

The Effects of Repression, Political Violence, and Pain and Loss on Social Capital in Central America

by

John A. Booth
Department of Political Science
University of North Texas
Denton, TX 76203-5340 USA
E-mail: booth@unt.edu or
john.booth5@gte.net

and

Patricia Bayer Richard
University College
Ohio University
Athens, OH 45701 USA
E-mail: richard@ohio.edu

Prepared for presentation at the XXII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Miami, March 16-18, 2000.

The Effects of Repression, Political Violence, and Pain and Loss on Social Capital in Central America

Abstract

State repression seeks to dissuade citizens from opposing the regime and its programs, and to bend civil society and social capital to regime purposes. Such repression may range from lesser forms of coercion and intimidation to the extreme infliction of physical pain upon citizens. Insurgents, too, may repress and inflict pain upon citizens and thus shape their behavior and attitudes. Central American states and their opponents in the 1980s and early 1990s employed widely varying levels of repression and political violence. Individuals within these nations differentially perceived violence and experienced varying levels of pain and loss stemming from it. Using 1990s survey data from six Central American nations to examine the effects of repression, perceived political violence, and resultant pain and loss upon social capital, we find that repression at the systemic level and the perception of political violence significantly affect civil society (group involvement) and varieties of social capital (political participation, democratic and antidemocratic norms, alienation from elections, and willingness to employ confrontational political tactics). The effects of pain and loss are less clear. While repression seeks to constrain participation and mold compliant norms, its effects in Central America are complex and sometimes inconsistent with such goals because it promotes increased communal level organization and certain confrontational forms of social capital.

The Effects of Repression, Political Violence, and Pain and Loss on Social Capital in Central America¹

If *Bowling alone* is bad for social capital, what is the effect of death squads? In his evocatively titled article *Bowling Alone*, Robert Putnam (1995) contends that the decline of participation in voluntary associations places U.S. democracy at risk by reducing the formation of important types of social capital. But in polities emerging from authoritarianism or intense political turmoil, political repression and political violence seem likely to be much more important than the vibrancy of bowling leagues to fashioning citizens' associations, political attitudes and behavior. In this paper we inquire into the effects of political repression and violence upon citizens' participation in groups (civil society activism) and social capital (interpersonal trust, political participation, and political attitudes) in Central America.

Theory

Regimes, their supporters, and sometimes their opponents employ political repression to influence political attitudes and behavior. Through repression they seek to shape, often by suppressing, the activities of political actors, and to constrain citizens' demands upon and expectations of the regime and state. Repression is highly instrumental. In the hands of the regime it tends to defend the power, perquisites and resources of incumbents and their allies from pressures from other elites and from mass publics. In the hands of regime opponents it is often employed to attack rulers' power. Repression in its various manifestations serves as both a pointed and a blunt political instrument, operating directly by intimidating, coercing, harming or killing specifically selected victims and indirectly by shaping the values, beliefs and behaviors of others who witness or merely learn of it. For example, citizens who suffer directly from repression may alter their opinions and, especially, change how they interact with others, the state, or political movements. But even those who only perceive or fear repression may change their behavior or attitudes to avoid becoming targets themselves. Such broad, indirect impacts of repression frame the nature and distribution of social capital in a society (Booth and Richard 1998a, 1998b), and there is evidence that widespread political violence has similar effects (Booth 2000).

Political repression research has been mainly state-focused (that is, viewed governments as the usual agent of repression), descriptive, historical, and concentrated upon its origin, development, roles, relationship to authoritarianism, and effects upon institutions and social forces.² Scholars have also extensively examined the complex links between repression and

¹We thank Chris Gelpi for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.

²Even for Latin America alone, this literature is too massive to cite. Good general bibliographies may be found in Lichbach (1995) and Mason and Krane (1989). Latin America-

political conflict (e.g., Gurr 1970, Tilly 1978, Gurr and Harff 1994, Lichbach 1995). Poe and Tate (1994) have documented the rapid growth of the study of repression *per se*, especially measured as the human rights performance of regimes.³ Other research explores how economic development levels, regime type, ideology, and interests shape governmental human rights performance (e.g., Petras et al. 1986; Pion-Berlin 1989, Barsh 1993:87-90; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995, 1999; King 1999). Recent studies reveal that new or emerging democracies have higher rates of repression (Fein 1995; Regan 1999) than more established ones.

A promising area of inquiry concerns how repression affects opposition behavior (Gurr 1970, 1986; Duff and McCamant 1976; Mason and Krane 1989, Singh 1991, King 1998, and Lichbach 1995). For instance, Singh (1991), King (1998), Davenport (1995), and Gartner and Regan (1996) have shown aggregate-level reciprocal effects between state repression and levels of opposition mobilization and violence. Others have recently begun to investigate how repression by regimes affects civil society and social capital at the individual level, especially political attitudes and citizen participation (Gibson 1988; Corradi et al. 1992; Booth and Richard 1996, 1998a, 1998b). Jennings (1999:1) has advanced this inquiry by discussing political responses to pain and loss defined as "exposure to events involving bodily harm, injury, illness, or death, whether personally and directly experienced or more remotely and vicariously experienced." He argues that "pain and loss experiences cut to the core of everyday lives and frequently infuse them with politics," and that "responses to pain and loss events occupy a prominent place in the domains of public opinion and issue activism" (Jennings 1999:1). Although Jennings focuses mainly on the impact of AIDS on individuals and groups, he argues that repression and civil war also generate great pain and loss, and may significantly affect political capital formation.

One might reasonably expect repression by regimes, intended as it is to reduce or manage citizen behavior, to depress participation and restrain expressions of support for democracy. Our own comparative research (Booth and Richard, 1996, 1998a, 1998b) shows that repression measured at the national level generally lowers Central Americans' support for democratic norms and several types of political participation. On the other hand, repression may produce political consequences unintended by those who employ it. At the system level, heavy state repression may promote rather than discourage the mobilization of opposition to a regime (Booth 1991). Other evidence suggests that repression's effect on individual-level civil society involvement and social capital formation may be complex. While participation and expressed support for democracy appear lower in repressive regimes, group participation and citizens' willingness to protest or confront the state may increase in such contexts (Foley and Edwards 1998). Jennings

oriented bibliographies may be found in Collier (1979:405-443) and Loveman and Davies (1989).

³One branch of this literature treats repression as an independent variable shaping public policy (e.g., Poe 1990, 1991). Another treats regime repression as a dependent variable, and seeks to explain variations in human rights abuse and repression (e.g., Poe and Tate 1994, Gastil 1989; Petras et al. 1986, Corradi et al. 1992; Stohl and Lopez 1984, 1986, 1988).

theorizes that pain and loss from intentional harm, that from terrorism, assaults, and civil war included, will likely change beliefs and contribute to political mobilization (1999:7-9).

