Sustaining Authoritarian Rule:
Democratization Theory Meets Cuba

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Introduction

Democratization theories have focused on successful transitions to democracy without considering the factors that sustain authoritarian rule. The opposite of a transition to democracy is not a transition to authoritarianism, but rather stable authoritarian rule. To help sort through the seemingly endless variables that are said to promote a democratic transition, scholars should examine cases of stable authoritarianism. Good research design and elementary logic require that scholars examine all outcomes on the dependent variable (transition to democracy). In other words, countries that have undergone a transition to democracy should be compared with each other, but also with countries that have not experienced such a transition.

This paper examines Cuba — the clearest case of sustained authoritarian rule in Latin America — with the aim of evaluating and amending key hypotheses about the causes of democratization. Cuba is an important case not only because it is a prominent anomaly but also because it has experienced many of the causal forces that are often associated with democratization, without in fact democratizing.

I argue that evidence from Cuba supports theories that stress the importance of leadership strategies, regime divisions, civil society, and legitimacy in democratic transitions. Theories that rely on structural factors such as socioeconomic development, economic crisis, and the international environment do not fare well and need to be amended. Rather than discarding these theoretical propositions entirely, I argue that structural factors are mediated in specific and predictable ways by public beliefs and historical experience.

The paper is organized as follows. I first discuss the shopping-list problem of independent variables in democratization theory, and argue that democratization theorists need to examine cases of stable, authoritarian rule. I then offer an overview of the Cuban case, arguing that Cuba should not be viewed as a special case that is incomparable with others in the world. The next section turns to an evaluation of three
favorable structural factors that are present in Cuba, yet have not produced a transition to democracy. In the fourth section, I evaluate actor-oriented theories and find that the actors hypothesized to promote democratization have a weak presence in Cuba. Their absence can help explain the lack of a transition to democracy, but also suggests that some deeper force may have prevented their emergence. The forces that actively sustain authoritarian rule in Cuba — leadership and legitimacy — are the topic of the next section, followed by some concluding remarks.

**Democratization Theory and Negative Cases**

As democracy has proliferated in a variety of countries around the world, so have explanations of democratic transition. Many theorists attempting to explain democratization offer a long "shopping list" of independent variables with little attempt to relate them to one another. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1989, 1990) — the editors and authors behind one of the most ambitious and well-known comparative projects of democratic transition — began with 49 theoretical propositions, which they consolidated into ten "theoretical dimensions" affecting democratic transition. Many of these ten dimensions are aggregates, combinations, or categories of smaller, more discrete variables (e.g. the political institutions dimension includes party system, party institutional strength, presidentialism/parliamentarianism, and judicial independence). The ten theoretical dimensions include causal factors as diverse as political leadership, ethnic conflict, and economic performance.

Viewed in aggregate, democratization theory resembles a grocery story shopping list. It may be overstatement — but not by much — to say that scholars would be hard-pressed to come up with variables that have not been identified as contributors to democracy. To be sure, some authors are more parsimonious and selective, and a few

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1 For reviews of the democratization literature making this critique, see Remmer (1991) and Schneider (1995).
have even produced unified theories of democratization. These more parsimonious analyses, however, tend to introduce new variables without rejecting old ones, or to highlight some of the more discrete variables that fit into the broad categories offered by Diamond, Linz, and Lipset.  

The shopping-list problem arises in part from theorists failure to consider negative cases of democratic transition. Most democratization theories have been built around successful cases of democratic transition. One recent review of large-scale comparative democratization projects notes that “focusing on the similarities [among democratic countries] poses analytic problems because the lack of variation on the dependent variable can inhibit theory building. If the outcome (democracy) is the same in a variety of cases, then in the absence of explicit methodological strategies such as a comparison of most different cases, it is usually difficult to reject competing explanations” (Schneider 1995, 229). Schneider argues that democratization theory would be more imaginative and more persuasive if scholars examined divergent cases more closely.

The lack of variation in the dependent variable is common-sense research design problem, and yet seems widely ignored. As King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 129) argue, “When observations are selected on the basis of a particular value of the dependent variable, nothing whatsoever can be learned about the causes of the dependent variable without taking into account other instances when the dependent variable takes on other values.” Without examining cases of on-going authoritarianism, scholars cannot sort through the independent variables that produce democracy. The result is a large number of studies, each highlighting a different set of factors that contribute to democracy.

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2 By way of example, Alvarez (1992) and Keck (1992) focus parsimoniously on certain social groups as factors in democratization while Rueschemeyer and others (1992) develop an unified theory of capitalist development and democracy.
To be sure, some large comparative studies of democratization have included cases with negative outcomes. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset’s original study of democracy included Mexico, Chile, Indonesia, and Nigeria — all authoritarian at the time of the writing. At the same time, the editors (1989, xxii) deliberately excluded countries "with no prior democratic or semidemocratic experience, or no prospect of a democratic opening" (leading them to exclude the Eastern European countries that would shortly become democratic). This exclusion means that they built a bias into their study by selecting partly on the dependent variable, thereby eliminating opportunities to sort through the importance of their independent variables. Further, their theoretical discussion remained focused on democracy. They sought explanations for why democracy had occurred in the study countries — either historically or currently — and why democracy had broken down. Their theoretical discussion largely excluded stable periods of authoritarian rule; in other words, it excluded an examination of negative outcomes on the dependent variable. The opposite of a transition to democracy is not a breakdown of democracy, but rather the lack of a transition to democracy.

