Bolivia is Indígena Citizen: Multiculturalism in a Neoliberal Age

by Nancy Grey Postero
Anthropology Department, University of California at Berkeley
npostero@igc.org,

Paper prepared for delivery at 2000 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association
Hyatt Regency, Miami, Florida
Session: Indigenismo/Mestizaje: New Views on Key Concepts
March 16, 2000

I. Introduction:

A group of men are standing around in a village meeting somewhere in lowland Bolivia, waiting for a politician to arrive for the meeting to begin. One man turns to another and says, Before he gets here, let’s get one thing straight. We used to be called indios, then we were campesinos, right? Now I hear we’re indígenas. What’s next???

This conversation, overheard in 1997, points to a striking change occurring in many parts of Latin America: the creation and use of the social category of indígena. This new subject position is part of a wider trend toward multiculturalism, in which indigenous groups are specifically named by nation states as actors and given individual rights as citizens, and, in some cases, collective rights as groups. Why is Indigenousness becoming important now, when for centuries Indians have been marginalized? How is the rise of multiculturalism related to the neo-liberal political and economic policies currently in favor in Latin America? What does multiculturalism mean in practice? This paper focuses this question on Bolivia, whose neoliberal government adopted a series of multicultural reforms in the early nineties. I argue that the seeming paradox between the tenets of neo-liberalism and the practices of multicultural reforms is explained by an articulation of history, politics, and culture. The resulting discourse and set of practices which make up Bolivia’s particular multiculturalism is now the new idiom for hegemonic contestations between indigenous peoples, who assert cultural and political autonomy through these reforms, and the State, which has used these reforms to fashion new forms of domination and incorporation.

II. The Bolivian Reforms:

In 1993, successful entrepreneur Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (Goni) lead his MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) party to victory promising neoliberal reforms that would lead his country to prosperity in the global marketplace. He also described Bolivia as a nation of many nations and chose as his vice-president, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, an Aymara Indian and leader of the MRTKL (Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement). (Albo 1994) This dual focus continued throughout the Goni administration. From 1993 to 1997, a series of wide-ranging reforms to the national constitution, laws, and administrative regulations were adopted. As part
of the neo-liberal push, Goni and his technocrats pared down the State mechanism through several innovative programs. First they came up with a unique form of privatization of state enterprises, called capitalization. Five of the largest state firms were privatized in this way. Then, they instituted a revolutionary decentralization project, called the Law of Popular Participation (LPP), in which twenty percent of the federal budget money was shifted to the municipal level. For the first time, tax money is going to the rural areas instead of just to the three large cities. The plan also established a new system for local participation in the development decisions at the municipal level. Comités de Vigilancia, or Oversight Committees, made up of representatives of constituent population groups called Organizaciones Territoriales de Base (OTBs), or Territorial Grassroots Organizations, have veto power over municipal budgets. These reforms were part of a larger plan to streamline the state, open the markets to trade, and make Bolivia more competitive on the world market, classic strategies of neoliberal governments.

The Goni administration also revolutionized the position of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples. Article One of the Reformed Constitution of the State declares Bolivia to be a multi-ethnic and pluricultural nation. More specifically, Article 171 declares:

The social, economic, and cultural rights of the indigenous peoples who inhabit the national territory are recognized, respected, and protected within the legal framework, especially those related to their communal lands of origin (tierras comunitarias de origen), guaranteeing the use and sustainable exploitation (aprovechamiento) of natural resources, and to their identity, values, languages, customs, and institutions. (My translation.)

These articles were the foundational language for multiculturalism in Bolivia, and they were followed by legislation that gave specific rights to indigenous peoples. Marinissen documents the huge changes in Bolivian law during this time, and describes the many laws and regulations that affect indigenous peoples. (Marinissen 1998). I want to focus on two of the most important.

First, the Law of Popular Participation, described above, specifically names indigenous groups as OTBs, the territorially based popular representatives able to participate at the municipal level. The law defines as subjects of popular participation three kinds of OTBs: Pueblos Indígenas (Indigenous Groups), Comunidades Campesinas (Peasant Communities), and Juntos Vecinales (Neighborhood Groups) and These groups are given legal recognition according to their uses, customs, and statutory dispositions. Thus for the first time, the State gave political power to indigenous social organizations and their customary leaders and acknowledged this was an expression of collective identities.

More radical yet were the changes in Agrarian Reform law, called Ley INRA (Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria). The new INRA law establishes the mechanisms for titling land, a complex process of unraveling hundreds of years of fraudulent titles and rights gained by possession and land takeovers. As part of this law, an elaborate juridical system has been put in place that will eventually give collective title to the territories of indigenous groups. As a result,
indigenous groups have made demands for millions of hectares throughout the country, and those
demands are now being processed by INRA. 11

Why did the neoliberal Goni administration adopt these reforms? How do they fit in with the
economic reforms? Neoliberal policies usually tend to promote the market as the prime engine of
development, and this means focusing on individualism, private property, and efficiency in
business and government. 12 These multicultural reforms, on the other hand, promote cultural
differences that are not defined strictly by economic measures, collective rights over matters of
efficiency, and a focus on social justice and democratic principles. 13 I have drawn these two
positions in a slightly exaggerated way to point out their differences, but my intent is rather to
examine the ways in which these differing ideologies or doctrines have come together in the
particular moment of Bolivia’s history to create a new political and social discourse, which has
redefined indigenous identity. To do so, I rely upon Hall’s notion of articulation, which asks
under what circumstances a connection can be forged between differing elements or ideologies to
form a unified discourse.

The so-called unity of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct
elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no
necessary belongingness. The unity which matters is a linkage between that
articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain
historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected. Thus, a theory of
articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under
certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how
they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political
subjects. (1996:141-2)

Li calls attention to the dual meaning of articulation: it is both the process of rendering a
collective identity, position or set of interests explicit, as in articulate or understandable, and of
conjoining, as in articulating that position to definite political subjects. (Li, in press: 3) Hall points
out that these articulations are both provisional, in the sense that they are not predetermined or
necessary, but that there are lines of tendential force, which anchor particular formations to
political, economic, and ideological structures. (Hall 1996:142.) That is, Articulations are limited
and prefigured by the fields of power or places of recognition which others provide (Li, in
press:3).

This perspective allows us to see that neoliberalism is not necessarily coherent and totalizing (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998:23), but, like capitalism itself, creative in its articulations
with the local. The strength of late capitalism, says Hall, is that it is both multinational and
decentered. Global capitalism rules through local capitalisms, reshaping, absorbing, negotiating
them, not obliterating them. (Hall 1991; see also Pred and Watts 1992 ). 14 The theory of
articulation, then, reminds us not to look just at the differences between neoliberalism and
multiculturalism, but to see what brings them together in this case. Hart (1998) has suggested
that only this way can we make sense of the multiple trajectories of capitalism in the globalized
economy. Likewise, there are a multitude of multiculturalisms which must be understood in context. (Bennet 1998). Let us, then, look at the many currents that brought these seemingly opposing strategies together in the Bolivian case.