We therefore ask how citizens respond to widespread high levels of political repression and to extended periods of political violence, especially in new or emerging democracies. How do citizens' perceptions of violence levels and their repression-induced experiences of pain and loss affect social capital? Do they participate more or less or differently under conditions of repression? Do they associate with each other more or avoid associating to enhance their safety?

Our previous research on Central America suggests that this turbulent region offers an opportunity to seek answers to such questions. We employ public opinion data from samples of urban Central Americans to investigate these issues, examining a number of hypotheses about the impact of repression, political violence, and pain and loss on civil society and social capital formation.

We begin with the relationships among state repression, perceived political violence, and personal pain and loss experience. We treat state repression as a polity-level constraint upon individuals. We capture political violence in terms of individual perception and view both state repression and opposition insurgent actions as capable of producing political violence. System-level repression should increase both individual perceptions of violence and experiences of pain and loss. Therefore:

H1a. Higher system-level repression will increase individuals' perceptions of political violence.

H1b. Higher system-level repression will increase individuals' pain and loss experiences.

H1c. Higher individual levels of pain and loss will increase levels of perceived violence.

People seek information for a variety of reasons, among them to defend against or minimize risk. Other things equal, therefore, we expect those who live in a repressive or violent political environment, and those who experience pain or loss because of it, to acquire political information as a means of protection.

H2: Higher system-level repression, perceived political violence, and experiences of pain or loss will contribute to higher individual levels of political knowledge.

Repression, perceptions of violence, and the experience of pain and loss because of them, we believe, will have certain effects on the formation of social capital, a congeries of attitudes and behaviors that shape citizens' interactions among themselves and with the state.⁴ Prior research,

⁴Foley and Edwards (2000) contend, supported by a rapidly growing coterie of other scholars (Schudson 1998, Rosenblum 1998, Berkowitz 1999) that the political science approach to conceptualizing social capital mainly in terms of interpersonal trust à la Putnam (1995, 1999) is deeply flawed. We concur, and have elsewhere argued (Booth and Richard 1998a, 1998b) that Putnam's vague conceptualization of social capital can be more usefully approached as a political

as cited above, has suggested that interpersonal trust, system support, political participation, and democratic norms are lower in repressive regimes, and we expect similar effects among those who perceive high levels of political violence or have experienced pain and loss. However, repression, violence, and pain and loss also increase the likelihood of mobilization as citizens organize for mutual benefit and protection. Repressive environments can alienate citizens from democratic methods such as voting in elections, and membership in certain organizations can inculcate norms supportive of political conflict and confrontation with governments. This suggests the following hypotheses:

H3: Higher system-level repression, perceived political violence, and experiences of pain or loss will decrease citizens' levels of interpersonal trust and diffuse support for the political system.

H4: Higher system-level repression, perceived political violence, and experiences of pain or loss will decrease levels of within-channels political participation (voting, contacting public officials, and campaigning).

H5: Higher system-level repression, perceived political violence, and experiences of pain or loss will decrease levels of support for democratic liberties.

Citizens may attempt to insulate themselves or advance their interests within a hostile or menacing political environment through collective action. Through their participation in a group, individuals may be socialized into political attitudes and beliefs that reinforce the group and enhance its ability to undertake mutually beneficial collective action. Different types of organizations, depending on their members' resources and class position, will thus cultivate different types of social capital. For example, community groups may promote contacting public officials to gain resources, and working class groups may encourage civil disobedience as a valuable political tool to the otherwise disadvantaged.⁵

H6: Higher system-level repression, perceived political violence, and experiences of pain or loss will increase levels of civil society activism (group activism).

Finally, citizens living under repression, who perceive violence, or who suffer pain and loss may become alienated from the political system or antagonistic toward the government in power. Thus they may evidence alienated or confrontational forms of social capital.

capital, a form of social capital consisting of attitudes and values and behaviors that impinge upon government in some way. Some may enhance civility by promoting democracy and citizens participation within institutions. Others may reduce civility, increase political conflict, or weaken democratic norms (Booth and Richard 1998; Richard and Booth 2000). Other than social trust, the social capital variables we include here are of the political capital type, some civility-enhancing and some civility-reducing.

⁵See Booth and Richard (1998), Richard and Booth (2000).

H7: Higher system-level repression, perceived political violence, and experiences of pain or loss will increase levels of support for civil disobedience, support for suppressing democratic liberties, justification of coups d'état, support for overthrowing the government, and alienation from elections.

Central America

Central America of the early 1990s constituted a promising arena in which to investigate the impact of repression, political violence, and citizens' attendant pain and loss. The six major countries of the region have long shared many social and cultural traits and historical experience, language, social culture, religion, small size, and economies, thus permitting a most-similar systems comparison. They vary dramatically, however, in their national political situations and types of regime, degrees of effective democracy, and levels of political repression and violence (Booth and Walker 1999). Formally democratic governments were in place in all six countries in the early 1990s in that each held elections, but several were still developing their institutions and struggling to resolve violent internal political conflict. In the early 1990s Costa Rica had been a stable democracy for decades. Honduras was moving gradually toward civilian democracy while Nicaragua's decade of Sandinista revolution and counterrevolutionary war had recently ended. El Salvador and Guatemala were still engaged in intense civil wars, with peace negotiations in the former making much more rapid progress than in the latter. Panama had been invaded by the United States in 1989 in order to topple the Noriega dictatorship and install a civilian government.

Data

Surveys of the urban residents of these six Central American nations -- Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama -- conducted in the early 1990s provide the data for this analysis.⁶ The six surveys included a large core of identical items, including

⁶Methodology: Surveys were conducted in mid 1991 among the urban, voting-age populations of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. In 1992 a similar survey was conducted in Guatemala. The Costa Rica survey was conducted in 1995. In each a stratified (by socioeconomic level) cluster sample of dwelling units was drawn from the national capital and other major urban centers. Interviewees were selected using randomizing procedures and sex and age quotas. We collected 4,089 face to face interviews region wide, with national samples ranging from 500 to 900. To prevent large country Ns from distorting findings in this analysis, the country samples have been weighted equally to approximately 700 each (weighted N=4,198). We generalize only to major urban areas, roughly half the region's populace.

We gratefully support for our data collection from the North-South Center of the University of Miami, the Howard Heinz Endowment-Center for Latin American Studies of the University of Pittsburgh Research Grants on Current Latin American Issues, University of North Texas Faculty Development Grants and Faculty Research Programs, the Andrew Mellon Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, the Heinz Foundation, and the University of Pittsburgh. The project was designed and much of the data were collected by a team including Mitchell A. Seligson of the University of Pittsburgh and John A. Booth of the University of North Texas.

perceptions of political violence, group activism, political participation, and political attitudes and values. Many of these items have been widely validated and field tested in various cultural settings (Booth and Seligson 1984; Muller et al. 1987; Seligson and Booth 1993; Seligson and Gómez 1989). Four of the surveys also included items on reported pain and loss from political turmoil.