To help sort through the large number of theories and hypotheses about democratization, scholars would do well to bring negative outcomes (i.e., stable authoritarian rule) into the analysis. I do so in this paper by focusing on Cuba. Although it is only a single "case," the Cuban regime has survived over a long time the rise and fall of many of the forces hypothesized to cause democratic transitions. As a result, it offers scholars a large number of observations on different values of the independent variables over time.\(^3\)

\(^3\)See King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 217-24) for a discussion on the importance of increasing the number of observations within a single case study and on the strategy of examining a single country over time.
regimes to democratizing countries should allow scholars to identify variables that
don't have as much causal force as they are thought to have when only positive cases of
transition are studied. Considering an anomaly like Cuba can offer scholars insights
into the conditions under which causal variables operate and fail to operate (Van Evera
1997, 23).

It is important to recognize the limitations of this exercise. Examining
democratization theories by applying them to a negative outcome like Cuba does not
provide a decisive test that can "score a clean knock-out over a theory" (Eckstein 1975
127). This is true in part because democratization theories do not have high levels of
certainty or uniqueness (Van Evera 1997, 31). In other words, democratization theories
are probabilistic rather than deterministic, and any number of factors can be used to
explain democratization. Cuba can be used to help scholars sort through the conditions
under which a probable theoretical statement operates. The case can also be used to
stimulate new thinking and insights about the causes of democratization by
introducing new patterns of events that contrast with well-known cases of
democratization. In short, an examination of Cuba can "weigh in the total balance of
evidence" (Van Evera 1997, 32) and stimulate new ideas, but cannot by itself provide
decisive evidence for or against any particular theory (King, Keohane and Verba 1994,
217-24).

**Overview of the Cuban Case**

Within Latin America, Cuba offers the clearest and most intriguing case of a
surviving authoritarian regime. In the last decade alone, Cuba has survived intense
U.S. pressure, the regional spread of democracy, the disappearance of its key
international allies, economic collapse, widespread popular discontent, and the rebirth
of some independent associational life. Many observers — journalists, politicians,
activists — have been forecasting the collapse of the Cuban regime at least since the end
of the Cold War, yet Cuba persists.
In contrast to the pronouncements of U.S. politicians and Cuban-American leaders, most scholarly analysts do not foresee a Cuban transition to democracy in the short to medium term — though it is probably inevitable in the long run (Pérez-Stable 1997, 33-36). Indeed, even in the early 1990s — when Cuba was at the height of its worst economic crisis since the Revolution — many scholars were predicting Castro’s political survival (Baloyra 1993; Griffin 1992; Schulz 1993; Zimbalist 1992). An examination of Cuba, then, might help analysts sort through the democratization variables to identify which ones are present in Cuba and yet have failed to produce a transition to democracy, and conversely to identify which factors are absent from Cuba which might have produced a transition.

To engage in this exercise, we must first reject the argument that Cuba is a special case with unique forces that do not operate elsewhere, rendering Cuba fundamentally incomparable to other countries. Cuba undoubtedly differs from other Latin American countries in important ways. These distinctions, however, should not be overdrawn. As Baloyra and Morris (1993, 1-14) argue, all regimes — not just Cuba — are unique in some important way, and Cuba shares much in common with both Eastern Europe and Latin America. The point of scholarship is to sort out systematic from non-systematic causes of political phenomena. Cuba shares some important independent variables that scholars have argued are important in democratic transitions. These include economic decline, comparatively high standards of living, relative equality, low levels of racial/ethnic tensions, and strong international pressures.

While Cuban specialists have produced a high-quality literature, they have generally failed to engage the dominant theoretical debates within the broader regime transitions literature. A few scholars have compared Cuba to socialist countries in Eastern Europe, using an inductive comparative method to tease out factors that make Cuba different (Linden 1993; Mesa-Lago and Fabian 1993; Radu 1995). These analysts, however, have not then used their findings to modify, support, or cast doubt on the
broader theoretical literature. The time seems ripe for comparativists to consider Cuba and for Cuba specialists to explicitly engage broader theoretical debates.

In the remainder of this paper I first consider independent variables expected to produce regime change that are present in Cuba, yet obviously lacking in results. I then examine two factors expected to produce regime change which are absent from Cuba; namely, soft-line factions and strong social groups. Finally, this paper looks at factors that actively sustain authoritarian rule in Cuba: leadership and legitimacy.

The Failure of Structural Factors?

In contrast to the first “wave” of democratization literature in the late 1980s and in response to repeated criticisms, more recent analyses have turned to economic structures as the principal causes of regime change. The Cuban case, however, presents important difficulties for some central structural variables. Despite socio-economic development, economic crisis, and a favorable international environment — all structural factors associated with democratization — Cuba remains stubbornly authoritarian. The negative example of the Cuba, however, should not lead scholars to discard these structural theories altogether. Rather, a study of Cuba suggests some ways in which choices and beliefs mediate the effect of structural factors.

