legislature in Brazil between 1946 and 1963.4 A first glance seems to confirm the prediction that the central trend is towards relatively low party cohesion under the 1946-1964 regime. For example, The PSD average for the whole period is only 58.9%. Although cross-national comparisons are often of dubious value because researchers use different criteria to build roll call samples, it is safe to say that, except for American parties, Brazilian parties displayed on average cohesion rates lower than those of their European and Latin American counterparts (as reported by the literature cited on pages 1 and 2).

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4 Only one roll call took place in 1964 before the March 31st coup d’état. We thus decided to eliminate this year from our tables and graphs.
However, on closer inspection, we observe significant variation in the Brazilian parties’ cohesion rates. Take, for instance, the values for the three largest parties. In the first legislature (1946-1950), PSD was the second most cohesive party, only after the tiny PR. Its average score on the Rice index declined in the second legislature, stabilized in the third, went up in the fourth, and, finally, plunged to its lowest in the last legislature. PSD wound up the period as the least cohesive among the largest parties. As for the UDN, its cohesion rates basically remained stable through the first four legislatures, but went up in the last one. PTB rates were stable in the first three legislatures, went up in the fourth, and dramatically jumped to its peak in the last legislature. These findings beg the question: what explains such variation?

3. The Puzzles of Party Cohesion

Before any attempt at explanation, we further disaggregate our cohesion data per year (see Graphs 1 and 2 below). Interestingly enough, across and within party variation is even more impressive than that found on Table 2. PSD, for one, scored 85.2% in 1947, a value close to that of European parties. Surprisingly, this party ended up the first legislature scoring only 48.5%. PTB and UDN also witnessed wide swings in their cohesion rates in a same legislature. In 1951, the first year of the second legislature, PTB cohesion rate was 74.8%, but plummeted to 44.2% in 1953. In 1959, the first year of the fourth legislature, UDN scored 64.7%, its second highest rate during the whole period. Nevertheless, its cohesion rate in 1962 was an amazing low 38.2%.
We see in this variation a first puzzle regarding party cohesion in Brazil. As already mentioned, the generalized electoral connection model seems to explain fairly well why party cohesion in Brazil is comparatively low. Yet we are still short of an explanation for cross-party and longitudinal variation.

A plausible starting point is to consider the impact of party size on cohesion. We learn from the logic of collective action (Olson 1965) that the size of a group is a key determinant of its ability to efficiently monitor and punish defectors. So it can be argued that the larger a party’s legislative contingent, the lower its cohesion. It makes sense to apply this reasoning to Brazilian parties because their leaders had no power to enforce discipline. What do our data say about it? Our measures do not confirm such a hypothesis. On the contrary, we observe that PSD, the largest party, was on average more cohesive than UDN and even PR, and in many years it scored higher than PTB. This is a second puzzling finding.

Additionally, another plausible expectation relates to the government versus opposition cleavage. One can hypothesize that governing parties have a harder time uniting their ranks than opposition parties. This is because the former incur incumbency costs, which many of their members may be unwilling to bear, thus paving the way for party disunity. Incumbency costs include the cost of supporting electorally painful government decisions, and, assuming budgetary constraints, the cost of dividing the spoils of government (Riker 1962). Hence we should expect that governing parties are less cohesive than opposition ones. What do our data suggest? Surprisingly, we observe many instances in which governing parties had cohesion rates higher than the opposition. PSD in 1947, PTB in 1951 and 1963 are cases in point. Moreover, the PR, a party whose cohesion rates were usually low, scored its highest values over the first legislature, a period during which it was a coalition partner of PSD and UDN. Conversely, UDN, an opposition party during most of the 1946-1964 period, did not score higher than any of the governing parties of the time. This poses a third puzzle as to party cohesion in Brazil. In the next section we try to come up with some hypotheses in hopes of partially explaining all three puzzles.
4. The Executive Connection

To make sense of the puzzles, our point of departure is to consider presidential-legislative relations in Brazil under the 1946 Constitution. Suppose a presidential regime in which the legislature is fragmented and parties are uncohesive. What are the consequences of these factors on the formation of legislative coalitions? There are two correlated consequences: (1) low cohesion leads to what Riker (1962, 77-101) calls the information effect, felt whenever those who are forming a coalition do not have complete information as to the weights of partners whose degree of loyalty is an unknown, and do not have perfect information as to prior moves taken by coalition partners; (2) as a result of the information effect, the sum of the parliamentary strength of the parties formally belonging to the governing coalition is a figure that does not correspond to these same parties' stances in the legislature.

