Protest and Collaboration:
Transnational Civil Society Networks
and the Politics of Summitry and Free Trade in the Americas

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Introduction

This paper examines the politics of hemispheric integration exemplified by the Summits of the Americas held in Miami (1994), Santiago (1998), and Québec (2001) and the negotiations over the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Our basic premise is that political and institutional arrangements articulating state, society, and economy in Latin America are currently in the midst of a process of reconfiguration unleashed by the acceleration of globalization and attendant crises of state-centered development strategies. More specifically, we believe the Americas are witnessing the emergence of an ensemble of new social and political actors, among the most salient of which are new social movements and civil society organizations (CSOs), organized in networks operating at the domestic, regional, and global levels.¹

Manifold processes of globalization of production, trade, and finance in the post-Bretton Woods era have been accompanied by shifting patterns of representation within civil society. Labor unions, social movements, international NGOs, transnational issue and advocacy networks, and related actors have responded to globalization by pursuing -- sometimes simultaneously, sometimes sequentially -- a broad range of strategies: from collaboration and participation within existing institutional arrangements, to contestation, opposition, and
confrontation with what are perceived to be the driving forces of globalization. The global expansion of markets is thus accompanied, in what Polanyi (1957) would identify as a “double movement,” by social pressures for regulating and governing those very same markets. In a process organized “from above,” world elites and policy-making bureaucracies seek to address these pressures and continue advancing the expansion of markets through what has become a non-stop series of bilateral meetings and formal multilateral summits, as well as “private” encounters and forums designed to construct new institutional arrangements. Simultaneously, organizations of civil society seek to shape and transform these arrangements “from below.”

The negotiations encompassing the Summit of the Americas (SOA) and the FTAA can best be understood as specific manifestations at the regional level of these broader transformations in world politics and the world-economy. Consequently, the SOA and FTAA negotiations provide privileged vantage points for analysis of the emergence of transnational social subjects and new, *sui generis* modes of social and political relations constituting civil society in the Americas.

After briefly sketching out these broad arguments, the paper addresses five sets of questions regarding regional networks and their strategies vis-à-vis the Summits of the Americas and the Free Trade Area of the Americas:

- What are the *main organizations* constituting key regional networks?
- What *linkages* have the networks established with national governments? With supranational organizations? With other important social actors operating at the national and regional levels?
- What have been the principal *strategies* of “insider” and “outsider” networks and organizations? How can one characterize the *strategic relationships* among the different networks?
• Is there a trend toward greater polarization or growing convergence between these two “branches” of the CSO movement?

• How successful have the CSO regional networks been in achieving their own goals? How successful have they been in shaping the agenda of national governments and international organizations with respect to summitry and FTAA negotiations?

**Global Civil Society, States, and Networks**

Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods international monetary system, the erosion of the compromises underlying the Keynesian welfare state in high-income nations, and the crisis in the 1980s of state-led development models in peripheral and semiperipheral countries (Ruggie 1982; Cox 1987) have given rise to what some analysts have termed a new international “non-system” (Gilpin 2000). The vertiginous acceleration of all forms of globalization, including not only trade, production, and finance but also ideas, norms, culture, and forms of intersubjectivity, has laid bare a crisis of “global governance” with new imperatives for consensus formation and international coordination (Cerny 1995; Prakash and Hart 1999). These exigencies, in turn, have given rise not only to a more vigorous role for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, two pillars of the previous Bretton Woods system, but also to greater prominence of organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now superseded by the WTO, as well as to a semi-institutionalized system of presidential summits, most notably the G-7 meetings of the leaders of the advanced industrialized countries. (The G-7 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.)

This “globalization from above,” spearheaded by the governments of high-income nations, and implemented through the IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the WTO has largely responded to the agenda advanced by transnational financial and business interests and has also sought out non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as representatives of civil society in an effort to find interlocutors with whom globalizing elites can negotiate the terms of a sustainable process of global development.  

By contrast, the United Nations has been more active and more open in its efforts to create global constituencies able to address a broad range of issues, ranging from global warming and the environment, promoting human rights, banning land mines, expanding gender and sexual rights, and so on (Nelson 1995 and 1996; Otto 1996). While not necessarily the UN’s stated objective, this process has provided new incentives for the emergence of new organizations and networks seeking to represent “global civil society.” These new instances of representation perceive themselves to constitute “a parallel arrangement of political interaction…focused on the self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge and action, by decentralized local actors that cross the reified boundaries of space as though they were not there” (Lipschutz 1992, 390).  


Many of the NGOs, INGOs, and TANs that have participated in the UN-sponsored world
summits have also engaged multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF (for example, the “Fifty Years is Enough” and the Jubilee 2000 campaigns) that promote the neoliberal agenda of deregulating domestic markets, promoting foreign investment, expanding free trade and market integration, and eliminating controls on international capital flows. In the process, these groups apply the skills and perspectives learned through their participation in the UN system, but at least some of them have shifted from an emphasis on supporting multilateralism and multilateral institutions toward more oppositional or confrontational strategies operating largely at the margin of existing institutional arrangements (Smith, Catfield, and Pagnucco 1997; O’Brien, et al. 2000; Wallach and Sforza 1999; Wallach 2000; Florini 2000; Martens 2000). Jackie Smith has observed that

As activists organized around global problems such as persistent poverty, violations of human rights, gender inequality, and environmental destruction, they learned about the UN system and global negotiating processes. They cultivated both global networks and skills that allowed them to better monitor the behavior of governments in international negotiations. After years of working to promote specific treaty regimes, many realized that broader structural factors—such as the overwhelming influence of the United States and the growing conflict between Northern and Southern governments—reduced the possibilities for UN negotiations to very limited agreements that did little to resolve the problems they addressed. Moreover, activists familiar with international legal developments could see quite clearly that the growing global trade regime meant that the goal of free trade took precedence over other international agreements, by, for instance characterizing social and environmental regulations as WTO-illegal “technical barriers to
Their disenchantment with the meager results of petitioning national governments and working for change through established international institutions led some global social movements and advocacy networks to embrace a “new left internationalism” expressed through “transnational communities of resistance” (Drainville 1995 and 2001). The political practice of these groups, expressed in the slogan “Wherever they meet, we’ll be there” to mobilize opposition, converts the places where the summits are held and globalizing elites gather into “world-wide grids of strategic places” (Sassen 1998, quoted by Drainville 2001, 16). These oppositional groups, though tied to particular issues, often dismissed for what Antonio Gramsci would have called their ‘economico-corporatist’ consciousness and for their inability to tell us ‘what we are fighting for’ and what ‘we care about’ [...], less about politics than strategy, and certainly lacking from the point of view of programmatic coherence, transnational campaigns may nonetheless be having a structuring impact on the world economy as a field of practice. Dragging context and politics with them, at once global and radically grounded, transnational communities of resistance may be transforming the world economy into a significant milieu, where ideas and modes of organization as well as ways of life and struggle acquire a life that is relatively autonomous from individual agency. Charged by contextualized struggles, the world economy may be becoming a conductor, or even catalysis, of politics (Drainville 2001, 13).
In the case of the SOA and the FTAA, the transnational issue and advocacy networks we analyze express a full range of strategic postures, including cooperation and participation as well as rejection of institutionalized channels of participation in favor of more militant modes of contestation. In all instances, but particularly in the case of the more oppositionist groups, these networks are perceived as comprising a shifting array of relevant actors working internationally who are bound by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Many argue that these regional networks—like the grassroots movements and local and national networks in which they are embedded—represent organizational forms that are distinct from either markets or bureaucratic hierarchies, and that these networks are generally characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of exchange and communication (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The potential transformative capabilities of these regional networks arise from their capacity to use their assets to advantage in the politics of information, symbols, leverage, and accountability. “Networked” actors and social movements constitute central components of emergent political constellations (encompassing both older state and societal actors as well as a variety of public and private supranational organizations) that are playing a crucial, albeit still inchoate, role in shaping political and policy debates about hemispheric integration in the Americas.

