ABSTRACT:

Despite considerable theoretical gains in our understanding of the origins of modern social insurance programs in industrialized countries, relatively few studies of such programs in Latin America directly address or challenge the theoretical approaches used in the European and North American contexts. This paper contributes to our understanding of the origins of the welfare state in Latin America through a detailed study of the origins of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) in 1943. The existing explanation of the creation of the IMSS emphasizes the importance of socio-economic development, international diffusion, and above all, the “relatively independent and entrepreneurial role played by the state.” In contrast to this explanation, this paper argues that the adoption and implementation of social insurance in Mexico can be explained as the product of the shifting class coalitions and the need for the regime to maintain the support of the organized working class.
Understanding Social Policy-Making:  
The Origins of Mexican Social Security Policy*

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Despite considerable theoretical gains in our understanding of the origins of modern social insurance programs in industrialized countries, relatively few studies of such programs in Latin America directly address or challenge the theoretical approaches used in the European and North American contexts. Few studies attempt to explain the origins of the fairly generous and comprehensive social security programs implemented early in this century in many of the countries of Latin America.¹ This paper contributes to our understanding of the origins of the welfare state in Latin America through a detailed study of the origins of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) in 1943. In particular, this paper addresses two substantive questions related to social insurance in Mexico. First, why did the progressive president, Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), fail to pass social security legislation amidst other reformist policies in the late 1930s? And, why was social security legislation later passed in 1943, after the dominant party had established control of the Mexican regime and a more conservative president had taken office?

Of the main theoretical approaches to the creation of the welfare state in industrialized nations, the earliest explanation posited that industrialization and its concurrent urbanization led to and necessitated the creation of social safety nets for industrial workers. Indeed, the standard explanation of the creation of the IMSS emphasizes the importance of rapid industrialization and urbanization for creating a propitious context for its creation. International policy diffusion through the International Labor Organization (ILO) is also argued to have created a favorable context. However, the standard explanation contends that key decisions among the Mexican ruling elite were ultimately what led to the adoption of the social security coverage in 1943 in order to preempt popular demands for social security and to build regime legitimacy (Spalding 1978 and 1980). In contrast to the existing explanation, this paper will argue that the creation and initial design of the IMSS is best understood as the result of the pressure brought to bear on the state by organized labor and the formation of a cross-class alliance between industrial workers and a narrow segment of the dominant class.

In the following pages, I very briefly outline the theoretical approaches to the study of the welfare state in the developed world. Then, I examine the failure of President Cárdenas to implement social security provisions during his administration and the subsequent success of

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¹ The exceptions are the extensive work by economist Mesa-Lago (1978; 1989; and 1994) and Malloy’s (1979) historical study of social security in Brazil.
President Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) to pass such legislation, paying particular attention to existing explanations and the theoretical approaches discussed in the first section. Finally, I discuss the significance of these findings for our understanding of welfare state development in Mexico in particular and post-revolutionary Mexican politics in general.

Overview of theoretical perspectives

Research on the welfare state in advanced industrialized countries has generated five broad theoretical frameworks used to explain the creation and development of the welfare state. In the literature, the welfare state usually consists of five core social insurance programs: old age and disability pensions, health care, work-related injury and illness insurance, unemployment insurance, and family allowances. In general, explanations of welfare state development can be divided into those that emphasize non-political factors, such as economic development or international diffusion of policy programs, and those that emphasize political factors, such as the role of the state, political regime type, and the formation of class coalitions. I will briefly discuss each of these theoretical perspectives before moving on to the particularities of the Mexican case.

First, the "logic of industrialism" explanation posits that economic surplus leads to welfare state spending and development; therefore, those countries with higher levels of economic development should also have higher levels of welfare state effort in terms of the types of welfare programs implemented and social spending (Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975). According to this approach, the urbanization associated with industrialization leads to the concentration of workers in urban centers without the benefit of their traditional familial safety networks in times of work-related disability, unemployment, or old-age. Therefore, social security policies were a functional response to the needs of increased industrialization, and therefore, all nations industrializing would adopt similar social security provisions at similar levels of development (Cutright 1965; Williamson and Flemming 1977). However, some studies have failed to replicate the findings in support of this approach of earlier studies (Flora and Alber 1981; Collier and Messick 1975).

Second, the fact that some late developing nations, like Mexico, adopted welfare state policies at an earlier stage of development has led some researchers to argue that late adopters were influenced by the policies adopted in Europe. While Flora and Alber (1981) found no evidence supporting the diffusion of policies among European nations, Collier and Messick (1975) found strong evidence for a pattern of diffusion of social security policies from Europe to other regions. The diffusion explanation suggests that lesser developed countries imitate the policies adopted by more advanced countries. While some cross-national studies, such as Collier and Messick’s, do not identify the actual causal mechanism involved in the diffusion process, recent cross-national quantitative work has suggested that contact with international organizations, such as the ILO, has influenced the timing of adoption of social insurance legislation (Usui 1994).

The remaining approaches emphasize the role internal political factors play in the development of the welfare state. For example, the third type of explanation suggests that the formation or architecture of the state influence the adoption and design of welfare state policies (Skocpol and Amenta 1986). In particular, more centralized states may favor welfare expansion by limiting the opportunities for minority groups to veto policies (Wilensky 1975; Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993). Welfare state policies may also reflect characteristics of the state at the time...
of adoption, as Skocpol (1992) has demonstrated with regard to pensions and social assistance in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century. Fourth, a large body of literature has also developed around the relationship between political regime type, particularly representative democracy, and the welfare state. For example, Cutright (1965) suggests that politically representative institutions were related to the early adoption of social security. Others have argued that increased suffrage or competitive elections in advanced industrialized countries have led to the expansion of welfare spending (Flora and Alber 1981; Skocpol 1992). Since the earliest adoption of national social insurance occurred in Bismarckian Germany, some have suggested that there are several distinct “paths” or combinations of political regimes with other factors that lead to social welfare state development (Hicks, Misra and Nah Ng 1995; Flora and Alber 1981). Since social insurance was adopted as the authoritarian regime was consolidating its control of the state, Mexico is an interesting case to study with regard to this political variable.