Independent variables: We operationalize indicators of repression, violence, and pain and loss. The first is a measure of **state repression** that treats repression as a systemic constraint upon individuals at the polity level. It includes two equally weighted components: one measuring repression at the time of the survey, and another the history of repression in the decade before the survey. The resulting measure (the mean of the two) provides a repression score for each country that we assign to each respondent by nation of residence.⁷

As distinct from repression, political violence includes the harm to citizens and property perpetrated both by regime forces and sympathetic paramilitary elements and by insurgent opponents of the regime. Citizens in countries with state and insurgent terrorism confront a social setting fraught with potential risks. We employ an item asking citizens how much political violence they perceive, providing an individual-level measure of **perceived violence**.

Four of the six countries experienced high levels of repression and political violence. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua experienced protracted insurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns and moderate to high repression. Panama's Noriega regime, under heavy pressure from the United States, also employed state repression and then suffered the 1989 invasion that toppled it. In these four countries the surveys included a battery of three items that tap pain and loss stemming from violence and repression **B** whether a member of the respondent's family had been killed or disappeared, been made a refugee, or had to leave the country. Table 1 presents the percentages of persons reporting each of these types of pain and loss. While less than nine percent of urban Guatemalans and less than seven percent of Panamanians reported any of these,

Team members who also directed field work were Ricardo Córdova, Andrew Stein, Annabelle Conroy, Orlando Pérez, and Cynthia Chalker. Guatemala field work was conducted by the Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES). Valuable collaboration was provided by the following: In Costa Rica: Consejo Superior Universitaria (CSUCA), Departments of Statistics and Political Science of the University of Costa Rica; in Nicaragua: Instituto de Estudios Internacionales (IEI) of the Universidad Centroamericana; in Honduras: Centro de Estudio y Promoción del Desarrollo (CEPROD) and Centro de Documentación de Honduras; in Panama: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos "Justo Arosemena" (CELA); and in El Salvador: Centro de Investigación y Acción Social (CINAS) and the Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos (IDELA).

⁷The measure includes a historical component (estimated intensity of regime repression over the decade before each nation's survey) on the assumption that the effect of repression on citizens will decay gradually even after repression has actually subsided. The immediate repression context also matters, so repression is estimated within each country at the survey date. See Booth and Richard (1996) for further details on construction and validation of this measure.

Salvadorans and Nicaraguans reported much greater impact of violence and repression. Roughly one in five Salvadorans and Nicaraguans reported the violent death or disappearance of a family member. Over thirty percent of Salvadorans had family member who were made refugees or exiles. Among Nicaraguans 42.4 percent reported family refugees, and 47.7 percent had family members in exile.⁸ These items have been combined to form an index of **pain and loss**. Table 1 presents distributions of these items among countries and details on their construction. Zero order correlations among these measures reveal that they are not multi collinear (Table 3).

Civil society measures. Responses to questions concerning activity in seven types of organizations provide the basis for our indices of civil society (see notes to Table 2). Factor analysis of variables measuring citizens' participation in groups and associations detected two distinctive civil society activity modes. We call the first **formal group involvement** (which includes membership in unions, civic associations, cooperatives, and professional groups). The second we label **communal involvement** (involvement in community groups such as parent organizations associated with schools, community development groups, and work on community projects).⁹

Social capital variables: We conceptualize social capital broadly, going well beyond the **interpersonal trust** measure that Putnam (1995) emphasizes so heavily as the key social capital measure.¹⁰ We include two sets of measures that indicate key potentialities among citizens -- for them to support and embrace democracy and participate within it (civility-enhancing social capital) and to disrupt, confront, or challenge political institutions (civility-reducing or conflict-promoting social capital). The optimistic approach to social capital embraced by Putnam assumes that citizens who interact in and through groups will develop such civility-enhancing traits as increased trust. In this vein, we believe that citizens may also increase their participation in politics through accepted channels and their support of democratic norms. We have three measures of citizens' participation in politics -- **voting, contacting public officials, and campaigning** (see notes to Table 2 for details). We assess support for democracy using multiple measures of two key concepts, support for general participation rights and tolerance, which are combined into a measure of **democratic norms** (see Table 2 for details).

⁸Note that these values do not mean that 47.7 percent of Nicaraguans or 36.6 percent of Salvadorans went into exile, merely that someone in the respondent's extended family had done so. There is, therefore, considerable over-reporting due to interlocking familial ties. Actual exile rates among Nicaraguans and Salvadorans, however, were quite high, perhaps exceeding ten percent of the population of each country.

⁹Means of both measures differed significantly between nations (see Booth and Richard 1998a, 1998b for details).

¹⁰As noted above, Foley and Edwards (2000) have argued, based upon extensive literature review, that interpersonal trust tells little about social capital formation and its effects on system characteristics. We include interpersonal trust here for comparative purposes.

However, as noted, especially in fledgling democracies riven with conflict, not all social capital is likely to promote civility or reduce conflict. Participation in death squads or violent paramilitaries provide vivid examples. Thus we incorporate into our analysis several items that capture aspects of civility-decreasing or conflict-increasing social capital. In addition to an expressed belief that a coup d'état might be justified (**coup justification**), others derive from a battery of questions rooted in the civic culture and polyarchy literature: an index measuring respondents=**approval of the suppression of democratic liberties** (e.g., approval of press censorship or banning demonstrations); an index measuring respondents=**approval of civil disobedience** (e.g., occupying buildings or blocking streets); an item eliciting respondents=**approval of armed rebellion** against an elected government;¹¹ and a final item on **alienation from elections**. This last is based on the respondents' explanations of why citizens did not vote in the last election. It scores as 1 all respondents volunteering that others did not believe in elections, were disillusioned with them, or did not want to vote; other answers are scored zero.¹²

Demographic measures. Because certain demographic traits are known to influence citizen behavior and attitudes and thus affect the relationships we are examining, we employ measures of respondents' living standard, education, and sex as control variables.

Analysis

We begin our analysis with an examination of the predicted relationships among system level repression, perceived violence, and pain and loss in H1a-H1c. Table 3 presents zero order correlations among these variables. The analysis confirms H1a, revealing a significant and strongly positive correlation between state repression and perceived violence, both for all six nations ($r=.509$) and for the subsample of the four most turbulent ones ($r=.432$). We also find support for H1c: for the same four most turbulent nations, perceived violence and pain and loss are positively, though not as strongly, correlated.

H1b, on the other hand, predicts that state repression will be associated with greater individual pain and loss experiences, but our analysis produces instead a significant negative relationship (Table 3A). We speculate that this anomaly may be an artifact of the interaction of regime repression styles (for instance, repression being more narrowly targeted in one country than in another) with the survey population, urban dwellers. For instance, the data in Table 1 reveal that Guatemala has a high state repression score, but a low pain and loss index among our urban respondents. Guatemala's heavily victimized indigenous populations, predominantly rural

¹¹See Seligson and Booth (1993) for an extended discussion of the tolerance and polyarchy literature from which these items were derived and citations of key references.

