Concepts of Democratic Consolidation

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Abstract

At the moment, students of democratic consolidation (DC) tend to define their key term in privatistic ways, wide or narrow, positive or negative, ideal or operational ... The result is conceptual fuzziness. The present enterprise of conceptual clarification tries to redraw the map of DC by unearthing its basic teleological coordinates. The meaning we ascribe to DC, the paper argues, is context-dependent and perspective-dependent. It depends on the type of political regime we study and on the type of regime we want to avoid or to attain. Applying this double distinction of empirical viewpoints and normative horizons – on the basis of a four-fold typology of political regimes (authoritarianism, semidemocracy, liberal democracy, and advanced democracy) – leads to five concepts of democratic consolidation: avoiding democratic breakdown, avoiding democratic erosion, institutionalizing democracy, completing democracy, and deepening democracy. All these teleological concepts are present in the literature, and as the paper concludes, they will continue to do so, since they are well-rooted both in political reality and in academic practice. And only when we resist the temptation of restricting the meaning of DC by conceptual decree, and accept the existing plurality of concepts, are we able to see what the fledgling subdiscipline of consolidology is all about.
Introduction

The nice thing with the term “democratic consolidation” (DC) is its seemingly infinite patience and malleability. It is a term that contains few semantic constraints, and in the vast field of consolidation studies, we can use it the very way we like and still uphold the comfortable illusion that we are speaking to each other in some comprehensible, commonsensical way. The bad thing is that the uncontrolled use of DC has swept us into a state of conceptual disorder that more and more acts as a barrier to subdisciplinary communication, theory-building, and accumulation of knowledge. To the misfortune of “the proto-science of consolidology” (Schmitter and Santiso 1997), Geoffrey Pridham’s observation made in 1990, according to which democratic consolidation was a “nebulous concept” (1990, 8), has not lost its unpleasant validity since then. Still “no clear consensus has emerged” (Gunther et al. 1995, 5) as to the meaning of DC. Quite to the contrary, the conceptual fog that covers the term has apparently become even thicker and denser the more students of democratization have paid attention to it.

Authors have reacted in different ways to the reigning conceptual confusion. Some just list competing notions of DC without trying to order them nor to adjudicate between them. Some try to close the debate by decree, to circumscribe the meaning of DC by authoritative definitions. Some prefer private solutions and explain their conceptual preferences without attaching any hegemonic pretensions to it. Some reconstruct the debate in dichotomic terms along polar distinctions such as positive versus
negative, or maximalist versus minimalist notions of DC. Some evade conceptual issues by refraining from explicit definitions and by using DC in implicit ways that assume its meaning to be unproblematic and equally shared among writers and readers. Some simulate the use of DC by including it in the title of some book or article but without making any further reference to it in the main text. Some try to give the term more precision by refocusing it from national political systems to political subsystems. Some try to do the same by disaggregating it into several dimensions. Some avoid the term and keep silent about it in order to introduce different terms into the study of new democracies, such as democratic governance or institutionalization. Some issue calls for more conceptual analysis. And finally, some question the very usefulness of the concept or even advocate the radical conclusion that we should get rid of it altogether.¹

The present paper takes a different route. It argues that the meaning of DC cannot be decided by conceptual fiat, without taking into account the concrete empirical realities as well as the practical tasks it is meant to address. Quite to the contrary, the meaning we ascribe to the notion of DC depends on where we stand (our empirical viewpoints) and where we look to (our normative horizons). It varies according to the contexts and the goals of our research. On the basis of this double distinction (between empirical and normative references of research), the paper will reconstruct five notions of DC: avoiding democratic breakdown, avoiding democratic erosion, institutionalizing democracy, completing democracy, and deepening democracy.
In essence, this perspective-dependent perspective on democratic consolidation reconstructs the concept’s teleological core. The paper is not the first one to note the teleological quality of DC. For instance, Ben Schneider (1995) and Guillermo O’Donnell (1996a and 1996b) have recently, and with strong critical overtones, hinted at the notion’s “strong teleological flavor” (O’Donnell 1996a, 38). Those critics are right. Democratic consolidation indeed is an intrinsically teleological concept. Yet, as this paper argues, there is nothing inherently wrong with teleology, as long as we accept three things. First, we have to avoid veiling or obscuring it; hidden teleology indeed is bad teleology. Second, we have to dissociate teleology from any belief in progress: supporting some telos, some normative goal or practical task, is one matter; assuming “some kind of automatic or ‘natural’ progression” (Gunther et al. 1996, 155) towards that goal, is quite another. Third, we have to acknowledge that the notion of democratic consolidation does not know only one characteristic telos but many, and that this plurality of teloi accordingly defines a plurality of concepts of DC.

