“Electoral Politics and Mexico’s New Party System”

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As the crucial presidential election of 2000 approaches, Mexico’s political party system and the dynamics of its electoral process bear little resemblance to their counterparts of fifteen years ago. Then a hegemonic party system structured the political participation of the Mexican people, reinforcing the electoral advantages held by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) by offering voters little in the way of effective choice at the ballot box. As late as 1985, the PRI took as many as two-thirds of the votes in federal congressional elections. Opposition parties there were, but only the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, or PAN) governed a major municipality and no opposition legislators had significant impact on debate in the congress or on the public policy that the congress legislated at the president’s behest.

In the fifteen years that have passed since economic crisis engulfed Mexico in the early-to-mid 1980s, two vigorous opposition parties have emerged to contest the PRI’s hegemony, the PAN on the center-right of the ideological spectrum and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, or PRD) on the center-left. The PRI has surrendered its majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of congress, to a combination of the PAN,
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the PRD, and two much smaller parties of opposition. Consequently, Mexico now has divided
government whereas once a PRI-dominated congress permitted unusual exercise of authority by
the Mexican presidency (Weldon 1997). While the opposition parties controlled not one state
government and only a handful of municipalities in the 1980s, PAN and PRD mayors now govern
a majority of the population, at least at the municipal level. Few electoral positions are effectively
uncontested today, so now the voter has real choice when casting a ballot. In short, the
hegemonic party system has expired even while the formerly hegemonic party remains the largest
vote-getter.

This paper will describe the main features of the new Mexican party system, arguing that
the contemporary electoral arena can be considered competitive and democratic even if there
remain impediments to full democracy in other dimensions of the political regime.¹ I will first
outline the major competitors—the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD—in terms of their policy and
ideological positions and internal divisions resulting from ideological issues and choices about
political strategy. Then I will explore the extent of competition across the electoral system,
identifying the regional differences in competitiveness within the party system as a whole and of
the individual parties themselves. In a third section I will undertake an ecological analysis of the
social bases of each party’s vote in order to reveal the settings in which each performs well.
Finally, to better illustrate the bases of each party’s electoral support, I will then examine survey
data to show who votes for each major party in terms of socioeconomic and demographic

¹Mexican electoral politics may be competitive and even democratic at this point, but other
features of the regime remain less than democratic. Executive accountability is far from
established, civil liberties are routinely abused, the independence of the judiciary is limited, and the
organizations of labor and the peasantry are not independent nor democratically run.
No analysis of the contemporary party system can be offered without reference to the history of PRI domination. While the evolution of electoral competition is less the focus of this paper than current electoral politics, I will provide both explicit and implicit comparisons of contemporary politics to those of the mid 1980s and before as they seem warranted. Mexico does not yet have a tradition of competitive electoral politics and the PRI has yet to yield the all-important presidency, so the novelty of electoral competition and of the prospect of a non-PRI president must be underscored by reference to the history of PRI hegemony.

The New Party System

Before 1988, the PRI had never lost a presidential, gubernatorial, or federal senatorial race it had contested since it was founded as the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, or PNR) in 1929. The PRI seldom won less than 98 percent of the federal deputy seats open each three years, even though the constitution’s no re-election clause meant that PRI candidates enjoyed no incumbency effect. Opposition party candidates infrequently contested and rarely won municipal elections. Political scientists felt comfortable in the 1960s and 1970s calling Mexico a hegemonic party system, distinguishing it from the single party states of the former Soviet bloc because opposition parties could and did exist legally and politically, but also recognizing thereby that opposition parties posed no genuine challenge to the PRI (Sartori 1976).

PRI hegemony owed much to the party's revolutionary heritage as the party built by the victorious revolutionaries and as the party that had brought land reform to the campesinos, labor
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rights to the working class, and economic development to Mexico as a whole. PRI hegemony was also due to its corporatist structure that channeled the electoral and other political participation of Mexico’s peasantry and unionized workers and to a vast clientelistic network through which the ruling elite materially rewarded those ambitious politicians who sought social mobility through politics and those social groups the same politicians claimed to represent (Hernández Rodríguez 1998: 74). The PRI’s monopoly on the elected executive positions at the federal, state, and local levels gave PRI leaders access to the governmental resources that made clientelism easy, particularly in a state with an extensive bureaucracy and a tendency toward intervention in the economy (Purcell and Purcell 1976). Opposition parties’ failure to gain any executive positions made them unable to challenge the PRI electorally because they had nothing with which to reward their supporters.

Table 1 displays the extent of PRI domination of the electoral arena prior to 1988. Economic modernization did produce gradual erosion of the PRI’s commanding position electorally, but the emphasis must be on the gradual character of that erosion—about 2 percent in each federal election. Opposition parties did markedly better in urban and industrial areas where the population had greater access to education and the mass media (Ames 1970; Klesner 1993). In the vastness of rural Mexico, where the opposition feared to show itself, the PRI’s vote totals sometimes reached numbers above the registered electorate. Whether such large numbers of campesinos voted enthusiastically for the PRI to reward it for giving them land or had their votes cast for them by rural bosses was unknown in individual districts because the urban press was no
more willing to venture into such rural areas than were oppositionists. Endemic political corruption and electoral fraud ensured large vote tallies for the PRI, but even without them, the PRI would likely have been hegemonic because Mexican public policy in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and even into the 1970s produced rapid economic development for which the electorate rewarded the PRI, and because opposition parties presented no real alternatives to PRI governance or to the PRI development strategy.