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue that transnational advocacy networks affect state behavior by acting simultaneously as principled and strategic actors that

‘frame’ issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and encourage action, and to ‘fit’ with favorable institutional venues. Network actors bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into policy debates and serve as sources of information
and testimony. . . . They also promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards . . . they seek to maximize their influence or leverage over the target of their actions. In doing so they contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behavior (1998, 2-3).

These capacities to frame issues have been put to the test in the SOA and FTAA processes, as have the efficacy of rival strategies of influence and leverage. In effect, although free trade was meant to be an integral part of the Summit of the Americas process, since 1994, the summit and trade negotiations have, in fact, crystallized a division of labor manifested in two parallel, though intertwined, tracks. These two tracks have given rise to quite distinct modes or trajectories of participation and contestation involving CSOs at the national, regional, and global levels. The SOA track has been managed primarily by the foreign ministries of the 34 participating governments. This track has focused on broad themes involving democratic governance and social issues such as gender equity, education, and judicial reform, as well as environmentally sustainable development.

As we shall see, many of the regional networks participating in the SOA track were originally brought into the process by various executive branch agencies of the U.S. government. This channel of participation created multiple spaces for government-civil society dialogue. Predictably, given that the U.S. government played a leading role in the summitry process, with their superior institutional resources, NGOs and CSOs based in the United States frequently took the lead in shaping these spaces for dialogue. Soon, however, northern CSOs began to create
and/or seek out broader hemispheric constituencies and partnerships with their Latin American counterparts, who also are interested in influencing the summit agenda.

As a consequence, for the SOA track, an ad hoc, open-ended process emerged alongside more formal structures of interaction, providing incentives for regional networks to form for the purpose of providing technical support and political inputs to governments and multilateral agencies such as the Organization of American States (OAS). Depending on the topic and political conjuncture, the SOA track has been characterized by some degree of transparency, consultation, and collaboration between regional networks and hemispheric governments.

In contrast with the SOA process, the FTAA track exhibits substantially different characteristics. Although trade and economic issues have figured prominently in the Miami, Santiago, and Québec summits’ agendas, from the very beginning, the FTAA negotiations proceeded along a very narrowly focused track in a highly centralized process largely monopolized by the Latin American ministries of trade and finance. This much more closed and largely opaque negotiating process has discouraged initiatives for greater civil society participation. In fact, even entrepreneurial interests have been only partially and sporadically allowed to participate in negotiations dominated by governmental officials. Not surprisingly, in this context, the FTAA track has been characterized by much more confrontational postures by CSO networks vis-à-vis official actors. In fact, in accordance with their programmatic agendas but also triggered by their exclusion from the negotiations, some CSO networks working on trade-related issues have sought to strengthen their ties with organized labor and grass-root constituencies so as to promote a broader anti-free trade strategy.

It is important at the outset to stress that the CSO networks tend to operate on one or the other of the two parallel tracks, and prior to the 1998 Santiago Summit were largely unaware of
each other. The networks interested in the FTAA negotiations have mobilized intensely around
the periodic meetings of trade ministers. Although placing little importance on the SOA process
per se, many of these FTAA-oriented networks have focused on the summits as opportunities for
intensive mobilization and denunciation of free trade and globalization. National organizations,
such as the Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio (Mexican Action Network on
Free Trade -- RMALC), or regional networks, such as the Alianza Social Continental
(Hemispheric Social Alliance -- ASC, usually referred to as the Alianza), adopt an oppositional
posture toward the official negotiating process, try to challenge perceived limits to participation
by mobilizing against the official process, and seek to develop alternative networks and alliances
outside the structures promoting hemispheric integration.

In contrast, although the networks focusing on summitry certainly advocate opening up
the FTAA process, they generally place a higher priority on questions of governance, the
environment, and social issues and, consequently, favor strategies designed to maximize their
influence vis-à-vis governments in hopes of helping to shape the broader agenda of hemispheric
integration. Organizations and networks such as Corporación PARTICIPA, the Esquel Group
Foundation, and the Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano (Foundation for the Latin American
Future -- FFL), use and seek to expand the opportunities for participation in the official
negotiating process, collaborate in this process by organizing policy-oriented research and
consultations, and have become formally incorporated into new networks and agencies linked to
the official presidential summitry process in the region.

Marisol Pagés, formerly with the Esquel Foundation, refers to the groups favoring
cooperation and participation as “insiders” and to those advocating more contestatory strategies
as “outsiders”: 
The ‘insiders’ are those that attempt to work closely with the official process, sometimes compromising their demands so as to make them more politically viable. The ‘outsiders’ are those that exercise external pressure, articulating their demands in a more explicit manner and often against governmental positions. Opening the process of the FTAA negotiations undoubtedly will require continuing of both kinds -- the ‘outsiders’ pressure and force openings or tendencies toward greater openness in the system, while the ‘insiders’ take advantage of these small opportunities -- to push issues toward greater substance (2000 172).

To anticipate the thrust of our argument, one of the fundamental differences between the programmatic positions and attendant strategies of the “insider” and the “outsider” networks is that although the former agree on the necessity of enhancing civil society participation in the FTAA process, their priority is elsewhere -- on creating a consensus on the importance of democratic governance and desirable social and environmental policies. The “insiders” thus believe in the eventual merger or unification of both tracks, but in the short- to medium-term are willing to subordinate economic issues to work toward strengthening civil society’s participation in official channels in order to influence governmental policies. The “outsiders,” in contrast, privilege the FTAA because they are convinced that trade and investment issues are the driving forces of hemispheric integration. From this perspective, other issues are at best a distraction, if not a deliberate effort to divert attention away from the “real” issues that are negotiated behind closed doors by political elites and transnational entrepreneurial interests. To a considerable extent, in other words, the “outsider” regional networks operating in the Americas have come to
display a number of the features common to the recent wave of anti free trade protests -- in
Seattle, Washington, D.C., Davos, Prague, and elsewhere -- against what they perceive as
predatory globalization advocated by unaccountable governments and transnational corporate
elites. The World Social Forum held in early 2001 in Porto Alegre, which was depicted by
organizers not as a protest but as an effort to propose alternatives, also points toward a
broadening of modalities of resistance to globalization.

