

A Shrinking Electorate in Post Pinochet Chile

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Abstract

This paper discusses electoral participation in Chile within a rational choice approach. I discuss turnout in Chile after the democratic restoration of 1990. I show that institutional constraints negatively affect enfranchisement and turnout. However, institutional constraints alone cannot explain the significant downward trend in turnout observed in the country since 1990. Instead, institutional constraints explain the growing number of Chileans who are not registered to vote, those who are not enfranchised. The electoral legislation adopted in 1989 creates additional incentives for people to abstain from registering to vote. I test some alternative models that explain turnout and find that none is a good predictor of turnout. Finally, I discuss how higher turnout affects the parties of the left and reports that contrary to what happened before 1973, higher turnout rates do not significantly favor the electoral strength of all leftist parties in Chile.

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Why do people vote? The theory

Anthony Down's seminal contribution, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) broadly suggests that in a two-candidate election, the platforms of the candidates will converge towards the median voter. In order to maximize their chances of winning, the two candidates will propose exactly the same policies and the voters will be indifferent between the two candidates. Each candidate will then have a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ of being elected. Down's model has been since renamed the Median Voter Theorem and it is widely used in the political science literature to understand elections and political processes. In Down's model, voting is compulsory and therefore, although both candidates propose exactly the same policies, citizens nonetheless turnout to vote. It has been widely argued that non-compulsory voting poses a difficult challenge to the Median Voter Theorem. If voters are rational, as Downs assumed, then why would they even care to vote if both candidates propose the same policies. In a perfectly rational electorate, there should be no turnout. Yet, because turnout does exist under non-compulsory voting, many have referred to this tension in the median voter theorem as the *turnout paradox*. Riker and Odershook (1968) formalized the turnout paradox as a function of the benefits of voting, the probability of an individual's vote being the decisive vote in the election and the benefit obtained by having your preferred candidate win. Citing Riker and Odershook, Uhlaner explains that the decision is:

Vote, if $pB + D > c$; Otherwise, abstain.

"Where, p is the probability that the voter is pivotal, B is the party differential (that is, the difference in the voter's utility if one candidate wins rather than the other) c is the cost of voting and D measures those positive contributions to the individual's utility (1995: 69). The decision to vote depends on the policies to be adopted, the cost of voting and the probability of being the pivotal vote. The problem with the analysis is that by definition, in a large electorate, p is necessarily very small, and consequently so is pB . In addition, D is unlikely to be very large, given that the policies of the two candidates will converge towards the median voter. For that reason, any marginally large c will lead to abstention. Yet, as Uhlaner explains, "if no one voted, representative democratic political systems would collapse. Downs himself recognized the seriousness of the problem raised by his theory's prediction and suggests solving it by introducing into the rational citizen's calculation a benefit that *stems from each citizens realization that democracy cannot function unless many people vote*" (1995: 67).

Downs assumes democracy to be some type of a desirable outcome, a public good of a sort. People want democracy to exist and they are willing to pay a price (turnout to vote) to secure its existence. Yet, as with most public goods, the provision of the good poses a prisoner dilemma (PD) problem. If voting involves a cost, then citizens have an incentive to free ride and abstain from going to the polls. Therefore, even if citizens value democracy, as long as there is a cost involved in voting, according to the theory there will be incentives to abstain from going to the polls.

The underlying assumption is that "rational choice takes it as fundamental that the individual prefers outcomes with higher utility to those with lower utility and chooses action to receive more highly valued outcomes" (Aldrich 1993: 48). With turnout, the utility of voting must be higher than the utility of not voting for the individual to vote. And because the

probability of being the decisive voter is so low and there is a cost involved in voting, citizens should abstain from voting unless their utility function includes some other benefits from the act of voting.

However, as Aldrich correctly points out, abstention might also signify a cost under some circumstances (1993: 248). Rational voters might include in their calculation that the cost of very low turnout might be the demise of democracy, a cost that is extremely high for each individual and for the entire population. In addition, because voters cannot observe what other voters do or their preferences, they cannot a priori determine if their own vote will be decisive. “The strategic interdependence of voter decisions makes it difficult to conceive of how the citizen could confidently assign probabilities to the states of nature”(Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974: 527).

And even if voting does not respond to a utility maximizing strategy, as Ferejohn and Fiorina recall, “rational choice theorists are guilty of equating the notion of rational behavior with the rule of maximizing expected utility”(Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974: 535). Therefore, according to Ferejohn and Fiorina, voting might be rational even if it does not maximize expected utility. Aldrich sidesteps the debate over utility maximization and rationality by claiming that “turnout is not a particularly good example of the problem of collective action. The main reason is that turnout is for many people most of the time, a low-cost, low-benefit action” (1993: 261).

Therefore, provided that the cost of voting is low, a sufficiently high positive turnout in national elections is not incompatible with the median voter theorem or with the expected behavior of rational actors. In every election, we would expect a significant number of people to turn out to vote.

Institutional arrangements affect turnout

Turnout is not uniformly distributed across countries or across the population. The U. S. has historically experienced lower turnout rates than most Western European nations. In addition, some groups have higher turnout rates than others in different countries. “Why, for example, are high income people more likely to vote?” (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974: 526) and why do turnout rates vary across countries? (Powell 1986). Almond and Verba (1963) stress the linkages between cultural values and political participation. “In participatory cultures, according to this interpretation, citizens are more politically satisfied with their institutions and therefore are more politically efficacious. Cultures that foster such values thereby enhance participation in general and voter turnout in particular”(Jackman and Miller 1995: 468).

In fact, in the U. S. and Western Europe, turnout has traditionally been reported as higher among groups with higher educational levels (Powell 1986: 28) and among older voters (Powell 1986: 30). Greater access to education and a longer experience with the political process (resulting from being older) positively affect turnout in industrialized democracies. In a sense, the cultural argument questions the utilitarian/rational approach explained above.

Despite the apparent empirical support for cultural explanations, some have observed that turnout is highly correlated with the competitive context of specific elections and institutional factors at all educational and age levels. The competitive context of each election, according to Powell, can also help us understand turnout. “Intuitively, it would seem that in elections in which the outcome was expected to be close, citizens would feel more reason to participate and, perhaps more importantly, party organizations and activists would feel more incentive to get their voters to the polls” (Powell 1986: 21). Along the same line, Grofman recalls that “ceteris

paribus, turnout is lower when the weather is bad, when the barriers to registration are steep and in elections whose outcomes few care about” (1995: 102).