Factors in the PRI’s Decline

Table 1 also shows that the PRI no longer dominates the Mexican party system in the way it did only a decade and a half ago. After the 1997 midterm elections, the most successful party of opposition, the PAN, held the governorships of six of Mexico’s thirty-one states (Chihuahua, Baja California, Jalisco, Querétaro, Guanajuato, and Nuevo León) and the PRD’s Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had won the position of jefe of the Federal District government. In 1998, the PRD won a governorship (Zacatecas) and the PAN took one new governorship (Aguascalientes) while losing Chihuahua to the PRI. In the past two presidential elections, the PRI has barely captured half of the valid votes; its vote total in the 1997 midterm elections fell below 40 percent. So, two significant parties of opposition, the PAN and the PRD, have emerged to challenge the PRI at all levels of government. Once of little interest to anyone other than the PRI politicians being elected to office, elections now receive intense attention from the press and are hard fought among the parties. What has changed Mexican electoral politics?

First, we must recognize that Mexico’s economic modernization, a process at work since the 1940s, has altered the social structure upon which the PRI’s hegemony was based. The
Mexico of the 1990s is more urban, more educated, and more influenced by the outside world than the Mexico of the 1930s. Consequently, Mexicans are now less subject to the control of the PRI’s corporatist organizations, more informed about alternatives to the PRI, and more desirous of the democratic practices observed outside of Mexico, especially in the United States, than were Mexicans of the 1930s. A more complex social structure means that public policy cannot please all Mexicans all of the time. As economic development proceeded, opposition support grew. In more modern parts of the country, especially in cities, the opposition has always performed much better (Ames 1970; Walton and Sween 1971; Reyna 1971; Klesner 1993). But economic modernization does not explain the sudden fall in the PRI’s electoral fortunes in 1988 nor all of its difficulties since then.

Second, seeking democratic legitimacy to supplement the support it received for producing economic success, the Mexican government encouraged the development of opposition parties through a long series of reforms that gradually opened the federal and state legislatures to representatives of the opposition (Molinar Horcasitas 1991a). The most significant of these electoral reforms came in 1977 when the government of José López Portillo not only reserved 100 of the 400 seats in the Chamber of Deputies for opposition representatives but also relaxed the laws that had previously kept several opposition groups from becoming registered political parties (Middlebrook 1986; Cornelius 1987; Klesner 1997a). This permitted both the Mexican Communist Party (Partido Comunista Mexicano, or PCM) and groups that had formed out of the 1968 student movement to emerge from semi-legal status and to compete for electoral support. The 1977 reforms reinvigorated the PAN too, and the political debate in the 1980s became much
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richer than any time since the 1930s as a consequence.

The richness of the debate among the parties and the increasing electoral contestation in the 1980s owed their origins to more than just political reforms that permitted greater opposition activity, however. The economic crisis experienced by Mexico from 1982 onward undercut the legitimacy built up by the PRI as the result of decades of economic policy success and gave the opposition parties opportunities to attract the voters being lost by the PRI. López Portillo’s populist last act, the nationalization of the banks in 1982, angered the private sector and much of the middle class, leading them into more vigorous electoral activity in support of the PAN (Cornelius, 1987). Miguel de la Madrid’s administration (1982-88) chose to respond to the debt crisis with an austerity program that became a liberalization project that accelerated under Carlos Salinas (1988-94) (Teichman 1995). The pain resulting from austerity and liberalization afflicted the peasants and workers particularly, the very sectors whose support played such a key role in PRI electoral victories. The sudden change in the development strategy also produced severe divisions within the PRI, leading by 1987 to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’s defection from the party shaped by his father and his candidacy at the head of a union of parties and groups of the left (Garrido 1993; Bruhn 1997).

Cárdenas’s presidential candidacy, the first by a PRI maverick since 1952, ruptured the stability of the hegemonic party system. His success at drawing millions to his campaign rallies and then to vote for him indicated significant disaffection of the electorate with the ruling elite. To defeat Cárdenas, the PRI and the government had to take extraordinary measures, even by their own standards, to the extent that the electoral authorities’ computer “crashed” on the night of the
election, the vote tallies of nearly half of the polling places were never reported, and those ballots were subsequently destroyed (Barberán et al. 1988). Even then, Carlos Salinas received only half of the votes. He entered office with the legitimacy of his presidency questioned by substantial portions of the Mexican population, the effective leader of a party whose capacity to carry elections had come under question, promising a program of accelerated economic liberalization likely to hurt the interests of the PRI’s bedrock of support, peasants and workers.

Salinas’s response to these challenges and the economic restructuring his government pursued further shaped the parties and the party system. What measures did he take to reinvigorate the PRI? How did the opposition parties respond to Salinas’s very vigorous leadership? What was the consequences for the electoral fortunes of the parties? I will first consider the major parties, and then the party system as a whole.

Reforming the PRI?

To understand the challenge of reforming the PRI, we must first grasp the real character of this “party” and its relationship to the Mexican state. Lorenzo Meyer has captured it well:

The PRI . . . was created to complement the institutional structure of the new regime, not to do battle with its political adversaries at the polls. It provides the forum for internal negotiations among the governing elite, for the distribution of political patronage awards, and for recruiting (fewer and fewer) and socializing new members. During electoral campaigns it acquaints the populace with its soon-to-be-elected officials, and it mobilizes specific sectors of society as needed for the preservation of the system. Between elections--excepting those occasions when government leadership needs limited mass mobilization--the official party practically disappears. Its activities are determined almost exclusively by the president and by the electoral calendar, not by grassroots interests or demands (1989: 335).

In short, the PRI has not “ruled” in the sense that we say the Labour Party rules in Britain. A self-reproducing civilian political elite has ruled in Mexico; it has used the PRI as an electoral organ to
mobilize voters and thereby to win the elections so critical to creating a vaneer of democratic legitimacy (Hernández Rodríguez 1998: 76). Real political power has been centered in the presidency, the key political institution in Mexico (Brandenburg 1964; Garrido 1989).

Increasingly, recruitment to the executive departments controlled by the presidency practically bypassed the party. However, electoral positions remained important as the patronage distributed by the party to sectoral groups whose votes the PRI counted on to produce electoral victories (Pacheco Méndez and Reyes del Campillo 1989).