In short, the lower party cohesion, the higher the information effect, therefore the more incentives to form multiparty coalitions in order to mitigate the information effect. Furthermore, the more fragmented a legislature, the more room there is for strategic behavior and agenda manipulation on the part of presidents, party leaders, and individual legislators (Riker 1982). High rates of defection and frequent coalition reshuffles should be the norm in this legislative setting. This implies that coalitions have to be built issue by issue, and for each coalition, a new membership configuration. The question, then, becomes: how is it possible to provide some degree of stability in such a legislative setting?

To begin with, we must first identify the political actor most interested in providing this kind of stability in the 1946-64 period: presidents. Why? Presidents sought such policy stability for three reasons. First, they were the only elected politicians with a national constituency, thus with an incentive to promote policies with a national scope. This kind of policy affected various and heterogeneous interests represented in Congress, therefore requiring that presidents accommodate them. Moreover, national policies were of a more complex technical nature, and the legislative branch did not have the expertise to deal with them. As a result, the executive was prompted to be even more active regarding legislative initiative, and to be more concerned than Congress with consistency in the law-making process. Finally, the 1946 Constitution granted the chief executive extensive powers. Presidents had constitutional authority to: (1) initiate laws, (2) propose the budget, (3) veto partially and totally bills (vetoes were overridden by 2/3 majority in joint session of Congress), and (4) exclusively introduce bills that would increase salaries of public servants, and create new jobs in existing public agencies, and modify the law establishing the size of the armed forces. Consequently, due to the weakness of parties, electoral incentives, and the constitutional powers of presidents, the latter became the main legislative agenda setter under the 1946-64 regime.

Which resources did presidents possess to push their agendas through the legislature? We identify one essential resource: patronage. Patronage was the basic currency for the political transactions under a localist electoral system of a country with a large, poor rural population. Additionally, it should also be noted that administrative
centralization in the national executive also played a role in rendering patronage so relevant. Starting in the 1930s, a process of administrative centralization gained substantial momentum in Brazil, and an enormous range of powers came to be concentrated in the hands of the federal executive at the expense of the political and administrative autonomy of the states. The Constitution of 1946 abolished the *Estado Novo*'s (New State) dictatorial practices but did not revoke its centralizing nature. The fall of the *Estado Novo* in 1945 was dampened by the maintenance of a corporatist, bureaucratic structure that curtailed the autonomy of states (Nunes 1984; Souza 1976). That is, the federation entered and left the Constituion of 1946 weakened.

The combination of a centralizing executive with a federative structure and an open-list PR system, where the units of the federation served as electoral districts, almost naturally made the lower chamber a kind of estuary into which pent-up regional interests flowed. And since the resources for responding to these regional demands lay in the hands of the executive, each state's legislators for all practical reasons assumed the role of lobbies representing their own units before the federal government. Brazilian legislators were predominantly office seeking politicians rather than policy-seekers. It was a distributive thrust that spurred these representatives' interest in supporting the executive and in the implementation - and not the formulation - of public policy (Souza 1976, 52-56). Control of executive posts thus became a *sine qua non* condition for politicians to muster political means and clout.

However, it is important to stress that recognizing the clientelistic nature of party behavior does not deny the role that ideologies play in party competition. Ideological politics and clientelistic politics were not mutually exclusive in the 1946 Republic. Ideological parties resorted to clientelism just as much as the more catch-all parties did (Nunes 1984, 113). Each variety of politics was represented by different factions within major parties. Within UDN, the group dubbed *Banda de Música* (Music Band - because it used to make a lot of “noise”) looked after the party's ideological purity while the *Chapa-Branca* (White License Plate - white was the color of government cars’ license plates in Brazil) faction became noted for its adherence to clientelistic pragmatism (Benevides 1981). PTB was split between class and clientelistic leadership (Araújo 1996). Even within the ranks of PSD - a pork-barrel party *par excellence* - a so-called young wing intent on the party's ideological revitalization was born at the end of the fifties. The point is that it was precisely through these clientelistic factions and leaders that Brazil's presidents could more easily negotiate when in need of political support.