In addition, institutional factors are often cited as more important in predicting turnout than either cultural interpretations of the specific context of any particular election (Powell 1986, Jackman and Miller 1995, Lijphart 1997). Lijphart (1997) in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1996, criticizes registration requirements to vote and compares them to literacy and property requirements existing in the earlier part of the century. Placing additional costs in voting will always result in lower turnout and lower electoral participation rates. Lijphart suggests that to expand the electoral base, “measures must be taken to improve the institutional structure of the country rather than to increase the levels of education or search for issues that might raise more interest among the electorate” (1997: 7). After all, as Grofman recalls, “most registered voters do vote” (1995: 102). Powell reports that participation is “facilitated by greater socio-economic resources and by general levels of political awareness and self confidence. On the other hand, participation is also facilitated or hindered by the institutional context within which individuals act” (1986:17). When discussing registration requirements in the U. S., Powell argues that “registration laws make voting more difficult in the United States than in almost any other democracy” (1986: 21). Jackman and Miller argue that “our results challenge the view that national differences in voter turnout reflect enduring and distinctive national political cultures” (1995: 484). Instead, “rather than reflecting cultural norms, levels of voter turnout are a function of institutional and electoral procedures” (1995: 484). To sum up the effect of institutional arrangements on turnout, I concur with Powell’s claim that the strongest single predictor of higher turnout is ‘automatic registration’ (Powell 1986: 25).

Turnout in elections in Chile

Most studies of turnout have focused on Western Europe and the U. S. (Almond and Verba 1963, Rae 1971, Powell 1986, Boyd 1989, Inglehart 1990, Jackman and Miller 1995) and only a few have considered democracies and elections in other regions (Lijphart 1995). If we study turnout in non-industrialized countries, would we come to the same conclusions as those who study turnout in Western Europe and the United States? Does turnout in developing countries also largely respond to institutional constraints and electoral procedures? Does any particular party or group benefit from higher turnout levels?

Here I discuss turnout in Chile after the transition to democracy in 1990. I show that institutional constraints negatively affect enfranchisement and turnout. However, institutional constraints alone cannot explain the significant downward trend in turnout among registered voters observed in the country since 1990. Instead, institutional constraints explain the growing number of eligible Chileans who are not registered to vote. The decrease in turnout among registered voters responds to other factors. I claim that the electoral legislation adopted in 1989 creates additional incentives for people to abstain from voting.

In the rest of the paper, I discuss the history of electoral participation and enfranchisement in Chile before 1973. I then discuss the historical links between the left and higher turnout. I then move on to the process by which an electoral registry was established in 1987 in the wake of the 1988 Plebiscite that brought an end to the military regime. The strategies followed by political parties to motivate people to register and the high stakes of the 1988 plebiscite explain the highest turnout ever registered in the country. Then, I discuss how after the 1988 plebiscite, turnout has fallen continuously. The 1996 municipal and 1997 parliamentary elections were no exception. The 1999 2-round presidential election saw an

increase in turnout when compared to 1997 and 1996, but it was still lower than the turnout for the 1993 presidential election. The downward trend in turnout among eligible voters continued in 1999 despite the intense political campaigning and the fact that Chile had for the first time in history a run-off presidential election.

I test some alternative models to explain turnout, but find that none is a good predictor of turnout. Finally, I discuss how turnout affects leftist parties. Using evidence from the 1997 parliamentary elections, I report that, contrary to what is observed for before 1973, higher turnout does not significantly favor the electoral performance of all leftist parties in Chile.

Turnout in Chile before 1973

As other developing countries, Chile experienced a steady increase in the number of enfranchised voters throughout the 20th century. Valenzuela (1998) identifies the 1890 Electoral Law as crucial in increasing the number of enfranchised voters. By eliminating property ownership requirements, that Electoral Law adopted successfully enfranchised most of the middle class and some literate working class Chileans. Table 1 reports a steady increase throughout the 20th century in the number of registered voters and the proportion of the voting age population that participated in elections. Women gained the right to vote in Chile in 1935 for municipal elections and in 1949 for national elections. Women first voted in presidential elections in 1952.

Table 1 About Here

Table 1 reports that electoral participation reached a peak in the presidential elections of 1964, when Christian Democratic (PDC) Eduardo Frei defeated the candidate of the Socialist-Communist alliance, Salvador Allende. After Frei's election, electoral participation dropped slightly in 1970 but increased again in 1973 in the last parliamentary election before the 1973 military coup. The enfranchisement of illiterates and the reduction in voting age from 21 to 18 year olds in 1970 expanded the universe of eligible voters, but newly enfranchised voters did not register to vote at high rates and therefore, turnout rates fell slightly from 1964 to 1970. In 1964, 61.6% of eligible Chileans voted but only 56.2% did in the 1970 presidential election. However, a larger proportion of Chile's population voted in 1970 than in 1964 as 30.8% of Chile's population cast a vote in 1970, 30% in 1964 and 15.7% in the 1958 presidential election.

The rapid growth of the enfranchised population coincided with the growth of social and political tensions in Chile. The 1958 presidential election was an extremely disputed contest between conservative Jorge Alessandri and socialist Salvador Allende. Alessandri won by a slight margin, but Allende's strength concerned the conservative political parties. For that reason, those parties supported PDC Eduardo Frei in 1964 to prevent Allende from winning the election. Frei campaigned on a 'Revolution in Liberty' program that included agrarian reform and the nationalization of the copper industry. His program included some of the same promises of Allende's socialist platform but clearly called for a less radical change than that proposed by the socialist. Frei's impressive 1964 victory is even more important because it took place among a rapidly expanding electorate, Chile's voting population more than doubled between 1958 and

Valenzuela (1985) argues that Chile's democratic institutions consolidated with the expansion of suffrage. However, as many have suggested, the social tensions caused by the economic and political developments could not be accommodated by the political system in place and eventually democracy broke down (Valenzuela 1978, Garretón and Moulián 1983,

Boeninger 1997). Jocelyn-Holt also suggests, rather ironically, that the inability of the Chilean elite to accommodate the newly enfranchised led to the democratic breakdown: “throughout the 20th century, Chile was living a social carnival; but as time progressed, through political empowerment and enfranchisement, the number of guests kept on increasing” (1998: 122).

Electoral turnout and the left in Chile before 1973

The increase in the number of voters has often been associated with the electoral strength of leftist parties and the PDC (Cruz-Coke 1984). As Przeworski correctly points out (1975), newly mobilized voters come into the political arena with political preferences already formed. Meller shows a simple econometric model that explains the reduction in electoral support for conservative parties as a result of an increase in electoral participation (1996: 102). Przeworski and Soares (1971) also report that the left benefited from higher levels of participation in the 1952 presidential election.

Political developments in 20th century Chile are linked to the expansion of the electoral base. The left obtained its highest support in 1964, the presidential election with the highest participation in the country before 1973. In 1973 the left obtained its best showing ever in parliamentary elections. Not surprisingly, turnout was also higher than ever before. With 69% of all eligible voters going to the polls, leftist parties got more than 44%. By all accounts, an increase in electoral participation in Chile before 1973 resulted in an increase in the electoral strength of the left. Expanding the enfranchised population was, by all means, the best electoral strategy for the left before 1973. The military coup brought an end to Chilean democracy. Conservative parties supported the coup and the military government because of their ideological similarities and because conservative parties had grown increasingly disappointed with their electoral performance over the past few years.