A Soft Semantic Core

In conceptual analysis, it often proofs quite helpful to take a step back, exhale, and dig into the fertile soil of semantic confusion, in order to unearth the etymological roots of the concept under discussion. In the case of democratic consolidation, however, etymology does not offer any authoritative source for conceptual dispute settlement. Both of the concept’s two component parts, democracy as well as solidity, represent broad notions
which do not offer clear interpretive keys but invite for multiple readings. Yet, though their semantic cores may be soft, it would be misleading to describe them as void. Both terms do constrain the range of admissible answers to the question of what democratic consolidation is ... and what it is not.³

First of all, any talk about democratic consolidation presupposes that a democratic regime exists from the beginning to the end of the process. Democracy is at the same time the indispensable starting point of DC (in form of a “consolidating democracy”) and its hopeful outcome (in form of a “consolidated democracy”). It does not make any sense to speak of the “democratic consolidation” of an authoritarian regime. This sounds trivial. But it is not. It assumes, for instance, that democratic consolidation cannot set in before a democratic transition has been successfully completed.⁴ And it implies that “mixed regimes” fall outside the realm of democratic consolidation unless we classify them (as I will do in this paper) as subtypes of democracy (even if “diminished” ones) and not as subtypes of authoritarianism.⁵

Then, “consolidation” – the term that denotes both movement and arrival, both progress and achievement, and that accounts for the teleological nature of DC. Its express goal is solidity. But what is solid? In everyday language, solidity bears two different connotations. On the one hand, it expresses firmness, robustness, stability: the solid wall, the solid alliance, the solid financial base, etc. On the other hand, it describes something more qualitative, something sound and well-done, something valuable
because of its intrinsic qualities: a solid piece of furniture, solid scholarship, a solid education, etc.

In democratization studies nobody ever speaks of a “solid democracy.” Perhaps, this would sound too much of an overstatement in any empirical case. Yet the terms “consolidating democracy” and “consolidated democracy,” though more modest in appearance, do carry the double meaning of stability and soundness. In most of academic literature, a “consolidating democracy” is meant either to remove the threat of democratic breakdown or to move towards some higher stage of democratic performance (or both things together). And a “consolidated democracy” is meant to be either a crisis-proof democracy or a high-quality democracy (or both things together). In the following we will argue that five competing concepts of DC circulate in academic literature, which all are compatible with the minimum semantic constraints the term implies: They all start from some type or other of democratic regime. And they all head toward some normative goal which either reads democratic survival or democratic progress.

Standpoints and Horizons

In contemporary studies of democratization, four general types of political regimes, or perhaps better, four extended families of political regimes, motivate and captivate much of our scholarly passion and interest. The key distinction runs, of course, between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. But in addition to democracy pure and simple, to “democracy without adjectives” (Enrique Krauze), two broad subtypes of democracy have gained pervasive
influence in the current literature on fledgling democracies. On the one hand, there are all those empirical borderline cases, those “mixed regimes” or “hybrid regimes,” which possess some but not all of liberal democracy’s essential features and which therefore fall somewhere in between democracy and authoritarianism. On the other, there are all those more or less imaginary “advanced democracies” which possess some positive traits in addition to the minimum defining criteria of liberal democracy and which therefore rank higher in terms of democratic quality than many neo-democracies. While the former represent “diminished” subtypes of democracy, the latter represent “increased” subtypes of democracy. Figure 1 (in the Appendix) presents this four-fold classification of regime families graphically along a one-dimensional continuum. For all its apparent simplicity, this continuum deserves a handful of brief comments in order to prevent some facile misunderstandings.

First, the labels are problematic in some aspects: I use “authoritarianism” as equivalent to nondemocratic regime and not, as others do, as one subtype of non-democracy among others. The term “electoral democracy” is not ideal either. Once employed to denounce liberal democracy, in today’s discussion it describes only one existing type of borderline democracy among many others. Then, “liberal democracy” is not a self-explanatory notion but given the contemporary consensus on procedural minima of democracy it may suffice here to hint at the Dahlsian standard package of civil and political rights plus fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (see Dahl 1971). Finally, the term “advanced democracy” (without quotation marks) bears the temptation of idealizing and
reifying established Western democracies. This is not intended here. But even if we recognize that admiring references to “established Western democracies” often rely on stereotypes, we have to acknowledge that discursive constructs (such as “democratic normality”) are social realities, too.

Second, while “advanced democracy” must be considered a genuine subtype of liberal democracy, one could plausibly classify “electoral democracy” as a subtype of authoritarianism. Yet most authors follow a different line and continue to speak of democracy, albeit one “with adjectives” that express its deficits and deficiencies. Third, positioning authoritarian and democratic regimes along a single continuum suggests that it were only quantitative differences which separate these regime types. This is no compelling assumption, however. For even if one thinks, as I do, that the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism is a qualitative one, a question of certain institutions being absent or present, one may concede that intricate problems of thresholds arise as soon as certain elements out of democracy’s institutional core package are either weak or absent. And finally, fourth, the continuum looks closed on both sides while in fact it is closed only on its authoritarian side (by ideal typical totalitarianism) but open on its democratic side (to future developments of democracy).

Now, of our four regime types, the two neighboring middle categories, electoral and liberal democracy, represent the empirical referents, the empirical starting points, of all debate on democratic consolidation. In normative terms, authoritarianism
forms the outer negative horizon both try to escape from and advanced democracy the outer positive horizon both try to approach. And both regime types constitute mutual normative horizons for each other. While electoral democracy appears as liberal democracy’s proximate horizon of avoidance, liberal democracy appears as electoral democracy’s proximate horizon of attainment.