Of course, whether an organization adopts one posture or the other is not always easy to
ascertain. What is perceived as participation by some may be construed as contestation by others,
and organizations may shift their strategies over time or even simultaneously seek to implement
both strategies. Also, the organizations and networks in question often perceive their own
orientation as straddling both “insider” and “outsider” strategies. For example, participants in an
“insider” organization might perceive their group as maintaining an autonomous identity, distinct
from official mainstream agencies and dedicated to contesting limits of participation by
expanding the opportunities for more effective civil society participation. Conversely,
participants in “outsider” organizations often portray their strategies not merely as efforts to
block official initiatives but as designed to construct more meaningful channels of participation.
In effect, many “outsiders” have sought to participate in consultations at the national level and
have consistently sought what they consider “meaningful” consultations at multilateral meetings.
In this sense, the organizations and networks in question might reject the label of “insiders” and
“outsiders” as being too schematic a characterization of their overall strategy.

The boundaries are also blurred depending on the particular universe of organizations
and networks observed for comparison. For example, in the context of the process of
hemispheric integration, some networks (such as the Alianza Social Continental) appear to be
“outsiders” when compared with organizations that have chosen to participate more actively in the official opportunities provided for civil society participation. However, the same networks might be branded as “insiders” by groups (such as anarchist activists) advocating a more radical and open confrontation with the agencies and actors promoting hemispheric integration.

In short, the labels of “outsiders” and “insiders” refer to a spectrum of positions on strategic choices regarding the extent to which organizations and networks should make use of -- or seek to subvert and transform -- the rules and procedures characterizing existing institutional arrangements. At one end of the spectrum, organizations and networks function within established rules and procedures. At the other end of the spectrum, organizations and networks reject established rules and procedures. In fact, few organizations and networks can be found at either end of the spectrum, as most adopt practices that seek simultaneously to use and to transform existing arrangements. Also, some organizations and networks begin in one equilibrium between the two polar strategies, but later the dynamics of their own practice impel them toward a different equilibrium. Hence, “social movements and collective actors are not always neat, rational, and unitary: rather, they contain and express a multiplicity of meanings, varying according to context and historical conjuncture” (Jelin 1997, 80).

Organizations and networks also differ in the extent to which they adopt a formalized system of internal administration. In part, the adoption of formal rules by an organization generally develops in response to the need for greater and/or more precise coordination of the tasks performed. For example, networks that originally are informally set up among the organizations of different countries might eventually find a need to establish more clearly the rules and procedures through which decisions are made. Furthermore, these efforts often dovetail with efforts to acquire greater efficiency in pursuing objectives by developing a more detailed
division of labor within the organization, frequently leading to the emergence of a more specialized administrative structure. All these internal dynamics are likely to promote greater bureaucratization within civil society networks and organizations.

From the point of view of the ability to attain goals, such an organizational development is not necessarily a negative development. On the contrary, as indicated by Max Weber, the adoption of bureaucratic procedures can allow for a higher degree of efficiency, as such a mode of administrative organization

...is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks (1978, 223).

Of course, despite this “intensive efficiency,” the adoption of such bureaucratic procedures by some networks and organization generally entails a tradeoff involving a perceived loss of many traits that accompany informality, such as closer, more direct and less hierarchical relations between the leadership and members, a more “mobilizational” quality to the orientation of the organization, and so forth.

But beyond the internal dynamics of these organizations, bureaucratization also becomes driven by efforts to influence and shape existing institutional arrangements. Of course, these institutional arrangements themselves are characterized by a high degree of bureaucratization that revolves around the constitution of very specialized and technical fields of knowledge. Civil
society organizations and networks seeking to influence these institutional arrangements find themselves “forced” to adopt compatible forms of operation (for example, by becoming versed in the specialized knowledge that governs prevailing bureaucratic structures). In this sense, as indicated by Weber, “When those subject to bureaucratic control seek to escape the influence of the existing bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible only by creating an organization of their own which is equally subject to bureaucratization” (1978, 224). Bureaucratization, from this point of view, becomes very much implicit in the very effort to transform existing fields of power.

Analyses of global civil society frequently ignore or downplay the role of states and international organizations in the formation of transnational actors, such as the regional networks active in summity and the FTAA negotiations. This is a mistake. States and domestic institutional arrangements are crucial to understanding how actors desiring to function across borders are able to form and sometimes to achieve access to decision-making processes of governments and to influence international negotiations. In fact, transnational networks might be most likely to emerge when states have an incentive to delegate limited authority to societal groups or when states have an incentive to encourage NGOs, INGOS, and TANs to engage in a degree of self-regulation with regard to specific domains of policy innovation and implementation.

Delegation and self-regulation are particularly relevant to the operation of “insider” networks that possess certain specific expertise or specialized knowledge that facilitates the creation of focal points for resolving coordination problems arising from the involvement of multiple governmental and societal actors located in many countries. Rather than states attempting to resolve certain issues directly, if political leaders believe that transnational societal actors can
provide more efficient or more effective solutions or can play a useful role in implementing or monitoring politically sensitive policies, it makes more sense for them to assume the costs of organizing and funding the transnational actors in question. Thus, rather than assuming an inevitable conflict between states and transnational actors, state policies could actually promote the formation of INGOs and advocacy networks by helping them to overcome their collective action problems. Moreover, in the process, states could grant them limited participation in decision-making arenas.

In the case of “outsider” groups, the same rationale applies but with a difference. States’ blockage of domestic access plays a crucial role in stimulating some actors to turn to collective action. States generally do not intentionally grant access to opposition groups, but by closing or curtailing these groups’ access to decision-making arenas, state elites may inadvertently compel some local organizations to seek out external allies, with whom they form transborder coalitions. Obviously, local actors who agree with government policies will have little incentive to organize or to seek external allies. In contrast, those actors deprived of local access are more likely resort to international pressure to attempt to forces states to change their policies. Moreover, those local actors whose interests, views, and policy preferences sharply clash with those of the dominant public and private policy elites will have the greatest incentive to form coalitions with like-minded groups in other countries. However, domestic exclusion of opposition groups that gives rise to transnational coalitions may indirectly force states to grant local actors greater access to international negotiations (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Pratt 2001).

With these minimum considerations in mind, we can turn to the analysis of the organizations that act both as nodal points for the constitution of formal and informal networks and as constituent parts of broader “insider” and “outsider” networks.
The “Insider” Organizations and Networks

Some of the organizations involved in hemispheric negotiations are long established and simply decided to make the summits an important part of their concerns by creating new channels or taking advantage of existing channels of dialogue with hemispheric governments. Their operation thus exemplifies the twin logics of delegation and self-regulation referred to above. This process has been spearheaded by various institutions that have played roles in the implementation of the civil society mandates of the 1994 Miami Summit. These organizations worked in close coordination with members of the “Troika,” comprised of the Civil Society Task Force, the Summit Follow-Up Office of the OAS, and the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG).

The Esquel Group Foundation (EGF) was founded in 1986 as the U.S.-based member of the Grupo Esquel Network (composed of independent, nonprofit, professional CSOs promoting sustainable and equitable development in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay). Esquel became involved in the summit process very early on as one of the original invitees to join the advisory group created by USAID and the U.S. Department of State to draft a proposal for the Miami Summit. In relation to the summitry process, the EGF has sought to promote civic engagement and enhance democracy. For EGF, the principal effort has been to establish “solid and effective mechanisms of participation” as a vital component of the summitry process (Pagés 2000). At the invitation of USAID, Esquel briefly played a role (see below) in attempting to promote civil society participation in the FTAA negotiations.