However, if Brazilian politicians were such office-seekers, what prevented them from supporting any administration in exchange for the perks of office? To put it in other words, what were the sources of opposition to incumbent presidents? First of all, the presidency was the highest political prize, the obvious consequence of which was that all relevant parties and political leaders had winning the presidency as their ultimate goal. Because presidentialism provides for a unipersonal executive (Lijphart 1994), the presidency is a non-divisible political good, which makes elections for this office a winner-take-all game, as Linz (1994) aptly portrays them. Hence presidential hopefuls (*presidenciáveis* in Brazilian politics parlance) had a conspicuous interest in defeating the
incumbent president’s agenda so as to maximize their chances of winning the next presidential race. Presidential hopefuls thus used whatever political clout they had to promote political circumstances unfavorable to the incumbent president.

Therefore, opposition to incumbent presidents was to a great extent mobilized by presidential hopefuls. Moreover, although presidents were formally out of the electoral arena (because they could not be reelected), they still needed to court voters to boost their popularity. Popularity, so to speak, was the president’s equivalent of an electoral arena. Presidential hopefuls’ opposition aimed to hurt the incumbents’ popularity so as to cripple the latter’s effectiveness. By doing so, presidential hopefuls enhanced their own electoral fortunes.

Yet, why should presidential aspirants care so much about incumbents if the latter could not run for reelection? First, many incumbents often tried to promote the candidacy of a heir apparent (Kubitscheck was the only exception). If incumbents were successful during their terms, their record could boost the electoral chances of their heir apparent, which, in turn, would lower the other presidential aspirants’ chances. In passing note that by having their heir apparent win their successsions, incumbents could ensure a high degree of continuity in the policies they enacted, and prevent their administrations from being scrutinized by future investigations. Given widespread graft in Brazil, the latter aspect was not of small importance.

Second, many presidents tried to stage a comeback at least one term after their tenure (Geddes 1994, 87, fn. 8). Vargas returned to power in 1950. Kubitscheck and Quadros tried to return to office, but were unsuccessful. Thus, presidents used the resources made available by their office (patronage) to either fuel their political machines or to create a new one in the case of presidents lacking solid partisan support.

In summary, presidential aspirants’ plans could be seriously damaged by successful incumbents, thus leading the former to fiercely oppose the latter’s agenda. Carlos Lacerda, the most famous UDN leader, with his embittered, anti-system opposition to Vargas, Kubitscheck, and Goulart is certainly the best example of this behavior. But instead of opting for this annihilative confrontation with presidents, why didn’t presidential hopefuls try to show the electorate they were able to govern more effectively than the incumbent? According to Mayhew (1991), this is what presidential aspirants strive to do in the US. By sponsoring major legislative initiatives, presidential candidates who are in Congress brighten their political records, reach a national status, and thus bolster their odds for the presidential race. Recent examples are senators Bob Dole and Phill Gramm, who jockeyed for the Republican nomination in 1996. Actually, by trying to outlegislate the president, opposition candidates end up improving the lawmaking performance of the government. For Mayhew, this is one of the main reasons why in the US there is no noticeable difference in legislative output (as measured by passage of relevant legislation) between unified versus divided government.

One simple reason explains why in Brazil elected politicians (legislators and sub-national executives) who aspired to the presidency could not do what Dole and Gramm
have done: legislators lacked expertise and staff, and subnational executives (governors and mayors) lacked resources (because of the high degree of centralization) and national scope. Hence policy impotence was the key driving factor of presidential hopefuls’ turbulent opposition strategies vis-à-vis incumbents.

Additionally, another reason that can be adduced to ascertain the sources of opposition behavior is ironically the use of patronage. Employment of patronage by presidents to obtain legislators’ cooperation also generates opposition because patronage is a limited resource. Were patronage unlimited, the stability of the legislative process would be less of a problem because presidents could simply buy off any majority they needed. Given budgetary constraints, patronage excludes politicians as much as it includes them in the president’s legislative contingent. It includes those appointed by the president to executive posts and/or those who have benefited from public largesse. It excludes all the others, thus driving them to the opposition camp.

In short, Brazilian presidents’ problem was to form majorities in a fragmented legislature with uncohesive parties under the fire of presidential hopefuls’ opposition. How could they make the best use of their limited patronage resources to govern?

Notice first the conditions under which presidents had to strive to win the support of the electorate. Candidates running for president had to obtain the greatest plurality of votes from an electorate of millions of citizens spread across a nation of continental proportions. They could not rely solely on the organizational structure of their party or of the parties on whose tickets they were running. State by state, they had to build an electoral coalition capable of carrying them to victory. To that end, they needed to align themselves with local party forces to maximize their ability to draw votes. Thus, when initially forming their governments, presidents had to reward the main forces that backed them in the election campaign by offering posts in the executive branch. So it was in the electoral arena and during presidential transitions that local forces held an unrivaled sway over national politics.