All these four combinations of different empirical viewpoints and normative horizons are present in contemporary “consolidology.” And they have given rise to four general concepts of democratic consolidation which are all coexisting and competing with each other in “this embryonic subdiscipline” (Schmitter 1995, 14). Those scholars who look (fearfully) from electoral or liberal democracies to authoritarianism equate DC with avoiding an authoritarian regression, a “quick death” of democracy. Those who look (hopefully) from electoral or liberal democracies to advanced democracies equate DC with democratic deepening, with advances in the quality of democracy. Those who look (with concern) from liberal democracies to electoral democracies equate DC with avoiding a “slow death” of democracy, the erosion of some fundamental democratic features. And those who look (with impatience) from electoral democracies to liberal democracies equate DC with completing democracy, with repairing its basic defects.

We may call “negative” those two concepts of democratic consolidation that are concerned with democratic stability and try to avoid regressions to either non-democratic or semi-democratic
regimes. And we may call “positive” those two notions of democratic consolidation that are concerned with democratic advances and try to attain progress towards either minimal or high-quality democracy. In the following, we will briefly discuss these four concepts of democratic consolidation. And we will add a fifth concept, the institutionalization of democracy, the establishment of democratic micro and meso rules. This notion of DC is “self-referential” insofar as liberal democracy serves as its point of both departure and arrival. It looks, so to speak, from liberal democracy to nowhere else. In normative terms, the concept is “neutral” insofar as it is not preoccupied with the normative goals the others pursue, even if it may be instrumental for their achievement. The Overview Table and Figure 2 (both in the Appendix) provide a skeletal overview over these five basic concepts of democratic consolidation.

Avoiding the Breakdown of Democracy

Once a transition from authoritarian rule in a given country has reached a point where (more or less) free, (more or less) fair, and (more or less) competitive elections are held, democratic actors often cannot afford to lean back, relax, and enjoy the “bounded uncertainty” of democratic rule. More often than not, regime-threatening “unbounded uncertainties” persist and the democrats’ fundamental anxieties do not recede but only shift from establishing democracy’s core institution to securing what they have achieved. For these actors, consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of breakdown to a point where they can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist in the near
(and not-so-near) future. This preoccupation with regime survival describes, so to speak, the classical meaning of DC. It gives coherence to a broad and crowded semantic field where a wide range of semantic labels define this telos in either positive or negative ways. In its positive formulations, this branch of consolidation studies speaks about the goal of reaching democratic continuity, maintenance, entrenchment, survival, permanence, endurance, persistence, resilience, viability, sustainability, irreversibility. By contrast, negative formulations invoke the necessity of moving beyond states of “non-consolidation,” beyond democratic fragility, instability, uncertainty, vulnerability, reversibility, the threat of breakdown. For all differences in nuance, the unifying purpose beneath this multifaceted vocabulary is straightforward. In biological metaphors: It is basically preoccupied with keeping democracy alive, with preventing its “rapid death” (O’Donnell 1992).

In accordance with its focus on coup politics, the central issue this first notion of democratic consolidation (DC 1) is concerned with are deviant actors, antisystem actors, who sponsor antidemocratic activities or else, harbor antidemocratic motives. In principle, the range of actors who actually or potentially fall into this category of dangerous elements is unlimited. Given Latin America’s recent history of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, in the region, fears of democratic breakdown have tended to focus on the professionals of state violence as well as on the business class who too in the course of time has acquired a solid antidemocratic reputation (until the latest cycle of democratization). But in fact the list of (either suspected or
convicted) assassins or gravediggers of democratic rule is much longer. It includes private men in arms (guerillas, drug cartels, violent street protesters), elected presidents who stage military-backed autogolpes, and also a disenchanted population who, as many fear, some day may become tired of a democracy that in some cases, in material terms, has not delivered much more than economic hardship and social inequality (see, for example, Diamond 1996; Gunther et al. 1995; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring 1986; Whitehead 1993).

Eliminating, neutralizing, or converting disloyal players represents the primary task of democratic breakdown prevention. Yet, taming the enemy is far from being the only practical concern associated with DC 1. In the name of democratic sustainability authors invoke many other, additional processes and policies. They discuss, for example, economic performance, nation building and state building, the creation of mass legitimacy, the diffusion of democratic values, the elimination of authoritarian legacies, the institutionalization of party systems, and so forth. The list is endless. But why is this so? Why does the probability of democratic survival, why does this apparently lean notion of democratic consolidation, provoke such extensive listings of second-order tasks and objectives related to it either by definition or by association? I would name two reasons basically why this sort of “conceptual stretching” has happened.

First, securing democratic survival is the original and most widespread meaning of DC. But more than that. It seems to be the hegemonic notion of DC insofar as most competing usages claim to
be motivated, in the last instance, by some (more or less direct) concern with democratic stability. The (ultimate) goal of democratic continuity serves as a general legitimating formula which gives an appearance of purpose, respectability, and subdisciplinary unity to any inquiry into "the problems of democratic consolidation," whatever its real focus.