The North-South Center at the University of Miami is an independent public policy
studies center with funding by the U.S. government, multilateral institutions, and the private sector. The Center has consistently promoted the expansion of civil society participation in the summitry process. The Center focuses on a variety of issues central to U.S.-Latin American relations, including democratic governance, trade and economic policy, migration, the environment and sustainable development, and information technology. A key aspect of the Center’s mission is to engage government, business, and opinion leaders through its research, publications, and public diplomacy activities. Since 1994, the Center has played a role in promoting summitry. Its most recent initiative in this area (see below) is the Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry, created to track progress toward the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas and related projects of hemispheric cooperation.

The Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) is an independent, non-governmental organization financed by the Canadian government, multilateral agencies, and the private sector. FOCAL’S mission is to strengthen Canada’s relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean through policy discussion and analysis. Issues relating to governance and human security, social policies, and economic integration represent FOCAL’s core policy concerns. FOCAL monitors critical developments in the Americas through conferences and workshops designed to promote innovative policy options, calling them to the attention of governments, international organizations, the private sector, the non-governmental community, and the media. FOCAL assumed a strong leadership role in planning civil society participation in the 2001 Québec Summit.

Corporación PARTICIPA is a Chilean organization that seeks to deepen democratic values and procedures so as to promote “a form of social organization based upon the development of a strong, organized, and expressive citizenship” to promote greater social justice
and greater equality of opportunities (Corporación PARTICIPA 2000, 4). Like Esquel, PARTICIPA received USAID funding in preparation for the Santiago Summit and worked with the Chilean Foreign Ministry and the official summit offices to coordinate a consultation process with civil society organizations and, subsequently, carry out follow-up consultations in preparation for the Québec Summit in 2001.

Several other organizations also played key roles at various moments in the summitry process:

Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano (FFL) was created in Ecuador in 1993 as a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting sustainable development by enhancing “a participatory decision-making process” (FFL 1995, 367). The high point of the Fundación’s participation occurred in the preparation for the Summit on the Environment and Sustainable Development, held in 1996 in Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

The Inter-American Dialogue, founded in 1982, is a prominent, nonpartisan center for policy analysis based in Washington, D.C. The Dialogue’s membership consists of 100 leaders from throughout the Americas, including former presidents and cabinet level officials, as well as business, academic, and non-governmental leaders. The Dialogue has carried out a number of activities related to the summit, particularly in relation to social equity and education through the Partnership for Educational Revitalization in the Americas (PREAL). Through its Task Force on Multilateral Governance, the Dialogue has focused on institutionalizing mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation, working with the Organization of American States and the presidential summits. The Dialogue also launched a network on gender, the Women’s Leadership Council of the Americas, first convened in 2000. The origins of the Dialogue’s work in both areas date from the recommendations made by an advisory committee to USAID that also
created the Civil Society Task Force (CSTF) in 1993 prior to the Miami Summit.

With a clearer picture of some of the most important “insider” organizations, we can now return to previous observations regarding the importance of state actions in the formation of societal actors to understand the encouragement and financial support that many of these “insider” organizations have received from multilateral organizations and national government agencies. Exemplifying the incentives of states to engage in delegation, it is particularly notable that U.S. government agencies such as USAID and the National Security Council (operating out of the White House) were active in encouraging civil society participation in the first summit. The Canadian government has also played a significant funding role in support of collaborative civil society endeavors.\(^{11}\)

Clearly, the purpose of governmental support of CSOs has been to take advantage of the expertise and specialized knowledge and contacts they have that state agencies typically lack. Another goal has been to energize pro-integration constituencies in the region and to enhance the ability of the more moderate CSOs to respond to multilateral initiatives promoting the SOA and FTAA negotiations. Incentives to engage actors via self-regulation in politically sensitive or controversial tasks such as monitoring and implementation are also evident in the activities of the organizations examined. In this regard, state support for the “insider” organizations has had the effect of promoting civil society actors that broadly share common priorities and objectives with governments and thus are likely to act as stakeholders with an interest in the success of the policies “and a clear sense of shared responsibility for the results.”\(^{12}\)

Since directly encouraging CSO participation could be perceived as an infringement on national sovereignty, however, the U.S. and Canadian governments have favored indirect mechanisms (such as relying on U.S. or Canadian organizations) to promote civil society
participation (Thorup 1995, xix). Indirect means of helping to overcome collective action and resource problems are reflected in the incorporation of several of the “insider” organizations into new networks linked to the official summit organizers. For example, the Civil Society Task Force, mentioned above, created in 1993 by USAID to promote participation in the summit process and coordinated by Esquel since 1996, has sought to function “as a clearinghouse as well as a vehicle to coordinate civil society input and monitoring action” on the summits (Esquel Group Foundation 1999a, 386). Over 400 groups have participated in this network, including “representatives from U.S. and international non-governmental organizations (CSOs), government agencies, multilateral institutions, foundations, academia, the media, and private for-profit organizations” (EGF 1999b, 1; Daubon and Pagés 1998).

Similarly, beginning in 1995, Partners for the Americas received the first of two five-year grants (a second began in November 2000) from USAID to fund the Red Interamericana para la Democracia, a network that includes the Asociación Conciencia (Argentina); the Fundación Poder Ciudadano (Argentina); the Corporación PARTICIPA (Chile); the Fundación BOLINVEST (Bolivia); the Departamento de Ciencias Políticas of the Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); the Instituto de Investigación y Autoformación Política (Guatemala); the Centro de Capacitación para el Desarrollo (Costa Rica); and the Compañeros de las Américas (USA) (Guiñazú 2000, 6; Citizen Participation 1999).

Another more recent network is the Citizen Participation: From the Santiago Summit to the Canada Summit project that brought FOCAL, Esquel, and Corporación PARTICIPA together in an “alliance” to develop greater citizen participation in the process leading to the April 2001 Québec Summit. Leaving aside the FTAA, this project focused exclusively on the SOA process. Its purpose was to coordinate the activities of the organizations so as to promote constructive
dialogue and collaboration between governmental and non-governmental sectors in each country to foster implementation of summit mandates, increase awareness about the summit process within the governmental and non-governmental sectors of the countries of the region, and promote enhanced information exchange between civil society and summit officials at the hemispheric level to advance effective participation of civil society in the process leading to the Canadian Summit.13

In pursuit of these objectives, in 1998 the Citizen Participation project initiated an evaluation of the implementation of the civil society mandates of the Santiago Plan of Action.14 This project also received financing to create a web page designed to promote dialogue between civil society organizations and governments and undertook the coordination of a series of national consultations that would culminate in a hemispheric meeting funded by the IDB, the Agencia de Cooperación y Desarrollo Internacional (ACDI), and the Ford Foundation (Corporación PARTICIPA 2000, 2). Results of this project are discussed below.