Allende's strong showing in 1964, when he obtained almost 40%, is often overshadowed by Frei's decisive victory. With 56% of the vote, Frei became the president with the largest in 20th century Chile, and the remarkable campaign of his PDC in 1965 led the party to obtain almost 50% of the vote in that elections and to gain majority control of the Chamber of the Deputies. However, the growth of the reform-minded PDC did not come at the expense of the left. In the 1965 election, the left secured 30% of the vote, their highest electoral performance yet. In 1969, the left consolidated its strength with over 32%, and in the 1970 presidential election Allende won a plurality with 37%. In the 1973 parliamentary elections, the left got an outstanding 44% of the vote. And although they lost, it was the electoral strength of the left what forced the PDC and conservative parties to form an electoral alliance in 1973. The electoral weight of the left increased as a result of other factors as well (Valenzuela 1977, Garretón and Moulián 1983), but the enfranchisement of new voters substantially improved the electoral performance of the left.

Table 2 About Here

Chile returns to electoral politics in 1988

After the 1973 military coup, General Pinochet's dictatorship burned all electoral rolls and closed the Electoral Service (SE). Although the military government organized plebiscites in 1978 and a constitutional plebiscite in 1980, no electoral registry was established. Late in 1986, as a result of the slowly emerging transition to democracy process, the military government agreed to re-organize the SE and to create new electoral rolls. When the SE was reopened,

citizens were encouraged to register to vote for the upcoming plebiscite. The 1980 Constitution established that a plebiscite would be held in 1988 to vote yes or no on a presidential nominee to serve an 8-year term proposed by the military government.

At first, the opposition political parties rejected the dictatorship's effort to validate the 1980 Constitution via the 1988 plebiscite. However, as social protests and political mobilization proved incapable of toppling the dictatorship, the leadership of the PDC and other leftist parties opted to promote vote registration in order to defeat the military presidential candidate in the 1988 plebiscite (Oppenheim 1991, Boeninger 1997). In addition, they legally registered their political parties in the newly created SE (Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda 1997). The PDC and the left-leaning Party for Democracy (PPD) emerged as the leading parties of the opposition. The Communist and Socialist parties were banned by the 1980 Constitution. The military rejected efforts by political party leaders to lift the ban on Socialists and other Marxist groups. Yet, in the end, the will to force Pinochet out of power, even under the conditions imposed by Pinochet himself, convinced the PDC and PPD to officially register as parties.

In part, the PDC decision was influenced by the tremendous success of the humanists in their campaign to collect the minimum number of members to register as a political party. The Humanist Party, a novelty in Chilean politics, lacked national figures but in a few weeks successfully obtained the minimum number of signatures required to register in the SE. In a sense, parties responded to the enthusiasm of Chileans who perceived the scheduled 1988 plebiscite as an opportunity to achieve a democratic transition. The PDC became the first opposition party to legally register with the SE.

The socialists, divided into several groups, were constitutionally banned. Yet, in a move to circumvent the legal restriction, a group of socialist leaders established an alliance with other progressive politicians and civil society leaders to form a 'progressive party' called Party for Democracy (PPD). Although a majority of the PPD leadership were long-term militants of the Socialist Party (PS), the PPD soon evolved into more than just a tactical move to have a PS with a different name. The new approach to doing politics adopted by the PPD together with enthusiastic use of marketing techniques positioned the PPD well with the electorate. In a matter of weeks, thousands of Chileans already registered to vote in the SE provided the party with enough signatures to make it an officially political party (Plumb 1998).

Together with acquiring legal status, political parties began mobilizing their supporters to register in the SE. The government, responding to international pressure and attempting to secure enough electoral support to win announced plebiscite, also launched an aggressive voter registration drive. In late 1987 and early 1988, most people believed that the more voters registered in the SE, the more likely Pinochet could be defeated (Cavallo, Salazar and Sepúlveda 1997). There were an estimated 8.1 million eligible voters, and by the time of the plebiscite more than 7.4 registered to vote. High turnout combined with the large number of voters secured a Pinochet defeat.

More than 90% of eligible voters turned out to vote on October 5, 1988. It was the highest turnout in Chile's history, but it was also somewhat predictable. Because there had been no elections in 15 years, because the stakes were high and because the government and the opposition had called on Chileans to register and participate, high electoral participation was expected. The institutional hurdles to participate, namely the need to register (which incidentally also guaranteed against government tampering with electoral results), did not deter people from participating in the plebiscite. After 1988, there has been a clear downward trend in turnout in Chile. In every national election since 1988, electoral participation has gone down from the

previous election. The drop in turnout brought electoral participation below 1964 standards in the parliamentary election of 1997. Turnout has fallen continuously with the 1999 presidential elections being the only exception.

The proportion of registered voters has gone down from a high of 96.6% in 1988 to a low of 71.1% in 1997. It increased again in 1999, when it reached 90% in the first round and over 90.5% in the runoff. But when measured as proportion of the eligible population (not just registered voters), turnout in 1999 was 70.1% in the first round and 72% in the runoff, higher than in the 1996 Municipal and 1997 parliamentary elections, but still significantly lower than in the elections between 1988 and 1993.

Table 3 About Here

The decline in participation and turnout after 1988

In the 1988 plebiscite, Chileans were asked to vote “yes” to accept or “no” to reject Pinochet re-election bid for a new 8-year term. Because the military had insisted on carrying out the plebiscite and because the presence of Pinochet made it easier for the opposition to join forces, two big coalitions of political parties and groups formed in the wake of the October 5, 1988 plebiscite. The parties loyal to general Pinochet campaigned for the “Yes” vote while the opposition coalition (*Concertación*) campaigned for the “No” option. The PC initially called to not register in the SE and then called on its supporters to abstain from voting. The PC rejected the thesis that Pinochet could be defeated using the framework established in the 1980 Constitution (Petras 1988, Oxhorn 1991, 1995, Schneider 1991). The opposition to Pinochet formed a coalition of 17 parties named *Concertación de Partidos por el No*, which was later renamed *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*. The *Concertación* represented a significant departure from previous electoral coalitions in Chile. The PDC sided with conservative parties in the 1964 and 1973 elections, but forged an alliance with socialists, their former foes, in the 1980s and successfully defeated General Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite (Oppenheim 1991, Petras and Silva 1994, Munch and Bosworth 1998).

In 1988, 54.7% of the 7.2 million Chileans voted against Pinochet, opening the way for free and open presidential and parliamentary elections in late 1989. In 1989 several constitutional reforms were adopted and the *Concertación* prepared for an almost certain victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for December (Fernández Jilberto 1991, Petras and Silva 1994). The 1989 elections were a blue print of the 1988 plebiscite, the *Concertación* obtained 55%, and turnout remained high with 86% of the voting age population going to the polls. However, overall participation was slightly lower than the peak reached in the 1988 plebiscite.