Second, as we have mentioned before, the term democratic consolidation denotes a process as well as its outcome. This semantic ambiguity bears problematic implications. It leads scholars to collapse the two and to define the outcome by the process, that is, to define democratic consolidation by "what it takes to achieve it" (Di Palma 1990b, 31). In this way, they fuse (and confuse) concept formation and causal attribution and commit what I have called elsewhere an "etimological fallacy." Out of this result expansionary definitions that equate DC with whatever one happens to identify as its necessary condition: self-inforcing rules, popular legitimacy, elite consensus, party building, whatever (see, for example, Bresser 1990; Di Palma 1990a; Higley and Gunther 1992; Linz and Stepan 1996, 7-15; Morlino 1995; Pridham 1990a and 1990b).\(^{13}\)

**Avoiding the Erosion of Democracy**

As students of DC have been rapid to recognize, focusing on the military and on classical coup politics as privileged objects of research may be morally, politically, and empirically questionable as it diverts attention from other pressing issues. Moreover, it may even turn out to be a misleading, misguided perspective that
looks for danger at the wrong places, and therefore overlooks real threats that hide elsewhere, at less traditional and less obvious sites.

Many new democracies do face the quasi-traditional threat of illegal or pseudo-legal overthrow by antidemocratic forces. But in addition to the risk of breakdown, of dramatic, sudden, and visible relapses to authoritarian rule, many neo-democracies have to manage the danger of decay, of less spectacular, more incremental, and less transparent forms of regression to semi-authoritarian rule. While the former provokes a radical discontinuity at the central frontstage of democratic politics (leading to open authoritarianism), the latter implies a gradual corrosion at its backstage (leading to fuzzy semi-democracy, to some hybrid regime somewhere in the middle of the road between liberal democracy and dictatorship). The former stands at the center of our first concept of democratic consolidation, the latter forms the normative core of our second one, its dominant concern, its defining horizon of avoidance.

It was Guillermo O’Donnell who at the end of the 1980s put forward the first explicit formulation of this extended understanding of DC. In his seminal essay “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes” (O’Donnell 1992) he drew attention to the threat of silent regressions from democracy to semidemocratic rule and built the withering away of related concerns into his (broad) definition of democratic consolidation (see ibid., 48). Emphasizing the temporal dimension of his observation, he proposed to distinguish between “rapid deaths” and “slow deaths” of democracy. While the
former referred to classical coup politics, O’Donnell described
the latter as “a progressive diminution of existing spaces for
the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness of the
classic guarantees of liberal constitutionalism” (ibid., 19), as a
“slow and at times opaque” (ibid.) “process of successive
authoritarian advances” (ibid., 33) which in the end would lead to
a demogradura, a repressive façade democracy (see ibid., 19 and
33).

Was has happen since the publication of O’Donnell’s article? Well,
an ironic version would celebrate that quite some new democracies
do not face the danger any more of retroceding to semidemocratic
rule – because it is there were they have moved to already. In
other words, for these polities, democratic erosion is no risk any
more because it has become a reality. Irony aside, the continuing
political relevance of the issue is quite evident. In a recent
article, Samuel Huntington even went so far as to assert that with
contemporary neo-democracies, “the problem is not overthrow but
erosion: the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by
those elected to lead it” (Huntington 1996, 9) (even though his
notion of democratic erosion is substantially wider than the one
developed here and includes, for instance, executive led-coups).

Together with their rising concern about the dangers of democratic
erosion, students of DC have improved their knowledge about
different routes “slow deaths” of democracies may take and about
different destinations (hybrid regimes) they may arrive at. The
reassertion of military supremacy emphasized by O’Donnell is only
one possibility, even if a very real one. Other forms of erosion
attack other institutional pillars of democracy. For example, state violence as well as state absence may subvert the rule of law; the rise of hegemonic parties may suffocate electoral competition; the decay of electoral institutions may affect the honesty of vote counting; incumbents may use their privileged access to state resources and to mass media in ways that violate minimum standards of electoral fairness and equal opportunity; or exclusionary citizenship laws may run against democratic norms of inclusiveness.

**Institutionalizing Democracy**

The two concepts of democratic consolidation I have discussed so far - DC 1 (avoiding democratic breakdown) and DC 2 (avoiding democratic erosion) - represent variants of “negative” consolidation. They both try to prevent democratic regressions towards a (negatively valued) horizon of avoidance. Symmetrically, the last two notions of democratic consolidation on my list of five - DC 4 (democratic completion) and DC 5 (democratic deepening) - represent varieties of “positive” consolidation. They both try to achieve democratic progress towards a (positively valued) horizon of attainment. But *tertium datur*. In between the two polar concept families lies, in an uneasy intermediate position, a “neutral” concept of democratic consolidation: the institutionalization of democracy.

Democratic institutionalization is meant here to describe two things basically: all those approaches that identify democratic consolidation with actors becoming less and less conscious of the
contingency of democratic institutions ("sociological institutionalization"); and all those approaches that look beyond democracy’s basic rules of the game and equate DC with the construction of specific institutions on meso or micro levels ("subsystemic institutionalization").

The former perspective imports a sociological view of institutions into consolidation studies, and considers democracy to be consolidated when certain modes of perception settle in, or more precisely perhaps, when certain modes of nonperception settle in. According to this conceptualization, in a consolidating democracy actors begin to perceive democratic institutions as part of the "normal" or "natural" order of things, as something familiar, taken for granted, beyond everyday reflection and concern, a simple element of practical knowledge. In an early formulation of this institutionalist perspective, Philippe Schmitter described democratic consolidation as a process "transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged [during transition] into structures, i.e. into relationships that are reliably known, regularly practiced and habitually accepted" (Schmitter 1988, 12).