III. Multiple Factors:

A. Indigenous Movements: The Push from Below

The most obvious factor in understanding these reforms is the activism that Bolivian Indigenous organizations have launched over the previous years. As in many countries in Latin America, the Bolivian indigenous movement grew throughout the 1980s, thanks to NGO and church funding, continent-wide organizing, and the impetus of the Quincentenario, the 500 year anniversary of Colombus’ arrival in the Americas. To understand this most recent organizing in Bolivia requires a brief look at the history of state-indigenous relations.

After the 1952 Revolution, the MNR-run state used the sindicato, (peasant union) model to incorporate highland Indians into the national economic and political schemes. In essence, this model was assimilationist in character, using and eliding the traditional land holding patterns and forms of social organization to make the varied Indian groups into campesinos, a group defined by class rather than ethnicity. Miners and campesinos were the backbone of the post-revolutionary state. As Toranzo Roca says, the Bolivian society was constructed and articulated predominantly through the sindicato model. (Toranzo Roca 1996). Political parties mediated the relation of the sindicatos to the state, which maintained this patronage through agrarian reform, agricultural credit, and attention to labor issues. (Ströbele-Gregor 1996, Yashar 1998)

Throughout the 1970s and 80s, an Andean political and cultural movement, the Katarista movement, organized by Aymara peoples, grew. Their influence was felt in organized labor and with the left during the years of military rule. Ultimately, the movement allied with the MNR political party, and in the 1993 election, gained the vice-presidency, and with it, political power. (See Albo 1998 for a detailed history of this movement.) The Katarista movement was urban-based, arising out of the Aymara migrants to the capitol, La Paz, many of whom had gone to university and begun organizing there. This gave their political demands a particular history and focus. What they were most interested in space in which to exercise political power.

It wasn’t until the early 1990s that the national indigenous gained great impetus, however. It was then that the lowland indigenous peoples, previously marginalized and ignored, came into the national political picture. In response to increased settlement in lowland areas, indigenous peoples organized around a new question, territory, and took their demands to the public. In 1990, the newly organized indigenous federation, CIDOB (Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente de Bolivia) marched from the lowlands up the Andes to La Paz in what was called the Marcha por Territorio y Dignidad, the March for Territory and Dignity. They were met at the summit by Andean groups, and together they marched into La Paz. Without a doubt, this march changed the face of Bolivia forever. Indigenous people and their demands for territory and recognition as part of the nation caused an immediate response. President Paz Zamorza met with
the people, created seven indigenous territories by presidential decree, and \textit{territorio} became an icon of indigenous-state relations.

When Goni was elected, with his Aymara vice-president, they created a Sub-Secretary of Ethnic Affairs, which managed indigenous issues and pushed indigenous interests in upcoming legislation reforms. It was staffed by anthropologists and social scientists who had spent their professional lives in NGOs working with indigenous and altiplano peasants. This was the first chance these people had had to work from within the government, and there was enormous desire to implement progressive changes. In April of 1994, the SAE signed an agreement with CIDOB, in which they agreed to work together on the SAE projects and legislation. This radically changed government-indigenous relations, because for the first time, indigenous leaders were decision-makers rather than beneficiaries of policies. Throughout the Goni years, although the control of the SAE shifted to other parties, and the dedication to these revolutionary alliances diminished, the SAE and CIDOB were able to get indigenous issues incorporated into the upcoming legislation on energy, natural resources, forestry, protected areas, etc. In 1996, when indigenous people felt their interests were in danger in the debates over the new land reform law, they staged another massive march. The results were the \textit{La Ley INRA}, described above, which establishes collective land titling for indigenous territories, completing the demands the 1990 march had begun. (See generally Lema 1998)

Understandably, this upsurge in organizing and the resulting institutional changes have formed the starting point for most analyses of indigenous issues in Bolivia. (See Lema 1998, Yashar 1998, Díez-Astete 1998, Brysk 1996). I suggest, however, that it is a mistake to see the multicultural reforms simply as a case of a homogenous indigenous movement which forced the state to accede to its demands and adopt policies that meet their collective interests. Indigenous groups in Bolivia are extremely heterogeneous. The ty or so self-identified indigenous groups of the lowlands diverge widely in terms of contact with the national society, historical relations to the state, connections to the market, education, language, and political experiences. As a result, the dangers facing and the resulting interests of a small previously nomadic tribe from the northern Amazon are quite different from those facing a settled, highly educated group from the Chaco desert. The indigenous leaders who marched and spoke on behalf of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia were members of certain tribes, with certain interests, who used the discourse of indigenous unity strategically to accomplish their ends.  \textsuperscript{21} (No doubt, indigenous unity was one of those goals.) There are, however, many other indigenous people whose interests might be contrary to those ends, or, more likely, have no idea that they were being represented by these leaders. \textsuperscript{22}

This does not undermine the strength or the validity of indigenous demands, or the response to those demands by the nation-state, but it does call for a more careful analysis of the process by which the discourse is articulated to particular indigenous subjects. One example is territory. Because vocal and politically connected indigenous leaders have named territory as the iconic indigenous demand, all indigenous peoples are currently being interpellated through this lens. The majority of the state's recent investments in indigenous issues have been in territorial mapping and
titling (see below). While this does in fact respond to the concerns of many groups, all groups do not share these concerns. The urban-based migrant indigenous groups, like the Guarani of Santa Cruz, for instance, fall outside this frame completely, and consequently, their needs for education and productive assistance go largely unrecognized. Even many groups which continue to be territorially-based, however, such as some of the more recently contacted tribes in the northern Amazon, find the whole process of mapping and then managing the territories completely foreign to their experience and administrative capabilities. Nevertheless, in the name of indigenous rights, the state and NGOs are imposing the multicultural reforms territorial mapping, resource management plans, and municipal participation -- upon these groups to protect their resources, for their own good. In this way, groups who came late into the indigenous movement, find themselves articulated by a discourse of indigenousness and multiculturalism to policies and programs that may or may not meet their interests. (The state has multiple reasons for applying these policies are discussed below.)

Like all movements, these disparate groups come together as a political movement for strategic reasons, but these conjunctures are contingent and provisional. It is with these disparate but temporarily coherent elements that the state, itself a heterogenous set of interests, articulates.