The economic strategies pursued by de la Madrid and Salinas created a gulf between the upper level of the political elite and the sectors of the party because the members of the labor and peasant sectors did not benefit from neoliberalism (Teichman 1995). In many ways the sectoral organization of the PRI created by Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s simply did not fit the Mexico of the 1980s and 1990s, a Mexico less rural, more educated, and more mobile than a half century ago. Increasingly, the sectors could only produce the votes needed for PRI victories though coercion or vote buying, or outright fraud. In this situation, elections did not legitimate the rule of the political elite but rather delegitimated that rule because they were so clearly fraudulent (Molinar Horcasitas 1991a). Salinas was not the first president to see a need to reform the PRI to maintain it as the electoral tool of the political elite (Bailey 1987), but he saw an urgent need after the debacle of the 1988 elections. Salinas’s strategy had two elements, one more successful, one less so.

First, Salinas sought to “modernize” the PRI. One aspect of modernization involved creating a more democratic image for the party, an image much tarnished by the massive fraud
committed by the PRI in its contests with the PAN in northern states from 1985 forward and
against the Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 1988. The more democratic PRI would use internal
primaries to select its candidates for office and it would recognize its losses when they occurred.
Moreover, it would replace its sectoral organization and the bloc affiliation associated with the
sectors with individual affiliation and geographical organization, similar to the organization of
parties in the U.S. (Dresser 1994). These efforts failed for the most part. Internal primaries were
used sparingly; they tended to exacerbate divisions already existing in state and local party
organizations and the president was unwilling to completely give up the opportunities for
distributing patronage offered by the more traditional presidential designation of PRI nominees
(Garrido 1994). Opposition victories in state and local elections were recognized, but selectively,
and often despite local PRI unwillingness to admit its defeats. Salinas had to use presidential
power to get PRI candidates to resign after they claimed victory in gubernatorial races marked by
electoral fraud. And, threatened by the demonstrated strength of the left in 1988, Salinas
permitted the PRI to use fraud and intimidation against the PRD even while encouraging the PRI
to recognize PAN victories (Morris 1995: 98-100).

Another, more successful aspect of PRI modernization involved the introduction of more
sophisticated campaigning tools: computers, polls, and better organization of the campaign.
Under the leadership of Luis Donaldo Colosio (later assassinated during his presidential campaign
in 1994), a massive effort was unveiled in 1989 to create a network of get-out-the-vote promoters
coordinated by the PRI’s state organizations with connections down to the most intimate level of
Mexican society. The plan targeted the 115 most important cities in the country. The plan also
used a system of national surveys which were designed to allow the PRI organization to tailor its candidacies and the campaigns of its nominees to meet the demands of the particular districts. While the PRI has always been able to mount a far larger and more richly funded campaign than its opposition, this was an unprecedented effort to reclaim the grassroots. Of course, such a massive effort could have been undertaken only with the support of government resources (Alcocer and Morales 1991). But whether the PRI played fair in this effort or not, it produced results in 1991 (see Table 1).

Second, recognizing the social costs to the Mexican people and the political risk to the PRI of economic restructuring, upon entering office Salinas immediately created the National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de la Solidaridad, or PRONASOL), a large and complex program aimed at ameliorating the burdens associated with economic restructuring in those areas in which poverty and costs associated with the economic crisis are the worst. Its major initiatives included building health care facilities in rural areas, extending telephone service to remote villages, and refurbishing schools. It was a form of welfare for the less fortunate, but one which emphasizes self-help through neighborhood committees which are supposed to participate in the selection of projects and the supervision of their implementation (Dresser; Cornelius, Craig, and Fox 1994). In the process, not only were poor people benefitted materially, but they were organized for, among other things, voting for the ruling party. PRONASOL allowed the PRI to distribute from the pork barrel to those it felt it had to reclaim for the party, for the distribution of PRONASOL funds went disproportionately to areas where Cárdenas did well in 1988. Results in the 1991 elections suggest PRI success was at least partially explained by
PRONASOL spending (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1994).

To keep the PRI ideologically in sync with the profound policy changes wrought under de la Madrid and Salinas, the PRI under Colosio abandoned revolutionary nationalism as its policy guide and adopted “social liberalism,” a neoliberalism that was supposed to be softened by social programs such as PRONASOL (Salinas et al. 1992). In important ways, this ideological shift moved the PRI into the ideological space that the PAN had occupied at least from the early 1980s (see below). While it allowed the PRI and the PAN to cooperate on the passage of legislation that advanced neoliberal policies during the Salinas regime, it also created powerful incentives for the PAN to distinguish itself from the PRI by emphasizing its support for democratization, thereby reiterating the opposition’s view that the PRI has been the main obstacle to democracy in Mexico.

Until the mid 1990s, the PRI was the one truly national party in Mexico, but it has suffered many fissures as it has tried to respond to pressures created by economic liberalization. Reformers such as Salinas, Colosio, and now President Ernesto Zedillo have tried to make the PRI a more modern political party, to move it from being a party of the state to a genuine political party competing for electoral victories. This should mean abandoning the more blatant practices of presidential imposition of candidates and electoral fraud; Zedillo has pledged not to choose his own successor. Salinas apparently found himself more convinced of the need to hurry forward with economic reform than to promote political reform, however. At times this meant looking the other way when the PRI returned to its practices of old and therefore looking hypocritical about “modernization,” for example, in the blatantly unfair elections in Michoacán in 1989. Zedillo, in contrast, publicly stated that he would make democratizing Mexico his priority.
The political fallout of the economic crisis touched off when the peso was devalued in December 1994 has put even greater pressure on the internal unity of the PRI. Among the immediate consequences of the economic downturn was a flight from the PRI in state and local elections in 1995 and 1996. Divisions within the ruling elite between the technocrats who designed the neoliberal economic policies which seemed to have failed in 1995 and the politicians of the PRI who were expected to rally the voters to support the government and between advocates of continuation of the neoliberal development strategy and those who would prefer a return to revolutionary nationalism have come ever more into the open (Hernández Rodríguez 1998). Given that the PAN has edged away from a policy perspective that argues for disengagement of the state from the economy to a position urging greater attention to the needs of those hurt by economic restructuring, for the PRI to remain committed to neoliberalism risks putting it on the right of the political and ideological spectrum and making it seem ever more the preserve of allies of the now-discredited Salinas. Yet, nominating the favorites of old-guard politicians such as Alfredo del Mazo, the candidate for regent of Mexico City who lost so devastatingly to Cárdenas in 1997, seems to hold no future for the PRI (Lawson 1997). Furthermore, the loss of party discipline that has gone hand-in-hand with the rise of these internal tensions has led many disappointed office-seekers to defect, especially to the PRD, when they fail to get the support of party leaders for nomination to important electoral positions. For these reasons, therefore, the party has reintroduced party primaries as one more effort to produce good candidates who can effectively compete against the increasingly combative opposition parties (Sheridan 1998; Dillon 1998).
Creating a Party of the Left