The newly elected *Concertación* government pushed for more reforms, but conservative parties controlling the senate through appointments made by the outgoing military regime blocked major constitutional reforms. After negotiations, some legislation was introduced, including a reform that established the democratic election of mayors. It was set for 1992 (Petras and Silva 1994, Collins and Lear 1995, Valenzuela and Scully 1997). The *Concertación* and the *Unión* conservative coalition were expected to win control of a majority of the local councils and municipal mayor positions. In addition, the newly legalized PC also ran candidates in all major cities. A fourth political coalition, the Center-Center Union, a group organized by 1989 independent presidential candidate Francisco Javier Errazuriz, also filled a slate for the 1992

municipal elections. The electoral arena did not change significantly as the *Concertación* maintained 55%, the *Unión* obtained 38% and the PC gathered 6.5%.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in 1993. These were the first elections where a democratically elected government gave way to another popularly elected government. The ruling *Concertación* obtained an impressive electoral victory with more than 54% of the vote (Chamber of Deputies). The *Unión* obtained 41% and the PC gathered 5% (Munch and Bosworth 1998, Rahat and Sznajder 1998). The Chilean electorate showed extremely stable preferences, but turnout was declining considerably as well. Only 73.2% of the eligible population voted in 1992. Although a drop in electoral turnout was expected since municipal elections often draw less attention than national elections, turnout did not increase significantly in the presidential elections of 1993. The 76% turnout of the 1993 presidential elections caused greater concern. Only 6.7 million voters turned out in December of 1993 to give *Concertación's* Eduardo Frei the largest margin of victory of any contemporary Chilean presidential election.

Two processes began to take place among the Chilean electorate. On the one hand fewer registered voters were turning out. On the other, few new eligible voters were registering to vote. Among registered voters, there was an increase in abstention and null/blank votes from 1988 to 1993. In the 1988 plebiscite, 65,000 voters cast null and blank votes. In the presidential election of 1993, 601,000 voters cast null or blank votes. Altogether, non-registered voters and those who abstained totaled 1.5 million in 1993. The 76% turnout rate in 1993 was slightly higher than the 73.2% in the municipal elections of 1992 but it was lower than the 86% observed in 1989.

According to the theory, the downward trend in turnout between 1988 and 1993 should be expected. The 1988 plebiscite was an election where important decisions were made. As Grofman (1985) and Powell (1986) recall, elections whose outcomes are deemed important for a large majority of the population will often lead to high turnout. The widely expected victory of the *Concertación* might help explain the fall in electoral turnout between the 1988 and the 1989 presidential and parliamentary elections. The 1989 race was not, under any definitions, a close race. *Concertación* presidential candidate Patricio Aylwin ran ahead in the polls since Pinochet's defeat in the 1988 plebiscite. Although parties loyal to Pinochet rallied behind Pinochet's finance minister, Hernán Buchi, Aylwin's victory came as no surprise. The 1989 elections also determined the composition of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The *Concertación* campaigned to win a sufficiently large enough majority to pass constitutional reforms to democratize institutions, restrict military independence and eliminate the so called dead lock laws established by the military. In many respects, the 1989 election was a continuation of the 1988 plebiscite and a *Concertación* victory was expected. Overall, turnout dipped only 4% as compared to 1988.

The electoral initiated in 1988 ended with President Aylwin's election in December of 1989, but also included a Constitutional plebiscite in July of 1989 where turnout was lower than in the plebiscite and the presidential election. The *Concertación* had proposed a long list of constitutional reforms but the military government only submitted a few of those to a popular plebiscite. The *Concertación* and the military government supported the constitutional amendments and, therefore, the plebiscite was a simple rubber stamp procedure.

One of the constitutional reforms adopted in 1989 reduced the first presidential period to 4 years. President Aylwin governed from 1990 to March of 1994. In December of 1993, in the wake of president Frei's election, the parliament approved a constitutional amendment setting the presidential term at 6 years without re-election. However, terms for the Chamber of Deputies remained at four years and senators stayed with their 8-year terms. As a result, parliamentary

and presidential elections will only coincide every twelve years. Frei's term expired in March of 2000 and presidential elections were held in December of 1999, but parliamentary elections were held in 1997 and new parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2001.

The high turnout levels of the 1988 plebiscite had two immediate effects. First, Pinochet's defeat was more significant as the highest electoral turnout in history handed the General his worst political defeat. Second, the 1980 Constitution, with its provisions restricting and limiting democratic government in the country, was also validated by the large electoral turnout. Pinochet was defeated but his Constitution with the restrictions on democratic governance was accepted. The electorate's inability to overcome those restrictions and existing institutional hurdles would eventually be reflected in disenchantment of voters and a fall in turnout. The transition to democracy initiated in 1988 seemed to have lost its appeal to voters who have stayed at home at increasing rates since 1988.

Table 4 About Here

The demise in turnout in 1996 and 1997

During the 1988-1993 period, Chileans voted in the 1988 presidential plebiscite, the 1989 constitutional plebiscite, the 1989 presidential and parliamentary elections, the 1992 municipal elections and the 1993 presidential and parliamentary elections. Altogether, there were five elections in six years.

After 1989, as a result of the government's effort to decrease the level of political activities within the country, political participation decreased considerably (Otano 1995, Cavallo 1998). That decrease was also reflected among the registered population. Although the eligible population increased by almost a million and a half between 1988 and 1996, the registered population increased only by 600,000. A growing number of Chileans was not enfranchised. And because registration is a one in a lifetime requirement (unless people may choose to report their new residencies and thus transfer their registration to their new districts) a majority of those not registered to vote are young adults who turned 18 years of age after the 1988 plebiscite. In addition to a reduction in electoral participation, other forms of political and social participation have also decreased since the restoration of democracy (Oxhorn 1995, Petras and Silva 1994, Collins and Lear 1995). Turnout also fell in 1996, but because those were municipal elections, when compared to the 1992 municipal elections, turnout actually increased in 1996. However, when measuring turnout as the percentage of eligible population casting ballots, turnout in 1992 decreased from 73.2% in 1992 to 65.3% in 1996.

An aggressive electoral registration campaign was launched in 1997 in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections in 1997. However, the campaign failed as the number of registered voters actually decreased from 8,073,000 to 8,069,000 voters from 1996 to 1997. The decrease results from having more deaths among registered voters than new voters registered with the SE (in 1997 78,472 Chileans died). The little enthusiasm expressed by young adults to vote sent strong signals to those concerned with the fundamental factor that legitimizes democracy: electoral participation. In addition, the number of absentees and those casting null and blank votes increased considerably from 1993 to 1996 and 1997. In the 1996 municipal election, 6.2 million voters went to the polls. In 1997, the number went down to 5.7 million. This is 1.5 million less than in the 1988 plebiscite.