B. State Formation and Subject Making:

While there is no doubt that the state reacted to the indigenous push from below, it is equally clear that such reforms are part of the continuing process of Bolivian state formation, which simultaneously produced a new subject position: the Indígena citizen. It has been widely shown that ethnicity is a relational concept, a constructed category of difference that often arises within the context of state formation (Wilmsen 1996, Comaroff 1996, Foster 1991, Anderson 1983). Corrigan and Sayer (1985) note that state formation has two dimensions. The totalizing or homogenizing dimension produces nationalism, as the imagined sense of political community conflates peoplehood, territory and state. In the individualizing dimension, the state makes subjects who fit into social categories such as citizen, indigena, or taxpayer. As Foucault has shown, the state’s productive power, through technologies, institutions, and rituals of state power (such as educational practices, documentation and regulation powers) provides acceptable forms and images of social life (Foucault 1977, Foster 1991:245). Such a framework assigns varying degrees of privilege, status, and access to power (Alonso 1994:391, Joseph and Nugent 1994).

State formation is a continuing process. Over the last thirty years, the oriente, the eastern lowlands home to many indigenous groups, has become the development pole of Bolivia. Businesses, lumber companies, cattle ranchers, and highland migrants have streamed into the oriente, and Santa Cruz, the capital of the department, now has a population of over one million people. Old models were no longer adequate to incorporate the residents of this part of the country. The indigenous people of the oriente had mostly been ignored by the state during the years of the agrarian reform, and historical relations to the patron state did not exist. More importantly, lowland indigenous peoples’ demand for territory did not fit into the small-holder
farmer model. So, by the 1980s and 90s, the neoliberal state, echoing indigenous demands, adopted a new model of incorporation: indigenous citizenship.

This state interpellation of citizenship was quite overt during the Goni years and continues to be so in the current administration. In one of his first speeches, Wigberto Rivero, the current Vice Minister of Indigenous and Original Peoples Affairs (VAIPO) said, "Our government’s policy is to use economic policies to create citizens of the indigenous peoples, and participation is the key." An official of the Popular Participation project explained that in this stage of state-indigenous relations, (which he called the "Canto a Diversidad," or "song to diversity") participation will forever change the relation of the indigenous to the state. Instead of seeing the state as the source of things, and making reclamos (demands) against it, now indigenous people will see themselves as citizens, with rights and obligations. "Queremos menos habitantes, y más ciudadanos." (We want fewer inhabitants and more citizens.)

I do not want to characterize this citizenship strategy as an evil or instrumental state conspiracy to coopt Indians. Rather this is a dialectic process between the push from below and the interpellation from above, which is strategically adopted and used by both sides, and which constitutes both the indigenous citizens as well as the state. (See Ramos 1998). The result of this articulation is a new form of identification, which as Hall notes, which is not essence, but positioning. (Hall 1990: 226, cited in Li, 1998). Indigenous people are positioned now as indígena citizens, and this new subject position brings with it a consciousness of that role. (See Jackson 1995). Of course, the internalization of this role varies widely among indigenous people, depending upon their histories and relationships with the state and Bolivian society. For instance, most of the Guaraní Indians with whom I work are very excited about the fact that they are now considered part of the nation, and appreciate the icons of this new status. As part of the LPP, the indigenous organizations are registered with the departmental government, the prefectura, and given what is called a personería jurídica, or legal representative status. One Guaraní friend told me, "Before we had personería jurídica, we were nothing, we were like animals. Now we are like people, because we have birth certificates." For the northern Amazonian peoples, however, who have had little contact with Bolivian society and have not been actively pushing for inclusion into that society, these symbols of citizenship mean very little. They have less understanding or appreciation of what citizenship might mean for them, and so have less interest in the outward signs of it. Nevertheless, this process of hailing is ongoing as the state reaches out, and NGOs using these terms and categories come forward with resources and programs.

Similarly, the nation-state of Bolivia also defines itself in part through these processes. Bolivians want to view themselves and portray themselves internationally as a modern society. Again, history plays a crucial part in the current articulations. One legacy of the years of military dictatorships is an overt official embracing of democratic processes. This is particularly evident now during the administration of the democratically elected president, General Hugo Banzer Suarez, who was the military ruler of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978. Favorable treatment of indigenous minorities is not only important for a good international image, it is now a requirement for much international aid. (See Hale 1999)
Bolivians’ pride and a long legacy of anti-imperialist discourse prevents their constructing a modern image solely by imitating the west, however. Rather, as in many other Latin American countries, Bolivians’ national self-image (which is, of course, multiple and heterogenous) reflects an ambivalent combination of cosmopolitan modernity and self-conscious reference to the traditions of the past, most often represented by the icons of indigenousness. (See Friedlander 1975, Garcia Canclini 1989, Chatterjee 1990). As Nelson points out in the case of Guatemala, the national image needs a relation with sincerity, with moral rectitude, and with the ardor and mystery of home. The indigenous past, in the form of both the pre-Colombian ruins and contemporary indigenous life, serves to overcome the distances between glorious past, degraded present, and hoped-for future. (Nelson 1999:87) The state claims these goals through indigenous values, often in ironic ways. For instance, I heard a non-indigenous official of the VAIPO, the ministry for indigenous affairs, talking to a group of indigenous leaders about etno-turismo or ethnic tourism, which the VAIPO was promoting. Why do these rich gringos want to come see Bolivia?, he asked. Because they can see here the things they have lost in their cultures: generosity, goodness, communalism, participatory democracy, and strong values. Thus, the multicultural reforms are mutually constituting for the state and its newly included citizens.

C. Bolivian Dualities

The foregoing are rather macro-explanations of the curious articulation of Bolivian multiculturalism with neoliberal strategy, but the particular political and cultural history of Bolivia also provides some answers. I want to suggest two factors, both of them tied to a notion of duality.

The first has to do with the particular political alliances that President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Goni, made in his government. The previous director of the SAE who worked closely with the president explained that Goni considered himself to be a social liberal or a liberal socialist. When he came into power, it was with a vision to change the model of the state to the model of the market, but he knew the market was no panacea, and had to be combined with the social side, with a state that provided health, education, and the rule of law, that is democracy. This duality was expressed in his pairing entrepreneurs on the economic side of the cabinet and progressives on the social side, including the indigenous affairs office. This was also influenced by the particular history of Bolivia under structural adjustment, in which the Fondo de Inversion Social (FIS), the fund set up to ameliorate those strongest hit by austerity programs, proved to be critical to public acceptance of harsh economic reforms. I see this hedging of bets as a sort of pragmatic version of Polanyi’s theory of the double movement: Liberal strategies to create a market economy have always generated corresponding and opposing measures to make the transitions feel more humane, if only temporarily until all parties adjust to the new situation. (Polanyi 1944). Nelson notes that one of the roles that the liberal state often carries out is in the Foucaultian sense of holding people in the gaze of power and in their designated place, but also in the sense of mending or repairing. (Nelson 1999: 28) Brown says, the social body is
stressed and torn by the secularizing and atomizing effects of capitalism and its attendant political culture of individuating rights and liberties, economic, administrative, and legislative forms of repair are required.\footnote{Brown 1995:17} Certainly, the multicultural reforms I have been discussing are seen as repairing the damage done by hundreds of years of colonial abuse as well as current forms of marginalization and racism.