Recent research representing a fifth approach has emphasized the ability of social democratic, Christian democratic, and liberal parties to influence social welfare policy outputs, including not only spending levels but also the types of spending (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993). The influence of such parties reflects underlying class coalitions that have been associated with welfare state development (Esping-Andersen 1990). While the more straightforward social democratic or class power resources explanations of the welfare state either explicitly or implicitly assume the presence of a democratic regime, a class coalition approach need not rely upon the existence of democratic elections or transfers of power. Even authoritarian regimes, such as the one that has dominated Mexican politics since the Revolution, must rely upon some support base among the populace. The withdrawal of support of certain classes or the desire to build support among members of a particular class may be reflected in changes in state policies. For example, O’Donnell’s (1978) analysis of the Argentine state between 1956 and 1976 suggests that state policies can lead to shifts in the coalition supporting the state which lead to further shifts in state policies.

Not all of these explanations are mutually exclusive; it is possible that evidence supporting more than one of these approaches could apply to the same instance of welfare state variation. For example, the process of state-building could happen simultaneously with the process of economic development. In the case of the creation of the IMSS in Mexico, there is evidence that could be construed to fit any one of these different possible theoretical explanations outlined above. For this reason, in the following section, after a brief summary of earlier social insurance proposals, I discuss the failure to adopt social insurance during the Cárdenas administration and the success of the Ávila Camacho administration. Then, I compare the circumstances surrounding each case in order to determine which factors vary between the two cases and which factors may account for the positive outcome in 1943 after a failure in 1938.

Social insurance in Mexico

Although modern social security provisions were not implemented in Mexico until the early twentieth century, religious fraternities and mutual aid societies had performed some social insurance functions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Ávila Espinosa 1993; Chávez Orozco 1966; García Flores 1989; Sanchez Vargas 1963, 18; Mesa-Lago 1978). The first proposal that was not based upon charitable nor private self-help organizations came in the form
of public assistance benefits proposed by President Benito Juárez in 1861 and the creation of the Dirección General de Fondos de Beneficencia (García Flores 1989). At the state level, laws were passed in the Mexican states of Mexico and Nuevo Leon in 1904 and 1906 respectively making employers responsible for compensating workers for work-related injuries (Sanchez Vargas 1963; García Flores 1989, 93). More state laws followed throughout the 1920s and 1930s until at least 18 of 32 states had some form of social insurance legislation, usually coverage for work-related injuries and illnesses (Sanchez Vargas 1963, 25, 27-28, 34-35; García Flores 1989, 99).

On the eve of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, Francisco I. Madero, candidate of the Partido Antireeleccionista included worker’s compensation for work injuries in his campaign platform. After calling for armed rebellion and being elected president in 1911, Madero (1911-1913) reiterated his commitment to the passage of such laws and created the Departamento de Trabajo to study labor issues (García Flores 1989, 94). Indeed, social protections for workers often became part of revolutionary rhetoric. For example, on September 24, 1913 in Hermosillo, Sonora, Venustiano Carranza, leader of the Constitutionalist revolutionary forces, invoked the need for social protections for workers and peasants and predicted their adoption after the Revolution, saying “…nos faltan leyes que favorezcan al campesino y al obrero; pero éstas serán promulgadas por ellos mismos, puesto que ellos serán los que triunfen en esta lucha reivindicadora y social” (cited in Barrangán 1945, 215).

The commitment to social insurance reflected in this public address was later incorporated into the new and current constitution adopted in 1917 in its Article 123, Part A, Section XXIX, which states that:

Enactment of a social security law shall be considered of public interest and it shall include insurance against disability, on life, against involuntary work stoppage, against sickness and accidents, and other forms for similar purposes (1917 Mexican constitution, English translation http://www.msstate.edu/Archives/History/Latin_America/Mexico/1917const.html).

In addition to the presence of Constitutionalists, or supporters of Carranza, many of the revolutionary leaders participating in the congressional convention in 1917 had been influenced by the proposals for social insurance propounded by the Partido Liberal since its creation in 1905 (García Flores 1989, 92-3). The inclusion of Article 123 in the constitution and its references to social insurance are considered an important milestone for Mexican labor. Indeed, the three years following the adoption of the very progressive Mexican constitution witnessed a significant increase in labor unrest, including very serious strikes in the most important industries of the time (petroleum, railroads, textiles, and mining), which have been attributed to rising expectations due to Article 123 (Matute 1995).

The 1920s and 1930s were periods of general political instability in Mexico in which the primary goals of the political leaders were the consolidation of personal political power and the establishment of a strong, centralized state (Valdés Ugalde, 1997). During and following the 2 Sections XIV and XXII of Part A of the same Article make employers responsible for work-related accidents or diseases and require employers to pay an indemnity of three months’ wages in cases of unjustified dismissal respectively.
labor conflicts of the late 1910s, the governments of Venustiano Carranza (1917-1920) and Alvaro Obregón (1920-1924) proposed various forms of social insurance, but continued armed rebellion and governmental instability forestalled their adoption (Sanchez Vargas 1963, 46-7; García Flores 1989, 95-98). Furthermore, during most of their administrations, these executives were faced with oppositions in the legislature that prevented them from having much legislative success in general (Weldon forthcoming; Weldon 1997, 230-232).