Socioeconomic Development

Numerous studies have shown a strong correlation between level of economic development and democracy, leading a wide variety of scholars to hypothesize that development produces democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 77). Not surprisingly, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990, 19) give some of their strongest support to this idea:

4 For earlier critiques of the agent-oriented literature, see Bermeo (1990), Karl (1990), MacEwan (1990), and Remmer (1991). For a review of more recent literature with a stronger structural orientation, see Schneider (1995).
"The evidence indicates that the most common and in the long run probably the most important effect of rapid socioeconomic development under authoritarian rule has been to generate pressures and create social structural conditions more conducive to democracy." Few scholars dispute this argument, but the difficulty lies in specifying the causal chain that leads from development to democracy. Huntington (1991, 65-6) identifies five factors that increase as a result of development, and that in turn produce democracy: civic culture, literacy rates, resources for distribution and accommodation, international influence, and the middle class. More parsimoniously, Rueschemeyer and others (1992) focus on a capitalist middle class while Diamond and others (1990) prefer to highlight higher levels of social equality as the causal mechanism.

If economic development produces democracy by reducing social inequalities and increasing literacy, then Cuba is a stunning anomaly. Cuba's post-revolutionary achievements in socioeconomic development are well known, though they have eroded in recent years (Eckstein 1994, 128-48). In 1989, Cuban per capita GDP stood at $1,641, good enough to place ninth in Latin America, ahead of other democratizers such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Cuba's education system is known for high enrollment levels, low student-teacher ratios and the high literacy rates it produces. Further, Cuba's life expectancy and infant mortality rates ranked first in Latin America in 1990 (Eckstein 1994, 224-7).

Why have well-educated, egalitarian Cubans failed to produce democracy? One answer is to focus on the importance of a capitalist middle class. Rueschemeyer and others (1992, 185) argue that the middle class was “the driving force behind the initial establishment of democracy” in Latin America. It is not clear from their argument, however, why a capitalist middle class would push for democracy while a socialist working class would not. The Cuban working class shares many characteristics with

5 See the table in Eckstein (1994, 220) and the World Bank's World Tables.
capitalist middle classes, including higher levels of education and gradually increasing standards of living. Why does one class demand democracy while the other remains quiescent? Why does capitalist development produce democracy, but not socialist development? In brief, the Cuban case raises questions about why middle classes support democracy. Some of the reasons offered by theorists — increasing living standards and higher literacy rates — exist among Cubans yet have not resulted in demands for democracy.

Another possible answer has to do with the historical association between regime type and level of development. The more "democratic" period in Cuban history was marked by uneven economic development, especially widespread disparities between rural and urban areas. "When Batista was deposed, over 40 percent of the rural population was illiterate, less than 10 percent of rural homes had electricity, and less than 3 percent of rural households had indoor plumbing. Malnutrition was widespread, and there were only three general hospitals in the countryside" (Eckstein 1994, 18). Socialist authoritarianism, on the other hand, has produced social equality and a higher standard of living — although both achievements have been undermined in the 1990s. The Cuban regime constantly reinforces these images of a miserable pre-Revolutionary life through the media and the educational system. To the extent that Cubans buy into the argument that the Revolution has improved their lives — and there is evidence that a large number of Cubans believe this (de la Fuente and Glasco 1997; Domínguez 1993b; Pérez-Stable 1993; Smith 1996) — they are less interested in demanding democracy. The current economic problems in Latin American democracies certainly don't help persuade Cubans of the virtue of democracy.

If correct, this answer raises serious problems with arguments that focus on socioeconomic development as causes of democracy. It suggests that educated and equal citizens are more politically agnostic than theories of social development suggest. Rather than demanding self-government, they will tolerate or even support an
authoritarian system as long as it raises their standard of living. Mexico is another country where an authoritarian regime has guided the development process without significant social mobilization for democracy until it became clear that the regime's economic policy had faltered badly. Asian countries like Indonesia and Singapore provide additional evidence of political agnostic middle classes. In sum, Cuba and other cases raise the possibility that levels of socioeconomic development are mediated by historical experience and people's beliefs about which regime types are likely to further the development process.

**Economic Crisis**

Huntington (1991, 72) makes the clear, concise, and common-sense argument that moderate levels of socio-economic development combined with short-term economic decline have created “the economic formula most favorable to the transition from authoritarian to democratic government.” In countries where people are relatively well off (Huntington suggests a GDP between $1,000 and $3,000) and expect to continue to improve their lives, economic recession creates the political unrest necessary to induce democratic change. Examples might include Brazil in the 1970s and 80s and Mexico in the 1990s.

The hypothesis of economic decline fails in the Cuban case. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of subsidies to Cuba caused immense economic suffering and induced a deep recession. The gross domestic product fell between 35 percent and 48 percent from 1989-93; real salaries dropped by 50 percent; and as much as a third of the labor force was unemployed (Mesa-Lago 1997, 41). These macro-economic figures cannot describe the suffering of the Cuban people in the mid-1990s as

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6For thorough analyses of Cuba's economic plight in the wake of the Soviet collapse, see Cardoso and Helwege (1992) and Mesa-Lago (1993).
they often lacked everyday necessities such as adequate food, electricity, oil-powered transportation, and prescription drugs. Cuba has now passed through the most difficult part of the recession and is again enjoying economic growth, although recovery has been slow and painful.

Cuba demonstrates that economic shock is not a sufficient cause of regime change. A glance at other transitions suggests that economic decline is not even a necessary cause. Haggard and Kaufman’s (1992) survey of 21 countries found that only eight regime transitions (either to or from democracy) were associated with economic recession. As a result, they (1992, 324) hypothesize that the effects of economic crisis are mediated by two factors: 1-the regime’s level of institutionalization; and 2-the degree of regime unity. High levels of institutionalization and unity insulate regimes from sharp economic decline, providing them with stability. Linz and Stepan (1996, 76-81), by contrast, suggest that the mediating factor is legitimacy. Saying that it is "difficult or impossible to make systematic statements about the effect of economics on democratization processes," they argue that regimes with high levels of legitimacy are more likely to withstand economic crisis for several years while those with low levels of legitimacy are more likely to fall quickly.