In 1997, only 60.8% of eligible voters cast valid votes in the election. This was the lowest since the 1970 presidential elections and lower than the turnout of the 1964 presidential election. In 30 years, Chile had gone from a 60% turnout rate to a high of 86% in 1988 and back down to 60.8% in 1997.

The 1999 presidential elections

When compared to 1997, the 1999 presidential election had a higher turnout among registered voters. In fact, it was the highest turnout since 1989. There was plenty of uncertainty about the results before the 1999 election. On December 12, 1999 the two leading candidates ended up with 48% of the vote each. For the first time since the return of democracy, the *Concertación* was not able to secure an electoral majority. The uncertainty associated with the 1999 election had a positive effect on turnout. As the theory suggests, more people vote when the outcome of an election is uncertain and the stakes are higher. Clearly, the stakes are higher in presidential than in other elections.

However, when measuring participation as a percentage of the eligible population rather than the registered population, turnout in 1999 was lower than in the presidential elections of 1989 and 1993. Whereas 84.6% of the eligible population voted in 1989 and 75.8% did in 1993, the first round in the 1999 presidential election had a 70.1% turnout rate. For the second round, the percentage of eligible voters that cast ballots increased to 72.1%.

Certainly, in order for an eligible Chilean to vote, she must do two things. First, she must register to vote at least four months before the election—if she is not already registered with the SE—and second, she must turn out to vote on election-day. In 1999, those who managed to register to vote turned out at high rates, but many eligible voters (more than 1.8 million, or 19% of all those eligible) are not registered to vote in the SE. Although disenchantment is often cited to explain the growing number of non-registered eligible voters, institutional constraints regulating electoral registration in the SE also play a role. Disenchanted or not, a voter must be registered before she can exercise her right to vote.

What explains the fall in turnout

Several reasons have been cited to explain the decrease in turnout rates. Here, I separate them in two groups, those that explain why new voters do not register to vote (the youth), and those that explain why registered voters choose to abstain in a given election. I refer to the first group as the disenfranchised and the second group as the disenchanted.

Deception with the unfinished political transition to democracy is often cited as the main reason why young people do not want to participate in politics. The inability of *Concertación* governments to reform the Constitution and eliminate the deadlock laws that give the military an unprecedented role (even veto power in some cases) over decisions made by civilian authorities is also cited as a reason for the lack of interest among the youth to register to vote. These disenfranchised voters are thought to be pro-democracy voters who are dissatisfied with the way the government is trying to overcome the institutional barriers placed on democratic accountability by the previous military government. Public opinion polls and electoral results in university student federations and other civil society organizations have fueled the belief that young voters do not hold in high regard the democratic system currently operating in Chile. As a result, they have decided to stay out of electoral politics because the rules of the game are unfair and overly restrictive.

Among those who are registered to vote, the presumption is that a majority of them opposed Pinochet and supported the *Concertación*, but many are now apparently disenchanted with the government. If we compare the electoral results of 1993 and 1997—as reported in Table 5—we can see that more than 1 million fewer people voted in 1997. Because there were very few new voters registered in that period, we can infer that a majority of those who abstained or cast null/blank votes in 1997 had cast valid votes in 1993. All political parties, except of the conservative Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and the Humanist Party (PH), lost votes from 1993 to 1997. The UDI improved by 11,000 voters, but mostly because the UDI ran candidates in 47 districts in 1997, compared to 30 districts in 1993. The PH doubled its number of votes, but it also had candidates in more districts in 1997 than in 1993. The PH went from 1.4% of the vote in 1993 to 2.9% in 1997.

Table 5 shows why most analysts conclude that a majority of the disenchanted voters come from within the *Concertación*. In particular, the PDC lost more than 500,000 votes between 1993 and 1997. The fall in PDC support account for half the decrease in turnout from 1993 to 1997. The *Concertación* lost more than 820,000 votes between 1993 and 1997. The overall percentage of votes varied little between 1993 and 1997, but despite obtaining fewer votes, opposition parties like conservative National Renovation (RN) and PC obtained a higher percentage of votes. The UDI, with an increased of 11,000 votes nationally, increased its percentage from 12.1% to 14.5%.

Chileans have shown a remarkable continuity in their electoral preferences. As Scully puts it: “the underlying patterns and tendencies within the Chilean political landscape are quite resistant to fundamental change” (1995: 136). When writing about the persistence of the right-center-left three-way split in Chilean political parties, Valenzuela and Scully argue that “each tendency has maintained its electoral support even though the electorate almost doubled during the dictatorship and most voters participated in competitive elections for the first time after it” (1997: 525). Valenzuela and Scully (1997) also report important continuities in the electoral preferences of Chileans between 1988, 1989 and 1992.

Certainly, not all abstentions and null/blank votes can be explained by the disenchantment of former *Concertación* voters. It might very well be the opposite: voters are satisfied with the government and knowing that the opposition does not pose a serious electoral threat, it is rational for them to abstain. However, Petras and Silvia (1994), Oxhorn (1995), Collins and Lear (1995) have reported growing levels of dissatisfaction with democratic consolidation in Chile. Survey data collected also reports growing levels of dissatisfaction with the democratic system in Chile (CHIP News January 7, 1998). In polls conducted before the 1997 election, president Frei’s approval ratings were just at 50% and voters expressed discontent with democratic consolidation in the country (CHIP News, December 1997). The disenchantment argument then does not result from observing electoral turnout. Low levels of turnout are simply consistent with the claim that Chileans are disenchanted.

Disenchanted voters always face two options. They can vote for the opposition or they can abstain/nullify their votes. If they vote for the opposition, the political mandate is clear: they want to get rid of the current government. If they abstain or nullify their votes, they are sending a signal of dissatisfaction, but they are not ready to turn the government to the opposition. In Chile, the electoral results of 1997 suggest that voters were disenchanted with the *Concertación* but were not ready to vote for opposition candidates.

In addition, a structural constraint exists to deter registered voters from turning out to vote (and even to discourage others from registering to vote). The electoral law in Chile makes it

very difficult for voters to alter the distribution of seats in the parliament (Magar, Rosemblum and Samuels 1998, Rahat and Sznajder 1998, Munch and Bosworth 1998). As Siavelis and Valenzuela (1996) report, the electoral formula was designed to secure significant parliamentary representation for the political parties supportive of General Pinochet. Chile is divided into 60 2-member Chamber of Deputies districts. Seats are allocated using the D'hondt Proportional Representation formula. Each party or coalition of parties can present up to two candidates per districts. Voters cast votes for any one candidate of any list. Votes are tallied by lists, and by candidates within lists. The first seat goes to the candidate with most votes in the list with most votes. The second seats goes to the candidate with most votes in the list that placed second in number of votes. However, if any given list doubles the number of votes of each other list, the winning party or coalition gets the two seats in that district. In practice, if the winning coalition obtains 60% of the vote and another coalition gets 35%, the two coalitions will split the two seats, but if a coalition obtains 65% of the vote and the other coalition gathers 30%, the two seats will go to the winning coalition. Smaller parties get no parliamentary representation.