The Leadership Council for Inter-American Summity, created in 1997 by the North-South Center, represents another key initiative along similar lines, albeit on a more modest scale, in collaboration with the Institute for International Economics (IIE), University of California, San Diego, and FOCAL. Financed primarily by foundation grants and private sector resources, the Leadership Council operates as an “independent, non-partisan initiative composed of citizens from throughout the Americas working in private business, legislatures, academia, public policy institutes, the scientific community, and other civic organizations” (Leadership Council for Inter-American Summity 1999a, 131). Among other things, this group seeks to provide the SOA with an institutional memory. In this regard, the Leadership Council’s work underscores one of the motives leading governments to delegate authority to societal actors, namely to provide
coordination on politically sensitive subjects related to the delicate task of building consensus on controversial issues and the monitoring of government's implementation of policies set forth at the summits. Although certainly committed to promoting the role civil society as a core aspect of democratic governance, the Leadership Council’s reports discuss civil society participation primarily as a necessity to help make the FTAA negotiations political viable, while giving somewhat less emphasis to such participation as something valuable on its own merits.15

The Inter-American Strategy for Public Participation (ISP), developed by the OAS, is another recent example of a networked arena. The initial recommendation for the development of this project emerged from a conference on civil society participation organized by the CSTF prior to the Bolivia Summit on sustainable development (Esquel Group Foundation 1999a, 386). The recommendation was endorsed in the Declaration of Santa Cruz, whose Plan of Action instructed the OAS to formulate “an inter-American strategy for the promotion of public participation in decision-making for sustainable development” (Organization of American States 2000a, 15).

The OAS’s Unit for Sustainable Development and Environment headed the effort to develop the ISP by creating two spaces for the participation of organizations. The first consisted of a Technical Group that included NGOs and advised the director of the relevant unit within the OAS. The Technical Group, according to one observer, served as “an unpaid kitchen cabinet to the OAS staff person responsible for the project” (Seymoar 1999, 405). The second consisted of a Project Advisory Committee (PAC) that comprised seven members “chosen from among the ISP National Focal Points, and designated at the first meeting of the National Focal Points [after being] identified and selected by their peers in Latin America and the Caribbean” (OAS 2000b, 2). Among the members of the PAC were representatives from organizations such as FOCAL,
the North-South Center, the Esquel Group Foundation, and Corporación PARTICIPA.

The experience of the Inter-American Strategy for Public Participation underscores the difficulties in promoting civil society participation in the more conflictive areas -- such as the environment and sustainable development—that involve potentially significant distributional issues as well as quality of life questions. The Bolivia meeting was part of the official summitry process, but sustainable development issues were clearly placed on a separate track. Originally this was supposed to give environmental issues a higher profile, and to give the recommendations and proposals emerging from Santa Cruz greater urgency. However, the low priority given to the Santa Cruz meeting and the facts that it was not well linked to the subsequent summit process and its Plan of Action was not taken up by the SIRG, were all seen by many observers as proving the “outsider” CSOs correct in their charge that the official process was biased and designed deliberately to divorce social issues (such as environmental and labor concerns) from the FTAA negotiations.

The failure of the Santa Cruz Summit was mirrored by the ongoing frustrations surrounding the FTAA negotiations. In fact, the relative success of the “insider” organizations regarding hemispheric summitry stands in stark contrast to their failure to gain access to and influence in the FTAA negotiations. Efforts to promote civil society participation in the trade agenda began with the creation of a Committee of Government Representatives on Civil Society at the 1998 San José trade ministerial meeting with a mandate to invite CSOs to offer their recommendations for expanding participation in the FTAA process. This was primarily a U.S. initiative, motivated by concern over the meager number of submissions from CSOs. The U.S. representative sought to encourage U.S. CSOs to become more actively involved and to make recommendations regarding the role and format of civil society participation in the FTAA
process in preparation for the Toronto meeting scheduled for 1999. In response, the Esquel Group Foundation was invited in 1998 to assume the coordination of a Working Group on Participation in the FTAA (Pagés 2000).

The Esquel-led Grupo de Trabajo succeeded in bringing the U.S. negotiator for civil society in the FTAA together with a diverse group of 20 to 25 CSOs, including some of the “outsider” groups (for example, the National Wildlife Federation, Women’s Edge, and some research and advocacy groups such as the Development Gap), to hammer out a broad consensus on a number of proposals and recommendations. However, the U.S. representative, perhaps concerned that these proposals represented just the tip of an iceberg, did not advance the recommendations with any enthusiasm, and, not surprisingly, the FTAA committee charged with promoting civil society participation failed to adopt any of them. This rejection was seen by the more confrontational “outsiders” as well as by a number of the more moderate “insiders” as proof that it was useless to participate in the official channels set up for this purpose. The rejection also confirmed the view of some critics that the “insiders” had no power, little autonomy, and were hardly more than agents of their home country governments. In any case, the fact that the FTAA’s civil society committee’s final report contained none of the substantive recommendations forward by the CSOs was seen by both “insiders” and “outsiders” as a slap in the face.¹⁸

After the ministerial meeting in Toronto in 1999 and the failure of the initial cycle of consultations, the FTAA’s committee on civil society participation resolved to initiate a second round of consultations. However, when the U.S. Department of State once again approached Esquel to coordinate the process, its invitation was met with a flat refusal and strong criticism of the limitations of the consultation process. Subsequently, Corporación PARTICIPA received a
USAID grant to run a website similar to the one it had organized to receive civil society input on the summit track (Pagés 2001).

This failure is consistent with rationalist arguments about state incentives to grant transnational actors access to decision-making processes in search of expertise and monitoring of policy implementation. However, in contrast to the summit issues, conducive to delegation and self-regulation, trade negotiations involve matters about which government negotiators believe they already possess sufficient expert knowledge and thus have no need for outside expertise. Moreover, rather than transparency and access to decisionmaking, in trade negotiations secrecy is a top priority due to the procedures used to try to gain a gradual consensus among interested (and often contending) parties. In addition, in contrast with summit issues such as democracy promotion, state reform, gender equity, education, and so on, trade negotiations on issues such as intellectual property, foreign investment, tariff reduction, and the like are fundamentally different in another crucial aspect -- they have strong distributional consequences with clear winners and losers -- with significant externalities for third parties (governments, firms, and social groups in general). Under these circumstances, delegation and self-regulation become less likely, the relevant actors face significant obstacles to forming transnational coalitions, and such actors tend not to be granted access to and influence in key decision-making arenas. Symmetrically, denial of access to information and decision-making arenas are likely to generate greater efforts by the relevant actors to strengthen ties with external allies with similar goals and objectives (Pratt 2001).