What insights can be gleaned by adding Cuba to the list of countries studied? The Cuban experience offers strong evidence against the institutionalization argument. Cuba’s institutions are remarkably personalized and weak, and grew weaker throughout the economic crisis (Centeno and Font 1997; Domínguez 1994). Regime unity, on the other hand, is extremely high in Cuba, as I discuss below in the section on soft-line factions. Unlike other Latin American authoritarian regimes, Cuba did not possess an independent business sector that broke with the regime in times of crisis. Nor did Cuba possess the moderate opposition groups who became key allies of regime dissenters in other Latin American countries.
Finally, the Cuban regime arguably entered its economic crisis in 1989 with relatively high levels of legitimacy (see the section on legitimacy below for a discussion), thus offering support for Linz and Stepan’s argument. The difficulty is that Linz and Stepan mistakenly equate legitimacy with democratic governance. Cuba (along with a variety of other countries around the world, e.g., Islamic nations) suggests that authoritarian regimes can also claim some level of legitimacy that helps insulate them from economic crisis.

In sum, legitimacy and regime unity emerge as two key variables that condition the impact of structural economic forces on democratization. In Cuba, these forces were apparently even strong enough to blunt the impact of one of Latin America’s sharpest economic contractions.

International Factors

Early analyses of democratic transitions downplayed the importance of international factors. Conventional wisdom suggested that regime transition was essentially a domestic process, with international forces acting at the margin. Over time, however, analysts began to see regional patterns of regime transition, suggesting that some international forces were at work.7 Pressure from the United States an Europe, transnational human rights and democracy groups, “demonstration effects,” the collapse of regional hegemons, and regional economic crises have been identified as some of the international factors that induce democratic change.

Most, if not all, of these forces are at work in the Cuban case. The United States, of course, exerts overwhelming pressure on Cuba in many different ways: trade and finance embargos, endless propaganda streams, and attempts at diplomatic isolation

7 Critiques calling for the inclusion of international factors include MacEwan (1990), Shin (1994), and Smith (1991).
and ridicule. Even European and Latin American countries — despite their position of engaging Cuba economically — have condemned the authoritarian regime for its human rights abuses and used diplomatic methods to promote change. Vigorous non-governmental groups ensure that Cuban human rights abuses remain in the international spotlight. Latin American economic difficulties of the 1980s and 90s have not bypassed Cuba, and plenty of examples of successful democratic transitions exist.

None of these factors has produced any notable impact on Cuba's political system, and some may have even strengthened it. As Domínguez (1996, 297-99) has eloquently argued, self-determination (sovereignty) is Castro's only remaining achievement and is tightly bound up in Cubans' identities. For many Cubans, "To oppose Fidel meant to oppose national sovereignty, which is the revolution's central legacy; to oppose national sovereignty was to deny the very meaning of their lives" (Domínguez 1996, 298).

As with social and economic structures, the Cuban case can help scholars sort through conditions that blunt the effects of the international environment. Cuba's recent history suggests that domestic economic conditions matter little for international pressures. While it is reasonable to expect that authoritarian rule is more likely to buckle under international pressure during times of domestic economic weakness, Cuba survived some of the strongest international pressure ever exerted on a country at the same time that it passed through deep economic recession.

At the same time, Cuba lacks independent social groups that could take advantage of the international pressures. If it is true that the "confluence of domestic and international factors" (Shin 1994, 153) characterizes recent transitions to democracy and that "the strengthening of civil society" (Shin 1994, 152) is one of the key factors in the collapse of authoritarian rule, then the absence of Cuban social groups is indeed a significant obstacle to the effectiveness of international pressures. In many other new democracies, international actors have simply bypassed the authoritarian regime to work directly with opposition groups. Those groups, in turn, have magnified
international pressure by squeezing the regime from below. The absence of independent social groups in Cuba impedes that process and suggests a crucial condition under which international pressure works.

The Absence of Key Actors

Two key actors or sets of actors theorized to lead to regime transition are absent from Cuba: a soft-line regime faction and strong social groups. Their absence means that we have non-events in both the independent and dependent variables. In other words, the actors that promote democracy are absent, and democratization is also absent. When compared with countries that possessed a strong soft-line faction and underwent democratization, this double-absence offers some additional support for actor-oriented theories. At the same time, the absence of democratizing actors raises questions about whether there are deeper historical or structural factors that account for their absence — especially when they have been present in many other Latin American transitions.

Soft-Liners

Analyses of change in authoritarian rule and transitions to democracy have repeatedly emphasized the importance of factions within the governing coalition. A O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 19) put it, “we assert that there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence — direct or indirect — of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself.”