Subsequently, President Calles (1924-1928) proposed a Ley del Seguro Obrero, and Alvaro Obregón’s re-election campaign in 1928 was backed by the Partido de Previsión Social, whose primary goal was the establishment of broad social insurance provisions (García Flores 1989, 99). President Calles was likewise faced with a divided government and a Congress that was divided among his supporters and those that supported former President Obregón; attempts to pass labor reform legislation failed as well (Weldon forthcoming; Weldon 1997). During the administrations between 1928 and 1934, a period known as the Maximato due to the overarching influence of former president Calles, several initiatives for social security failed to be adopted due to the high level of political instability, including proposals by Presidents Portes Gil (1928-1930) and Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932) in 1928 and 1932 respectively (García Flores 1989, 99-100; Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 115, fn. 9). The presidents of the Maximato were also hindered by the political maneuvering of Calles and his supporters in Congress. The divisions between the supporters of Calles and Obregón continued to obstruct policy making in the legislature throughout this period (Weldon 1997, 232-234).

The first substantial efforts to pass social insurance legislation occurred under the administration of President Cárdenas (1934-40). The Primer Plan Sexenal of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), which was essentially Cárdenas’s electoral platform and the six year plan for his government, included a pledge to pass a social security law (Sanchez Vargas 1963, 67-70; PNR 1933). The PNR, which was created by President Calles, was the direct antecedent of the Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM, 1938) and later the still hegemonic Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).3 Furthermore, in 1934, the Primer Congreso de Derecho Industrial, that included representatives of labor, employers, and the state, affirmed the necessity of adopting social security legislation (Sanchez Vargas 1963, 65-67). They agreed social security should cover all social risks (including work accidents, professional illnesses, general illnesses, maternity, unemployment, old age, and disability) for all industrial workers, employees, professionals, and agricultural workers. They supported the creation of a non-profit, autonomous Institute funded with contributions from employers, workers, and the state to oversee the provision of social insurance. (Professional accidents and illnesses would be paid for entirely by employers, as required by the constitution.) Representatives of labor, employers, and the state would oversee the Institute (Bach and Zamora 1934). 4 The characteristics of this proposal are

3 For a discussion of the early history of the PRI, see Garrido (1982).
4 Several sources mention a social security proposal that was sent to congress sometime during 1935 similar to those of the PRM’s Plan Sexenal and of the Congreso de Derecho Industrial (Sanchez Vargas 1963, 67-70; García Flores 1989, 101-2; Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 116-117). However, the exact date is the proposal was sent to the Congress in 1935 is never cited, and I have been unable to find any reference to this proposal or its final outcome in the Diario de Debates of either congressional chamber. Subsequent versions of this paper will hopefully address this proposal in more detail since it came before the oil expropriations and the collapse of the ruling coalition and theoretically would have stood a better chance of being adopted than the 1938 proposal.
very similar to later proposals, including the proposal sent to Congress by Cárdenas in 1938 and the final version adopted under President Ávila Camacho in 1943.\(^5\)

In 1938, toward the end of his mandate, President Cárdenas asked Ignacio García Téllez, the Secretary of State, to prepare a new proposal for a social security law, which was ultimately very similar to the proposal heard at the 1934 Congreso (García Flores 1989, 102-3, Sanchez Vargas 1963, 97; Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 118). That is, the proposal called for the creation of a unified, autonomous, and decentralized Institute with tripartite funding from workers, employers and the state, to oversee the implementation of a variety of social insurance programs for industrial and agricultural workers, including old age and disability pensions, health and maternity care, and protections for work-related illnesses and injuries. Unemployment insurance was not included, though the Mexican constitution requires employers to compensate workers in the event of unjustified termination of employment (Sanchez Vargas 1963, 97; Pozas Horcasitas 1990; 118). In late December 1938, Cárdenas sent this proposal to Congress. Officially, Congress rejected the law due to a lack of “bases actuarias,” or adequate data supporting its design (Spalding 1978; Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 118). It is more likely, however, that this proposal for social security failed due to a collapse of the coalition of social classes that had previously supported the Cárdenas regime resulting from the petroleum expropriation earlier that year (Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 119-120; Spalding 1978; García Flores 1989, 103; Valdés Ugalde 1997, 121).

During the early years of his administration, President Cárdenas had built a coalition consisting of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie and the owners of small and medium enterprises that benefited from his economic policies (Hamilton 1982; Valdés Ugalde 1997; Contreras 1977, 173-174). Through his progressive policies, such as agrarian reform and support for organized labor’s wage demands, Cárdenas had also cultivated much popular support that he later organized under the auspices of the PRM in 1938 (Córdova 1974; Hamilton 1982; Middlebrook 1995). Hence, President Cárdenas enjoyed the support of a coalition of the working or popular classes and the most dynamic sectors of the dominant class. However, some of his more popular programs, such as agrarian reform, support of labor demands for wage increases, and finally, the oil expropriation, created conflicts between capital and Cárdenas toward the end of his six-year term (Valdés Ugalde 1997, 118). Despite widespread popular support for the petroleum nationalization, the industrial and financial bourgeoisie that had matured due to the economic policies of Cárdenas suddenly withdrew their support for the regime. After the nationalization in March 1938, a broad movement developed in opposition to the Cárdenas administration, which included groups organized by the Northern and Central industrial and financial bourgeoisie, landowners, and agents of the expropriated oil companies (Garrido 1982).