In the 1993 election, the *Concertación* obtained 54% of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies. The *Unión* got 33%, but in the overall distribution, the *Concertación* obtained 71 seats (59%) and the *Unión* obtained 48 seats (40%). In 1997, the *Concertación*, with slightly over 50% of the vote obtained 69 seats (58%) and the *Unión* with 35% of the vote obtained 47 seats (39%).

Siavelis and Valenzuela (1996) using electoral data for 1989 show that a small increase in the electoral support for the *Concertación* together with a decrease in the *Unión* vote would significantly alter the composition of parliament. This is so because the *Concertación* would successfully double the number of votes of the *Unión* in a large majority of districts and would therefore pick two seats in many districts. Rahat and Sznajder (1998) and Magar, Rosemblum and Samuels (1998) have also shown that the electoral system in place greatly hinders electoral competition as it was designed to favor the political parties that supported the military regime.

The following argument can share light into the rational calculations of voters. A small decrease in the support for the *Concertación* would not significantly alter the distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. If the *Concertación* were to lose 10% of the vote across districts, the seat distribution would not change dramatically. In fact, if we think of the country as a single large district, then it does not matter if the vote distribution is 55% for the *Concertación* - 35% for the *Unión*, or 55% for the *Unión* - for the 35% *Concertación*. The seat distribution would be exactly the same, one seat for each coalition in the two-seat district.

Clearly, given the difficulties of altering the seat distribution, rational voters have incentives to abstain even if they care about the results of the elections. Or, in other words, if *Concertación* voters think they are not going to be able to double the votes of the *Unión* candidates in their district, they might as well stay home. It is highly unlikely that the *Unión* candidates will double the number of votes of the *Concertación* candidates. In 1993, the *Concertación* doubled the votes of the *Unión* in 11 districts and the *Unión* doubled the *Concertación* in 1 district. In 1997, the *Concertación* doubled in 10 districts and the *Unión* doubled in the same district as in 1993.

Although more research is needed to explain the fall in turnout, the often-cited disenchantment of voters with the democratic transition should only partially explain the fall in participation levels. The electoral law in Chile also creates structural incentives against participation. This must be understood as an unintentional effect of the electoral law adopted by the dictatorship to favor conservative political parties. Clearly, the 1980 Constitution restricted

the direct influence of voters on the composition of government. The National Security Council (with a strong military presence), the appointed senators that make up 20% of the senate, the inability on the part of the president to remove commanders in chief of the armed forces, and the binomial electoral system are all features intentionally put in place to restrict the power of the citizenry to self-govern. The fall in electoral participation in parliamentary elections represents the rational response on the part of voters to an electoral law that makes it very difficult to alter the composition of the parliament.

The increase in turnout (as a percentage of the registered population) in 1999 is also consistent with the rational explanation. Presidential elections provide more incentives for voters than parliamentary or municipal elections in a country with a strong presidency. Also, voters are more likely to be pivotal when there is a closely contested election. Yet, the turnout among eligible voters did not increase as much in 1999 because of the existing structural constraints for people to register.

Why is turnout low and who benefits from it?

A Weighted Least Squares regression or a Maximum Likelihood Estimation analysis on turnout using the variables often cited to explain turnout fail to provide significant results when predicting turnout for the 1996 municipal election in Chile. Educational levels, poverty, school enrollment, industrialization and the percentage of workers in agriculture have been used to explain electoral participation and turnout in Chile (Przeworski and Soares 1971, Isuani and Cervini 1975, Valenzuela 1977, Caviedes 1979). Using 1992 census data available for 332 Municipalities, none of those variables is significant in predicting turnout. Contrary to what's reported by Almond and Verba (1963), education and other social indicators are not good predictors of turnout in Chile in 1996. To be sure, Almond and Verba used survey data while I use census data; they have individual level information while I only have aggregate data at the municipal level.

Table 6 About Here

Because a large majority of those not registered to vote are young, the older the person is, the more likely that person is to vote. Therefore, age will obviously have an effect on turnout (however I do not have age data for all the 332 municipalities). Besides age, other socio-demographic variables fail to explain what causes turnout. In general, statistical models that use census data to explain turnout fail to explain why people vote and what is the profile of those who abstain or are not registered. However, different turnout levels do help us explain the electoral performance of different political parties.

Leaving aside the question of what kinds of people abstain, I consider turnout as an independent variable and use it, along other socio demographic characteristics, to predict support for political parties in 1996. Table 7 shows that higher turnout has a positive significant effect on the vote for the *Unión*, PDC and, most strongly, the PPD. The effect of turnout on the PS is not significant and the effect of turnout on the PC (MIDA coalition in 1996) is positive, but significant only at the 0.10 level.

Table 7 About Here

Table 7 also shows that socio-demographic indicators do a better job predicting the vote for *Unión* rather than for the other parties. Socio-demographic indicators do a poor job predicting the vote for the *Concertación* and they only marginally predict the vote for the PC. As discussed above, the left did better in Chile when turnout was higher. However, in 1996 the PS did not benefit from higher turnout and the PC only benefited marginally. The PPD, however, benefited significantly more from higher turnout, as did conservative parties and the PDC. The positive correlation between turnout and the vote for the *Unión* merits attention, as it does not reproduce the historical negative correlation between participation and support for conservative parties. In 1996, higher turnout benefited conservative candidates.

The explanation for the relationship between the PDC and turnout responds to the significant fall in PDC support starting in 1993. “Disenchantment” hit the PDC the hardest. Wherever disenchantment was not as high and therefore turnout did not fall as significantly, the PDC did better. In other words, higher turnout does not favor the PDC as much as a fall in turnout deeply hurts the PDC more than anybody else. And as I argued above, although abstention voters did not abandon their preferred party in 1996, their vote should no longer be taken for granted by that party even if turnout were to increase in the future.

The weak positive relationship between turnout and the vote for the PC in 1996 calls into question the belief that the PC caters to a captive and highly ideological vote. The argument suggests that because the PC always gets the same number of votes, the lower the turnout, the higher the percentage of votes PC sympathizers will represent. Higher levels of participation marginally favor the PC, although the relationship is weak and a better-specified model might show that relationship to disappear altogether.