One of the most important and common divisions arising in authoritarian regimes is the split between soft-liners and hard-liners. I use these terms to refer to different

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8 See, for example, Huntington 1968, 231-263; O'Donnell 1979; Przeworski 1986; Stepan 1986; Stepan 1988.
actor preferences with respect to long-term regime strategies. The essence of soft-liners is:

... their increasing awareness that the regime they helped to implant, and in which they usually occupy important positions, will have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation. To this the soft-liners add that, if its eventual legitimation is to be feasible, the regime cannot wait too long before reintroducing certain freedoms, at least to the extent acceptable to moderate segments of the domestic opposition and of international public opinion (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 16).9

Soft-liners do not necessarily believe in the principle of democratic elections, but they realize that such elections are an essential feature of modern political life. Strategically, they believe that the best way to preserve the authoritarian regime in the long run is to implement a gradual process of political liberalization that can be controlled from above through new political institutions. In this way, the regime can mollify international and moderate domestic critics and avoid the risk of strong, widespread opposition.

9 Many scholars scoff at the notion of a soft-line faction, pointing out that this faction still favors a repressive state and is "soft" only in comparison with the extremely repressive, amoral security officials whose thirst for terror knows few bounds. The point is well-taken and perhaps the term "soft" is not the best possible descriptor. This critique, however, does not attack the heart of O'Donnell and Schmitter's definition in which soft-liners are those who worry about the long-term legitimacy of the regime and consequently support a strategy of controlled liberalization.
The best available evidence suggests that soft-liners are essentially absent from the upper reaches of the Cuban regime (del Agüilia 1994). A close reading of public pronouncements of top Cuban leaders reveals an absence of reform ideas and a profound silence on questions of Cuba's political future. The last high-ranking official to speak publicly in ways that suggested soft-line thinking was Carlos Aldana, who spoke favorably of Mikhail Gorbachev's brand of reform Communism and who even suggested that dissidents might participate in parliamentary elections (Domínguez 1993a, 120-4; Schulz 1993, 104-5). In December 1991, however, Aldana issued a mea culpa and harshly attacked the dissidents. His about-face did not save him, as he was removed from office nine months later and disappeared from view.

Another key indicator of the lack of a soft-line faction is the ongoing crackdown on Cuban social scientists which was initiated in 1996. In the early 1990s, Cuban social scientists — many of them affiliated with the Centro de Estudios sobre América — began developing ideas about how to make Cuba's political institutions more participatory and more democratic. Their ideas and arguments, which were often published in the Center's journal, Cuadernos de Nuestra América, adopted classic soft-

\footnote{It is of course difficult — but not impossible — to diagnose the presence of soft-liners in an authoritarian regime because individual leaders are under strong pressure to preserve unanimity. Nevertheless, soft-liners in other countries have floated reform ideas or quietly changed government policies within their area of responsibility in ways that make them identifiable.}

\footnote{I make this assessment based on a review of the Cuban press in recent months and years. Although the Cuban media often fully reproduce the text of the speeches of the Castro brothers and other top leaders, observers search in vain for hints of reform ideas. The most important media sources are Granma, Juventud Rebelde, Trabajadores, and Bohemia.
They called for more representative institutions, for greater pluralism, and for a stronger rule of law — all in the name of strengthening and reforming the current socialist system.

These ideas and arguments caught the attention of the Cuban regime, which quickly clamped down on them. In March 1996, the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party issued a Report in which implied that CEA scholars were fifth-columnists, counter-revolutionaries, and imperialist pawns (Cuba 1996). The report, which was first read by Raúl Castro and then printed in Granma, marked the beginning of a broad crackdown on Cuban academics with foreign contacts and reformist tendencies. The regime harassed the CEA scholars into silence, dispersed them to a variety of academic institutions, and installed a hard-liner at the helm of the CEA. Given this punishing crackdown on scholars that do not hold high-level political positions, it is difficult to imagine that any regime official expresses soft-liner views, even if some may secretly hold them.

The lack of a soft-line faction raises the question of why Cuba has failed to develop a leadership schism that was so common in many other Latin American countries. Even in comparison to other Latin American authoritarian regimes, Cuba is remarkably free of political factions and internal political debate. Of the South American authoritarian regimes, Chile was the most centralized under one-man rule. Yet soft-liners still emerged early in the regime, made public pronouncements in favor of alternative political futures, and gained important influence with President Augusto Pinochet (Valenzuela 1991).

Why has a soft-line faction failed to emerge in Cuba? Is it a product of chance or is some deeper force at work? Two possibilities immediately suggest themselves. First,

Castro has simply been more skillful at managing his subordinates and stomping out dissenting views than most other leaders. The 1989 trials of several prominent officials — including the popular and well-known war hero Arnaldo Ochoa, who was executed by firing squad — demonstrated to potential high-level dissenters that Castro could destroy anyone's career if he chose to. It was not even clear that Ochoa was challenging Castro's power or held soft-line views; it was simply enough that he was capable of doing so.

Second, Cuba lacks the political norms and the domestic political traditions which would foster the growth of a soft-line faction. Soft-liners' principal argument is that the regime should have a base of popular support demonstrated through the ballot box. This argument makes sense in countries with more established traditions of electoral politics, as in the Southern Cone. Cuba's political traditions and norms, however, mitigate against such an argument being taken seriously. Castro has established other methods of determining popular support for himself or his policies, including demonstrations, rallies, marches, and meetings of the mass organizations. Prior to 1959, elections in Cuba were not accurate measures of public support but rather corrupt exercises in self-promotion. Cuba re-instituted limited electoral processes in the mid-1970s and has expanded their scope in recent years. Nevertheless, these elections are not used to choose Communist Party leaders where real power lies; nor do Cubans vote directly for Castro in his role as president.