During 1939, right-wing groups including bankers, industrial capitalists, landowners, religious elements, and even members of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista (UNS, an ultra-right-wing group), united to form the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) (Garrido 1982, 280). The party’s platform was a response to “socialist” public education, agrarian reform, the petroleum expropriation, and in general a reaction against the principal tenets of the PRM and Cardenismo. Their program called for the consolidation of national unity via collaboration between classes

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\(^5\) In fact, one of the economists associated with this early proposal in 1934, Federico Bach, was also involved in the presentation of the proposed law to the public in November, 1942 (El Popular, November 13, 1942).
(Garrido 1982, 280), which later became one of the catch phrases of the Ávila Camacho-PRM government. The creation of the PAN in 1939 and the events surrounding the presidential succession of 1940 are signs that capital had been able to assert at least some independence from the state as early as 1940, contrary to what many believe (Valdés Ugalde 1997, 123). By early 1939, leaders of the northern industrial and financial bourgeoisie had decided that Juan Andreu Almazán would be their candidate in 1940 to win the presidency to the exclusion of the PRM (Garrido 1982, 274; Contreras 1977, 132).

In addition to capitalists and landowners, some segments of the organized working class began to move into the opposition in 1939. Dissatisfied with the undemocratic process of candidate selection within the PRM and the shift away from leftist policies (to be discussed below), many of the most important national industrial unions with the most organizing experience (electricians, miners, and sections of railroad workers) abandoned the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM), the main labor organization formally linked to the PRM, in order to support Almazán in the upcoming elections (Contreras 1977, 77-84). Indeed, criticisms of the PRM regime were common in 1939, and calls for greater democracy were frequent (Contreras 1977).

Although Almazán was clearly associated with the right and bourgeoisie interests, his platform was not significantly different from that proposed by the PRM and its presidential candidate, Ávila Camacho. He tried to appeal to the popular classes by supporting legislation guaranteeing workers’ access to health care and social security (Contreras 1977, 135-137). Furthermore, during August 1939, Almazán made conciliatory comments toward labor and claimed to support a reformist platform in the press and at his Mexico City campaign rally in order to generate more popular support among the popular classes (Contreras 1977, 140-144).

This opposition movement of capital and portions of labor dovetailed with the presidential succession struggles within the PRM that began two years before the 1940 presidential elections. Indeed, the threat posed by an organized opposition behind the candidacy of Almazán and the loss of support of the financial and industrial bourgeoisie, forced the PRM to abandon some of its progressive causes and nominate a more conservative candidate in order to regain the support of capital and moderate interests (Garrido 1982, 271). Ultimately, the supporters of Ávila Camacho’s candidacy within the PRM, principally the CTM and the Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC), were able to impose him as the PRM’s candidate, by-passing any internal formal procedures for candidate selection (Garrido 1982).

In the end, the opposition coalition consisting of diverse labor, capital, and middle class religious interests that supported Almazán began to fall apart in late 1939 and early 1940. Following Almazán’s leftist proclamations in August 1939, many of the northern capitalists began to withdraw their support for his campaign (Contreras 1977, 158). Although the PAN created later that year officially supported Almazán and many of its supporters were active in his

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6 Almazán had been a pre-candidate for the presidency within the PRM but quickly became independent once it became clear Ávila Camacho would receive the party’s nomination.

7 Additional dissent surfaced among the rank-and-file of some unions that continued to support the PRM candidate (CTM, CGT, CROM, and the FSTSE), but supporters of Almazán were quickly silenced by the union leadership (Contreras 1977, 86-90).
campaign, the PAN as an organization was not (Contreras 1977, 166). Furthermore, key groups began negotiating secret pacts with Ávila Camacho’s campaign manager and future Mexican president, Miguel Aleman. For example, the Northern capitalists that are concentrated in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon agreed to support the PRM’s candidate in exchange for the right to designate the future governor of their state and the municipal president of Monterrey (Contreras 1977, 167). Likewise, Miguel Aleman signed a similar agreement with the leader of the UNS, which claimed to represent 300,000 peasants in 1940, offering them titles to collective landholdings in exchange for not participating in the 1940 elections (Contreras 1977, 168). The most powerful capitalists had been brought back into the fold of the PRM, leaving Almazán without a powerful support base. The withdrawal of or lukewarm support of right-leaning groups and capital ultimately undermined Almazán’s candidacy and facilitated the PRM’s fraudulent capture of the 1940 presidential elections.

The 1940 presidential elections were the most violent in the recent history of Mexico. The morning of the elections, the CTM and PRM affiliates occupied the polling sites, and the violence and fraud that ensued went beyond the “traditional” violence that has come to accompany election day in Mexico (Garrido 1982, 293-295). The same day as the elections, the PRM candidate, Ávila Camacho was declared the winner by a large margin (see Table 1), and opposition candidate Almazán, not able to find backing among the Mexican elite nor the United States, went into exile in Cuba shortly after the elections (Garrido 1982, 295). Almazán was the first major challenge to the PRM’s hegemony and the extent to which the PRM resorted to fraud and violence reflects the real threat posed by his candidacy and highlights the authoritarian means to which the regime’s leaders would resort to maintain control of the state. The opportunity for Mexico to become democratic was forgone as a result of the 1940 elections.

The succession struggle within the PRM and the highly contested presidential election of 1940 became the backdrop for the initiation of the process that would lead to the adoption of the Ley de Seguro Social in January 1943. The Segundo Plan Sexenal, which would become the PRM and Ávila Camacho’s electoral platform in 1940 was originally drafted by the CTM in 1939 and reflected the labor confederation’s commitment to the principles of Cardenismo. However, some members of the PRM felt the Plan and many of its proposed policies and reforms were too leftist and might further alienate the capital interests that still supported the PRM after the oil nationalization. The CTM had to revise the Plan, cutting many of its reform proposals. However, the Plan’s commitment to pass a social security law within the first year of the new administration was not compromised, suggesting that social security was an important demand of the organized labor sector of the party (Garrido 1982, 273, 281, and 285; Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 120).