However, because low party cohesion deprived even nominally majority administrations of stable support, during their terms presidents had to reach out to opposition parties to form majorities and to deflect the piercing fire of presidential hopefuls. Thus, on the one side stood the president, requiring parliamentary support, and on the other, the lower chamber, demanding clientelistic, distributive resources. This was the raw material out of which legislative majorities were wrought. And by this logic, legislative behavior in 1946-1964 Brazil can be seen as a consequence of the combined effects of local forces and presidential agency, rather than a consequence only of the former, as the comparative and secondary literatures view it. How?

We surmise that the best way presidents could use their limited patronage resources consisted of widening as much as possible the size of their loyalists inside all relevant parties. For governing parties, presidential patronage aimed at strengthening pro-government unity, and insuring against the information effect. As for opposition parties, it
was employed to coopt their member so as to weaken anti-government unity, and hurt presidential hopefuls’ ability to mobilize legislative opposition.

A chief consequence of such coalition-building formula is to create a potential for two latent factions within each party - a presidential faction, and an anti-presidential one. Presidential factions include: (1) deputies who have supported the president during the presidential campaign and have received patronage during his term, and (2) deputies who have supported defeated presidential candidates, but were later benefited by executive patronage. Anti-presidential factions are composed of (1) deputies associated with defeated presidential candidates; and (2) members of parties which endorsed the president in his electoral campaign but for any reason have been excluded from the distribution of spoils.

The question, then, becomes: how do presidential coalition-building strategies affect party cohesion? Our basic hypotheses are:

H1: the larger the amount of patronage a party receives from the president, the larger its presidential faction.

H2: the larger the presidential faction inside a governing party, the more cohesive the party.

H3: the larger the presidential faction inside a nominally opposition party, the less cohesive the party.

H4: as the presidential term elapses, the lower the value of the patronage dispensed by the president, then the smaller the presidential factions inside governing parties, then the lower their cohesion rates.

For a governing party, an increase in the size of its presidential faction strengthens pro-government unity, thus boosting cohesion rates. For opposition parties, an increase in the size of the presidential faction weakens opposition unity, thus lowering cohesion rates. And given that immediate reelection of the president is not allowed, as the presidential term elapses, the value of supporting the president declines, thus weakening pro-government unity, which, in turn, lowers cohesion rates.

Measures and Tests

In order to test our hypotheses, we run OLS on pooled data (cross-sectional plus time-series data). The dependent variable, party cohesion, is operationalized as the average Rice index. For each party we compute its yearly average cohesion from 1946 to 1963. Then, we pool the observations for all parties in a same sample. We have developed three measures to tap parties’ executive connection:

As an indicator of patronage resources, we use the budget resources allocated to parties (call it BUDGET) by presidents. For a given party we count the number of days it headed a ministry in a given year. We then divide this number by 365, and multiply the result by the percentage share of the civilian budget spent by that ministry in said year. We
do this calculation for all ministries headed by a party in a same year, and add up all values. For example, suppose party P headed ministry A during 3/4 of year Y, and ministry B during 1/2 of Y. Ministry A received 20% of the civilian budget in year Y, and ministry B, 10%. Thus, party P was allocated \( 30\% \times \frac{3}{4} + 10\% \times \frac{1}{2} = 27.5\% \) of the civilian budget during year Y.\(^5\) We expect this variable to have a positive effect on party cohesion rates.

To account for the declining value of patronage over time, we use the *elapsed time of the presidential term* (call it ELAPTIME). For a given year we measure the percent of time of the presidential term elapsed at the end of that year. As the presidential term in Brazil was five years, then we assign 20% for the first year, 40% for the second, 60% for the third, 80% for the fourth, and 100% for the last one. We expect this variable to have a negative sign.

As an indicator of the government/opposition cleavage, we identify the members of *presidents’ electoral coalitions* (call it PRESCOAL). This is a dummy variable, which assigns 1 if a party is a member of a president’s electoral coalition, and 0 otherwise.\(^6\) We assume that presidents will allocate more patronage resources to the their closest allies, which is the case of the parties endorsing their candidacies. Hence, these parties are expected to have larger presidential factions than the others, therefore higher cohesion rates.