Civil Society

13 See Oppenheimer (1992, Part I) for a journalistic account of the trials.

14 For a fascinating debate on the Cuban electoral system complete with a wide range of critiques from both Cuban and U.S. scholars, see Dilla (1995).
Although early analyses of regime change emphasized elite leadership and bargaining, much subsequent work has focused on an endless variety of grassroots social groups as important causes of regime transition. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990, 22) argue that "Where associational life is dense, institutionalized, and autonomous, it may also undermine authoritarian rule and generate effective pressure for democratization. . . ." On the flip side, "As a strong and autonomous associational life may buttress or foster democracy, so the absence of a vigorous sector of voluntary associations and interest groups, or the control of such organizations by a corporatist state, may reinforce authoritarian rule and obstruct the development of democracy."

Cuba offers support for these observations. Associational life in Cuba is remarkably shallow, weak, and state-controlled, although it is becoming less so over time (Domínguez 1997, 15-19; Domínguez 1994, 8-16). Prior to 1990, only a very small number of social groups and minimal economic activity existed beyond state control. In the first half of the 1990s, the growth of NGOs was "explosive," with some 2,200 NGOs in existence by 1994 (Gunn 1995). Most of these groups, however, had very small memberships and many were not entirely non-governmental but rather front groups under government control (Gunn 1995). Economic activity beyond state control increased rapidly during this same time period (Pérez-López 1997, 172-9), and may help drive the increase in social groups as people learn to create trust and associations outside the state's control.

The absence of independent social groups raises questions about the conditions facilitating civil society growth and the exact nature of the relationship between civil society and democratization. Has Cuba alone, out of all the Latin American countries, failed to develop a strong civil society? Why have other countries developed strong civil societies? If others do not have strong civil societies, how did they become democracies? Is it necessary that a strong civil society develop prior to a democratic
transition, or can its development occur simultaneously? Or is civil society more important for democratic stability than it is for democratization in the first place?

These questions suggest that scholars should take a step back in the causal chain. We have innumerable arguments that vigorous social groups contribute to democratic change, but few arguments about the ways in which a strong civil society develops or factors that prohibit it from developing. The Cuban case suggests that a historical revolution is, paradoxically, a constraint on the development of an independent civil society. Social and political upheaval in Cuba paved the way for a strong state to dominate the formation of social groups in the 1960s. Mexico — another country with a comparatively state-dependent civil society until recently — also passed through a social revolution and the subsequent building of a strong state. Thus, it is possible that historical experience with social upheaval is a determinant of the strength of civil society and should be factored into theories of regime transition.

Factors Sustaining Authoritarian Rule

The absence of soft-line factions and social groups may be seen as permissive factors that facilitate stable authoritarian rule. I now turn to an examination of factors that actively work to maintain authoritarian rule in the face of economic and international forces that have assaulted Cuba in the past decade.

Regime Leadership/Strategies

Although political leaders are undoubtedly constrained by surrounding structures and institutions, Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990, 15) argue that leadership is a central force in the stability or breakdown of democratic regimes. "The more constraining and unfavorable are the structural circumstances, the more skillful, innovative, courageous, and democratically committed must political leadership be for democracy to survive."

The same argument can be made about authoritarian rule. Although he is more often adopted by international relations scholars, Machiavelli was one of the first
students of authoritarian rule. His best-known work, The Prince, is centered on the proposition that good leadership produces a stable authoritarian polity. Authoritarian elites often face difficult structural and institutional constraints, including economic decline, waning legitimacy, opposition movements and organizations, and even their own rhetoric promising more participation and democracy. Some authoritarian elites deal more skillfully with these crises than others, as evidenced by the contrasting cases of Chile and Argentina. Argentina's military regime responded to economic decline and waning legitimacy by initiating an ill-conceived war with Great Britain. Augusto Pinochet in Chile, by contrast, managed economic collapse and mass protests in 1982-84 through a "skillful" mix of promised reform and repression that allowed the regime to survive another half-decade and to set many terms of the democratic transition.

Although it is a difficult factor to measure and build into systematic theories, the Cuban case suggests that leadership is sometimes crucial. Few leaders have been as tenacious and defiant in the face of difficult structural and circumstantial conditions as Fidel Castro. Since the late 1980s — when Cuba embarked on a series of economic and political difficulties — Castro's personal role in regime governance has increased while government institutions have lost much of their prestige and effectiveness (Dominguez 1994, 1-4). As a result, Dominguez has observed that, "To a degree unparalleled since the regime's founding, Fidel Castro's personal role is paramount." Although his speech has slowed and his celebrated charisma has dwindled, Castro's aura and legacy help sustain authoritarian rule in Cuba (Centeno and Font 1997; Pérez-Stable 1997).

Not only Castro's personality, but also his policy choices and strategies have sustained the regime. Throughout the crisis, Castro has mingled idealistic rhetoric with pragmatic policies in ways that thwart regime opposition (Eckstein 1994, 96-119). First, he has purged old rivals to his leadership and has elevated a younger generation into positions of power in an apparent effort to secure their loyalty to him and to the system. Since 1989, Castro has shaken up the country's high-level leadership five
different times — a process that ensures that he remains unchallenged as supreme leader while successfully renewing the leadership cadre (Pérez-Stable 1997, 28).

Second, he has continued to rely on nationalist resentment of the United States and his well-known international image to win popular support. Castro has managed to increase his international presence and prestige in recent years, as evidenced by his heavy international travel schedule, the warm welcomes he receives abroad, and the Pope's visit to Cuba in January 1998.