Transnational business networks and their role in hemispheric integration are not the focus of our analysis. Nevertheless, a quick examination of some of the networks representing business interests in the region is useful and reinforces our argument regarding the role of states
and domestic institutional arrangements. For example, the Miami Summit received extensive input and documents from a variety of groups, including the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America (representing 16,500 companies and individuals in the region); the Hemispheric Entrepreneurial Leadership Summit, hosted by the Cámara de Comercio Latina de Estados Unidos (Latin American Chamber of Commerce of the United States -- CAMACOL), bringing together chambers of 20 countries in the Americas; and from the Columbus Group, an association of Latin American and Latin European (principally Spanish) businesspeople. These efforts were complemented by efforts spearheaded by the Council of Americas (which comprises 240 of the largest U.S. transnational corporations) to form the Americas Business Forum (Foro Empresario de la Américas -- ABF/Foro/Forum). The Foro, which first met in conjunction with the 1995 Denver trade ministerial meeting, was accorded official status at the 1996 trade ministerial held in Cartagena, Colombia.²⁰ These groups enthusiastically support the idea of free trade in the Americas and generally reject the incorporation into the agenda of core labor and environmental issues.²¹ These positions are, of course, in basic accord with those of the governments of the region. Hence, while entrepreneurial and financial interests are intensely interested in the details of an eventual free trade regime, they have little incentive to engage in extensive political mobilization on behalf of free trade. Hence, their general posture has been limited to seeking information and providing general support for the FTAA, while expressing virtually no interest in the broader issues of democracy, education, and equity, all of which are at the heart of the SOA process.

The “Outsider” Organizations and Networks
The origins of the “outsider” networks are rooted in the widespread popular opposition that emerged in the early 1990s in Mexico, Canada, and the United States to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Domestic opponents among organized labor, environmentalists, human rights activists, and other groups soon established linkages with like-minded groups in the other countries and began to build transnational coalitions in opposition to the integration of North America into a single economic zone.\(^{22}\) Opposition to free trade experienced another spurt of growth in reaction to the 1994 Miami Summit’s launching of the FTAA negotiations. In examining these groups, our analysis will focus on the Alianza Social Continental, the most interesting and significant of the CSO networks currently operating on a regional level.

The Alianza is a broad and heterogeneous network of coalitions of citizen groups and labor organizations claiming to represent more than 45 million people throughout the Americas. The Alianza consists of a stable core group of well-organized affiliated organizations and a much larger array of peripheral organizations whose participation in the network is less intense and more sporadic. Officially founded in 1999, the Alianza first appeared informally in 1997, and a number of the national organizations that would be part of the Alianza network were already active much earlier, even before the Miami Summit in 1994. In the post-Miami mobilizations, some of these organizations served as nodal points for the articulation of a broad gamut of informal and formal regional networks of “outsider” civil society groups.

The level of complexity among the “outsider” groups in the Alianza defies any categorization. In fact, the “outsiders” within the Alianza or allied with it really are divided into two segments. Some “rejectionist” elements do not want any form of engagement in the summit and FTAA process. Others in the Alianza originally pursued engagement and have made a point of proposing very detailed demands, hoping to establish a fruitful dialogue.\(^{23}\)
The distinction between moderates and rejectionists became progressively blurred following the “Battle of Seattle” in 1999, when the “Nader people,” led by Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch (Wallach and Sforza 1999; Wallach 2000), adopted a posture of strident, across-the-board opposition to globalization and integration efforts. At this time, the influence of this “rejectionist” posture extends well beyond the Global Trade Watch network and the Americas, as their links are worldwide in scope (Jay 2001b).

The differences between the two different “outsider” segments are linked to the politics of the trade union movement. From the beginning, labor issues have been central to the SOA debate as well as to the FTAA negotiations. Governments in the region, led by the United States, have preferred to deal with labor and environmental questions as part of non-trade related “baskets,” and this approach has been followed in most bilateral agreements, which have relegated these issues to so-called “side agreements.” As Bruce Jay notes:

> The controversy [over labor issues] has revolved around efforts to link international labor standards to trade expansion; specifically, to condition the opening of world markets on adherence to internationally recognized worker rights. These include freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively, prohibitions on child and forced labor, and non-discriminatory practices in the workplace (2001a, 4).

The largest and most influential union confederations have pursued a more sophisticated policy than simply mobilizing against corporate power and have sought to gain influence in the FTAA negotiations by putting their concerns on the table alongside those of governments and transnational businesses. Following the lead of the AFL-CIO, the union movement partially
boycotted (see below) the first Summit of the Americas in Miami. But this did not imply abandonment of a gradualist strategy of engagement and chipping away at what was critically perceived as corporate-led globalization. On the contrary, this strategy continued, although modulated by lack of success in advancing labor’s agenda. Occasionally, this frustration has been expressed in tough rhetoric vis-à-vis the FTAA and the adoption of a more protectionist position.

At the second Summit in Santiago, the AFL-CIO, the Canadian Labour Congress, Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT), and the most powerful Latin American labor confederations, such as the Brazilian Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), played an important role in promoting public awareness on trade issues and in bringing the concerns of their constituencies to bear in shaping the agenda of hemispheric negotiations. The union organizations joined with worker rights activists from across the hemisphere in formal and informal ties to the Alianza. Subsequently, the relationship between the two large segments of the “outsider” forces has shifted the balance from moderation toward greater militancy.

Other civil society organizations not directly tied to labor have occasionally played an important role in bridging the divide between the two segments of “outsiders.” One such organization is the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Generally referred to as Rights and Democracy, this organization was created in 1988 by the Canadian Parliament as an independent non-partisan group to promote the universal values of human rights and democracy around the world. Rights and Democracy has consultative status with the UN’s Economic and Social Council and has strong links with the International Labour Organization.
Notwithstanding Rights and Democracy’s governmental funding, its record of commitment to issues such as women’s rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, democracy and justice, and labor rights and globalization has made it a mediator and interlocutor to a wide variety of both “insider” and “outsider” groups throughout the hemisphere. This broker role has been particularly significant in recent years (see below) during the various meetings held in Canada by the Organization of American States, the region’s trade ministers, and, most recently, the Québec Presidential Summit.\footnote{24}

Before tracing the Alianza’s evolution and role in the SOA and FTAA, we will briefly describe several of the most significant of the national organizations -- themselves complex networks -- that ultimately coalesced in constituting the Alianza Social Continental.

The Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART) is a multi-sectoral U.S. network created in 1991 with the participation of a large number of groups, such as the International Labor Rights Fund, the Development Gap, and the Institute for Policy Studies, all of which are Washington, D.C.-based think-tanks. ART’s primary goal has been to articulate a “progressive internationalist” position on structural adjustment, trade, labor rights, and globalization. During the NAFTA debate, ART worked closely with counterpart networks in Mexico and Canada to develop trinational citizens’ statements that critiqued the official proposals and outlined alternative policies for economic integration compatible with higher environmental and labor standards, while also promoting equitable and sustainable development. Following NAFTA’s approval, ART worked in coordination with its Mexican and Canadian counterparts to document the trade agreement’s economic, social, and environmental impacts. After the December 1994 Summit of the Americas, ART extended its focus on U.S. trade policy to the proposed FTAA.\footnote{25}

The Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC) was created in
Mexico in 1991 in the context of NAFTA negotiations, which spurred joint efforts by unions and labor activists with their U.S. and Canadian counterparts (Reygadas 1998, 369-387). The national network brings together labor unions, human rights groups, environmentalists, peasant and indigenous groups, and academics committed to creating a more dynamic civil society and accelerating Mexico’s democratic transition. The early 1990s, when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional -- PRI) government, headed by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was relatively permeable, witnessed the high point of Mexican CSO participation in debates on trade. Following NAFTA’s launching in 1994, however, the Mexican government moved to monopolize trade discussions and paid little attention to groups such as RMALC. In response, RMALC maintained its focus on NAFTA but became more vocal on hemispheric matters and widened its scope to explore alternative economic development strategies in the context of Mexico’s membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the World Trade Organization, and the FTAA negotiations. In recent years, RMALC (like the Chilean ACJR, see below) has occasionally modulated its staunch anti-NAFTA and anti-FTAA posture somewhat. In fact, RMALC has declared that it can accept free trade as long as 1) there is negotiation with national societies; 2) concerns for social justice and reduction of asymmetries among economies are part of the integration process; 3) respect for cultural diversity and environmental protection are assured; and 4) human rights, citizen participation, and democracy are advanced (Martínez 2000, 4). More recently, however, RMALC has articulated a more “rejectionist” strategy. Reflecting its origins in the controversy over NAFTA, RMALC initially worked most closely with its U.S. and Canadian partners but subsequently broadened and deepened its engagement with Latin American, European, and Asian networks working on issues of trade liberalization and globalization.27
Common Frontiers is a multi-sectoral Canadian network that grew out of the popular opposition movement to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the recognition that opponents must not only cooperate across sectors nationally but also across borders. The Common Frontiers network combines research, analysis, and action in cooperation with labor, human rights, environmental, religious, development, and economic and social justice organizations.\(^{28}\) Common Frontiers played an important strategic role in rallying the opposition against NAFTA and, subsequently, against the FTAA. Common Frontiers played a key role in the November 1999 Toronto ministerial meeting and in the 2000 meeting of the Organization of American States in Windsor and was one of the leaders in civil society participation in the Québec City Presidential Summit held in April 2001. Like other Canadian NGOs, Common Frontiers receives subsidies from the Canadian government, although this funding has had no noticeable effect in moderating its anti-FTAA policies.\(^{29}\)

The Alianza Chilena por un Comercio Justo y Responsable (Chilean Alliance for Just and Responsible Trade -- ACJR) was formed in post-Pinochet Chile by a variety of groups critical of their country’s status as a “model” for showcasing neoliberal economic restructuring. The ACJR’s priority focus is on the negative social, economic, and environmental consequences of globalization via trade liberalization. Its efforts have singled out Chile’s full membership in APEC, its associate membership in the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur – MERCOSUR), and its numerous bilateral free trade agreements, including ones with both Mexico and Canada, for strong criticism. The ACJR strongly advocates the incorporation of environmental and social clauses in regional trade pacts.\(^{30}\) Recently, the ACJR has taken the lead in lobbying the Chilean Foreign Ministry for a broader consultative role for Chilean civil society.\(^{31}\) ACJR is a member of several Canadian-based global networks, including Peoples’
Global Action and the French-based Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), which promotes the Tobin tax on international financial transactions. Although independence has its advantages, the fact that the ACJR apparently does not have close ties to the Chilean labor movement, which has long-standing linkages to the parties of the Concertación governments in power since 1990, also is a handicap.\textsuperscript{32}

The Réseau Québécois sur l’Intégration Continentale (Québec Network on Continental Integration), while less visible than Common Frontiers, has played a crucial role within the Alianza network. The Réseau Québécois describes itself as a “coalition of research teams and of grassroots, union, community, environmental, and international-cooperation organizations.” Its objective is to “propose a vision of development for the Americas in a framework of respect for social, labour, and human rights and to promote democracy, involvement, respect for the environment, and the eradication of poverty throughout the hemisphere.”\textsuperscript{33} The Réseau Québécois assumed a high visibility role (see the next section) in the mobilizations surrounding the 2001 Summit held in Québec City.

The Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos (Brazilian Network for a Peoples’ Integration -- REBRIP) is one of the most recent and less institutionalized members of the Alianza network. The REBRIP emerged in connection with the 1998 Peoples’ Summit in Santiago and enjoys the support of FASE (Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional, a 40-year-old social service organization); ABONG (Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não-Governamentais, the umbrella group for thousands of NGOs throughout the country); and numerous other CSOs, such as RITS (Rede de Informações sobre o Terceiro Setor); the Rede Brasil sobre Instituições Financieras Multilaterais; and the Forúm Brasileiro de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais para o Meio Ambiente.\textsuperscript{34} REBRIP also enjoys close, cooperative
relations with the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), Brazil’s largest and most powerful union confederation linked to the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and other left and progressive forces. REBRIP maintains close contacts with the Mexican RMALC, Common Cause in Canada, and the U.S.-based Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN). Like the CUT, REBRIP has participated in the civil society consultations organized by Itamarty, the Brazilian foreign ministry, in which the government’s view of the FTAA is explained to civil society organizations (Botelho 2000; Mello 2001). In view of the Brazilian government’s resistance to U.S. positions in the FTAA negotiations, REBRIP’s presence in these meetings has not been incompatible with its “outsider” posture. REBRIP also maintains good contacts with the Brazilian Congress and the center-left parties (such as the PT, the PPS, and the PSDB). This posture is facilitated by the strongly pro-MERCOSUR position in favor of regional integration advocated by CUT.

Foro de Consulta a la Sociedad Civil sobre el Ajuste Estructural (FOCO) and Dialogo 2000 are the Argentine CSOs most closely linked to the Alianza, which does not have an official affiliate in that country. Other groups participating in some Alianza-related activities include El Grito de los Excluidos, the Argentine affiliate of ATTAC, and the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Línea Fundadora). In 2000, anxious to have a higher profile in Argentina, the Alianza initiated a series of meetings in preparation for the FTAA trade ministerial in Buenos Aires in April 2001. This initiative led to the organization of a Foro Multisectorial sobre el ALCA (Multisectoral Forum on the FTAA) to mobilize popular support against the free trade negotiations. In contrast with the generally close relationship between the Alianza and organized labor in some countries, in Argentina organized labor’s politicization and fragmentation in three competing labor confederations—the official Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), the
dissident part of the CGT led by Hugo Moyano, and the more confrontational Confederación de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA)—have posed significant obstacles to the creation of an Alianza affiliate. Following the Québec Summit, new efforts were made to unify the various anti-FTAA organizations and create an official Alianza affiliate organization. Nevertheless, in view of the rivalries between groups such as FOCO and Dialogo 2000, plus the complex tensions dividing the union movement, the future of the Alianza in Argentina remains highly uncertain.39

The Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo (Latin American Coordinator of Rural Organizations -- CLOC) is an international organization that coordinates peasant organizations and agricultural workers, as well as indigenous communities and small- and medium-scale rural producers, to defend their basic interests. CLOC’s activities seek to foster solidarity and “unity and diversity” among rural organizations to promote social justice, economic equality, food self-sufficiency, and sustainable and equitable agricultural development. CLOC’s International Coordinating Commission is based in Quito, Ecuador, and includes representatives from member organizations throughout the hemisphere as well as from affiliated organizations in Asia and Eastern and Central Europe. The Asociación de Organizaciones Campesinas Centroamericanas para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo (Association of Central American Peasant Organizations for Cooperation and Development -- ASOCODE) is one of CLOC’s central members and was responsible for the creation in 1993 of the Iniciativa Civil para la Integración Centroamericana (Civil Society Initiative on Central American Integration -- ICIC). ASOCODE also served as the Iniciativa’s general secretariat between 1994 and 1998. ICIC is a member of the Alianza Social Continental.40

**Summits, Networks, and Mobilizations**

From the beginning, the SOA and the FTAA have proceeded on two separate and independent
tracks. The “insider” organizations dedicated considerable efforts to coordinate consultations and channel observations from civil society into the summits. The “outsider” organizations did not take part in these consultations, nor did they originally participate in preparing documents directed to the summits. Initially, the two groups were largely unaware of each other’s activities. Over time, some of the networks active in one or the other track began to play both games. By and large, however, the “outsider” networks remain disenchanted with the summitry process, and their involvement in the FTAA has become increasingly contestatory, focusing on mobilizing support for parallel or alternative “Peoples’ Summits” to protest the official gatherings of presidents, heads of state, and trade and finance ministers.