Finally, we also provide a measure to account for the impact of electoral incentives on party cohesion. To tap the incentives of Brazil’s localist electoral system, we propose an indicator of *electoral heterogeneity* (call it ELEHET) This indicator is based on the index of disproportionality, devised by Loosemore and Hanby (1971) to measure the amount of deviation from proportionality between seats and votes that a given election produces. Its formula is:

\[
\text{ELEHET} = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (|S_i - D_i|)
\]

where: \( S_i \) is the percent of lower chamber seats the party has obtained in the \( i \)-th state (district); and \( D_i \) is the percent of lower chamber seats the \( i \)-th state (district) holds in the lower chamber.

---

\(^5\) Data on budget expenditures per ministry were culled from Brazil - IBGE (1990, 623-625); and data on cabinet appointments per party were collected from Amorim Neto (1991), Beloch and Abreu (1984), and Hippolito (1985, 293-303).

\(^6\) Presidents’ electoral coalitions were the following: (1) for Dutra, PSD-PTB; (2) for Vargas, PTB-PSP; (3) for Kubitscheck, PSD-PTB, and (4) for Quadros, UDN-PDC-PL-PTN. As for the acting vice presidents (Café Filho, Nereu Ramos, and Goulart), we considered they had no electoral coalition, thus assigning zero for all parties under their terms.
To arrive at the electoral heterogeneity for a given party, we add up the $|S_i - D_i|$ values for all parties represented in the legislature, whether or not the party obtained seats in all the states, and then divide by two. Subtracting the result from 1 yields the electoral heterogeneity.

What are the properties of this indicator? First, it defines a boundary of total equilibrium between the seats won by a party and the size of districts. Any departure from this boundary is detected. What can be affirmed is how the distribution of a party’s seats is roughly weighed vis-à-vis the dispersion of seats across districts.

Second, it varies from zero to one. A party that garners all its seats in the smallest district will have a heterogeneity rate near zero. For example, suppose a country with a 100-seat legislature, with seats distributed in multi- and single-member districts. Now suppose a party wins only one seat from a single-member district. Its electoral heterogeneity will be calculated as follows: the $|S_i - D_i|$ value will be $|0.01 - 1| + |0 - 0.99|$, which equals 1.98; this result divided by 2 gives us 0.99, which subtracted from 1 leaves 0.01 - a numerical result congruent with its political meaning. A party that wins all its seats in the smallest district will have a very low electoral heterogeneity because it represents a very narrow spectrum of interests. In contrast, a party that wins seats in all districts in identical percentages to each district’s delegation in the legislature will score the highest electoral heterogeneity rate: 1. This party is highly electorally heterogeneous because it represents a wide spectrum of interests. The more electorally heterogeneous a party, the lower its cohesion. We thus expect electoral heterogeneity to be negatively associated with party cohesion. Table 3 below shows the results of the electoral heterogeneity index applied to our five parties after five elections.

**TABLE 3 - Electoral Heterogeneity of Brazilian Parties After Five Elections (1946-1963)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDN</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Table 4 below reports our pooled data analysis. BUDGET and ELAPTIME were found to be significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. PRESCOAL and ELEHET were both significant at the 0.1 level; however, both were found to be significant at the 0.05 level under a one-tailed test.
Given the prevalence of time series data in our sample, we decided to check for autocorrelation by regressing the unstandardized residuals on its first-order lag and all the explanatory variables (see equation 1 below). Our results proved that there was in fact positive autocorrelation in our data, thus indicating that our standard errors are wrong. To correct for this problem, we included the first-order lag of the dependent variable on the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>64.630</td>
<td>46.113</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(3.519)</td>
<td>(8.860)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUDGET</td>
<td>.135**</td>
<td>.166**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.051)</td>
<td>(.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESCOAL</td>
<td>3.846***</td>
<td>-2.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.236)</td>
<td>(2.848)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAPTIME</td>
<td>-.098*</td>
<td>-.057***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEHET</td>
<td>-.095***</td>
<td>-.2666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(12.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAGGED COHESION</td>
<td></td>
<td>.249**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>-3.294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.734)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.542)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>3.704</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.253)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>-2.453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.399)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
** significant at the 0.05 level.
*** significant at the 0.1 level.

*** significant at the 0.01 level and at the 0.05 level under a one-tailed test.
right-hand side of the regression equation plus four dummies to control for possible fixed effects of the five parties. BUDGET still remained significant at the 0.05 level, however, ELAPTIME is only significant at the 0.1 level (significant at the 0.05 level under a one-tailed test). The lagged COHESION variable was found to be significant at the 0.05 level. All other variables were found insignificant under the second model, with PRESCOAL having its sign reversed from the original model and ELEHET retaining its expected sign.