Cárdenas’s presidential campaign in 1988 had been postulated by a wide range of independent and collaborationist parties of the left under the umbrella of the National Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nacional, or FDN), each of which maintained its separate legal identity while advancing Cárdenas as its presidential candidate (Valdés 1994). When Cárdenas proposed a united party of the left in the fall of 1988 to consolidate and channel the gains of 1988, three collaborationist parties (the Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana, or PARM; the Partido Popular Socialista, or PPS; and the Partido Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional, or PFCRN) left the FDN. Eventually, the remnants of the FDN converted the registration of the Mexican Socialist Party (Partido Mexicano Socialista, or PMS) into the new PRD (Valdés 1994; Bruhn 1997). But the PRD has been divided internally over ideological and strategic issues as well as personal differences among leaders. Therein lies one of its weaknesses.

Revolutionary nationalism motivates most peredistas, but most also recognize that economic nationalism and import-substituting industrialization will not bring Mexico out of economic crisis or would be nearly impossible to implement at this point. Yet the PRD provides the most articulate critique of the neoliberal development strategy within the party system. As a party fused from former socialist parties and former PRI members and seeking to recruit members and leaders of popular organizations to its fold, the PRD incorporates a number of perspectives on socioeconomic policy. Two major contending currents within the party have been a more social democratic wing headed by former party president Porfirio Muñoz Ledo which seeks to attract a more middle class constituency from among progressive PRI voters and a more radical
wing associated with current party president Andrés Manuel Obrador which looks for support from “popular” sectors, the urban poor, workers, and peasants (Bruhn 1998).

PRD militants hold very bad feelings toward the PRI as the fallout of the 1988 elections and the party has rejected compromise with the PRI and the government over electoral results and legislative proposals for electoral reform. This strategic intransigence may have satisfied the PRD hardliners, but it probably gained the party few independent voters in its first six or eight years of struggle for power (Bruhn 1998). PRD leaders continue to seek to reward those PRD members who have supported them over the decades at the expense of those PRD members who came from other organizations. Squabbles among leaders result, and the press reports them, contributing little to the party’s public image. These internal weaknesses have made the consolidation of the PRD as the party of the left somewhat disappointing to those who saw bright opportunity in the 1988 cardenista campaign. At the same time, the PRD works to make a virtue of its internal democracy and the transparency of its internal differences, comparing them to the monolithic PRI that most of its supporters see to be corrupt and authoritarian.

The PRD has faced an equally difficult external challenge: the unwillingness of the PRI and the government to recognize its successes (Gilly 1990). Because of the strength of the Cárdenas performance in 1988 and the PRD’s ardent opposition to neoliberalism, the Salinas government felt more threatened by the PRD than by the PAN. Also, to priistas, Cárdenas, Muñoz Ledo and other PRD leaders are, quite simply, traitors and hated for their betrayal of the PRI. While PAN triumphs in gubernatorial races were recognized by Salinas, when the PRD claimed victory, electoral authorities more often published results indicating PRI wins. In the
states of Michoacán and México in 1989 and 1990, state and local elections produced intense conflicts between the PRD and the PRI, and the government sided with the PRI (Gómez Tagle 1994; Mastretta 1990). The PRD may have exaggerated its performance, but it seems clear that the government permitted extensive fraud by the PRI.

In federal elections in both 1991 and 1994, the PRD finished third (see Table 1). Compared with the historical performance of the independent left, however, the PRD’s 1994 finish indicated a significant advance. In the six years between 1988 and 1994, the PRD elbowed the collaborationist left out of the electoral arena; the PARM, the PPS, and the PFCRN all fell below 1.5 percent of the vote. Riding on Cárdenas’s coattails in the 1997 Mexico City regent’s race, the PRD moved to second among all parties in the 1997 midterm congressional elections, thereby approaching the 1988 FDN finish. For all intents and purposes, the PRD is now the electoral left in Mexico. Importantly, the PRD has consolidated the second position electorally in many states in the center and the south, especially Chiapas, Guerrero, the Estado de México, Michoacán, Morelos, Oaxaca, Tabasco and Veracruz (see below). In those states of the south where the effects of economic liberalization have been harsh for many campesinos, the PRD offers a voice of opposition.

The PAN: The Responsible Opposition?

The 1988 elections came as a disappointment to the PAN. Despite running a charismatic candidate for president (Manuel Clouthier), the PAN finished a distant third with no more than its usual share of the national vote, around 17-18 percent. Many analysts relegated the PAN to a permanent third position in light of the cardenista surge. However, since then the PAN has won
eight gubernatorial races. Its congressional delegation was instrumental in the passage of electoral reform legislation and laws altering the Church-State relationship and the status of the ejido under Salinas (Morris 1995: 90). The PAN’s acceptance of Ernesto Zedillo’s presidential victory in August 1994 made the Cárdenas attempt to organize protest across the country ring hollow. Has the PAN become Mexico’s loyal opposition?