¹²Two additional items employed later in the analysis measure respondents' self-described leftist or rightist **ideological extremism**. For instance, those who rated themselves in the left end of an ideological continuum received higher scores on the left extremism scale the farther to the left they placed themselves, and scores of zero if in the center or right.

residents, are under-represented in our urban sample. In Panama, conversely, the higher pain and loss index reflects the high incidence of violence manifested in urban areas during the Noriega regime and 1989 invasion. We were able to extend our analysis through examination of data from 1993 and 1995 two-stage surveys of nationwide samples of 2,400 Guatemalans, including urban and rural dwellers and many indigenous people.¹³ We see considerable regional variation within Guatemala in levels of perceived violence, suggesting that subnational contexts may influence this relationship when examined through cross-national samples.

In sum, then, there is strong evidence for the hypothesized positive links between state repression and perceived violence, and between perceived violence and pain and loss. An anomalous negative repression-pain/loss correlation appears likely to be an artifact of the sample design.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that citizens experiencing higher levels of repression, perceived violence, or pain and loss will have higher levels of political information. We see the acquisition of political knowledge as providing citizens with a tool to avoid becoming victims of repression or violence. We also expect that the ability to acquire political information would be somewhat contingent upon one's level of education, standard of living, and mass media exposure. Table 4 presents the results of a regression analysis. Model 1 presents beta coefficients indicating association between an index of political information levels and various independent and intervening variables, including demographic factors. Model 1, including the full 6-nation sample but excluding the pain and loss variable since it is available only for four of the countries, supports the hypothesis for perceived violence. Repression, in contrast, has no significant effect in model 1. When we include pain and loss in the 4-nation equation (model 2), the hypothesis fails: neither repression nor perceived violence nor pain and loss have any significant effect on information levels independent of sex, education, standard of living, and media contact.

These findings provide inconclusive evidence concerning H2. Neither state repression nor pain and loss affect citizens' information levels, but perceived violence has the hypothesized effect in the region-wide sample. Our information index (which includes some international political information items) may be flawed for this application, or the resources of education, higher living standard, and media contact may simply far outweigh repression- and violence-related effects in shaping political knowledge.

We turn now to social capital formation, beginning with diffuse support for the political system and interpersonal trust, the latter an especially important variable according to some scholars. H3 predicts that higher levels of repression/violence phenomena will depress both system support and trust. Table 5 presents multiple regression analyses of the impact on our diffuse support index of state repression, perceived violence, and pain and loss, as well as several control variables for demographic traits, media exposure, and information levels. Contrary to the prediction of H3, state repression has a positive effect on diffuse support for both the 4-country

¹³We extend our sincere thanks to Mitchell Seligson for these data.

and 6-country samples (models 1 and 2). However, as H3 predicted, perceived political violence markedly lowers diffuse support. In effect, then, Central Americans who live in repressive regimes -- but also perceive less violence -- tend to make slightly stronger professions of patriotism and institutional pride. On reflection this pattern has a logic: the repressive context urges citizens to profess patriotic pride, something those not personally perceiving excessive violence would seem more likely to do.

Interpersonal trust, in contrast, performs largely as predicted by H3, being lowered by state repression (in the 4-country model 4 only), and by higher levels of perceived violence (in both of Table 5's models 3 and 4). Very little of the variance in interpersonal trust (2.0 percent in model 3, 3.5 percent in model 4) is explained, however, even when regressed on various demographic factors. Again, the pain and loss index has no significant independent correlation with either diffuse support or expressed trust in others in any of the four models presented in Table 5. We continue to wonder whether our measures of pain and loss adequately capture these phenomena.

To test H4 and H5 we regressed measures of overall political participation and overall democratic norms on our measures of repression, perceived violence, and pain and loss. Table 6 reveals that repression and perceived violence both lower participation in politics for the 6-country sample (model 1); only repression does so for the 4-country subsample (model 2). The pain and loss measure has no significant impact on political participation in either model. Thus the findings confirm H5 for repression, partially confirm it for perceived violence, and fail to confirm it for loss and pain. In terms of democratic norms, both the 6-country and 4-country models reveal that repression has strong negative effects, while neither perceived violence nor pain and loss have any effect. Thus, state repression is the factor that consistently and sharply reduces two key forms of social capital among Central Americans, taking part in politics and holding democratic norms. That it does so while perceived violence and pain and loss have little or no effect suggests that our various repression and violence phenomena may exercise differentiated paths of influence upon diverse types of social capital.

Table 7 presents the results of regression analyses of two forms of civil society involvement. Exploring the patterns of group behavior among Central Americans, we have previously (Booth and Richard 1996) identified two distinct types: **formal group involvement**, including membership in civic associations, professional groups, cooperatives, and unions, and **communal involvement**, including activity in locally-focused organizations such as community betterment, church, and school groups. While Hypothesis 6 predicts that repression, perceived violence, and pain and loss each will be associated with higher levels of civil society activity, the hypothesis is not confirmed with regard to pain and loss. On the other hand, Central Americans are indeed more active in community groups in more repressive regimes and when they perceive high levels of violence. In terms of formal group participation, we find no effect for repression but a significantly negative one for perceived violence. Together, these findings indicate that our independent variables have differential mobilizing effects for different types of groups, upon which we expand below. Thus again we see somewhat distinctive paths of influence of repression and

violence upon social capital. Neither the repressive context nor pain and loss experiences affect the propensity to join formal organizations, but perceiving high violence reduces joining such groups. In contrast, both state repression and perceived violence (but not pain and loss) independently increase communal level civil society activism.

Community Groups: Rather than being depressed, citizens=communal involvement is higher under conditions of repression and perceived violence. Communal groups, because of their local focus, constitute arenas in which citizens can participate even in violent and repressive political environments. Community groups provide safe havens for activists to pursue goals without being viewed as regime-challenging.

Formal Groups: Our formal group measure encompasses diverse types of organizations, representing citizens from different classes and with quite different interests. Unions and cooperatives typically have working class and lower middle class members, whose goals may include redistribution of wealth and services directed toward the less advantaged. In Central America, unions are especially prone to challenge government wage policies. One might thus expect unions and cooperatives to be restrained by state repression. On the other hand, civic and professional association members come from the middle and upper classes. We suspect that members of such groups, being far less likely to have anti-regime biases than members of disadvantaged classes, may evade repression or even prosper under repressive regimes. We investigated these conjectures by exploring the effect of our three independent variables on activism in each type of group,¹⁴ and thereby identified divergent repression/violence effects. As we expected, higher state repression associates with lower union and cooperative membership, but with higher professional group activism. In contrast, those who perceive higher political violence levels appear discouraged from professional and civic association involvement.¹⁵

The divergent effects of repression and political violence suggest there is reason to investigate the types of social capital formed by Central America's pro- and anti-regime organizations and radical political movements of both right and left. Since our data do not capture the full range of group participation in Central America, we turn instead to self-reported ideological extremism in our samples. Preliminary analysis of two measures, **left-wing** and **right-wing ideological self-identification**, reveals the following: holding other factors constant, self-identified left-wing extremists (a small minority of the population) tend to be poor, have higher levels of education, live in lower repression countries, and perceive high levels of political violence. In sharp contrast, self-identified right-wing extremists (much more numerous than leftists but still a minority of urban citizens) tend to be better off economically, less well educated, live in lower repression countries, and perceive low levels of political violence.¹⁶ Living in nations

¹⁴Not included here to conserve space.