A second interesting explanation gives a cultural twist to this duality. Author and social scientist Javier Medina notes that Andean cultures are based upon notions of duality, particularly upon the complementarity of oppositions. The new reforms are the result of this Andean third possibility,\footnote{Recognizing the fact that Bolivia is made up of a surprising mix of the pre-modern and the post-modern. In an argument with shades of both Garcia Canclini (1989, 1993) and Bonfil Batalla (1996), Medina explains that it would make no sense to simply interpellate the animist and complex cultures of the Amerindian component of Bolivia into a linear, monocausal, and mechanistic occidental subject. Instead, what is needed is a synergy of the two worlds. He argues that the recognition of indigenous customs and values within the Popular Participation project was a conscious attempt at doing this, which explains the combination of the economic, focusing on the western notions of global capitalism, and the social, allowing the interplay of indigenous cosmovisions. (Medina, 1996).} which recognizes the fact that Bolivia is made up of a surprising mix of the pre-modern and the post-modern. In an argument with shades of both Garcia Canclini (1989, 1993) and Bonfil Batalla (1996), Medina explains that it would make no sense to simply interpellate the animist and complex cultures of the Amerindian component of Bolivia into a linear, monocausal, and mechanistic occidental subject. Instead, what is needed is a synergy of the two worlds. He argues that the recognition of indigenous customs and values within the Popular Participation project was a conscious attempt at doing this, which explains the combination of the economic, focusing on the western notions of global capitalism, and the social, allowing the interplay of indigenous cosmovisions. (Medina, 1996).

IV. Multicultural Practices and Neoliberal Effects:

These varied explanations point out the complex interplay of strategies, standpoints, discourses, and ideologies. Whether the reforms were \emph{intended} as part of a neoliberal agenda may not be as interesting as what the \emph{effects} of these reforms have in practice. Discourses, expressed in a complex of language, institutions, and technologies, may have effects widely divergent from the expressed intentions of the actors. (Foucault 1979). In the following section, I will describe some of the practices of the two major reforms described above, Popular Participation and INRA, the territorial titling law. These observations are based on several years of fieldwork in the lowlands, specifically with the Guaranís and more generally at the national indigenous organization, CIDOB. I have also spent several months in the Bolivian Amazon studying the issue of territory. This gives my analysis a profoundly lowland slant. I do not claim to describe the experiences of highland organizations. Also, as these are fairly recent changes, my comments are necessarily preliminary conclusions.

A. Popular Participation: Be Careful What You Ask For

\textbf{First}, popular participation has changed the rules of the game,\footnote{Switching the power struggles to a much more local level. The results of this change depends widely from community to community. For some communities with strong local leaders and particularly where there is a majority of indigenous people, this has opened a new space of political action. In the case of the Guaranís of Alto y Bajo Izozog (CABI), for example, the Capitanía has managed to gain the \textit{subalcalde} position, and now manages a substantial amount of funds for the benefit of the Guaraní people.\footnote{For the majority of communities, however, the reform has greatly increased the political power to local elites, most of whom are non-indigenous. What this means practically is that...} For the majority of communities, however, the reform has greatly increased the political power to local elites, most of whom are non-indigenous. What this means practically is that...} switching the power struggles to a much more local level. The results of this change depends widely from community to community. For some communities with strong local leaders and particularly where there is a majority of indigenous people, this has opened a new space of political action. In the case of the Guaranís of Alto y Bajo Izozog (CABI), for example, the Capitanía has managed to gain the \textit{subalcalde} position, and now manages a substantial amount of funds for the benefit of the Guaraní people. For the majority of communities, however, the reform has greatly increased the political power to local elites, most of whom are non-indigenous. What this means practically is that...}
political parties (who always follow the money) are now involved in municipal and even community concerns. Indigenous villagers who only saw politicians once a year when they brought T-shirts and cases of beer before election time, now find political parties trying to influence internal community politics. The State has reached into the farthest village in Bolivia.  

This does not surprise Sociologist Jose Enrique Pinelo, who reminded me that the LPP is, after all, a project of the MNR party, which, since the revolution in 1952, has had as its main goal, the strengthening of the state. In the 1980s, this general goal became imperative, as inflation, food crises, and political conflict accompanied the return to democracy. Sanabria says that in this context, neoliberalism emerged in Bolivia as a politico-economic undertaking intended to reconstitute the state and capitalism (2000:62). He argues that the neoliberal program put into effect when Goni was Minister of Planning in 1985, called the New Economic Policy (NEP), and continued through the present government, was not merely an economic program but was rather a political plan to reestablish the authority of the state over society (quoting Goni in Conaghan and Malloy 1994).  

**Second**, inclusion in municipal politics has effectively limited the range of questions indigenous people are asking. Instead of making demands about autonomy or cultural rights, these new citizens are worrying about learning to read municipal budgets. The co-participation funds are small, so the development decisions left up to the OTBs and the Vigilance Committees are about what is possible with this limited funding, like potable water and school rooms in villages. This is not problematic in itself, because the villages do in fact want potable water and more school rooms. It is only to note that this set of practices is very homogenizing, as cultural and political demands have no place within the local pragmatics. Kohl notes that

> In the Bolivian case, the availability of revenues for local investment are subject to the adoption of certain standardized notions of development and well defined procedures. Potentially dissenting voices are controlled as they must use the language and tools of dominant groups, a process which subjects them to a democratic processes. (Kohl 1998:19)

While participation in local activism can be empowering, even transforming in certain situations, my work has shown that in practice, the agenda is strictly circumscribed. By inclusion at the local level, indigenous demands have been fragmented and refocused to the immediate decisions of local governing, precluding more critical responses to existing inequality. The practices of multicultural democracy produce a citizenry easily controlled. (See Kohl 1998, and Rose and Miller 1992).  

**B. INRA and the Battle for Territory:** 

The INRA law is potentially the most radical of the new reforms, giving large areas of valuable land to indigenous groups in collective titles. The lands claimed by indigenous peoples are extensive, and often in areas of isolated forest, those regions of refuge to which they fled after conquest, the rubber boom, and the extension of the cattle ranching frontier. Now those lands are very valuable for logging, cattle, and commercial farming, so this policy is not just a token land
give-away to pacify indigenous protests. How does this fit in with neoliberal market-oriented policies?

**First**, the indigenous territorial titling is part of a larger national process to clear titles of all landholdings. Currently, land tenure is based more upon power than legal right, because the titles are so insecure. There is widespread fraud in documents, officials are corrupt, the record-keeping process is antiquated, and the agrarian reform law gave rights by possession to squatters. The new law will supposedly clear up all these rights once and for all, making land transfers and credit applications easier, which will ultimately lead to more successful resource development.  