During his inauguration speech, Ávila Camacho reaffirmed his party’s pledge to pass social security legislation. On June 2, 1941, just over six months after taking office, Ávila Camacho created a technical commission consisting of representatives of labor, employers, and various state ministries to formulate a proposal for a social insurance law to be submitted to Congress (Medina 1979, 290; López Villegas 1990, 166). Emilio Schoenbaum, a social security specialist that was recommended by the ILO to perform the statistical analysis accompanying the

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8 During its national convention in September 1941, the CTM again called for the creation of social security for workers (López Villegas 1990, 153).
proposal, later joined the technical commission (Medina 1978, 293, fn. 139). The technicalities of the law were such that the technical commission did not finish their study and proposal until late 1942, delaying the passage of the law by over a year (Pozo Horcasitas 1990, 121; Medina 1979, 293, fn. 139). Once completed, several unions and many employers’ organizations formally approved the final document (López Villegas 1990, 166).\(^9\)

Around the same time that Ávila Camacho created the technical commission charged with drafting the new social insurance legislation, other events transpired that directly affected labor’s relationship with the state and may have contributed to the timing of the creation of the technical commission. In March 1941, the Ley Federal del Trabajo was reformed, formalizing the procedures unions must follow prior to going on strike. The reforms also created sanctions for strikes not following the proper procedures, or illegal strikes. Overall, the reforms increased the state’s regulatory control over the labor movement (Medina 1979, 290; López Villegas 1990, 163-4; Middlebrook 1995, 70).\(^10\) The creation of the technical commission to study social insurance a few months after the regulatory reforms to the labor code has been interpreted as a compensatory offer to labor in exchange for the heightened state regulation of strikes (Medina 1979, 290, 293).

The proposal of the technical commission was presented to the President in October 1942, and a series of conferences were held in November 1942 to introduce the new law to the broader labor and employer community (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social 1941; El Popular, November 12-15, 1942). The law was later passed unanimously by both the Cámara de Diputados on December 23\(^{rd}\) and the Cámara de Senadores on December 29, 1942 (El Popular, December 24 and 30, 1942); the final version of the law was published in the Diario Oficial on January 19, 1943. The final law called for the creation of an autonomous, non-profit, and decentralized Mexican Social Security Institute that would oversee the administration of workers’ social insurance benefits. A commission consisting of representatives of labor, employers and the state would oversee the Institute. The benefits provided by the Institute would be funded by a contribution of six percent of salaries by employers and another three percent from employees and the state each, with the exception of compensation for work related illness and accident insurance which would be funded entirely by employers. Fifty percent of the contributions would be used to provide medical care for workers and their families, and the other 50% was earmarked for disability and old age pensions and compensation for work-related accidents and illnesses. The final law did not include unemployment insurance. Benefits were originally obligatory for industrial workers, and the President would have the option of extending benefits to new groups or new regions as they were deemed suitable. Initially, only industrial workers of Mexico City were to be covered by benefits beginning on January 1, 1944.\(^11\) Shortly after the law was adopted, several labor organizations demonstrated their support for the law in statements made

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\(^9\) The labor organizations were the CTM, STMMRSM, STFRM, textile, petroleum, and electricity workers. Among those employers’ organizations that approved the proposal were the Cámara de Industria y Comercio, Cámara de Transportes y Comunicaciones, Cámara de la Industria Minera, la Confederación Patronal de la República, y la Asociación Nacional de Electricidad (López Villegas 1990, 166).

\(^10\) Other reforms to the constitution in late 1941 were also designed to increase the state’s capacity to intervene in labor conflicts (Medina 1979, 290-293).

\(^11\) The next year benefits were extended to Puebla and Monterrey and to Guadalajara in 1946 (Sanchez Vargas 1963, 121-122).
during their national congresses and in the press. In particular, the CTM, the CROM, the COCM, the CGT, the CROC, the FSROC, the railroad workers, petroleum workers, electricians, cinematographers, and members of the Federación de Trabajadores del Distrito Federal (FTDF) all officially supported the new Institute (Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 127, fn. 52; López Villegas 1990, 167). Although membership figures for all of these organizations are not available (see Table 2 for partial figures), it should be sufficient to point out that this list includes the major labor organizations of the time.

One of the most striking characteristics of the creation of the Institute was the noticeable lack of opposition from employers and other groups while the plan was being formulated. Instead, the first real opposition came after the law was passed and especially once contributions began being collected in June 1943. Of course, various capital groups expressed their dissatisfaction with the law, asking that its implementation be delayed until after the conclusion of World War II due to their economic hardships during the war (López Villegas 1990, 168). Furthermore, private insurance companies opposed the state’s monopoly of work injury and illness insurance, but the state argued that it could not allow private companies to insure the profitable cases, leaving the poor risks to the state (Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 131-134). Various physicians’ groups also opposed the implementation of the law because they were not represented in the commissions overseeing the Institute’s administration (Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 122-123). Some newspapers, especially La Prensa and Excélsior, were opposed to the implementation of the new social security law because they were organized as cooperatives and felt their legal status under the new law was ambiguous. In particular, they feared the members of the cooperatives would have to pay both the employer’s and the employee’s contribution to receive benefits from the new Institute; their dispute was later resolved with a private “gentlemen’s agreement” with the IMSS administration (Pozas Horcasitas 1990; 126-128). 12

In addition to these groups, a working class movement opposing the implementation of the new social security law formed the Frente Nacional Proletario (FNP) on January 24, 1944.13 Though they stated in communication with the president that they supported the idea of social security in general, the main goal of the FNP was to stop the implementation of the new social security law if it was not reformed. In particular, their complaints with the law included the following: that employers interpreted the law to mean they did not have to honor contracts stipulating higher benefits than those required by the new law; that workers should not have to contribute toward benefits; and that the CTM should not have a privileged position in the IMSS advisory commissions (Letters from FNP to the President and to the Director of the IMSS, February 18, 1944 and March 13, 1944 respectively, reprinted in Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación, México, 1982; 32-39, 44-49; Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 130; López Villegas 1990, 167). In addition to dialogue with the government regarding their concerns, the FNP also attacked an IMSS clinic on March 26, 1944 and staged a larger protest on July 20, 1944 that ended in

12 Due to their own bias against social security, many of the accounts of protests against the new law in the contemporary press must be weighed with caution. In response, El Popular, a leftist paper associated with the CTM, and El Nacional, the official paper of the PRM, published editorials and accounts in support of the law, which must be considered with similar wariness (Pozas Horcasitas 1990; 127).