¹⁵See Booth and Richard (1998) and Richard and Booth (2000) for a discussion of how repression differentially affects civil society and social capital by type of group.

¹⁶These findings are based on a multiple regression analysis, not shown here to conserve

with low levels of repression constitutes the one commonality between the left and right extremists. Perceiving high levels of political violence encourages leftist orientation, perceiving low violence right-wing.

We now turn to the types of social capital we have elsewhere (Booth and Richard 1998c, Richard and Booth 2000) labeled "negative political capital"-- antidemocratic norms as well as attitudes that endorse or justify disruptive, confrontational, or violent political behavior or expression political alienation. Hypothesis 7 predicts that higher levels of state repression, perceived violence, and pain and loss will be associated with such attitudes. Again our pain and loss measure had no significant effects. The other findings portrayed in Table 8 are complex and again reveal differential social capital influences by state repression and perceived violence: higher state repression correlates with lower approval of civil disobedience and justification of coups d'état, but higher support for suppressing civil liberties and more alienation from elections. The picture for perceived violence is slightly clearer. The hypothesis is supported with respect to justifying coups, overthrowing the government, and alienation from elections, but not for the suppression of civil liberties. Citizens of Central America's more repressive states and those who perceived high levels of violence were, somewhat logically, alienated from the elections that had done little to bring about peace. Moreover, violence perceivers also tended to be more approving of overthrowing the government, to justify coups, and as noted above, to be left-wing ideological extremists. These findings at least partly confirm that repressed or fearful citizens may embrace confrontational orientations toward the state.

Finally, we may assess some larger patterns that emerge from reviewing Tables 5 through 8. Taken together these findings leave no doubt that state repression and perceived violence make a distinct mark on social capital. In every regression model reported, either state repression or perceived violence and often both have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable. But how strong are the effects we have modeled? They vary considerably. As demonstrated by R^2 , our most successful models account for between nine and nineteen percent of variance explained in three dependent variables -- overall political participation, formal group involvement, and general democratic norms. In contrast, explained variance is very limited (3.5 percent or less) for several variables: interpersonal trust, justification of coups, approval of overthrowing the government, and alienation from elections. Explained variance is only slightly more robust (in the four to six percent range) for the civil society variable communal involvement and for three attitudes -- diffuse support, support for civil disobedience, and support for suppressing civil liberties.

We surmise that the difference in explained variance between the first group and latter two groups of variables arises from three sources: First, the better explained variables mostly consist of civility-enhancing, socially acceptable, within-channels phenomena -- e.g., support for democratic norms, voting, contacting officials, civic and professional association membership. In contrast, many of the remaining less explained variables consist of civility-reducing, conflict-

space.

endorsing, or alienated responses possibly subject to social desirability response bias. Some respondents may well have found it difficult to admit such civility-reducing behaviors and attitudes, thus introducing some error into these data. Second, we suspect that the social capital and civil society phenomena in the better explained group are better measured than those less explained. The better explained variables consist mostly of indices constructed from multiple items and have been repeatedly validated in diverse political settings. The phenomena in the less explained group, in contrast, consist of several single-item variables -- coup justification, alienation from elections, and support for overthrowing the government -- and may thus be less reliable. Another of the poorly explained variables is interpersonal trust, which we measure in the usual way but which is increasingly criticized in theoretical, conceptual, and measurement terms (Foley and Edwards 2000, Power and Clark 1999). Thus these civility-reducing measures and trust may need further development and refinement in future studies. Third, the less explained variables tend to have smaller standard deviations and thus less variance to explain than the better explained social capital variables.

Conclusions

Our findings may be summarized as follows:

- \$ Neither state repression nor perceived violence increased levels of political information as we measured it.
- \$ Diffuse support for the political system was lower among high violence perceivers, as hypothesized, but higher among citizens of more repressive regimes. This anomalous finding may well stem from citizens' unwillingness to express to interviewers their reservations about highly repressive governments.
- \$ State repression and perceived violence lower interpersonal trust.
- \$ State repression and perceived violence sharply lower levels of political participation.
- \$ State repression lowers levels of democratic norms.
- \$ State repression and perceived violence, as hypothesized, increase certain types of civil society activism (in communal groups and in professional associations). Contrary to hypothesis, state repression depresses union and cooperative activity, and perceived violence lowers professional and civic association activism. Repression and violence effects on civil society thus appear to be a function of specific organization type.
- \$ State repression and perceived violence increase citizens' alienation from elections.
- \$ State repression increases citizens' expressed willingness to suppress civil liberties (i.e., to embrace censorship or prevent political meetings or peaceful demonstrations).
- \$ Perception of violence increases citizens' willingness to justify a coup d'état, support overthrowing the government, and express left-wing ideological radicalism.
- State repression and perceived violence affect different social capital variables distinctively. State repression is the main factor reducing participation and democratic norms, for example, while perceived violence is the principal factor reducing interpersonal trust, formal group participation, and willingness to overthrow the government. State repression and perceived violence each independently but jointly affect several social

- capital variables, sometimes even working in opposing directions.
- Contrary to our predictions, pain and loss experiences had very little effect upon social capital formation independently of state repression and perceived violence.

On balance, then, repression and political violence in Central America, as expected, weaken such civility-enhancing forms of social capital as democratic norms, political participation, and interpersonal trust. Repression and/or political violence also increase alienation from elections and willingness to suppress democratic liberties, but increase such civility-reducing (conflictive) political capital as justifying coups and supporting overthrowing the government.

Our pain and loss measure, based on respondents= having experienced violence-related deaths of family members, family members becoming internal refugees, or family members being exiled, proved unfruitful in predicting levels of social capital when state repression and perceived violence were also included. This presents an interesting problem: Is pain and loss as Jennings= (1999) theory suggests a problematical concept, or do we have a measurement problem?

We attempted to discern whether the fault lay in the theory, our measures, or both by running our regression models on a country by country basis, thereby excluding the state-repression variable.¹⁷ We thus discovered some influence of pain and loss on social capital. Specifically, independently of perceived violence, the pain and loss measure explained significant levels of variance in most of the dependent variables in the case of Panama: as hypothesized, Panamanians reporting pain and loss were more active in both formal and communal groups and were more disposed to support civil disobedience and overthrowing the government. Moreover, Salvadorans reporting pain and loss had lower democratic norms. Contrary to our hypothesis, though, Nicaraguans reporting pain and loss had higher levels of political participation.