Third, he has mixed economic reform and an easing of church-state relations with continued repression of human rights groups and other dissidents. The increased religious freedom offers Cubans a way to engage in social activities outside the boundaries of the state, but without posing a direct or immediate threat to the state. It thus helps prevent Cubans from forming illegal associations that might lead to a greater breakdown of regime authority. Economic reforms provide the same type of benefits to the regime. Cuba's economic reforms have been largely pragmatic, yielding as little state control as possible while nevertheless offering Cubans an opportunity to pursue limited, independent market activity that enables them to survive the economic crisis.

In short, Cuba's leadership "may defer a more substantial regime transition for an indefinite time despite the country's economic hardships" (Domínguez 1994, 16-17).

This analysis echoes (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 15-23) original argument that liberalization of authoritarian regimes is a choice made by regime elites. Cuba offers additional evidence that the decision to liberalize is not determined by surrounding structures and conditions, cannot easily be predicted, and is thus an important independent influence on democratization.

Legitimacy

In a recent review of the literature on the causes of democratization, Shin (1991, 151-2) wrote, "The most prominent domestic factor is the steady decline in the
legitimacy of authoritarian rule.” Huntington (1991, 45) has argued that “the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems” was the first of five causal factors of the third wave of democratization. In a more nuanced vein, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1990, 10) have written that “Regimes that lack deep legitimacy depend more precariously on current performance and are vulnerable to collapse in periods of economic and social distress.”

Cuba offers some mixed support for this argument, although scholars must be careful not to engage in the circular reasoning that because Cuba has not collapsed, it must therefore retain some legitimacy. The way around this tautological trap is not to throw out the concept of legitimacy altogether, but rather to measure it independently of regime collapse. Linz (1978, 16) defines legitimacy as “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience.” Measuring public beliefs in an authoritarian regime is admittedly a very difficult task, and so scholars must rely on a variety of imperfect measures.

That the Cuban regime enjoyed high levels of legitimacy prior to 1989 is comparatively easy to establish and a point few scholars would dispute. In a review of Latin American literature on Cuba, Parker (1998, 249) concludes that the “capacity of regime to survive . . . undoubtedly owes much to legitimacy it enjoyed at outset of crisis and willingness of most of the population to make the extraordinary sacrifices required.” The regime was born of a popular, widespread revolution and the intensity of public support for regime policies in the 1960s is well-documented. The legitimacy that the Cuban regime enjoyed in its first three decades is especially clear when comparing Cuba with other socialist regimes in Eastern Europe (Linden 1993; Mesa-Lago and Fabian 1993; Rabkin 1992; Radu 1995). Only in Cuba was socialist communism initiated by a popular revolution led by a charismatic leader. From this perspective, it is not surprising that Cuba — even though the socialist country most
dependent on Soviet aid — was the only small Soviet ally to survive the collapse of Communism at the end of the Cold War.

While the Cuban regime enjoyed relatively high levels of legitimacy in the past, the crucial question in the late 1990s is how much of that legitimacy remains after the deep problems of the past decade. The dominant scholarly opinion is that regime legitimacy has eroded considerably but not completely (Perez-Stable 1997, 31-2; others). In particular, Cuba arguably still meets Linz’s minimalist definition that “the existing political institutions are better than others that might be established.”

Evidence of declining legitimacy is easy to come by. In 1991 in preparation for the 4th Communist Party Congress, the regime created local, regional and national fora for citizen complaints. The ensuing debate was remarkably open, and critical of basic political institutions and practices. Cubans called for direct, competitive elections, greater tolerance of free speech, more free market reforms, and a party more in touch with the people (Dominguez 1994, 8-16). The dramatic increases in disobedience to government authority also indicate a sharp decline in regime legitimacy — especially when measured from the late 1960s at the height of the voluntary labor movement and idealism about the creation of a new "socialist man" (Bunck 1994; Eckstein 1994). Legitimacy problems are especially evident among younger generations, who have ably resisted the state's attempts to socialize them (de la Fuente and Glasco 1997; Fernández 1993).

Despite this steep drop in legitimacy in the 1990s, the regime still maintains some legitimacy — especially among the older segments of the population. Evidence for the regime's continuing though depleted legitimacy comes from a variety of sources. First, the lack of protests — even in the face of widespread economic crisis — suggests that the regime might retain some legitimacy. This evidence is of course problematic because the lack of protests may also be a result of an efficient repressive apparatus or the fact that dissatisfied Cubans tend to flee the country rather than stay to protest.
Second, the relatively low levels of blank or spoiled ballots in secret, direct elections suggest continuing regime legitimacy (Perez-Stable 1997, 30-31). Further, a large number of Cubans heeded the regime’s call to vote for a unified slate of candidates. Third, non-scientific polls and surveys show that Cubans continue to support basic socialist programs such as free medical care and education, and subsidized food and transportation (de la Fuente and Glasco 1997; Domínguez 1994).

What impact do lower levels of legitimacy have on the Cuban regime? Przeworski has argued that legitimacy is irrelevant because it is not the lack of legitimacy which determines the end of a regime, but rather the organization of political alternatives. Following Mainwaring (1992), I do not dispute the point that authoritarian regimes do not require legitimacy in order to rule. They can survive through repression, fear, public apathy, and the lack of possible alternatives. Nor do I question the argument that the organization of a political alternative matters.15 Certainly no regime transition can or will take place without some alternative form of organizing political power.