Finally, the positive effect of turnout on the vote for the PPD sheds some light as to where the future of the Chilean left may lie. Out of the three leftist parties in this study, the PPD benefits more than the PS or the PC from higher turnout. An increase in turnout had a strong positive effect on the vote for the PPD in the 1996 municipal election. The PPD is a new political party, formed in the wake of the 1988 plebiscite. The PPD attempted to form a coalition of leftist and progressive leaders as a new catch-all party, free from the heavy ideological constraints of older leftist parties like the PS and the PC (Plumb 1998). With the legalization of the PC in 1989 and the reunification of the PS in late 1989, the future of the PPD was called into question and many PPD leaders joined the PS. Dual PS-PPD membership was allowed during a transition period, but in 1992, the PPD and the PS formally separated and PPD-PS members had to choose between the two parties. But the PPD and the PS continued to work together as allied parties. In the 1992 municipal election, the PPD and PS formed an electoral coalition within the *Concertación*. The PPD obtained 9.2% of the vote in 1992 and the PS obtained 8.5%. In the 1993 parliamentary election, the PS-PPD alliance allowed both parties to avoid electoral direct electoral confrontation. The PPD supported PS candidates and the PS supported PPD candidates in almost all the 60 electoral districts. There were no districts where a PPD and PS candidates ran against each other. The PPD obtained 11.8% and the PS 11.9% of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies.

The alliance was kept for the 1996 municipal election when the PPD and the PS ran candidates under the same alliance within the *Concertación*. And although there was PS-PPD direct competition because both parties had candidates in most municipalities, votes were tallied

first within parties and then within lists so that a vote for the PS would eventually also help the PPD elect more council members. The PPD obtained 11.8% of the vote and the PS obtained 10.6%. In the 1997 elections, both parties adopted the same arrangement used in 1993. In the end, the PPD obtained 12.6% and the PS 11.1%. Together, the PS and PPD combined to obtain 23.7% of the vote. For the first time since 1990, the combined vote of the PS-PPD was higher than that of the PDC (23%).

Over the years, the PPD has emerged as an independent party in the center-left and a very active leader in issues of human rights, ecological concerns and the fight against corruption, censorship and impunity. The PPD is a novelty in a political system characterized by the continuity of strong parties. The positive effects of turnout on the PPD point to the good possibilities the PPD has to become a stronger political party and one that might receive the support of newly enfranchised and currently disenfranchised voters.

The situation of the PC is different. The PC did not join the *Concertación* in 1988. In part, this was due to the PDC's unwillingness to accept an alliance with the PC and to the PC's own conviction that democracy could not be achieved within the framework established by the 1980 Constitution (Petras 1988, Petras and Silva 1994, Oppenheim 1991). After the constitutional reforms of 1989, the PC legally registered but not in time to run candidates in the 1989 elections. The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused a significant crisis within the PC and many of its leaders abandoned the party to join the PPD. In 1992, the PC, forming the MIDA alliance with other smaller groups, presented candidates in many of the municipalities for the 1992 elections. The PC obtained 6.6% in 1992. The PC also ran candidates in a majority of the 60 electoral districts in the 1993 elections and obtained 6,4% of the national vote for the Chamber of Deputies. The electoral law in place, however, placed high electoral threshold and the PC failed to win seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the presidential elections held concurrently with the parliamentary elections in 1993, the PC supported Catholic priest Eugenio Pizarro as their presidential candidate. Pizarro obtained 4.7% of the vote. In the 1996 municipal election, the PC obtained 5.9% and in the 1997 parliamentary elections, it got 7.5% of the vote. The PC, however, has not been able to convert some of the political and electoral success it has experienced in university student federations and labor union elections into electoral gains in national elections. PC candidates have won control of the University of Chile student federation for the past three consecutive years and a PC member was recently elected president of the National Workers Union (CUT). Yet, the PC electoral weight has remained below 10% in all the elections since 1992.

Conclusions

Higher levels of turnout in Chile were always associated with a strong left. The more people voted, the more likely the left was to win. The demise of the electoral power of conservative parties in Chile is a direct result of the increase in the number of enfranchised voters up to 1973. However, turnout is a rational action on the part of individuals. People will vote only if they believe their vote will have a positive effect on their lives (or in game theoretic terms, if voting will result in more benefits than costs in their utility maximizing strategy). Not surprisingly, turnout among registered voters declined from 1988 until 1997 but it increased in 1999.

Disenchantment with the democratic consolidation and structural disincentives resulting from the electoral law have a negative influence on turnout and enfranchisement. When measured as a percentage of eligible voters, the participation level in elections today in Chile are

dismal. Turnout has fallen in every national election in Chile since 1988 until 1997. Turnout increased in the 1999 presidential election as a proportion of registered voters, but it fell compared to the 1993 presidential election. Turnout among registered voters in the 1997 parliamentary election was lower than that of 1964. In the 1996 Municipal elections, higher levels of participation favored conservative parties, the PDC and PPD. In the left, the PPD is better positioned than either the PS or the PC to benefit from higher levels of electoral participation. If the historic relationship between turnout and electoral strength of the left is to reemerge, the PPD will most likely be the party where those new voters go.

Table 1. Electoral Turnout in Chile 1870-1973 (in thousands)

Year	Total Population (1)	Voting Age Population (2)	Voters (3)	Voters as % of total population (4)=(3)/(1)	Voters as % of voting age population (5)=(3)/(2)
1870	1,943	919	31	1.6	3.3
1876	2,116	1,026	80	3.8	7.8
1885	2,507	1,180	79	3.1	6.7
1894	2,676	1,304	114	4.3	8.7
1915	3,530	1,738	150	4.2	8.6
1920	3,730	1,839	167	4.5	9.1
1932	4,425	2,287	343	7.8	15.0
1942	5,219	2,666	465	8.9	17.4
1952*	5,933	3,278	954	16.1	29.1
1958	7,851	3,654	1,236	15.7	33.8
1964	8,387	4,088	2,512	30.0	61.6
1970	9,504	5,202	2,923	30.8	56.2
1973	9,850	5,238	3,620	36.8	69.1

*=Women were enfranchised in 1948. From Meller (1996: 102) and Cruz Coke (1983)

Table 2. Electoral Strength of Right, Center and Left. 1958-73

Parliamentary Election	Rightist parties %	Centrist parties %	Leftist parties %
1912	75.6	16.6	0.0
1918	65.7	24.7	0.3
1921	54.6	30.4	1.4
1925	52.2	21.4	0.0
1932	32.7	18.2	5.7
1937	42.0	28.1	15.3
1941	31.2	32.1	28.5
1945	43.7	27.9	23.0
1949	42.0	46.7	9.4
1953	25.3	43.0	14.2
1957	33.0	44.3	10.7
1961	30.4	43.7	22.1
1965	12.5	49.0	29.4
1969	20.0	36.3	34.6
1973	24.8	29.1	44.8

From Meller (1996: 102) & Cruz Coke (1983).