"The genus of social processes of which DC is a subspecies has been given a number of labels. ‘Structuration’ is the currently fashionable one [...]. Routinization, institutionalization and stabilization – not to mention reification – were concepts earlier used to refer to congate phenomenon. The basic idea common to all of these is that social relations can become social structures, i.e. patterns of interaction can become so regular in their occurrence, so endowed with meaning, so capable of motivating behavior that they become autonomous in their internal functioning and resistant to externally induced change.” (ibid., 10)
Other common terms that describe essentially the same process are “habituation” (see Rustow 1970, 358–61) and “internalization” (see Whitehead 1989, 79). The basic point is that, whatever the label, democratic “institutionalization” is a demanding process, which moves beyond the usual stability requirements students of DC tend to formulate. In the field of democratic breakdown prevention, two “attitudinal” variables compete for the honorable status of preconditions to democratic sustainability: strategic acquiescence and normative consent. To this conventional pair of variables, the institutionalization of democracy adds a further, a cognitive dimension: irreflexive knowledge. Institutionalizing democracy (in the present, sociological sense) requires more than actors who play by the rules, accept these rules out of self-interest, and value them for normative reasons. It demands, in addition, that actors lose their initial consciousness regarding the contingent character of democratic institutions; that the rules of the game enter the general pool of practical knowledge; that they become an intersubjective and quasi-natural part of the individual “life-worlds.”

The second “neutral” concept of consolidation grouped under the broad heading of democratic institutionalization turns its attention from the ground rules (procedural minima) that define democratic regimes to the specific rules and organizations that define subtypes of democracy. It switches the level of analysis from regimes to subsystems, or in Philippe Schmitter’s terms, to “partial regimes” (Schmitter 1988). In this understanding, democratic consolidation comes to be synonymous with institution building, the construction of concrete, lower-level institutions,
such as forms of government, parties and party systems, legislative bodies, state bureaucracies, and systems of interest intermediation (including their internal operating procedures). It is, to my knowledge, Philippe Schmitter who deserves the credits for introducing and developing this concept of DC (see e.g. Schmitter 1988). But others have followed his track, many of them subdisciplinary specialists to whom this notion of DC provides an opportunity to link up their particular scholarly concerns with the general discussion on DC (see e.g. Liebert 1990a, 19–23; Merkel 1996; Schedler 1995, Pridham 1990, 226f. and 245f.).

Both institutionalist perspectives often go hand in hand (see, for example, Schmitter 1988 and Pridham 1990). This seems quite logical given that “sociological institutionalization” cannot progress unless prior processes of “subsystemic institutionalization” have taken place. It is hard to see how democratic habits, routines, and “natural worldviews” could develop unless it has become clear who are the basic participants and which are the concrete working rules of the democratic game. The interdependence of the two approaches becomes quite evident, for example, in Linz and Stepan’s idea of “constitutional consolidation,” which they see accomplished when all political actors “become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6, emphasis added).

Both variants of DC 3 are normatively neutral (and some authors are emphatic in stressing this neutrality, e.g. Schmitter 1988,
16) insofar they are indifferent towards the normative goals of either preventing democratic regressions or effecting democratic advances. Yet if we raise our eyes and look up from the liberal democratic point in our conceptual landscape – either “forward” to advanced democracy or “backward” to authoritarianism and semidemocracy – normative neutrality reads as normative ambivalence. It is plausible to expect in the abstract that “institutionalizing democracy” (in its double sense) may contribute to both democratic stability and democratic quality – even if its concrete contributions represent one of the many consolidological matters where more research is needed.

Completing Democracy

Liberal democracies face the “negative” challenge of preventing democratic erosion, the regression to semi-democratic rule. Semi-democratic “electoral democracies” face the symmetrical “positive” challenge of democratic completion, the attainment of full democratic rule. Students of such regimes often associate the notion of DC with this democratizing task, with the telos of moving away from some “diminished subtype” of democracy towards a “non-diminished” democracy, or as Guillermo O’Donnell put it once, with the accomplishment of a “second transition” from a democratic government to a democratic regime (see O’Donnell 1992, 18f.). In other words, when academic observers of hybrid regimes speak of DC they tend to think of the goal of completing a pending transition to democracy. In graphical terms, they tend to look not just backwards to the dangers of authoritarian regression; but also forwards to the promises of democratic progress. 16
Which are the basic actors, conflicts, and sites of democratic completion? The answer is easy: It depends. It depends on the type of “electoral democracy” in place. In Latin America, three configurations have been of special relevance. To begin with, there are those countries where the outgoing authoritarian regime was able to write certain authoritarian rules into the constitution. In such cases of constitutional defects, full democratization required these formal authoritarian legacies to be removed. The prototypical Latin American case of constitutional semidemocracy has been Chile after 1990. And the classical piece to model a general notion of DC along the Chilean fault lines was J. Samuel Valenzuela’s “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings” (1992). In his perspective, abolishing “tutelary powers,” “reserved domains,” and “major discriminations” in the electoral law, appeared as necessary ingredients of democratic consolidation. Since then, this notion of DC has received widespread attention. For instance, in their recent comparative volume, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan extensively analyse this constitution-centered type of democratic completion under the heading of “constitutional consolidation” (see Linz and Stepan 1996).\(^{17}\)