13 The FNP claimed to represent 125,000 workers (Spalding 1978). The FNP grew out of the declining CPN, which claimed to represent 61,180 members in 1946 (Medina 1979, 287, fn. 129).
bloodshed. The movement dissipated soon after the July 20th demonstration when many of their leaders were imprisoned for their participation (Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 129-130).

The exact nature of this working class opposition movement against the implementation of the social security law remains unclear. The movement and the FNP in particular are never mentioned without some cautionary remarks regarding either the motives of the movement’s leadership or its possible ties to capital interests or the UNS. The animosity between the FNP and the CTM is obvious, and it is possible that the conflicts over social security were really about struggle for power between the dissident labor leaders of the FNP and the dominant CTM that had been simmering since the final years of Cárdenas’s government (Pozas Horcasitas 1990, 130-131). It has also been argued that the FPN’s goal was really demonstrating opposition to the Ávila Camacho government and that social security was the policy it manipulated for that end (López Villegas 1990, 168). Furthermore, according to Medina (1978), the organizations leading the protests, including the FPN, were “letterhead organizations” and were led by outcasts from the organized labor movement seeking a personal following and a public audience and to compete with more established unions, especially the CTM (323). Despite declarations by the FPN to the contrary, several authors suggest right-wing capitalists or the fascist UNS were associated with the movement and partly responsible for its activities (López Villegas 1990; Spalding 1978; Letter from Francisco Urrutia López to the Director General of the IMSS, March 30, 1944 reprinted in the Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación, México, 16-18). While it is still possible that the reputation of the opposition movement has been clouded by the “official” position of the CTM against it, the various allegations nevertheless call into question the origins and motivations of the movement.

It has also been argued that the increase in strikes during 1943 and 1944 reflects labor unrest due to the adoption of social security legislation and that this means labor must not have wanted such legislation (Spalding 1980). Indeed, the official strike data for 1943 and 1944 reveals a steep increase in the number of legal strikes over the figures for the late 1930s and early 1940s (see Table 3). However, it is likely that the strike data for 1942 is artificially low due to an agreement among the main labor organizations to temporarily renounce their right to strike for the duration of the war. The agreement was conditional upon creating an agreement with employers to submit labor conflicts to arbitration, and when owners refused to make such an agreement, labor began to demonstrate their power by calling a number of strikes, some of which were politically motivated (Medina 1979, 307, 311-2). Furthermore, during World War II, real wages had declined, and the wave of strikes in 1943 and 1944 are generally interpreted as demands for salary increases, including large strikes by petroleum and mining workers (Roxborough 1984, 20-1; Semionov 1972, 129-131). For example, workers’ real salaries in 1941 were only 72% of those in 1939; real salaries in 1943 and 1944 were 76% and 66% of 1939.

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14 See, for example, the FNP’s February 18, 1944 letter to the President regarding the excessive influence of the CTM in the IMSS (Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación, México) or the CTM’s claim that the FNP leadership and a related organization were trying to divide the labor movement (López Villegas 1990, 153).

15 On June 5, 1942, the five largest labor confederations and the electricians’ union signed the Pacto de Unidad Obrera in which they temporarily agreed that during the war to renounce their right to strike and submit labor disputes to arbitration if employers would agree to settle disputes justly. The pact also called for the unification of the labor movement into the Consejo Nacional Obrero (Tiempo, June 12, 1943, 4-5; Medina 1979, 302-5; López Villegas 1990, 158).
salaries respectively. In addition, during 1941 through 1943, prices in Mexico City increased by 60% while workers’ salaries increased by only 20% (Semionov 1972, 129-131). Prices in the Federal District (Mexico City) went up another 29% between 1943 and 1944 while the minimum wage there was constant from 1938 through 1943 (Estadísticas Históricas, see Table 4). Given the evidence of economic hardship faced by the working class in the early 1940s, it seems unwise to attribute the drastic increase in strike activity solely to opposition to the adoption and implementation of social security.

Explaining social insurance in Mexico

As mentioned in the introduction, the creation of the Mexican Social Security Institute in 1943 has been interpreted as the product of the “relatively independent and entrepreneurial role played by the state,” guided particularly by President Ávila Camacho and a small group of technocrats (Spalding 1980). Furthermore, socio-economic development and international diffusion have been credited with creating a context conducive to the adoption of social insurance (Spalding 1978 and 1980). However, as I will argue in the following section, such an explanation overlooks the dynamic relationship that organized labor has had with the Mexican state and the broader political context in which social insurance was adopted. By comparing the failure to adopt social insurance under President Cárdenas and the success of his successor, I will explain which factors are likely to explain each case.

One of the suggested explanations for the success of Ávila Camacho’s social insurance proposal in 1943 has been the process of socio-economic development preceding the 1940s. It is true that the Mexican economy grew throughout the 1930s and early 1940s (see Table 5). However, President Ávila Camacho adopted the first phase of a strong state-led push for import substitution industrialization growth (Valdés Ugalde 1997, 126). For example, the first legislation offering new and dynamic sectors of Mexican industry tax relief and protectionist barriers for a period of five years, or the Ley de Industrias de Transformación was implemented in May 1941 (Lopez Villegas 1990).