Second, it is critical to look at how titling is being carried out in Bolivia. The reform was accompanied by a complex set of regulations, which establishes four phases: for the titling and use of what are called TCOs, Territorios Comunitarios de Origen (Territories of Communal Origin): 1) the initial indigenous demands and immobilization of the land; 2) field investigation, in which the land are geo-referenced and the rights of all parties are established. The result is **saneamiento**, or clearing of the titles; 3) a spatial study carried out by the VAIPO to determine how much land the indigenous people will really need. Once this is decided, the land is titled; and, finally, 4) to make use of any of the natural resources on the land, such as lumber or wildlife, the indigenous groups must develop management plans based upon scientific studies, which must be approved by the local government.

The process is incredibly slow, and is fraught with problems. The INRA law was passed, but it was not funded, so there is no money for the complex mapping and field work necessary. Some NGO funds have been given for this, notable from the Danes, but this is a project by project grant. In the five years since INRA was passed, only a few titles have been finalized, including to those given initial titles by presidential decree in 1990 after the first march. Thus, while the discourse of collective titling is progressive, the practices have had specific results.

While the process dawdles on, third parties, called terceros, consolidate their holds on the land, increasing their possession, continuing to exploit lumber and other resources, all of this happening faster and faster with no legal recourse. One result is that indigenous peoples watching the despoiling of their land and resources have decided to join in the process as a form of survival. There is an often-quoted saying: *si yo no aprovecho, otros van a aprovechar.* (if I don’t take advantage of it, other people will). (See Stocks 1999). Consequently, it has often been indigenous leaders who have made illegal agreements with lumber companies to exploit the forests of the TCOs. While the land is supposedly immobilized, business as usual continues, and the natural resources are consumed without supervision, rapidly, and in the least sustainable manner possible (Stocks 1999). More importantly, however, is that these incursions by terceros form the basis for rights of possession, so that when the **saneamiento** is finally carried out, the territorial demand is reduced. In the case of the Weenhayeks’ demand, between the time of the initial executive decree and the final demarcation of the territory, the territory was drastically reduced. Some fear where this will all lead. CEJIS recent editorial warns that this will result in the tacit disappearance of the TCOs:
This has begun an ominous legal precedent, and the tendency is towards converting the process of saneamiento and titling of the TCOs into a direct path to their formal and real liquidation. (CEJIS 1999) (my translation).  

The Third and final observation has to do with the end result of this titling. Since there have been so few titles granted so far, this is somewhat speculative, but is based on what is in process in many TCOs now. Once the titles are granted, this will be the green light for massive harvesting of the forests. Already, there are several TCOs who are writing their management plans for exploitation of forests, with the help of NGOs and departmental, that is, State forestry agencies.  

What was chaotic, often corrupt, small-time illegal harvesting will now be big-time, commercial logging. Indigenous groups are becoming enterprises for rapid appropriation of their resources, of course using the NGO discourses of sustainable development, participation, and equal distribution of profits.

I want to make it clear that I am not criticizing the results per se, or lamenting the loss of the pure or traditional ways of the indigenous peoples. While I might regret large-scale harvesting of forests or believe other alternatives might be sought for what is being called ethno-development, I also acknowledge that many indigenous people want in on the profits of the forest. My point here, though, is not to evaluate these development decisions in and of themselves but to show how these multicultural practices are part of what Corrigan and Sayer (1985) call the concrete forms of rule and ruling. As Schild notes, the state is not a monolith with intentions but rather an abstraction that refers to ensembles of institutions and practices with powerful cultural consequences. (Schild 1998: 97) In demonstrating the effects of both the popular participation project, (which fragments and homogenizes indigenous demands, making indigenous citizens more easily governable); and the territorial reforms, (which operates to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources) I am suggesting that the practices of the multicultural reforms, that is the practices of indigenous citizenship, act to regulate indigenous peoples’ behaviors and subjectivities in a way that reinforce decentralized governance and market policies.

V. What is Multicultural Citizenship? Governmentality ≠ Practices

What, then, does citizenship mean for indigenous people in Bolivia’s neoliberal age? Many critics have noted that globalization and neoliberal policies have profoundly changed what it means to be a citizen. Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar argue citizenship is now tied to the market:

In response to the allegedly inevitable logic imposed by the processes of economic globalization, neoliberal policies have introduced a new kind of relationship between the state and civil society and advanced a distinctive definition of the political domain and its participants based on a minimalist conception of both the state and democracy. As civil society is charged with taking on the social responsibilities now eschewed by neoliberalism shrinking state, its capacity as a crucial political domain for the exercise of democratic
citizenship is increasingly being downplayed. Citizens, in this view, should pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, and citizenship is increasingly equated with individual integration into the market. (Alvarez, Escobar, and Dagnino 1998: 1)

I agree that citizenship is part of economic integration, but my work shows that state practices, rather than shrinking, are actually extending their reach in Bolivia, actively amplifying spaces and means for indigenous citizens=integration into the market economy, both individually and collectively. I concur with Drainville, who argues that the process of political integration of the world economy works through states and their citizens, who are increasingly cast as bearers of economic rationality whose primary function is to bring to states claims for greater efficiency in the management of economic resources. The global economy requires the production of a coherent political cadre on which to hang the globalization of production. And this process relies on the ability of states to structure political participation, either through consensus building or coercive measures. (Drainville 1995: 60)

In the Bolivian case, the practices of multicultural citizenship described above do just that: structure indigenous participation in neoliberal economic and political processes. But what is important is the particular way this happens, the means of articulation. Here, the neoliberal state has recruited the political demands and cultural resources of indigenous peoples, specifically their collective land tenure traditions, into its strategies, incorporating these local particularities into its changing economic processes. As Bolivia has shifted its economic development pole to the Oriente, and focused its political-economic strategies on participation and market efficiency, this has allowed an articulation with indigenous demands. Multiculturalism, then, is the site at which the push from below meets the incorporation from above. The result of this articulation is a discursive framework (multiculturalism with its indígena citizen) enacted through a particular set of institutions and practices (a decentralized government regulating a more efficient and productive private sector which now includes indigenous collective entrepreneurs.)