This further exploration into pain and loss suggests the following possibilities. On the one hand, in Central America of the early 1990s pain and loss experiences may have had little sociotropic utility for shaping attitudes and behavior so as to improve individual survival chances. Experiencing pain and loss would provide only a retrospective behavioral cue. Such retrospection about a personal or family loss would, we surmise, be far less fruitful than exploring the extant political environment for prospective cues related to actual repression and perceived political violence. In essence, considering repression and violence would suggest to many citizens strategies for adjusting their actions and expressed opinions so as to evade political risk. The collective effects on social capital of such prospective cues and calculations could be substantial.

On the other hand, the variable as conceived and operationalized may incompletely capture pain and loss. First, because we have studied only urban samples in Central America we miss the pain and loss of the rural populations who were the main victims of repression and violence in some countries. Second, the interaction of migration patterns arising from civil

¹⁷Regression analysis not shown here to conserve space.

conflict and the timing of the national surveys (e.g., war having ended in Nicaragua but continuing in Guatemala and El Salvador) may have effectively eliminated many pain and loss victims from the Guatemalan and Salvadoran samples. Alternatively, pain and loss victims in the sample may have experienced sufficient disruption of their resources and social networks to preclude detectable social capital effects at the time of measurement. Fourth, we could not measure pain and loss in the region's two least turbulent countries of Costa Rica and Honduras, eliminating potentially important variance from our data base. In sum, the limited associations we find for our pain and loss measure may arise from question and sample design shortcomings. That notwithstanding, the limited pain and loss effects we have discerned at the national level lend support to the theory that pain and loss can mobilize citizens and generate conflict- or change-oriented social capital. We conclude that pain and loss effects warrant further inquiry, with careful attention to issues of measurement and sample design.

Our research on Central America allowed us to consider the effects of the political pathologies of repression and civil conflict, and two of their effects, individuals' perceptions of violence and their pain and loss experience on social capital. Taking note of a theoretical debate as to whether civil society activity and resulting social capital necessarily enhances civility or whether they may sometimes reduce civility and promote conflict, we set out to examine social capital formation in Central America. Theory and prior research suggested that political context mattered significantly in shaping social capital. We therefore argued that state repression, perceived political violence, and pain and loss would likely lower citizens' civility-enhancing social and political capital, but would probably increase civil society activism and the formation of civility-reducing and conflict-promoting political capital. Despite some data limitations and certain interesting anomalies, we largely confirm these expectations with respect to state repression and perceived violence in Central America. Though inconclusive here, further investigation of pain and loss effects appear very warranted.

Bibliography

- Barsh, Russell Lawrence. 1993. "Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose." *Human Rights Quarterly* 15:87-121.
- Berkowitz, Peter. 1999. *Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Booth, John A. 1991. "Socioeconomic and Political Roots of National Revolts in Central America." *Latin American Research Review* 26 (No. 1): 33-73.
- _____. 2000. "Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala Within the Central American Context." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (forthcoming).
- Booth, John A. and Patricia Bayer Richard. 1996. "Repression, Participation, and Democratic Norms in Urban Central America." *American Journal of Political Science*, 40: 1205-1232.
- _____. 1998a. "Civil Society, Political Capital, and Democratization in Central America." *Journal of Politics*, 60 (August): 780-800.

- _____. 1998b. "Civil Society and Political Context in Central America." *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (September): 33-46.
- _____. 1998c. "Civil Society in Central America: The Dark Side?" Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, April 23.
- Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1984. "The Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: A Reexamination." *Latin American Research Review* 19, 1:106-124.
- Booth, John A. and Thomas W. Walker. 1999. *Understanding Central America*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Collier, David, ed. 1979. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Corradi, Juan E., Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón. 1992. *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Davenport, Christian. 1995. "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions." *American Journal of Political Science*, 39: (No. 3):683-713.
- _____, ed. 1999. *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights and Contentious Politics in Comparative Perspective*. Rowman and Littlefield (forthcoming).
- Duff, Ernest A. and John F. McCamant. 1976. *Violence and Repression in Latin America: A Quantitative and Historical Analysis*. New York: The Free Press.
- Fein, Helen. 1995. "More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987." *Human Rights Quarterly* 17,1:170-191.
- Foley, Michael W. & Edwards, Bob. 1996. "The Paradox of Civil Society." *Journal of Democracy* 7: 38-52.
- _____. 1998. "Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and Social Capital in Comparative Perspective." *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (No. 1): 5-20.
- _____. 2000. "Is It Time to Disinvest in Social Capital?" *Journal of Public Policy* (forthcoming).
- Gartner, Scott S. and Patrick M. Regan. 1996. "Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 33, 3:273-288.
- Gastil, Raymond D. 1989. "Freedom in the Comparative Survey: Definitions and Criteria." In Raymond Gastil, ed., *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1988-1989*. New York: Freedom House.
- Gibson, James. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare." *American Political Science Review* 82, 2: 511-529.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gurr, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff. 1994. *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Jennings, Kent. 1999. "Political Responses to Pain and Loss." *American Political Science Review* 93, 1: 1-14.
- King, John C. 1998. "Repression, Domestic Threat, and Interactions in Argentina and Chile." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 27 (Winter): 1-37.

- _____. 1999. "Ameliorating Effects of Democracy on Political Repression as Seen in 51 Countries Across 35 Years." In Christian Davenport, ed., *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights and Contentious Politics in Comparative Perspective*. Rowman and Littlefield (forthcoming).
- Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1995. *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Loveman, Brian, and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds. 1989. *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Mason, T. David and Dale A. Krane. 1989. "The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror." *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (June): 175-98.
- Muller, Edward N. et al. 1987. "Education, Participation, and Support for Democratic Norms." *Comparative Politics* 20 (October):19-33.
- Petras, James F., Howard Brill, Dennis Engbarth, Edward S. Herman, and M.H. Morley. 1986. *Latin America: Bankers, Generals, and the Struggle for Social Justice*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Pion-Berlin, David. 1989. *The Ideology of State Terror: Economic Doctrine and Political Repression in Argentina and Peru*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Poe, Steven C. 1990. "Human Rights and Foreign Aid: A Review of Quantitative Research and Prescriptions for Future Research." *Human Rights Quarterly* 12:499-512.
- _____. 1991. "Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance." *Journal of Peace Research* 28:205-216.
- Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88, 4: 853-872.
- Power, Timothy J. And Mary A. Clark. 1999. "Does Trust Matter? Interpersonal Trust and Democratic Values in Three Latin American Nations." Paper presented at the Conference on Democracy and Development, Middelbury College, May 8-9, 1999.
- Putnam, Robert B. 1995. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." *Journal of Democracy* 6: 65-78.
- _____. 2000. *Bowling Alone: Civil Engagement in America*. New York: Simon and Schuster (forthcoming).
- Regan, Patrick M. 1999. "Democracy, Threats, and Political Repression: Are Democracies Less Violent Internally?" Paper presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, (September).
- Richard, Patricia Bayer and John A. Booth. 2000. "Civil Society and Democratic Transition in Central America." In Thomas A. Walker and Ariel C. Armony. *Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources (forthcoming).
- Rosenblum, Nancy L. 1998. *Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schudson, Michael. 1998. *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life*. New York: The Free Press.
- Seligson, Mitchell A. and John A. Booth. 1993. "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica." *Journal of Politics* 55 (August):777-792.