Furthermore, other measures of industrialization, such as percentage of the rate of urbanization, the per capita usage of electricity, or the economically active population employed in the secondary sector, do not suggest dynamic changes during the presidencies of Cárdenas nor Ávila Camacho. With regard to urbanization, the spectacular growth of Mexican cities began after World War II (see Table 6). Urbanization could not explain why social security legislation failed in 1938 and was passed a few years later in 1943 because the difference in the percentage of the population living in cities did not change dramatically in those few years. Likewise, the per capita consumption of electricity, another measure often used to measure socio-economic development, does not reveal a stark increase in the late 1930s. While the per capita usage almost doubled in the 8 years between 1929 and 1937, it only increased by about a third in the next decade (see Table 7). Electricity usage continued to increase steadily after the 1950s, rather than leveling off. Finally, the most telling of measures is the percentage of the economically active population employed in the secondary sector, which actually declined between 1930 and 1940 (see Table 8). Together, these measures suggest that while Mexico’s economic takeoff certainly might have begun with the Ávila Camacho administration, it could not have been substantial or
early enough to explain why social insurance legislation failed in 1938 but was later initiated again in 1941 and successfully adopted the first month in 1943.

That Mexico adopted three of the five core social security programs at a lower level of urbanization and industrialization than all the countries of Europe (Collier and Messick 1975) might suggest diffusion of policies rather than industrialization may explain why the Mexican Social Security Institute was created in 1943. There is evidence that President Lázaro Cárdenas commissioned Ignacio García Téllez to study the legislation of Southern Cone countries in 1935 and that the ILO participated in the drafting of the social security proposal in the early 1940s (Zertuche Muñoz 1980). Clearly the creation of the IMSS was influenced by the policies of other countries and international institutions. While the policies of other countries probably influenced the initial design of the IMSS, this foreign influence does not necessarily explain the timing of the policy. The ILO-recommended statistician that aided in the drafting of the proposal was not brought in until after the technical commission had begun putting together the proposal, and the letter sent by the Chief of the Social Security Section of the ILO to the Mexican President in August 1942 congratulating Mexico on its well-designed social insurance proposal came after the process was well underway (López Villegas 1990, 166-167; Zertuche Muñoz 1980). While the ILO may have played an advisory role at stages in the law’s development, it would be rash to claim the ILO’s presence or influence caused the social security law to be adopted.

The question of the influence of the state and political regime type on the adoption of social insurance in Mexico is complicated by the concurrent nature of the processes of state consolidation and centralization and authoritarian regime consolidation that dominated the Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho administrations. While President Calles (1924-1928) strove to consolidate the Mexican state and strengthen the dominant party’s control over it, the political instability of the Maximato precludes concluding that these processes were complete. With the reorganization of the PRM in 1938, Cárdenas had centralized decision-making. The president's ability to influence the outcome of legislation in Mexico improved under both Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho due to a confluence of institutional factors. Both presidents enjoyed a unified government where the PRM dominated the legislature. Despite institutional factors that favored Cárdenas’s legislative success, such as party control of the legislature, high party discipline, and the unity of the national presidency with the party presidency (Weldon forthcoming), he was still unable to push his social security legislation through Congress in late 1938. Like Cárdenas, Ávila Camacho had the benefit of a unified government and legislature dominated by PRM delegates. Ávila Camacho had the slight benefit of having additional CTM labor representatives in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in order to support his social security proposal, though this slight difference is unlikely to explain the distinct outcomes of social security legislation under Cárdenas and Ávila Camacho (see Tables 9 and 10). What the composition of the legislature does demonstrate, however, is that by this time, the CTM which clearly favored social security legislation, had almost completely replaced the CROM as the most politically important union organization in Mexico.

While the state was becoming increasingly centralized under Cárdenas, it is still not clear whether it had the capacity to initiate a policy as ambitious as the IMSS. As it was, insufficient state capacity in the 1940s limited the extension of social insurance to workers in Mexico City in 1944 and other industrial centers later in 1945 and 1946, even though the law would ultimately
apply to all workers. The centralization of state resources and industrial activity in Mexico City definitely influenced the decision to cover those workers first, and subsequent expansions were guided by similar criteria.

While Cárdenas did reorganize the PRM in 1938 to increase the party’s control over the organized masses and thereby strengthen the party’s authoritarian control of the state, this occurred around the same time as his proposal for social insurance made its way to Congress. However, had the party’s control of the regime been ironclad before 1940, the presidential succession struggles of that year might not have been severe; the extent to which the PRM had to rely upon fraud to win the elections reflects its position of relative weakness. Although many welfare state studies have suggested that democracy has had a positive influence on the adoption of social insurance policies, Mexico made its most significant advances toward the creation of a modern welfare state precisely when its authoritarian regime was being consolidated. Social security could even be interpreted to have contributed to the consolidation of the social pact between labor and the PRM-dominated state.

In the end, Cárdenas’s failure and Ávila Camacho’s success with regard to social security legislation appears most closely tied to the changes in the coalitional bases of their administrations. That is, there is nearly universal agreement that Cárdenas was unable to push his social insurance legislation through Congress due to his loss of support among the domestic industrial and financial bourgeoisie and foreign capital. The oil nationalization, which was really the result of a labor dispute between unions and foreign-owned enterprises, finally undermined the precarious coalition of bourgeois and popular interests that had supported his government. The schism caused by the nationalization of petroleum was only mended with the nomination and election of a more moderate PRM candidate. Once in office, Ávila Camacho promoted “safer” policies, including legislation protecting and promoting domestic industry.