Another kind of semidemocracies which have been raising peculiar challenges of democratic consolidation-as-completion are “hegemonic party systems in transition.” In the continent, the cases are Mexico and Paraguay. What is the problem here? In nuce, the problem is how to tell at what point (authoritarian) hegemonic parties have become (democratic) dominant parties. Hegemonic parties do not and cannot lose elections, given their reliance on
state patronage, media control, repression, and “in the last instance,” on electoral fraud. Dominant parties, by contrast, do not but can, in principle, lose elections. However, as long as alternation in power, the ultimate proof of any democratic cake, remains a mere possibility and does not occur in fact, entrenched suspicions will tend to persist as to whether the incumbent party would really accept losing a national election.\textsuperscript{18}

While the constitutional legacies of military regimes as well as the structural legacies of hegemonic systems pose formidable “threshold problems” to democratizing agents, they nevertheless concern just a small handful of cases. In comparison, a third variety of DC 4 appears of more general relevance for Latin American countries: the transformation of “illiberal democracies” (Diamond 1996) where the rule of law is biased and selective (or even aleatory) into liberal democracies which effectively guarantee basic political, civil, and human rights. With the notable (and debatable) exception of the three Southern Cone countries, Latin America’s contemporary “designer democracies” (Nodia 1996) have not followed western Europe’s “organic” (ibid.) route of political development, the well-known historical sequence of state building, first, legal domestication of the state, second, and democratic domestication of the state, third. Instead, as with many other “third wave” democracies, the sequence has been inverse. Democracies have been conquered on the top of states whose presence looks partial and precarious (in both spatial and social terms) and with judicial systems in place that often cannot do much more than to administer the rule of lawlessness.\textsuperscript{19}

Correspondingly, the two key words to transcending “the illiberal
nature of ‘democracy’ in Latin America today” (Diamond 1996, 73),
read “state reform” and “judicial reform” – both fashionable terms
which have already entered the vocabulary even of international
financial agencies (see e.g. Dakolias 1996; Rowat et al. 1995).

**Deepening Democracy**

The notion of democratic consolidation just discussed – completing
the democratic transition and traveling from electoral to liberal
democracy – represents one progress-oriented “positive” version of
DC. Moving further on the “continuum of democracy” – by deepening
liberal democracy and pushing it closer to advanced democracy –
represents another, a second one. When we compare Latin America’s
contemporary democracies with (more or less rosy pictures of)
established Western democracies, the former appear as faltering on
many accounts. They appear to possess (or to be possessed by)
“comparative disadvantages” in virtually any field of democratic
politics. The list of presumptive structural deficits is endless.
It covers fields as wide and diverse as governmental performance,
public administration, judicial systems, party systems, interest
groups, civil society, political culture, and styles of decision
making. In all these and many other areas, most Latin American
democracies look “underdeveloped” by comparison. They fall short
of standards set by “advanced democracies.”

Most authors who talk about democratic consolidation either think
about our very first notion of DC, the stabilization of democracy,
or about this present notion of DC, the deepening of democracy.
These two concepts of DC are by far the most popular ones. But the
academic popularity of DC 5 comes as no surprise. Most of Latin America’s middle-aged “neo-democracies” still do have to worry about their long-term survival. But as rule, this is not an immediate concern any more. It has become just one issue among many others that command political attention. Today, in most countries, issues of democratic quality are much more salient in everyday politics than issues of democratic survival.

So, there are good political reasons for scholars to be concerned with the quality of democracy. This does not mean that equally good scientific reasons exist to use “democratic consolidation” and “democratic deepening” as synonymous terms. Yet if one chooses to do so, one should make this semantic choice clear and explicit. Wherever some more or less nebulous image of “advanced democracies” serves as the hidden telos of DC, scholars risk measuring the achievement (or not) of democratic consolidation in uncontrolled and incongruous ways (see O’Donnell 1996a, 38f., 42f.; 1996b). In any case, it is easy to agree that more research and reflection is need in the realm of democratic quality (see e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996, 457; Schedler 1996).

Conclusion

In the preceding essay I have proposed a simple way of reordering the conceptual map of consolidation studies. If we want to know what authors are talking about when they talk about democratic consolidation, I have argued, we have to look at the practical challenges they are addressing with this term. We have to look where they stand and where they want to go, or avoid going to. We
have to look at their empirical points of departure in terms of regime type (semidemocracy or liberal democracy). And we have to look at their feared or desired points of arrival (with authoritarianism and advanced democracy forming the extreme poles). If we combine these two variables of empirical viewpoints, on the one side, and normative horizons, on the other, we obtain two “negative” notions of consolidation (avoiding democratic breakdown and avoiding democratic erosion) plus two “positive” notions of consolidation (completing democracy and deepening democracy). To this conceptual quadriga I have added a fifth and “neutral” notion of DC (institutionalizing democracy).