Although the object of PRI-engineered electoral fraud in the north in 1985 and 1986, which led PAN leaders to organize massive demonstrations and hunger strikes in defense of the vote (Molinar Horcasitas 1991a), the PAN must be recognized as the party of legal and gradual reform that it has been since its founding (Mabry 1974). The influx of middle-class and business militants into the party in the early 1980s may have made the PAN seem more stridently opposed to state intervention in the economy (Bartra 1983; Mizrahi 1994), but the PAN has always stood for constraints on state power (Mabry 1974). In short, ideologically and attitudinally, the PAN has changed less over the past fifteen years than many have suggested. Salinas’s accession to power and the Cárdenas surge presented both the president and the PAN leadership with good reasons to seek accommodation in the 1990s: Salinas proposed to curtail state power and to initiate policy changes in directions favored by the PAN for decades, for which he needed the legislative help of the PAN; the PAN sought to avoid falling into obscurity as the result of the cardenista phenomenon and could accomplish that if Salinas recognized the PAN’s victories when they occurred.

This accommodation proved highly successful for each (Morris 1995: 90). The PAN won the gubernatorial races in Baja California and Chihuahua in 1989 and 1992 respectively, and saw
Salinas force the resignation of PRI candidates for governor after blatantly fraudulent elections in Guanajuato and San Luis Potosí in 1991; Salinas appointed a panista governor of Guanajuato. Salinas was able to point to PAN victories as evidence of political opening. The PAN achieved some electoral changes it sought through the electoral reform process while the PRD was left looking intransigent on this issue (Klesner, 1997a). Since Zedillo has taken office, the PAN has won the governorships of Jalisco, Guanajuato, Querétaro, Nuevo León, and Aguascalientes and many of the most important city halls in the nation.

Has the occasional accommodation with the government compromised the PAN’s capacity to serve as a party of opposition? Former PAN leaders Jesús González Schmall, Pablo E. Madero and Bernardo Bátiz argued that it did when they left the party, but the 1994 presidential campaign of Diego Fernández de Cevallos did not seem accommodationist in tone, particularly during the televised presidential debate. Overall, the PAN has advanced electorally, even if the congressional midterm elections of 1997 seemed to be a disappointment, and the experience of governing large states and municipalities will produce leaders capable of presenting themselves as realistic presidential candidates in the future, perhaps no one more so than the governor of Guanajuato, Vicente Fox (Reding 1996). Although it lacks the resources available to the PRI as the party of the state, the PAN runs far more professional campaigns than it could a decade ago (Mizrahi 1998). Still primarily a party of the middle class, the PAN could not win the gubernatorial races it has won without attracting working class voters. Hence, the PAN has converted itself into a catch-all party with a somewhat right-of-center ideology willing to work with the federal government legislatively but to compete strongly with it when elections are held.
But this conversion is less the result of changes in ideology than changes in circumstance, principally the rise of the PRD.

Within the PAN today there exist divisions, as there have since the political humanist current of the party was challenged by a more free-market oriented group in the mid 1970s (Craig and Cornelius, 1995: 269-70). As I describe above, the PAN cooperated with the Salinas administration to accomplish several aspects of the neoliberal agenda in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today, panistas differ about the degree to which they should advocate a neoliberal economic and social policy and about how closely to work with the PRI in the legislature given that a PRI member still sits in the president’s seat. In large part, these divisions stem from the evolution of the party from an organization strictly on the outside, with little hope of taking office, to one that governs in several states and many localities and whose members of congress have votes that really matter. In making this transition, the PAN must confront the dilemma of how to make the change from an opposition party to a governing party without losing its sense of identity, as PAN President Felipe Calderón aptly put it (Mizrahi 1998: 110). As the PAN seeks to remain competitive in the new electoral reality it faces, creating a professional party organization will be essential; however, a professional party organization could change what the PAN has understood itself to be, a largely citizen-oriented and open electoral association.

A Transformed Party System

In 1982, Mexico had a hegemonic party system—one large party that had no real competitors and no intention of ceding power even where it was challenged by one of the several much smaller parties that formally contended for power. Its electoral left was fragmented into
several parties, some independent, some bought off by the PRI. Notwithstanding the electoral success of the small Workers’ Party (Partido del Trabajo, or PT) and the growth of the Green Party (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, or PVEM), Mexico now has a three-party system. Mexican voters can choose from two catch-all parties (PRI and PAN) that differ little on national economic policy issues but that offer different views on some social issues and on the need for further democratization of the society. In many areas, the PAN and the PRI are campaigning in the way catch-all parties might—those in power are touting their successes and those out of power are promising to improve governance if placed in power by the voters. In addition, the PRD serves as a genuine party of the left for those not satisfied by the more conservative character of the catch-all parties. While the PRI and the PRD seem unable to collaborate politically at this point, the PAN’s sometime cooperation with the PRI—as during the Salinas term—and its current legislative coalition with the PRD, PVEM, and PT to deny the PRI control of the Chamber of Deputies suggests that party system dynamics may be moving toward what we would consider normalcy in multiparty democracies. The PRI has yet to lose the presidency and its militants engage in considerable violence against their foes (especially the PRD) in the countryside, but the degree of competition in this party system has grown significantly since the mid 1980s, as I will now show.

**The Expanded Party System and Electoral Competitiveness**

To assess the competitiveness of the party system we can measure the number of effective parties. Juan Molinar’s NP index (Molinar 1991b) provides an extremely useful measure of competitiveness that has been employed by other studies of Mexico (Pacheco Méndez, 1997;
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Klesner 1997b). To measure the increase in competitiveness in the party system, I have grouped the 300 federal deputy election districts into four categories, following the procedure used by Guadalupe Pacheco Méndez (1997): hegemonic refers to districts in which a single party dominates (NP ranges from 1.0 to 1.5); pure bipartism refers to districts where two parties compete (NP=1.5 to 2.0); plural bipartism refers to districts in which two parties compete and are joined by a third which is weaker (NP=2.0 to 2.5); in tripartism, three parties effectively compete (NP greater than 2.5).