VI. Contestation in the Neoliberal Framework

I have used Hall= theory of articulation to help explain how multiculturalism and neoliberalism have been mutually articulated in Bolivia. But Hall reminds us that articulations of collective identities or common interests are always provisional, not eternally fixed in some essentialized past, subject to the continuous play of history, culture, and power. (Hall 1990:225). The particular alignment I have described is not a treaty or an alliance, negotiated at a bargaining table between two parties with equal power. Rather, it is a momentary equilibrium in the long-term hegemonic process of struggle over land, resources, and meaning between indigenous peoples and the elites that continue to control the state. Multiculturalism is the current idiom of that struggle, what Roseberry calls a language of contention. He suggests that what hegemony constructs is a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination. (1996:80, my italics). The discourse of multiculturalism, and indígena citizenship, acts out the central terms around which contestation and struggle can occur.
This does not mean that multiculturalism is merely a sham, or that indigenous people have been fooled. Rather, it points out that the arena of struggle has changed in Bolivia. Previously marginalized indigenous peoples who could never even speak to political officials, now find themselves in battles in municipal meetings, fighting over school room budgets or in vice ministries, arguing over regulations for land titling legislation. Some things have changed; some have not. While the places and language of these struggles are new, they say, the underlying power relations have not changed much. Educated elite politicians still manipulate them, political parties still control the funds, and loggers and ranchers continue to take over their lands. As Veronica Schild has noted, new social movements may sometimes contribute to the emergence and development of new forms of domination. But the effects of this newly articulated discourse of multiculturalism, like any form of domination, are not totalizing. What Bolivia’s new citizens do with their citizenship remains to be seen. Hall argues that, in fact, a social group only becomes a unified social force through the constitution of itself as a collective subject within a unifying ideology. As a result of the multicultural reforms described here, Indígena citizens express growing feelings of entitlement, rights which encourage further collective action. The question is how this new activism will be articulated with the current fields of force, and what the upcoming articulations will bring.
End Notes:

1. Instead of selling the enterprises outright, the government sold 50% of the businesses to strategic partners who agreed to invest money into the businesses to make them more efficient and profitable. The remaining equity in the firms was divided 49% to fund a national pension system and 1% to employees of the former state owned firms. See Kohl, 1998, for a critical analysis of Bolivia’s capitalization and popular participation projects.

2. They were oil and gas, telecommunications, airlines, power generation, and the railroads. Ley de Capitalización, Ley No. 1544, March 21, 1994.

3. Ley No. 1551, April 20, 1994

4. For a general discussion of neoliberal policies and practices, see Biersteker, 1992. He says at the most general level, the economic reforms being pursued throughout the developing world today include a reduction and transformation of state economic intervention,... an increased reliance on market mechanisms, more frequent use of monetarist policy instruments, and a shift in public-private relations in the direction of greater support for (and increased reliance upon) the private sector. (108). Common practices of this strategy include greater reliance upon exports, (along with increased export incentives and reduced tariffs and licensing systems): devaluations of currency and exchange rate management to get prices right; major fiscal policy reforms such as tax reforms, ending government subsidies, and reducing government expenditures; and privatization of government enterprises. (108-110). See Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye, (1991) for a discussion of how neoliberal economic policies affected international development and multilateral lending practices.

5. Ley de la Republica No. 1585, August 12, 1994.

6. OTBs are defined as the basic unit with a communal or neighborhood character that occupies a determined territorial space, comprises a population without differentiating level of education, occupation, age, sex, or religion; and maintains a principal relation with the public organs of the State through the Municipal Government of the jurisdiction where it is located. (My translation.) Regulation D.S. No. 23858, September 9, 1994, and additions in D.S. No. 24447, December 20, 1996.

7. Article 3 of the LPP.

8. The regulations also specifically recognize as representatives of the OTBs traditional indigenous leaders, such as Capitanes, Jilicatas, Curacas, Mallcus, Secretarios, etc, as they are
designated according to their uses, customs, and statutory designations. Article 3 of the LPP.

9. In addition, the law makes provision for the creation of what are called *Distritos Municipales Indígenas* (DMIs), or Indigenous Municipal Districts, in areas where the entire municipality is within indigenous lands. In this case, the *sub-alcalde*, or sub mayor, who directs the district is elected by the indigenous organization rather than being appointed by the mayor. For an excellent explanation of DMIs and the possibilities this political opening might afford indigenous peoples, see Balslev 1997.

10. Ley No 1715, October 18, 1997.

11. For the current situation of these demands, see the April 1999 issue of *Artículo Primero*, edited by CEJIS, which has figures of the territorial demands.


13. Hale also draws this distinction between neoliberalism and multiculturalism in his 1999 paper from the Cochabamba conference. See Hale, 1999.

14. Comaroff (1996) suggests that globalism and localism are complementary sides of a single historical movement. The transnational flow of universalizing signs demands their domestication, that they be made meaningful and salient to homespun realities. If anthropology has demonstrated anything at all over the past decades, it is that there is no such thing as a universal symbol or image. Denotation may be global. But connotation is always local (174). The other side of the equation, he argues, is that nation-states under pressure are asserting their cultural uniqueness. The result is the rising tide of ethnonationalisms (174-75). Thus, globalization produces local particularities, and vice-versa.

15. I thank Gillian Hart and Allan Pred for impressing upon me the critical importance of the interplay between economy, history, and geography. As Pred and Watts succinctly put it, "Our (spatial) point is simply that how things develop depends in part on where they develop, on what has been historically sedimented there, on the social and spatial structures that are already in place there." (1992:11)

16. For a review of the growth of the international indigenous movement, see Brysk (1996), and Yashar (1998)

17. The *Quincentenario* effect was widely analyzed at the time. For an interesting comparison, see Vargas Llosa (1990), Nelson (1999), and Hale (1994).

18. For reasons of space, I have had to choose 1952 as the beginning point of my analysis. Of course, this history is much older than the 1952 revolution. See Larson 1988.
19. While this model was foreign to some Andean collective land-holding practices and social organizations, it took hold, especially in the valleys where there was already a class of individual small holders. See Larsen, 1988. See Ströbele-Gregor 1996 for a description of the *sindicato* model as it was taken on by highland peoples. One observer calls this stage of homogenizing incorporation the Angalls Family model, because it was part of the Christianizing, civilizing process by which the Indian family was brought into modernity through homogenization. van Arias, personal communication, October 23, 1997


21. For instance, the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity was lead mostly by Mojeños from the IsiboroBécure park, along with Chimanes from the Chimane forest, and a small group of Siriono. Lehm’s detailed study of the formation of the march and their internal differences is one of the few analyses that documents the heterogeneous natures of the indigenous movement. Her recent book describes how even among the Mojeño organizers of the march, there were fundamental differences in their ideologies and goals. Some represented a long-term religious, milenarianist tradition within the Mojeños, the search for the utopia of the *Loma Santa*, or Holy Land; and some represented a new secular movement searching for political autonomy and control over natural resources. Lehm describes how these two divergent ideologies came together to drive the march to its conclusion:

> At the same time, to bring about this interaction, a process of translation was produced on the part of the indigenous leaders of the new movement who interpreted the hopes of the searchers for the Loma Santa into secular terms, making them intelligible and formulating them as demands before the state and the national society... In fact, we assert that these processes of translation and retranslation were possible with a high degree of success because the searchers for the Loma Santa and the indigenous leaders shared the same Mojeño cultural matrix, marked by milenarianism, even though the latter group had not participated in the milenarian migrations. (Lehm 1999:134, my translation).

Lehm’s analysis is the sort of particularized study that is necessary to understand the real make-up of the indigenous movement, and to see how their divergent interests articulate in particular moments.