At first sight, it is somewhat startling to find that a pivotal notion such as democratic consolidation, which after all gives its name to a whole subfield of political science, bears so many diverging meanings. Yet it is easy to explain why this semantic diffusion (and confusion) has taken hold of democratization studies. Two factors have been interacting to widen the meaning of DC. First, for all its different uses, DC does have a common denominator, a core meaning that provides a shared point of reference to the whole of consolidological literature. Most authors agree that democratic consolidation is a phase in regime change which opens the moment the prior phase of democratic transition has come to an happy ending. Some authors argue that both phases may overlap and most admit that it is hard to define precise endpoints of DC. But the basic sequential logic lies beyond serious controversy.\textsuperscript{20} Defining DC in purely temporal terms, however, does not do away with the concept’s basic teleological thrust. It just evades (and obscures) it. It leaves it up to each
individual author to fill the term with concrete meaning, to give it tangible substance. Second, if the notion of DC indeed works the way I say it does, as a broad unifying label for the study of new democracies (and near-democracies), nobody should be surprised to see scholars moving beyond narrow concerns with regime stability in order to accommodate, under the wide and permissive roof of democratic consolidation, any other democratic challenges and aspirations that happen to arise in post-transitional polities. Or the other way round, as long as DC serves as the generic term for studies in post-transition, it would be surprising to see the subdiscipline privileging one theme to the exclusion of others, and converging towards a narrow, single-issue definition of DC, whatever it is. Most observers would rapidly denounce such a one-sided agenda as empirically inappropriate, normatively annoying, politically unwise, and academically boring.

All in all, DC’s “strange multiplicity” (James Tully) of meanings is here to stay with us. It is well-protected through the boundaries of an emerging subdiscipline. And it is well-anchored in real-world problems of continuing relevance. Thus, any ambition to “legislate” the semantic field of DC into some imaginary unity seems doomed to failure. But what do we gain if we accept the given plurality of concepts? I would say it is, above all, conceptual clarity. The preceding “teleological” reconstruction of DC, the effort to distinguish, in a theory-guided and non-arbitrary way, diverging acceptances of DC on the basis of their normative goals, is itself driven by an implicit telos: making our “consolidological”
language more transparent, more intelligible, more reliable. This paper’s basic pair of questions—the empirical one, where do you stand, and the normative one, what do you want—as well as its five ensuing concepts of consolidation—deepening, completing, institutionalizing, and securing democracy against breakdown and erosion—should allow tracing clear and distinct melodies in the current Babylonian chorus of voices singing songs of democratic consolidation. Today’s discussion lacks clarity and consistency on intersubjective as well as subjective levels. Too often people employ the same word, democratic consolidation, but talk about vastly different things. Or they use the term but pack, without much concern about economy or coherence, diverging meanings into it, often overloading and confusing it. This paper, its farewell to “the consolidation of democracy” in the singular, and its corresponding embracement of “types of democratic consolidation” in the plural, should help us writing our discordant songs of DC in more conscious, more precise, and in many cases, more modest ways.22

Notes

1 To give just some examples: for simple listings of concepts, see Beyme (1995, 228) or Sorensen (1993, 45f.); for authoritative definitions, the most common conceptual strategy in the field, see Diamond (1996); Higley and Gunther (1992); Linz (1990); Linz and Stepan (1996); Mainwaring et al. (1992); Munck (1995 and 1996); Schmitter (1988); for dichotomic orderings of the debate, see Di Palma (1990a and 1990b); Pridham (1990a and 1990b); Waldrauch (1996); for implicit uses of DC, see Ágh and Kurtán (1995); McClintock (1989); Sandbrook (1996); for largely decorative uses of DC, see Baloyra (1987), Ethier (1990); Tulchin and Romero (1995); for disaggregating approaches, see Gunther et al. (1995a); Linz and Stepan (1996); Merkel (1996); Schmitter (1988 and 1993); for efforts to introduce other terms, see Dominguez and Lowenthal (1996);
Merkel et al. (1996); for observations that more research is needed, see Diamandouros et al. (1995, xii); Munck (1995 and 1996); and finally, for suggestions to trash the concept, see O’Donnell (1996a and 1996b); Przeworski et al. (1996); Schneider (1995, 219–21).

When asked, anyone will agree with this cautious note against facile assumptions of linear progress. The literature is full of warnings that nothing is certain, that reversals can happen any time, and that even “consolidated” democracies are not immune against crises, “deconsolidation,” and breakdown (see e.g. Gunther et al. 1995a, 7f.; 1996, 155; Linz and Stepan 1996, 6; Munck 1996, 13; Schmitter 1988, 4). However, when authors use the term “democratic consolidation” to describe not the telos of DC but the process that leads towards its attainment, it is hard to avoid connotations of progressive certainties creeping into the language. For instance, common expressions such as “the process of democratic consolidation” “the dynamics of democratic consolidation,” or “the logics of democratic consolidation,” (see e.g. Gunther et al. 1995a; Morlino 1995; Pridham 1990a and 1990b) tend to suggest an underlying moving reality that propels itself towards the promised lands of consolidation.


Authors who think that a democratic transition does not end with the inauguration of the first parliament but instead set later and more demanding endpoints (see, for example, Schmitter 1988) as well as those who define DC in operational terms and associate it with certain tasks (such as the diffusion of democratic values) that may begin before transitions come to an end, and even before they start (see again, for example, Schmitter 1988) challenge this (mainstream) sequential view of transition and consolidation (for a brief discussion of possible overlaps between the two phases, see Waldrauch 1996, 46–52).