Table 3. Electoral Turnout in Chile 1988-2000 (in thousands)

Year*	Voting Age Population (1)	Registered Population (2)	Voters (3)	Voters as % of voting age population (4)=(3)/(1)	Voters as % of registered population (5)=(3)/(2)
1988	8,062	7,436	7,251	89.9	96.6
1989	8,243	7,558	7,157	86.8	92.3
1992	8,775	n.d.	6,420	73.2	n.d.
1993	8,951	8,044	7,385	82.5	84.3
1996	9,464	8,073	6,944	73.4	76.6
1997	9,627	8,069	6,912	71.8	71.1
1999FR*	9,945	8,084	7,272	73.1	90.0
2000RO*	9,945	8,084	7,316	73.6	90.5

Only election years are considered; 1988= plebiscite; 1989, 1993= presidential and parliamentary; 1997= parliamentary; 1992, 1996= municipal elections. *=First Round and Run Off. From Navia (1998: 63)

Table 4. Null and Blank votes in Chile 1988-2000 (in thousands)

Year	Voting Age Population (1)	Valid Votes (2)	Null and Blank votes (3)	Absentee voters and unregistered population (4)	Valid votes as % of voting age population 5=(2)/(1)
1988	8,062	7,187	65	824	89.1
1989	8,243	6,974	183	1,163	84.6
1992	8,775	6,420	n.d.	n.d.	73.2
1993	8,951	6,784	601	1,540	75.8
1996	9,464	6,183	761	2,306	65.3
1997	9,627	5,733	1,178	2,513	59.6
1999FR	9,945	7,055	216	2,674	70.1
2000RO	9,945	7,169	148	2,628	72.1

Table 5. Electoral Results in 1993 and 1997 Parliamentary Elections in Chile.

Party	1993 elections	%	1997 elections	%	Net Difference
PDC	1,827,373	27.1	1,317,441	23.0	(509,932)
PS	803,719	11.9	636,357	11.1	(167,362)
PPD	798,206	11.8	719,575	12.6	(78,631)
PRSD	254,214	3.8	179,701	3.1	(74,513)
Ind Concert	49,764	0.7	45,288	0.8	(4,476)
RN	1,098,852	16.3	962,247	16.8	(136,605)
UDI	816,104	12.1	827,324	14.5	11,220
Ind. Unión	337,506	5.0	287,871	5.0	(49,635)
UCCP	216,639	3.2	112,587	2.0	(104,052)
PC	430,495	6.4	428,838	7.5	(1,657)
PH	96,195	1.4	166,569	2.9	70,374
Independents	7,104	0.1	39,916	0.7	32,812
Total	6,736,171	100	5,723,714	100	(1,012,457)

Concertación: (PDC=Christian Democratic Party; PS=Socialist Party; PPD=Party for Democracy; PRSD=Radical Social Democratic Party; *Concertación* Independents). *Unión* (Union for Chile's Progress): (RN=National Renovation; UDI=Independent Democratic Union; *Unión* Independents) UCCP=Progressive Center-Center Union. PC=Communist Party. PH=Green Humanist Alliance.
From: Navia (1998a: 71).

Table 6. Electoral Results in 1992 and 1996 Municipal Elections in Chile.

Party	1992 election	%	1996 election	%	Net Difference
PDC	1,857,660	28.9	1,608,428	26.0	(249,232)
PS	549,293	8.6	654,925	10.6	105,632
PPD	590,535	9.2	726,036	11.8	135,501
PRSD	344,771	5.3	402,406	6.5	57,635
Ind Concert	31,081	0.5	72,534	1.2	41,453
RN	863,230	13.5	844,088	13.7	(19,142)
UDI	653,542	10.2	206,877	3.4	(446,665)
Ind. Unión	402,604	6.3	956,381	15.5	553,777
UCCP	519,724	8.1	172,502	2.8	(347,222)
PC	420,202	6.6	354,814	5.9	(65,388)
PH	52,467	0.8	98,180	1.6	45,713
Independents	137,448	2.1	70,656	1.2	(66,792)
Total	6,419,457	100	6,176,827	100	(242,630)

Concertación: (PDC=Christian Democratic Party; PS=Socialist Party; PPD=Party for Democracy; PRSD=Radical Social Democratic Party; *Concertación* Independents). *Unión* (Union for Chile's Progress): (RN=National Renovation; UDI=Independent Democratic Union; *Unión* Independents) UCCP=Progressive Center-Center Union. PC=Communist Party. PH=Green Humanist Alliance.
From: <http://www.elecciones.gov.cl/RESULTADOS/>

Table 7. Weighted Least Squares (WLS) Regression of Independent Variables and Turnout on the vote for different Parties in Chile. Parliamentary elections, 1997.

Variable	<i>Unión</i>	PDC	PPD	PS	MIDA
Constant	-19.7 (15.024)	7.28 (23.2)	6.19 (148.23)	-56.75 (145.75)	74.24 (121.153)
Turnout	0.30** (0.035)	0.27** (0.054)	0.74** (0.347)	0.06 (0.341)	0.48* (0.284)
Sewerage	-0.32** (0.135)	-0.02 (0.209)	2.15 (1.336)	1.60 (1.313)	-0.34 (1.092)
Service Sector	0.65** (0.191)	0.11 (0.296)	-2.97 (1.890)	0.121 (1.858)	-2.05 (1.544)
Agricultural Sector	0.34** (0.149)	-0.12 (0.230)	-0.22 (1.469)	-1.06 (1.444)	-2.96** (1.200)
Low Schooling	0.36** (0.142)	-0.12 (0.219)	-0.07 (1.402)	-2.64* (1.378)	0.89 (1.146)
Poverty Level	-0.38* (0.22)	-0.001 (0.344)	-5.25** (2.202)	2.03 (2.166)	2.276 (1.800)
R2	0.26	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.05
Adjusted R2	0.24	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05
Durbin-Watson	1.85	2.05	1.85	2.15	1.65
Log-Likelihood	-1,631.6	-1,740.1	-2,355.5	-2,346.0	-2,283.0
N (municipalities)	325	325	325	325	325



** Significant at 0.05; * Significant at 0.1;

Because WLS is simpler and more intuitively powerful estimator than MLE, I report WLS rather than MLE results. Both equations present very similar coefficients and standard errors.

Unión=National Renovation and Independent Democratic Union, pro-Pinochet, rightist parties; Concertación: PDC=Christian Democratic Party; PPD=Party for Democracy; PS=Socialist; MIDA=Communist Party and allies. All municipal level 1992 census data from www.interior.gov.cl

Turnout measured as % of registered voters. Sewerage: % of households with access to sewerage; Service sector: % of labor force in services; Agricultural sector: % of labor force in agriculture; Low Schooling: % of adults with little school instruction. Poverty level: % of population living under poverty level.

All 1996 municipal election data from www.interior.gov.cl



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