Table 2 about here

Table 2 shows how the 300 electoral districts fell into those four categories in the midterm congressional elections over the past twenty years. It indicates that most electoral districts were hegemonic even as late as 1991; in 1979, fully five-sixths of the districts were hegemonic. The growth of competition was gradual until very recently. However, in 1997, fewer than 10 percent of the districts fell into the hegemonic category and six of the twenty-five cases were won by opposition parties. That over 90 percent of the Mexican federal electoral districts are now competitive among two or more parties marks a profound change from the 1980s and before.

Table 3 about here

However, it is also important to recognize that less than 20 percent (56 of 300) of the electoral districts fall into the tripartism category. Mexico may have a three-party system in the congress and at the national level, but at the district level most competition is between two of the three parties. More specifically, that competition is between the PRI and one of the other two major parties. Table 3 provides a disaggregation of the districts for the 1997 congressional
election. In slightly over one-third of the districts (110 of 300), the PRI and the PAN squared off, the PAN winning 52 and the PRI 58 of those districts. Again in slightly over one-third of the districts (114), the PRI and the PRD competed, the PRI again taking 58 and the PRD 56 seats each (see the first column of Table 3). This suggests that Mexico is less a three-party system than a pair of two-party systems that may be evolving to genuine three-party competition across the nation, but perhaps is not.

**Figure 1 about here**

The last point would be less remarkable if the districts in which two-party competition were not geographically concentrated. The remaining columns of Table 3 distribute the types of electoral districts according to region. The division of the states into regions that I use is shown in Figure 1. The vast majority of districts in which the PRI and the PRD compete is in the south and the greater Mexico City area (here defined as the Federal District and the Estado de México). Meanwhile, most of the districts in which the PAN and the PRI struggle mainly against each other are in the north and the Bajío, the center-west region north and west of the capital. Figure 2 illustrates the regional distribution of competition more graphically, although it is a cruder indicator because it remains at the level of the 32 Mexican states rather than its 300 electoral districts.

**Figure 2 about here**

These data suggest that the PRI is still the only party with a strong national presence and that the PRD and the PAN, while becoming increasingly competitive across the nation, have strong regional bases. To what extent are these regional bases merely reflective of the different
“Electoral Politics and Mexico’s New Party System”

socioeconomic characteristics of the regions—which differ dramatically, as any observer of Mexico will quickly report? To what extent might they reflect the difficulties for a new party in building a party organization and gathering electoral support across a nation as large and diverse as Mexico? The following sections will attempt to provide some answer to these questions.

**From Where Do the Parties’ Supporters Come?**

To explore the first of the questions just mentioned—whether the regional bases of party support simply reflect socioeconomic differences that are concentrated in regions—we can undertake a multivariate regression analysis of the predictors of the parties’ vote, using socioeconomic, demographic, and regional factors as the explanatory variables. If the regional variables prove to be statistically insignificant, that would indicate they have no independent explanatory power *controlling for* socioeconomic and demographic factors. Past studies of Mexican voting behavior using aggregate data at the state level (Ames 1970; Klesner 1987) and the district level (Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon 1990; Klesner 1993, 1994, 1995) have found that urbanization, industrialization, and education are among the most powerful predictors of the percentage of the vote received by the PRI or its opposition in federal elections. Here I use aggregate data gathered at the level of the *municipio*, the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. county (N=2,403) to explore the relationship among electoral, socioeconomic, demographic, and regional variables. Table 4 reports the results for the three federal deputy elections held in the 1990s.

**Table 4 about here**

As in other studies conducted with aggregate data (cf. Klesner 1993), measures of urbanization (percent of the population living in localities of greater than 20,000) and
industrialization (percent of the population employed in manufacturing) prove to be significant predictors of the direction of the vote. Likewise, education (here measured by the illiteracy rate) is also a significant explanatory variable, as it has in earlier studies with data aggregated at a higher level. In terms of these social structural variables, the PRI does well in municipios which are more rural and in which illiteracy is high. In 1991 and 1997 it finished worse in areas that were more industrial. This conforms with the broad understanding that the PRI performs best where the population is uneducated and vulnerable because of its lack of education, its lack of access to urban-based media, and its economic marginality as poor peasants. In contrast, the PAN’s best performances are in municipios that are more urban and more industrialized. In 1997, the PAN did better in districts with lower levels of illiteracy, as earlier studies had also suggested. Again, this fits with past descriptions of the PAN as a party with a urban, middle-class base (Barraza and Bizberg 1991). The PRD’s electoral base is less easy to describe in terms of these measures of socioeconomic modernization (note that the \( R^2 \) for the PRD equations is much lower than for the PRI or the PAN). On the one hand, it has become a party of non-industrial areas, as the statistically significant and negative coefficients for the industrialization measure indicate. In this feature the PRD’s base of support looks like the PRI’s (only more strongly so). On the other hand, however, the PRD does better in areas where the illiteracy rate is low, unlike the PRI and more like the PAN. This suggests that the PRI does well in rural areas where the manufacturing base is weak and the population is less educated while the PRD does well in all areas (rural and urban–note that the urbanization variable is statistically insignificant and its coefficient equals zero) where the manufacturing base is weak but the population is better educated.
One other variable proves to provide significant explanatory power—the percent of the population that is Catholic. Of course, this variable does not measure the religiosity of the population, simply the percentage that declares itself Catholic to census takers. However, because the level of aggregation here is relatively low, there is greater variance in this variable than has been available to those conducting ecological analyses of Mexican elections with district or state-level data. As would be hypothesized given the PAN’s history of close identification with the church and its social Christian message (Mabry 1974), the PAN performs well in municipios with a higher percentage of Catholics. In contrast, the PRD and the PRI, both strongly secular in their ideology, perform more poorly in districts with higher concentrations of Catholics.