Furthermore, in the 1940 elections, the PRM had won monopoly control in the legislature by winning all Senator seats and all but one Deputy seat. By 1940, the CTM had established itself as the most important union organization in Mexico, supplanting the privileged position formerly held by the CROM in the 1920s and early 1930s. The CTM’s importance within the party is supported by its occupation of nearly all of the PRM’s legislative seats (see Tables 9 and 10). As one of the main proponents of social insurance legislation, the CTM was guaranteed greater voice in its adoption than other minority labor organizations that might have been opposed. This increased the likelihood that such legislation would be passed without significant criticism.

While Ávila Camacho had to satisfy some of the demands of the labor movement, such as social security, in order to regain the support of labor that was undermined during the 1939-1940 electoral period, the social security concession came on the heels of legislation that further increased the state’s control over organized labor’s right to strike. This tradeoff reflects the give-and-take process of coalition building in Mexico under the PRI-dominated authoritarian regime. Therefore, the adoption and implementation of social insurance in Mexico can be explained as the product of the shifting class coalitions and the need for the regime to maintain the support of the organized working class.
This interpretation of the adoption of social security legislation reflects a more dynamic interpretation of labor-state relations than is usually applied to the analysis of Mexican politics. It has been common to consider most policy initiatives in Mexico as originating in the state in order to pre-empt or silence popular mobilization.\textsuperscript{16} However, some sectors of the organized labor movement, particularly the CTM which was officially linked to the PRM, clearly felt social security legislation was desirable and an important achievement for their organization. At the same time, the creation of the IMSS should not be considered an absolute victory for organized labor since its proposal was accompanied by some loss of labor autonomy. Such trade-offs also reflect the generally pragmatic nature of organized labor in Mexico. The organized labor movement in Mexico has often been characterized as relying upon a close and pragmatic relationship with the state in order to overcome its weakened position in front of Mexican and especially, foreign capital. In contrast to the dominant view that the state holds the upper hand in that relationship, some scholarship has come to question the state’s dominance (Roxborough 1984) or at least consider the relationship more dynamic (Middlebrook 1995). The present analysis of the initial creation of social insurance in Mexico lends additional evidence to support such an interpretation.

\textbf{Tables}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Candidate & Votes & Percentage \\
\hline
Manuel Ávila Camacho (PRM, PCM) & 2,476,641 & 93.9\% \\
Juan Andreu Almazán (PRUN, PLM, PNAR, PSD) & 151,101 & 5.7\% \\
Rafael Sánchez Tapia (independent, formerly of PRM) & 9,840 & .4\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Presidential election results, 1940}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
CTM & 145,471 \\
CROM & 17,471 \\
COCM & 10,170 \\
CGT & 5,506 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Labor confederation membership, 1946}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{16} See for instance Kaufman Purcell’s (1973) discussion of the implementation of worker profit-sharing or Hansen’s (1971) analysis of economic development policy.
Table 3: Federal and local jurisdiction strikes, 1938-1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strikes</th>
<th>Workers Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>13,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>14,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>19,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>12,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>13,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>81,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>165,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>48,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>10,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>10,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Spalding 1978, appendix)

Table 4: Mexico City Wholesale Price Index, 1953=100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SALA Supplement 3, 1974
Table 5: Mexican GNP, 1932-1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP (millions of 1980 pesos)</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>230,346</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>257,259</td>
<td>11.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>275,040</td>
<td>6.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>293,225</td>
<td>6.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>317,139</td>
<td>8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>327,320</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>334,671</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>351,504</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>356,659</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>392,534</td>
<td>10.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>412,832</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>429,075</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>463,403</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Brachet 1994, 200)

Table 6: Urbanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of Population living in urban areas</th>
<th>Urbanization Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Estadísticas Históricas. For calculation of index, see Luis Unikel, et al. *El Desarrollo Urbano de México*, Mexico, DF: Colegio de México, 1976.)

Table 7: Per capita electricity consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Per capita consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Supplement 3)
Table 8: Percentage of economically active population (EAP) employed in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary sector</th>
<th>Secondary sector</th>
<th>Tertiary sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>14.55</td>
<td>16.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>61.93</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>16.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>67.15</td>
<td>15.05</td>
<td>16.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>71.43</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>70.20</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>11.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>65.39</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>19.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>58.32</td>
<td>15.95</td>
<td>21.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Estadísticas Históricas)

Table 9: Labor Representation in the Senate, 1936-1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Labor Senators</th>
<th>Labor Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936-1940</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CTM 1, National Industrial Unions 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1946</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CTM 6, Unknown 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1952</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CTM 1, National Industrial Unions 3, Unknown 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Middlebrook 1995, 104. Rodríguez Araujo’s [1975, 162-163] comprehensive list of Senators only lists 3 for the 1946-1952 term. Since Rodríguez Araujo does not include estimates for the 1936-1940 term, I have used Middlebrook’s estimates.)

Table 10: Labor Representation in the Chamber of Deputies, 1937-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Labor Deputies</th>
<th>Labor Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937-1940</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CTM 6, Unknown 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1943</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CTM 7, CROM 1, Unknown 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CTM 8, National Industrial Unions 1, Unknown 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1949</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CTM 7, National Industrial Unions 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Middlebrook 1995, 103. Again, Rodríguez Araujo [1975, 180-185] has considerably different figures for the 1940-1949 terms, which suggests that the Middlebrook figures seriously underestimate the representation of labor in the Chamber of Deputies in general. According to Rodríguez Araujo, there were 25 labor deputies in 1940-1943, 25 in 1943-1946, and 13 in 1946-1949, during which time all but one or two deputies in each term were representatives of the CTM.)
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