22. I thank anthropologist Enrique Herrera for helping to push my thinking about the heterogeneity of the Bolivian indigenous movement. I have relied greatly upon his field work among the people of the northern Amazon (see Herrera 1998), as well as his helpful and critical observations of my arguments.


25. Indigenous people mention the Artículo Primero, the first article of the constitution, often, and often in situations where it make little legal sense, but gives them a sense of entitlement. One person told me about a dispute with his boss, and then said, but they (meaning the rich bosses) can treat us that way anymore, because we are protected now by the Artículo primero. @


27. Pro-indigenous policies in the World Bank, and USAID proved to be a fruitful source of political power for indigenous groups who know how to make institutional allies. In 1998, the Guaranís of Izozog relied on both of these institutions to back them up in complex and confrontational fights with the governments of Bolivia and Brazil whose joint venture gas pipeline crossed Guaraní land. See Benería-Surkin 1998.

28. As Nelson cynically puts it, An imagined community needs more support than military parades and shopping trips to Miami. @Nelson 1999: 87).


30. Ramiro Molina, personal communication, November 10, 1997. Many observers credit the contradictions between the two sides of Goni’s government for the eventual disintegration of the political alliances upon which it was based.

31. See Benería and Mendoza (1995) for a discussion of the role of social emergency funds in other countries. Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar refer to these funds and the discourses they engender as Apparatuses and practices of social adjustment. @They suggest that these funds operate by creating new individualizing and atomizing discourses such as Aself-help, and Aactive citizenship, @which ultimately might depolitize the basis for mobilization against structural adjustment. (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998: 22)

32. Paoli and Telles (1998) discuss recent popular participation experiments in Brazil. Like the majority of authors describing Anew social movements, @they focus on the liberatory possibilities such changes in the rules of the game open up. They say that the rules of the game cannot be reduced to the formal rationality of the constitutional order, but are constructed through the mediation of public spaces in a A reinvention of the public contract. @They wonder what might be the possibility of a democratic legality if social groups could negotiate their differences around a Asocial pact of justice and equality. @76-77).

33. See the work by Benería-Surkin (1998) on the political and economic strategies of CABI. With institutional allies such as USAID and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), the Izozeños have managed to carry out a triple strategy: 1) they control a large territory as an indigenous organization, 2) they control an indigenous municipal district as an indigenous OTB, and 3) they
co-manage (with WCS) the largest national park in South America.

34. Kohl found similar results in his study of popular participation in both the highlands and lowlands, (Kohl 1998). Both Kohl’s and my results find support in Slater’s observations that decentralization programs in general may reinforce the power of central authorities even while transferring decision making power away from the center as decentralization brings government closer to the people. (Slater 199X)

35. Personal Interview, December 9, 1997.

36. Sanabria argues that the Bolivian state, facing serious social threats from below, was forced to strengthen itself, and to take control over a disintegrating society. He shows how the state achieved a high degree of vertical and horizontal ideological cohesion, through the emergence of a corps of well-trained bureaucrats, and by alliances with other political parties, who were able to override class and regional biases. Through these strategies, the new stronger state was able to implement market reforms that brought in more revenues to the state coffers, and increase the stream of international capital. But this was all based on the curbing union power and dismantling the public sector, especially the miners’ union which had long been the strongest voice of popular resistance. (Sanabria 2000).

37. This homogenizing effect is becoming even more pronounced under the present government of former dictator and current president General Hugo Banzer Suárez. His government has focused on a war on poverty which hardly mentions cultural differences. This has prompted many jokes at the popular level all around the general theme of: Have you heard about General Banzer’s war on poverty? Yeah, he’s going to kill all of us poor people!!!!

38. Much of this section was based upon a consultancy I did for World Wildlife Fund-Bolivia, June 1999.

39. Hale notes the same thing in Nicaragua, where a limited version of indigenous community land rights was not only compatible with the state’s development plans, but essential to them, because without regularization of land tenure, modern agricultural and resource development would be impossible. (Hale 1999:11)

40. The first stage happens in the following manner: the indigenous group makes a demand to a certain territory and presents it to INRA. These demands have been made through the regional indigenous groups and the national indigenous organization, CIDOB. INRA makes an initial resolution about the demand, based upon a study of the area and the people to be benefitted. These studies, called Caracterización Preliminar, were carried out by consultants and approved by the Secretaría de Asuntos Étnicos, (SAE). INRA then issues an order immobilizing the lands, meaning making any further development or transfer illegal. At present there are 14 TCOs at this stage of inmobilización.
41. In the second stage, INRA orders a *pericio de campo*, or field investigation, in which the areas are measured and georeferenced., all the other users or owners of the property are identified and their legal rights determined by INRA. An important part of this investigation is a determination of whether the land use conforms to a *función económico social* (FES), or social economic function. The agrarian reform laws require that all land be used in such a way as to promote family welfare or economic development in accordance to the best possible uses of the land. (Ley INRA, Art. 1715). The resulting field studies include title-holders, squatters who have rights by possession, other indigenous groups, etc. The result is a map of territory available for indigenous territory, usually a great deal smaller than the initial demand. This phase is proceeding extremely slowly, to the continued anger of indigenous groups. As of early 1999, only 4 small TCOs have been *saneado*. By January 2000, several more had been finished. Semi-annual meetings of the multi-disciplinary group CITCO, (*Comite Interdisiplinario de TCO*) bring together the government agencies, NGOs, and indigenous leaders and técnicos to hash out the process, but the government complains it does not have enough money or staff to do the required mapping, etc. The Danes have donated funds for the mapping projects for many, but not all, of the TCOs.

42. The third stage, which is supposed to be carried out at the same time as the first, is carried out by VAIPO, and is called an *identificación de necesidades espaciales*, (identification of spatial needs). This study is to determine the actual amount of territory each indigenous group really needs, considering their form of production, population, natural resources, etc. Understandably, the methodology at this stage is extremely important, and is the source of debate between CIDOB técnicos and VAIPO consultants. (See discussion in Martinez 1999.) There have also been accusations of failures to share information, etc. In mid 1999 VAIPO produced the first such study, for the Guarayos, which was then presented for consideration by the indigenous organization which must assent to its conclusions. At an assembly in August 1999, the Guarayos rejected the study, because the size of the territory was greatly reduced. After this first experience with the spatial study, national indigenous leaders began to argue that these studies were so politicized that they it made no sense to continue to pretend that they were based on science. Several leaders argued the spatial study should be totally done away with.