While these demographic, socioeconomic, and religious variables prove to be significant explanatory factors for predicting the percentage of the vote going to the PRI, the PAN, and the PRD, they only contribute about half of the explanatory power of the models displayed in Table 4. Factoring in regional variables greatly improves the explanatory power of the models. Table 5 reports the standardized regression coefficients for the equations estimated in Table 4. Standardized regression coefficients (often called beta weights) serve to indicate the relative weights of the explanatory variables in predicting the actual (as opposed to the estimated) values of the dependent variables (here, the percentages of the vote to the parties). Higher absolute values for the standardized regression coefficients indicate that those variables contribute relatively more to the overall explanatory power of the model. As Table 5 shows, regional variables provide much predictive power to each equation, especially in 1997 for the PAN and the PRD. This would suggest that by 1997 region had become even more important for explaining the
variation in the PAN and the PRD vote than earlier in the decade. Because this is a multiple regression model, we must remember that region continues to explain much of the variance in the vote even controlling for socioeconomic, demographic, education, and religious variables.

Table 5 about here

In Table 4, how much region matters to the vote for the parties is indicated by the regression coefficients. In these models, the constant indicates the share of the vote that would go to the party in question if the values of all of the other variables were zero, in the central region–i.e., in the states surrounding the greater Mexico City area but not including the capital city and its environs (the remainder of the Estado de México, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala). The regression coefficient for each regional variable indicates what must be added to the constant to obtain that region’s intercept.\(^2\) In effect, it indicates the percentage of the vote that the party gains or loses over the base case (the central region) by being in that particular region.

So, for example, in the north in 1997, the PAN performed 8 percent better than the base case. In the Bajío the PAN performed 12 percent above the base case, while in the greater Mexico City area it performed 11 percent below the base case. Thus, one can say that, controlling for other factors, the PAN overperforms in the north and the Bajío and underperforms in Mexico City.

Conversely, controlling for other significant explanatory factors, the PRD performed about 8 percent below the base case in the north in 1997 and about 3 percent lower than the base case in the Bajío. However, it overperformed by about 4 percent in the southern states and by a

\(^2\)Each regional variable is a dichotomous variable scored 1 if the municipio falls into that region and 0 if it does not.
whopping 18 percent in greater Mexico City. Regionally, then, the PRD’s strengths are the converse of the PAN’s.

We should also note that the size of the regression coefficients for region grew from 1991 to 1997 for the PAN and the PRD. While the PAN underperformed by about 3 percent in the Mexico City area in 1991, it did so by 8 percent in 1994 and by 11 percent in 1997. The trend in the metropolitan region for the PRD was the reverse. The PRD lost ground in the north in each election and lost much in the Bajío between 1994 and 1997. The PAN gained modestly in the north and ended up much better in the Bajío in 1997 than it had been in 1991. The PRI, meanwhile, had regional strengths and weaknesses, but they evidenced no major change in their power during the 1990s, with the coefficients for 1997 not differing much from those for 1991.

This multiple regression analysis thus supports the argument that Mexico’s party system has regional dimensions even beyond what would be expected given the already considerable differences of the regions on the standard measures of socioeconomic modernization and religion. The two major parties of opposition have become more competitive and thereby raised the degree of contestation in Mexico’s electoral system. However, the analyses displayed in Tables 3 through 5 indicate that the parties have divided the labor of creating competitiveness along regional lines. The result is thus less three-party in each part of the country than many examples of two-party competition with the PRI present everywhere.

**Individual Voters and the Party System**

Unfortunately, aggregate data is just that—aggregated data that does not easily allow the analyst to do more than infer individual behavior from grouped data. To get a more accurate
picture of who votes for the PAN, the PRI, and the PRD, we must rely on individual-level data gathered in surveys. While I do not intend to conduct a thorough analysis of voter attitudes in this paper, some survey evidence can serve to reinforce the observations about the strongholds of the parties made above. The data used here come from the exit poll conducted by Mitofsky International for the Chamber of the Radio and Television Industry at the time of the presidential election in August 1994.

**Table 6 about here**

Table 6 offers support for the argument that the PAN draws its support from a middle-class constituency that is based more strongly in the private sector. PAN support generally rises as income rises. PAN voters are drawn more from private sector employees and independent professionals than from other occupations. In 1994 it also drew heavily from full-time students. This last point and the ecological analysis above suggest that the PAN does better among more educated voters. This inference is supported in Table 7 which shows that PAN voting is clearly positively correlated with the level of education of the voter.

**Table 7 about here**

Meanwhile, the PRI did well in 1994 among the poorest Mexicans, perhaps paradoxically given the impact of the economic restructuring on the poor during the Salinas term (see Table 6). In terms of occupation, the PRI’s strongest supporters were found among the state-sector employees and housewives, the former who had been rewarded by PRI rule, the latter seeking stability above all. Table 7 shows perhaps the most important factor for explaining the PRI vote—education. Much in line with the ecological evidence in Tables 4 and 5, Table 7 shows that
the least educated Mexicans still voted for the PRI disproportionately in 1994, while the best educated Mexicans shunned that party, at least when compared to their less educated countrymen.

Much as might be expected given its relatively populist stance on economic policy, the PRD’s weakest support among the occupational categories came from the private sector employees followed by housewives, perhaps concerned that the PRD could bring political instability to their lives. Students, part-time workers, and the unemployed were stronger supporters of the PRD than those from other occupational categories, again much in line with our expectations given that the PRD has a more populist economic policy orientation. Supporting the argument made above that the PRD does relatively well among the more educated, controlling for other factors, Table 7 indicates that PRD support grew as one ascended the educational levels.