On “diminished subtypes” of democracy, see Collier and Levitsky (1995).

In essence, this classification corresponds to the way Collier and Levitsky (1995) order the semantic universe of democracy and its subtypes. In their admirable effort to bring order into the close to 600 subtypes of democracy circulating in recent studies on democratization, they distinguish two “diminished subtypes” of democracy (1995, Figures 4 and 5): one “derived in relation to [a] procedural minimum definition” of democracy (my hybrid “electoral democracy”) and one “derived in relation to [a] prototypical conception of established Western democracy” (my procedural minimum “liberal democracy”).

In its narrow sense, the term is meant to describe polities that manage to hold (more or less) inclusive, clean, and competitive elections, but fail to uphold the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy (see e.g. Collier and Levitsky 1995; Diamond 1996; Hadenius 1994).

See also Collier and Levitsky who state that “for some cases that are very marginally democratic, the issue arises as to
whether it would be better to call them authoritarian, rather than democratic" (1995, 22).

9 For a general discussion of qualitative versus quantitative distinctions between authoritarianism and democracy, between distinctions in kind and distinction in degree, see Munck (1996, 20–22).

10 In this sense, the metaphor of a horizon we use below is "realistic" only for this open-ended side of our figure – the metaphor of a horizon which, after all, can never be reached but instead, moves with the walker.

11 Note that this distinction between “positive” and “negative” consolidation is different from Geoffrey Pridham’s one. He associates “negative consolidation” with securing democratic survival and “positive consolidation” with legitimizing democracy at elite and mass level (see e.g. Pridham 1995, 169). To my view, the theoretical grounds of this distinction as well as the relation between the two types of DC remain unclear.

12 Note that the bibliographical listings in the Overview Table are just illustrative. Some authors are listed more than once when they sponsor multi-dimensional notions of DC. And some classifications will be controversial. Critical comments and suggestions are highly welcome.

13 For a discussion of the “etimological fallacies” some notions of DC incur (and which I consider more distorting that their “teleological fallacies”), see Schedler (1997), in a piece dedicated to the definition and operationalization of DC 1.

14 For “strategic” views that emphasize incentive compatibility, see, for example, Przeworski (1988) and Di Palma (1990a). For “normative” views that stress legitimacy, see, for example, Diamond (1996), Linz and Stepan (1996), Munck (1996), Pridham (1995).

15 I think it is misleading to describe this change in the level of analysis as a “disaggregation” of (see e.g. Schneider 1995, 220f.). After all, the relation between fundamental rules and secondary rules is not a relation between sum and parts (as the term disaggregation suggests) but more a relation between, say, basis and superstructure.

16 In such situations of incomplete democracy, talking about democratic consolidation implies hoping for advances towards full democracy. However, when such expectations of democratic progress do not materialize, students of consolidation (or non-consolidation) tend to express this frustration with notions such as democratic “sclerosis” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1996, 42) or democratic “freezing” (Karl 1995) – which represents, in a way, the equivalent of DC 3 in electoral democracies: the institutionalization of semi-democratic rule.

17 Note, however, that Linz and Stepan’s actual analysis is often inconsistent with their own term. For example, they classify Chile (correctly, I think) as an “incomplete democracy” and not as a “constitutionally unconsolidated” one (as their notion of “constitutional consolidation” would have suggested). The same thing with Portugal’s military Council of the Revolution (until 1982) and with Estonia and Latvia’s exclusionary citizenship laws. The reason for this inconsistency is simple: Linz and
Stepan’s term “constitutional consolidation” is at odds with their own prior assumption that liberal democracy forms the indispensable starting point of DC (see Linz and Stepan 1996, 3–6).

18 I have borrowed the (again, teleological) notion of “hegemonic party systems in transition” from Mainwaring and Scully (1995). For a seminal discussion of “hegemonic party systems,” see Sartori (1976, 230–38). On “dominant parties” see, for example, Duverger (1964, 341) and Pempel (1988).

19 It is quite instructive to take a look at the “Map of Freedom” published regularly in the Freedom House “Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties.” In the 1995–96 report, of all Latin America, only Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Panama are colored white, indicating their status as “free” countries. All the remaining countries appear in grey shades, expressing their lower ranking as no more than “partly free” polities (see Freedom House 1996, 99).

20 For some brief remarks on sequence versus simultaneity of transition and consolidation, see note 4 above.

21 The allusion is to Zygmunt Bauman’s (1991) distinction between “legislative” and “interpretive” reason.

22 And as a sort of postscriptum: Drawing clear distinctions between different concepts of DC may also serve as a starting point for reopening the debate on alternative semantic choices. I am personally inclined to reserve the term DC exclusively to its two “negative” varieties, preventing “rapid” and “slow” deaths of democracy. The main argument that supports such a language preference is empirical: the availability of alternatives. At least for the two “positive” types of DC, we dispose of alternative labels which are more precise and even more elegant, namely, completing and deepening democracy (with the concrete borderline between the two depending on the notion of democracy one adopts).

References


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