In November 1999, a meeting was held between CIDOB and VAIPO to discuss the model used by VAIPO to make these determinations. A mathematical model was used which did not take into account the hunting and fishing of the local peoples, because this usage was not deemed *sustainable* by VAIPO. After heated debates, an agreement was reached that modified the model to include the current use of land by indigenous peoples engaged in what is called *traditional* usage. *Traditional* here is intended not as a historic reference, but as a term to describe the way the indigenous people use that land, including hunting and fishing. However, there is no time or funds to do this by geo-referencing, so it will be done by community meetings and mapping. This points out the need for serious study about how such land needs can be determined. Acknowledging the inadequacy of any model, VAIPO official Doris Vidal admitted that *this is a political questions, and we are trying to resolve it scientifically.*
43. Before using any resources in their territories, each group must present their Plan de manejo, or management plan of the resources in the territory. This is a technical document, describing the state of the resources, and the plans for conservation and use of all the resources in the area. Only one such plan has been formulated so far. The Yuracarés, with the help of the Cochabamba NGO CERES, and funding from the Inter-American Foundation, presented their plan last year. Although the Yuracaré TCO has not passed the saneamiento or spatial study phases, the plan was approved by the Superintendent of Forestry and the Prefectura of Cochabamba, and the Yuracarés are beginning to act upon the plan. These management plans are complicated by the fact that they must be in accord with several other interlocking legislation, particularly the new Forestry Law, the Hydrocarbons Law, and the Biodiversity law. Several of the TCOs are also overlaid with national parks or other protected areas, which impose further difficulties in management.

44. The Indigenous people have not sat still for this, however, and the result is a growing level of conflict and violence. The case of Monte Verde in the Chiquitano region is well-known. In 1997, large numbers of colonos and terceros entered the area, cutting the forest, making roads, and establishing homesteads. INRA ignored the complaints of the Chiquitanos until they were forced to blockade the highways of the zone. The resulting conflicts gained national attention and INRA finally responded, making Monte Verde the highest priority area for saneamiento. In several other indigenous demand areas, one in the Guaraní communities outside of Santa Cruz, fights between supposed title holders and indigenous peoples have resulted in physical attacks, shootings, and arrests.

45. The Yuracaré (see fn. 28) management plan is already being put into effect. The first lumber harvests began in May 1999. The Yuquí are finalizing their plan with the help of the GTZ, the German aid agency, a forestry NGO funded by USAID, BOLFOR, a local forestry NGO called FUNDFORMA, all with the assistance of the Prefectura (roughly the governor) of Cochabamba = Programa de Apoyo a las Comunidades Indígenas del Trópico de Cochabamba (Program for the Aid to Indigenous Communities of the Cochabamba Tropics).

46. These processes are dialectically related: not only do citizenship practices structure economic policies, but economic policies are critical in the creation of citizens. When Wigberto Rivero, Vice Minister of Indigenous and Original Peoples Affairs (VAIPO) said that his government would use economic policies and participation to create citizens of the indigenous peoples (see above, fn 16), I believe he was right, but missed the second half of this dynamic.

47. Diane Nelson makes a similar argument, to explain why Guatemala’s elite cooperated with the approval of the ILO Convention 169, which grants indigenous peoples many rights. She notes that as the neoliberal model changes the elites’ interests in indigenous populations from plantation workers to workers in post-Fordist flexible specialization, this can be articulated with new forms
of regulation that includes a different vision of the state and the Indian. (Nelson 1999: 344).

48. Schild argues that while citizens may contest and struggle over the forms the state takes, the terms by which they do so are predetermined. Although people obviously contest and struggle, their struggles are not entirely of their own making. (@1998:99).


Bibliography

And from Kataristas to MNRistas? The Surprising and Bold Alliance between Aymaras and Neoliberals in Bolivia, in Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America, Donna Lee Van Cott, ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Alonso, Ana Maria 1994.

Alvarez, Sonia; Añgino, Evelina; and Escobar, Arturo, 1998.

Distritos Municipales Indígenas en Bolivia: Las Primera Experiencias en el Chaco. La Paz: Subsecretaria de Asuntos Étnicos (SAE).

Structural Adjustment and Social Emergency Funds: The Cases of Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua, in The European Journal of Development. 7 (1): 53-76.

Benería-Surkin, Jordi, 1998.

Bennet, David, ed. 1998.

Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: A Conceptual Exploration of IMF and

Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo, 1996.


Brysk, Alison, 1996.
  *Turning Weakness into Strength, The Internationalization of Indian Rights*, in *Latin American Perspective* 23(2):38.

CEJIS, 1999.
  *Articulo Primero*, 3(6), April 1999.

Chatterjee, Partha, 1990.

Comaroff, John 1996.

Connaghan, Catherine, and James Malloy, 1994.

Corrigan, Philip and Sayer, Derek 1985.


Drainville, André C., 1995.
Friedlander, Judith, 1975. 

Foster, Robert 1991. 

Foucault, Michel, 1977. 
----------------------, 1979. 

García Canclini, Nestor, 1989. 
*Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
----------------------, 1993. 
*Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Hale, Charles, 1994. 

----------------------, 1999. 

Hall, Stuart, 1996 

----------------------, 1991. 

----------------------, 1990.

Multiple Trajectories: A Critique of Industrial Restructuring and the New Institutionalism, in Antipode 30(4).

Informe de Caracterización Preliminar de la Demanda TCO Ese Eja, Tacana, y Cavineño. Trinidad: SAE/VAIPO.

Jackson, Jean, 1995.  
A culture, genuine and spurious: the politics of Indianness in the Vaupés, Colombia, in American Ethnologist 22(1):3-27.


Kohl, Benjamin, 1998.  


Milenarismo y Movimientos Sociales en la Amazonía Boliviana: La Búsqueda de la Loma Santa y la Marcha Indígena por el Territorio y la Dignidad. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: CIDDEBENI/APCOB/OXFAM.

Pueblos Indígenas de la Amazonía Boliviana. La Paz: AIP FIDA-CAF.

Li, Tanya Murray, in press.  

Legislación Boliviana y Pueblos Indígenas, Inventario y Análisis en la Perspectiva de las Demandas Indígenas. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: SNV-CEJIS.
Martinez, José, 1999.
A Tierra y Territorio: La Casa Grande de los Indígenas para Bolivia y el Mundo, in Artículo Primero, 3(6):73.

Medina, Javier, 1996.

Mosley, Samuel; Harrigan, Jane; and Toye, John, 1991.


Paoli, Maria Celia, and Telles, Vera da Silva, 1998.

Polanyi, Karl, 1944.

Pred, Allan and Watts, Michael, 1992.


Rose, Nikolas, and Miller, Peter, 1992.

Roseberry, William, 1996.


Slater, David, 199x.

Informe Técnico Proyecto BOLFORT. Iniciativas Forestales en el Trópico Boliviano: Realidades y Opciones. Santa Cruz: BOLFORT.

Ströbele-Gregor, Juliana, 1996.
ACulture and Political Practice of the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia: Autonomous Forms of Modernity in the Andes, in *Latin American Perspectives* 23(2): 72.

Toranzo Roca, Carlos, 1996.

Wilmsen, Edwin 1996.

Vargas Llosa, Mario, 1990.

Yashar, Deborah, 1998.