- Seligson, Mitchell A. and Miguel Gómez B. 1989. "Ordinary Elections in Extraordinary Times."
In John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. *Elections and Democracy in Central America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Singh, Karandeep. 1991. "Sikh Terrorism in India 1984-1990: A Time Series Analysis." Ph.D. dissertation. Denton: University of North Texas.
- Stohl, Michael and George A. Lopez, eds. 1984. *The State as Terrorist*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- _____, eds. 1986. *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- _____, eds. 1988. *Terrible Beyond Endurance: The Foreign Policy of State Terrorism*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley.

Table 1. Repression levels, perceived violence and pain/loss measures for Central American urban dwellers, by country.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Guate- mala</u>	<u>Hon- duras</u>	<u>El Sal- vador</u>	<u>Nica- ragua</u>	<u>Costa Rica</u>	<u>Panamá</u>	<u>Region</u>
CONTEXTUAL LEVEL							
Repression level ^a	5.00	2.00	4.50	3.00	1.00	1.50	2.83
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL							
Perceived violence level ^b	3.44	1.44	3.79	3.17	1.75	2.15	2.62
Family member killed or disappeared (%) ^d	9.0	- ^c	22.9	19.4	- ^c	6.7	- ^c
Family member a refugee (%) ^e	6.6	- ^c	30.9	42.4	- ^c	6.9	- ^c
Family member in exile (%) ^f	7.7	- ^c	33.6	47.7	- ^c	6.9	- ^c
Pain and loss index ^g	.09	- ^c	.26	.30	- ^c	.17	- ^c

^a Index of repression at the system level; half of score based on level at time of survey, half of score based on repression during decade prior to survey; score is mean; very low repression=1...very high repression = 5. See Booth and Richard (1996) for details on index construction.

^b Item: **A**How much political violence is there in the country?@ none=1,some=2,much=3.

^c Not available; question not asked in countries without civil war.

^d Item: **A**Has some member of your family been killed or disappeared during the political violence?@ Values = percent responding affirmatively.

^e Item: **A**Has some member of your family been a refugee because of the political violence?@ Values = percent responding affirmatively.

^f Item: **A**Has some member of your family had to leave the country because of the political violence?@ Values = percent responding affirmatively.

^g Index of pain and loss due to political violence; constructed based on affirmative responses to death/disappearance, refugee, and exile items above.(range 0=low to 3=high).

Table 2. Civil society and social capital indices for Central American urban dwellers, by country.^a

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Guate- mala</u>	<u>Hon- duras</u>	<u>El Sal- vador</u>	<u>Nica- ragua</u>	<u>Costa Rica</u>	<u>Panamá</u>	<u>Region</u>
CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT							
Communal self-help involvement ^b	1.09	.87	1.05	1.56	1.80	1.28	1.27
Group involvement ^c	.66	1.05	.33	.43	.47	.84	.63
SOCIAL CAPITAL -- POLITICAL PARTICIPATION							
Voting ^d	1.51	1.86	1.39	1.62	1.91	1.72	1.67
Campaigning ^e	.25	1.08	.18	.47	.87	.84	.62
Contacting public officials ^f	.41	.77	.32	.17	.56	.56	.46
Overall participation level ^g	2.21	3.74	1.90	2.32	3.33	3.11	2.77
SOCIAL CAPITAL -- SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES							
General partici- pation rights ^h	7.06	8.07	7.47	8.31	8.22	8.46	7.94
Rights for regime critics ⁱ	4.60	6.99	5.21	5.69	6.12	7.10	5.98
Overall democratic norms ^j	5.85	7.53	6.34	7.01	7.17	7.79	6.96
SOCIAL CAPITAL -- OTHER POLITICAL ATTITUDES							
Support for civil disobedience ^k	2.01	3.41	2.12	2.42	1.93	1.96	2.31

Table 2, continued

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Guate- mala</u>	<u>Hon- duras</u>	<u>El Sal- vador</u>	<u>Nica- ragua</u>	<u>Costa Rica</u>	<u>Panamá</u>	<u>Region</u>
Support for suppression of civil liberties ^l	3.75	4.18	4.75	3.55	2.96	3.22	3.73
Justify a coup d'état ^m	1.24	1.06	1.20	1.16	1.31	1.25	1.20
Support overthrow of government ⁿ	.43	.56	.45	.56	.40	.47	.48
Alienation from Elections ^o	.52	.28	.60	.43	.45	.35	.44

^a Differences of means between countries on all items are significant at the .0001 level or greater.

^b Involvement in five community self help activities; 1= yes, 0=no for each; range = 0-5.

^c Sometimes attend union, civic association, cooperative or professional association; yes=1, no=0 for each; range=0-4.

^d Registered to vote plus voted in last election; yes = 1, no=0 for each; range 0-2.

^e Attempted to persuade others how to vote or worked on campaign in last or prior election; 1=yes, 0=no for each; range = 0-3.

^f Ever contacted president, legislative deputy, city council member, or national government agency; yes=1, no=0; range = 0-4.

^g Index of overall political participation; sums the scores of voting, contacting, and campaigning indices above; range = 0-9.

^h Index of support for general participatory rights based on 3 items; range 1 - 10.

ⁱ Index of support for 3 participation rights for regime critics (tolerance); range 1-10.

^j Overall index of support for democratic liberties (arithmetic mean of support for general participation rights and for critics= participation rights; range = 1 - 10.

^k Index of support for civil disobedience and protest behavior(4 items), range 0-10.

^l Index of support for suppressing civil liberties (support censorship, etc.), range 0-10.

^m Item: **AI**s there any justification for a coup d'état?@ (1=no, 2=yes).

ⁿ Item measuring support for a violent attempt to overthrow the elected government; 1=strongly disapprove... 10=strongly approve.

^o Item: Respondent thinks that nonvoters disbelieve in elections. (0=no, 1=yes)

Table 3. Relationships (zero-order correlations) among state repression, perceived political violence, and pain and loss.