At the same time, Przeworski throws out the baby with the bath water. Just because authoritarian regimes can survive without legitimacy does not mean that they prefer to survive without legitimacy. Many authoritarian regimes tailor their political strategies in ways intended to shore up public approval. As authoritarian regimes engage in discourse and practices intended to increase their legitimacy, they inadvertently create spaces for opposition groups to mobilize and challenge the regime. The Cuban regime,

15 In his classic discussion of legitimacy, Linz recognizes this point by arguing that regimes retain minimal levels of legitimacy when the populace cannot imagine a better political alternative. Thus, for example, there may be widespread disenchantment with democracy, but if people still believe that democracy is better than other forms of government then democracy retains minimal levels of legitimacy. In this sense, the evidence suggests that the Cuban regime maintains minimal levels of legitimacy.
for example, has turned to a more liberal discourse of individual freedom and to the ideas of nationalist icon Jose Marti in an effort to increase legitimacy in the 1990s (Fernandez 1997; Rabkin 1992). Dissidents and small opposition groups have seized on these changes to argue that the regime is not living up to its promises of individual freedom and that the current system acts to divide Cubans rather than to create a national unity.16

Further, declining legitimacy can produce significant political impact — even in the absence of organized alternatives. Most importantly, declining legitimacy prompts intellectuals or opposition figures to discuss and design alternative political institutions, and it makes the public receptive to ideas about alternative ways of organizing political power. In this light, it comes as no surprise that Cuban social scientists at the CEA began publishing work in the early 1990s which offered specific ideas about how to reform political institutions.

Further, declining legitimacy leads to the rebirth of civil society. As legitimacy decreases, ordinary citizens increasingly disregard laws in everyday life. Eckstein (1994, 119-26) has shown how "covert acts have defiance" have increased dramatically in the 1990s. Such acts include crime, prostitution, black-market trade, under-reporting dollar income from foreigners, stealing work tools and supplies for personal gain, absenteeism at work, and refusing to accept employment in the official sector in order to make more money from the tourist trade.

Such widespread disobedience can generate social understandings and solidarity among people beyond the boundaries of state control.17 Neighbors who once spied on

16 Martínez (1996, 149-79) offers a revealing compilation of dissident documents. More recently, four prominent Cuban dissenters released a document that has attracted enormous attention: “La Patria es de Todos,” available at any number of web sites.

17 These arguments are based on my own observations and interviews while in Havana in June.
each other to report illegal black-market activity now inform each other of the presence of state authorities who might clamp down their common black-market activities. Indeed, the black market for any number of goods is now so open in Havana that it might be better termed a grey market. Policemen routinely look the other way and citizens routinely engage in interactions outside the pale of state control. Such interactions appear to be building trust and civil society in a slow yet inevitable fashion.

In short, the Cuban case suggests ways to rethink the polarized theoretical debate about legitimacy. Many scholars make the strong claim that declining legitimacy produces regime change while Przeworski prefers to toss the concept out all together. A middle ground position is preferable. Low levels of legitimacy do not necessarily result in regime change even when combined with economic hardship. At the same time, declining legitimacy has three medium-range effects: 1-It leads authoritarian regimes to adopt new strategies that create new spaces for the opposition; 2-It offers social actors a motivation to construct ideas about an alternative political future and it creates a populace potentially willing to listen to those ideas; and 3-It encourages the formation of civil society by generating social activity outside of state control.

Conclusions

I have tried to make three general claims in this paper. First, the research design of many qualitative comparative studies of democratization is flawed and would benefit from consideration of cases of stable authoritarian rule. The Cuban case alone cannot indicate which variables to throw out and which to keep. Consideration of the Cuban case, however, illustrates the broader point that non-democratizing countries can help scholars sort through factors that are more and less important causes of democratization. Specifically, cases such as Cuba illustrate the conditions which magnify or blunt structural causes and suggest new hypotheses or avenues of exploration.
Second, beliefs and actor choices mediate structural causes and deserve to be incorporated into democratization theories despite difficulties in measuring them or thinking systematically about their effects. By way of summary, I propose the following hypotheses: 1- The effects of socioeconomic development are conditioned by widespread beliefs about which regime type is more likely to advance the process of economic advancement; 2-The effects of economic crisis are mediated by regime unity and legitimacy; and 3-The effects of the international environment are conditioned by the size of independent social groups.

Third, the Cuban case — when compared with other Latin American cases — confirms the importance of soft-liners and independent social groups in the democratization process. The absence of these actors can help explain why Cuba has not embarked on liberalization or democratization. At the same time, Cuba raises deeper questions about the absence of these groups. Are there historical and structural factors that prevent their emergence? I hypothesize that political norms of public participation and historical events such as revolution might help explain the absence of key democratizing actors.

Finally, legitimacy and leadership actively sustain authoritarian rule in Cuba, and mediate the influence of structural forces such as socioeconomic development, economic crisis and the international environment. Some might respond to this paper by arguing that the overwhelming structural forces on Cuba will eventually force democratization. I do not necessarily dispute that point. Before that happens, however, I expect that some of the conditions sustaining authoritarian rule will have to change. In other words, legitimacy will have to continue to decline — which it may not do in a period of economic recovery — or the leadership (or its strategies) will have to change — also an unlikely event in the foreseeable future.
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