Table 8 adds a pair of additional demographic variables to our analysis–age and sex, neither of which can be explored with aggregate data. Two findings are clear: first, the PRI did better in 1994 among women while both parties of opposition received more votes from men than from women. This may suggest a greater willingness to countenance change among men in Mexican society. Second, the PAN did better among younger voters while the PRI drew somewhat more successfully from older voters. Again, this may suggest that those more inclined to consider change—in this case the young—were more inclined to vote for the PAN, in 1994 the most efficacious party of opposition, than were their older countrymen.

Conclusions: Toward a National Three-Party System?

Because the PAN and the PRD have had to struggle to build their electoral bases and their
party organizations, for many years in conflict with a PRI willing to use any and all means to keep them from winning office, it comes as no surprise that the two major opposition parties in Mexico have yet to establish strength throughout the nation. To some extent, that reflects the different interests of the regions and the programmatic stances of the parties on economic development strategy—the PRD’s message is less appealing in the north, the PAN less appealing in the Mexico City area and the south. To some extent, the parties’ internal differences over strategy have led them to concentrate intentionally or unintentionally on those parts of the nation where they have already had success and developed support bases. As parties develop areas of strength, it is conceivable that patterns of competition that have emerged in the past decade could become institutionalized in the distinct regions of the country. Thus, particularly to the extent that in the north the PAN and the PRI do not differ markedly on ideology and economic policy, one can imagine that the PRI and the PAN could compete in a two-party system there which focuses on a struggle of those in office versus those seeking to throw them out with the two parties acting as catch-all parties. Even in the south we can conceive of this as happening because much of the PRD in the south was until recently local segments of the PRI. Hence, the two parties there may differ less about policy issues than they do in congress and in national competition. Again, there could emerge a catch-all character to the PRI and the PRD in the south as they develop a two-party competition. So long as the internal pressures this process produces in the PRI between a more market-oriented northern wing of the party and a southern wing more inclined to the policies associated with revolutionary nationalism, we could imagine the continuation of this pattern of two separate two-party systems that looks like a three-party system in Mexico City and
in national institutions like the congress.

However, despite the considerable evidence about the growing division between northern and southern Mexico that I have presented here, there is some evidence that the PRD can penetrate the northern part of the nation and the PAN can make inroads in the south. Among its successes in the 1995 and 1996 state and municipal elections, the PAN counts winning the mayoral races in the state capitals of Michoacán, Puebla, Oaxaca, and Chiapas, states in which the competition ought to be between the PRD and the PRI according to the argument I presented above. Likewise, the PRD made important inroads into the northern state of Sonora in the 1997 midterm elections and it took the northern state of Zacatecas in the 1998 gubernatorial race there. Zacatecas may not be a prototypical northern state, but that the PRD was able to lure a disgruntled PRI candidate to its gubernatorial nomination and then win the race may indicate that it could do so again in other northern states when PRI factionalism presents the opportunity. For now Mexico’s party system has evolved to three parties nationally, with one having a true national presence and the other two having regional strengths, but an effective presidential campaign by either or both of the PRD and the PAN could likely extend their influence to make them truly national.
REFERENCES


“Electoral Politics and Mexico’s New Party System” 33


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Table 1
Federal Deputy Election Results, 1961-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PPS</th>
<th>PARM</th>
<th>PDM</th>
<th>PCM</th>
<th>PSUM</th>
<th>PMS</th>
<th>PRD</th>
<th>PST</th>
<th>PFCRN</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>PVEM</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>--</td>
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Annulled votes have been excluded.
Table 2
The Rise of Competition in Mexico, 1979-97
Federal Electoral Districts Categorized by Number of Parties

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Parties (NP Index)</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1997</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tripartite (NP &gt; 2.5)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plural Bipartism (2.0 - 2.5)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>Pure Bipartism (1.5 - 2.0)</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>107</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemonic (1.0 - 1.5)</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>187</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300</td>
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Table 3
Districts Categorized by Number of Parties and Principal Competitors, 1997

<table>
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<th>Type of District</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRI Wins Two-Party District</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRI Wins 2 ½ Party District</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>PRI Wins</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN Wins</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD Wins</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: PT Wins</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>84</td>
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</table>

Source: electoral data acquired from Instituto Federal Electoral.
Table 4
Multiple Regression Analysis of Direction of the Vote, 1991-97
Federal Deputy Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>-.12</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of population in towns &gt; 20,000</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of population employed in manufacturing</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Catholic</td>
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<td>.49</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td>-.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>% illiterate</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>-.17</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>% immigrants</td>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.08</td>
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<td>South</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bajío</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=2,403 municipios. Unstandardized ordinary least squares estimates. Cases have been weighted by population. Bold-faced figures are statistically significant at the .001 level.
**Table 5**

**Multiple Regression Analysis of Direction of the Vote, 1991-97**

**Federal Deputy Elections**

**Standardized Regression Coefficients**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of population in towns &gt; 20,000</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population employed in manufacturing</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.28</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Catholic</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>% illiterate</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
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<td>-.16</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>% immigrants</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajío</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=2,403 municipios. Standardized ordinary least squares estimates. Cases have been weighted by population. Bold-faced figures are statistically significant at the .001 level.
Table 6

Occupation, Income, and the Vote, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PRD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time State Employee</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Full-time Private Sector Employee</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Professional</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-employed (blue collar)</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-time Worker</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below poverty line</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle income</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wealthy</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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</table>

Table 7
Education and the Vote, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PRD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
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<td>49.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8

Age, Sex, and the Vote, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PRD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29.0</td>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-23</td>
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<td>24-29</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-44</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-59</td>
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<td>53.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mexico’s Regions

- Central (4)
- North (11)
- Bajio–Center-West (6)
- Metro (2)
- South (9)

Figure 1
Electoral Politics and Mexico’s New Party System

Figure 2

Party Competition
Mexico 1997

Other (3)
Three Party Competition (13)
PRD--PRI Competition (5)
PAN--PRI Competition (11)