**Equation 1** - Test for Autocorrelation (standard errors are indicated in parentheses)

\[
\hat{e}_t = 0.324* e_{t-1} - 0.003* BUDGET - 1.097* PRESCOAL + 0.036* ELAPTIME + 3.464* ELEHET \\
(.101) \quad (.047) \quad (2.066) \quad (.031) \quad (3.352)
\]

The results we have gotten give us an indication that the direction of our research is quite promising. The variables BUDGET and ELAPTIME have significant explanatory power of party cohesion. Moreover, given the early stage of our research, PRESCOAL and ELEHET cannot yet be discarded until we do further test of the model (for example, test for heteroscedasticity).

We feel now that we are in a position to at least pose a plausible solution to two of the three puzzles. Variation in the cohesion rates across parties can be explained by changes in the relationship between parties and presidents. For each new president and legislature, new presidentially-defined factions emerge inside the parties. The size of these factions is a function of the amount of patronage channelled by presidents to them. And under each presidency, changes in the partisan control of ministerial posts, which were frequent in the 1946-64 period (Amorim Neto 1995; Santos 1986), affect the amount of patronage available to presidential factions, thus affecting their size. Variation over time is due to the elapse of the presidential term. As presidents cannot be reelected, their ability to retain the loyalty of their supporting factions decline as the presidential term approaches its end. As a result, presidential factions shrink, and cohesion rates follow suit.

As for the higher cohesion rates of the largest parties, this can be elucidated by the fact that they are the most relevant parties, for which presidents channel the bulk of their limited patronage resources. Therefore, the largest parties have potentially larger presidential factions than small parties. Finally, our tests failed to explain the higher cohesion rates of governing parties.

**5. Conclusion**

The partial results of this article have two implications. First, that students of legislative behavior in 1946-64 Brazil should pay attention not only to the impact of local electoral forces but also to the consequences of presidential agency. To put it in broader terms, legislative behavior is the product of the interaction between the electoral system (open-list PR) and the system of government (presidentialism). By looking at Brazil’s lower chamber from the perspective of presidential coalition-building strategies -- the
executive connection -- we were able to partially solve some questions left unanswered by the generalized electoral connection model, namely variation in cohesion rates across and within party.

Second, there is room to argue that the effective legislative agent in Brazil’s lower chamber in the period we investigated was neither individual legislators nor parties, but presidentially-defined factions. These factions are different from those found in Italy or Uruguay. In these countries, factions are based either on ideology, as in the case of Italian factions, or on party slates, as in Uruguay. At any rate, these countries’ factions have an independent identity in the eyes of voters. In contrast, presidentially-defined factions are not politically autonomous. They are put together by presidents using patronage and by presidential hopefuls assembling those excluded from presidential patronage. These factions are fluid coalitions, thus making the legislative setting where they operate as fluid as they are. In a sense, Brazil’s presidentially-defined factions resemble Japanese factions because both are dependent on the dispensation of patronage by chief executives and strong individual leaders. However, Japanese factions have some autonomy vis-à-vis the government because voters know they exist. It remains to be seen whether presidentially-defined factions convey any information to voters.

We believe the concept of presidentially-defined factions (or executive connection) merits further study. Our findings are far from conclusive, and our data still too aggregate. In order to provide robust tests of our hypotheses, we have yet to identify who are the members of the presidentially-defined factions, and check how cohesive their legislative behavior is. If we find their cohesion rates are higher than those observed for political parties, then we will be able to make a compelling case about the importance of presidentially-defined factions to understand legislative politics in Brazil. Besides, we need to disaggregate our roll calls per policy area and origin. Some issues and bills are critical to presidents (certainly those initiated by themselves), and they rationally invest the bulk of their resources in them. By analyzing critical roll calls, we expect to generate highly reliable evidence on who sides with presidents and who opposes them. Additionally, another important item on our research agenda is to develop more precise operational indicators of variables pertaining to electoral connection theories. The one we used in this paper, the index of electoral heterogeneity, proved to be too blunt an instrument.

Finally, the role of presidential hopefuls also requires further study. In this paper we theorized that they are key actors in the mobilization of opposition to presidents, and have incentives to challenge the latter in a radical fashion. This, in turn, leads presidents to use the bait of patronage to divide opposition parties, which may possibly explain their low cohesion rates. We need to understand better which resources presidential aspirants have to fight incumbents and become successful candidates in patronage-based systems.
REFERENCES