A. Four-country sample (excludes Costa Rica and Honduras).

<u>Perceived violence</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>State repression</u>	
Perceived violence	.432****	-	
Pain and loss	-.050**	.054**	(2666)

B. Correlation between state repression and perceived violence, six-country sample:

<u>r</u>	<u>(N)</u>
.509.****	(4096)

C. Correlations between pain and loss and perceived violence, by country:

<u>(N)</u>	<u>r</u>
Guatemala	.017 (651)
El Salvador	-.051 (696)
Nicaragua	.019 (667)
Panama	.163*** (651)

Significance levels: * \leq .05; ** \leq .01; *** \leq .001; **** \leq .0001.

Table 4. Multiple regression, individual **political information index** on repression, perceived violence, pain and loss, media contact, and demographic factors(beta weights significant at .05 or better), urban Central America.

Variable	Model 1 (6 country)	Model 2 (4 country)
State Repression	.029	-.030
Perceived Violence	.043 **	.004
Pain and loss	- ^d	.012
Sex (M=1,F=2)	-.222 ***	-.261 ***
Education	.331 ***	.329 ****
Living Standard ^a	.123 ***	.148 ****
News Media Contact ^b	.156 ***	.139 ***
R ²	.268	.325
Standard Error	.907	.863
F	247.35	180.73
Significance of F	.0000	.0000
(N)	(4057)	(2635)

Significance levels: * ≤ .05; ** ≤ .01; *** ≤ .001.

^a Living standard is an index of family wealth based upon the ownership of color televisions, refrigerators, washing machines, telephones, and automobiles; range 0 - 15.

^b An index of news media contact based upon reported listening to news on television, radio, and reading the newspaper daily; range 0 - 3..

^c An index of political information/knowledge based upon giving correct answers to questions about name of U.S. Secretary of State, Russian President, and number of seats in national legislature; range 0 - 3.

^d Item not available in 6-country sample.

Table 5. Multiple regression, individual **diffuse support** and **interpersonal trust indices** on repression, perceived violence, pain and loss, media contact, political information, and demographic factors (beta coefficients), urban Central America.

Dependent Variables:		DIFFUSE SUPPORT			INTERPERSONAL
TRUST					
Independent Variable	Model 1 (6 country)	Model 2 (4 country)	Model 3 (6 country)	Model 4 (4 country)	
State Repression	.042*	.132***	-.022	-.072**	
Perceived Violence	-.100***	-.207***	-.044*	-.045*	
Pain and loss	- ^a	-.035	- ^a	-.006	
Sex (M=1,F=2)	.054**	-.005	.041*	.045*	
Education	-.170***	-.095***	.035	.013	
Living Standard ^b	.219***	.084**	.067**	.085**	
News Media Contact ^b	-.035*	.027	.000	.018	
Political Information ^b	.000	-.027	.041*	.041	
R ²	.056	.048	.020	.035	
Standard Error	1.510	1.501	.937	.941	
F	32.53	15.70	11.04	11.20	
Significance of F	.000	.000	.000	.000	
(N)	(3880)	(2498)	(3837)	(2511)	

Significance levels: * ≤ .05; ** ≤ .01; *** ≤ .001.

^a Item not available in 6-country sample.

^b See Table 4 for details on index construction.

Table 6. Multiple regression, individual **participation** and **democratic norms** on state repression, perceived violence, pain and loss, media contact, political information, and demographic factors (beta coefficients), urban Central America.

Dependent Variables: Independent Variable	POLITICAL PARTICIPATION		DEMOCRATIC NORMS	
	Model 1 (6 country)	Model 2 (4 country)	Model 3 (6 country)	Model 4 (4 country)
State repression	-.286***	-.200***	-.271***	-.301***
Perceived violence	-.092***	-.009	.033	B.008
Pain and loss	- ^a	.023	- ^a	-.019
Sex (M=1,F=2)	-.108***	-.098***	-.010	-.034
Education	.072***	.056*	.071***	.095***
Living standard ^b	-.050**	.023	-.004	-.041
News Media Contact ^b	.098***	.081***	.003	.025
Political Information ^b	.078***	.110***	.245***	.192***
R ²	.174	.119	.158	.181
Standard Error	1.49	1.40	1.88	1.88
F	115.05	41.95	107.03	69.84
Significance of F	.000	.000	.000	.000
(N)	(3828)	(2502)	(3845)	(2532)

Significance levels: * $\leq .05$; ** $\leq .01$; *** $\leq .001$.

^a Item not available in 6-country sample.

^b See Table 4 for details on index construction.

Table 7. Multiple regression, individual **formal group involvement** and **communal involvement** on state repression, perceived violence, pain and loss, media contact, political information, and demographic factors (beta coefficients), urban Central America.

Dependent Variables: Independent Variable	FORMAL GROUP ACTIVISM		COMMUNAL GROUP ACTIVISM	
	Model 1 (6 country)	Model 2 (4 country)	Model 3 (6 country)	Model 4 (4 country)
State repression	.020	.011	.084***	.056*
Perceived violence	-.068***	-.088***	.049**	.039
Pain and loss	- ^a	.004	- ^a	-.001
Sex (M=1,F=2)	-.090***	-.112***	.088***	.093***
Education	.139***	.082**	-.039*	-.030
Living standard ^b	.058**	.142***	-.017	-.075**
News Media Contact ^b	.087***	.057***	.096***	.115***
Political Information ^b	.111***	.032	-.010	-.030
R ²	.103	.090	.035	.044
Standard Error	.881	.852	.942	.928
F	66.187	32.239	20.750	14.950
Significance of F (N)	.000 (4021)	.000 (2608)	.000 (4043)	.000 (2621)

Significance levels: * $\leq .05$; ** $\leq .01$; *** $\leq .001$.

^a Item not available in 6-country sample.

^b See Table 4 for details on index construction.

Table 8. Multiple regression, **civil disobedience, support for suppressing liberties, justification of coups, and alienation from elections**, on state repression, perceived violence, pain and loss, media contact, political information, and demographic factors (beta coefficients), urban Central America, all six countries.

Dependent Variables: <u>Independent Variable</u>	CIVIL DIS- OBEDIENCE	SUPPRESS LIBERTIES	JUSTIFY COUPS	OVERTHROW GOVT.	ALIENATED FR. ELECTIONS
State repression	-.129***	.184***	-.105***	-.020	.079***
Perceived violence	-.007	-.125***	.159***	.063***	.138***
Sex (M=1,F=2)	-.012	-.017	.026	-.011	.019
Education	-.101	-.010	-.007	.003	-.003
Living standard	-.192***	-.049	.017	-.072***	.009
News Media Contact	.042**	.028	-.004	-.001	-.009
Political Information	.159***	-.133***	-.100***	-.040*	.011
R ²	.048	.056	.032	.012	.034
Standard Error	2.11	2.55	.397	2.03	.488
F	28.93	33.45	18.08	28.90	21.15
Significance of F	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
(N)	(4012)	(3971)	(3801)	(4016)	(3955)

Significance levels: * ≤ .05; ** ≤ .01; *** ≤ .001.