The Miami Summit

For the 1994 Miami Summit, there were three main tracks of consultation with civil society, with the National Security Council and the White House Council on Environmental Quality playing a role in creating “spaces” for civil society participation by organizing and funding the Civil Society Task Force and a number of what would become the principal “insider” organizations.

The North-South Center, in coordination with White House efforts, initiated its own consultations in collaboration with various Latin American educational institutions (such as the University of West Indies in Jamaica, the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Colombia, and the Universidad de Belgrano in Argentina) and produced documents summarizing consultations on democratic governance, the environment and sustainable development, trade, investment, and economic development. The North-South Center (1995, 147) indicated that these consultations brought together “leading experts from academia, bilateral and multilateral agencies, business
and labor organizations, and non-governmental organizations,” but the list of participants suggests that the consultations principally involved academics. The work of the North-South Center was encouraged by Richard Feinberg, who at the time was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. Some policy-making organizations, such as the Inter-American-Dialogue and the International Center for Research on Women, and other civil society organizations, such as the Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief, also convened Latin American non-governmental actors. Information about the Summit was made available through electronic networks operated by organizations such as Florida International University, the National Audubon Society, and the Church World Service.

The Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano (FFL), created in Ecuador specifically for the purpose of generating input from civil society, initiated its own consultations in 14 Latin American countries. PARTICIPA was the national coordinator for the consultations in Chile. A summary was provided of this input, but overall it had little impact on summit planning. However, FFL’s efforts were noticed by U.S. government officials, particularly those at the National Security Council.

Environmental CSOs in the United States, coordinated out of the White House Office on Environmental Policy, directed by Vice-President Albert Gore’s office, played an early role in mobilizing civil society input. These CSOs “had supported the Clinton Administration in the struggle for NAFTA implementing legislation” (Rosenberg and Stein 1995, iv). The most influential CSOs were the Audubon Society, the Nature Conservancy, and the Environmental Law Institute. These organizations seem to fall under the category of participants “who weighed in with succinct language” and “seemed to have made the biggest imprint on the Summit agenda.
and final documents” on issues related to trade, the environment, and sustainable development (Rosenberg and Stein 1995, iv). 41

In addition, the U.S. delegation encouraged its Latin American partners to consult with CSOs at home. In the United States, this idea was formalized by the creation of the Civil Society Task Force mentioned above. Abroad, the United States sought to encourage participation by sharing its own experience, instructing ambassadors to express support, and incorporating a number of environmental CSOs in the bilateral/multilateral consultations.

Relatively little is known regarding the participation in the 1994 Miami and 1996 Bolivia Summits by the “outsider” CSOs and national networks with more contestatory orientations. However, adopting a rather critical posture, the Concerned Civil Society Organizations Office (see CCSOO 1995), an arm of the Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief, produced a document endorsed, among others, by the Esquel Group Foundation (USA); the Servicio de Paz y Justicia, Catholic Church-related Service for Peace and Justice -- SERPAJ (Uruguay and Argentina); the Washington Office on Latin America -- WOLA (USA); Common Frontiers (Canada); and RMALC (Mexico). While some of these organizations would continue to support subsequent summits critically, others, such as Common Frontiers and RMALC, would become core members of the Alianza Social Continental.

Labor’s position vis-à-vis the Miami Summit was complicated. Some leaders in the AFL-CIO and ORIT desired to avoid an open break with the Clinton administration and the more moderate CSO groups, while others pushed for a more critical position from the very beginning. The result was a partial boycott of the official summit proceedings, with the issuance of a declaration calling for a more comprehensive inclusion of labor issues, including higher standards than NAFTA’s on labor and environmental issues and declaring that the Summit’s
draft document “barely pays lip service to the needs and interests of working people” (AFL-CIO/ORIT 1995, 363). Labor’s critical posture would subsequently prove crucial: the political clout of the AFL-CIO in U.S. domestic politics and ORIT’s claim to represent over 40 million members allowed these organizations to advance strong claims of broad-based grassroots opposition to free trade accords. It also bolstered the union movement’s criticism of the legitimacy of many of the “insider” groups. This early opposition by labor also was crucial in strengthening ties to the “outsider” CSOs. In this regard, it is important to recall that at the time of the Miami Summit, the Sierra Club, Public Citizen (a Ralph Nader group), and other important U.S. groups that would eventually adopt a much more critical policy on trade issues still retained ties with the pro-NAFTA coalition. Many of these groups still believed that the NAFTA labor and environmental “side agreements” could play a useful role in a broader project of hemispheric integration.

The optimistic perspective is that the overall opening to civil society participation in the Miami Summit survived several challenges and was maintained in key components of the Summit’s closing document, entitled Plan of Action (Rosenberg and Stein, 1995, 12-34). Overall, the final Miami documents “bear the imprint of an unprecedented participation by non-governmental actors,” with some of the official initiatives drawing “word for word from some of the documents submitted” by CSOs (Rosenberg and Stein, 1995, vi).

In contrast, even some of the more mainstream organizations recognized that “civil society’s concerns were not adequately reflected in the Summit agenda, and regretted that those concerns that did receive consideration were not expressed in sufficiently strong language” (Rosenberg and Stein 1995, iv). Thus,
[m]any of the [civil society organizations] who had worked tirelessly to have their concerns included in the Summit drafts were dismayed to find that strong statements on everything from human rights and collective action in defense of democracy to the link between trade and the environment were either watered down or eliminated during the final few weeks of official consultations (Rosenberg and Stein 1995, v).

More specifically, for example,

the ardent attempts by environmentalists, led by the U.S. NGO community, to obtain strong language establishing the reciprocal linkage between trade and the environment seem to have had the opposite effect. The Declaration of Principles ended up expressing the philosophical converse to their position: that environmental benefits would trickle down from the process of integration (Rosenberg and Stein 1995, v).

In an evaluation of the outcome of the Miami Summit, a representative of the Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief indicated a mixed outcome, with a “heavy emphasis on traditional approaches to trade and economic integration coupled with . . . weak provisions on human rights,” but acknowledging that the organization’s effort “to promote more responsive and accountable government policies and programs may be bolstered by a number of provisions included in the plan of action” (Morden 1995, 217). This evaluation indicated that opportunities had been provided in the Summit for inclusion and some measure of participation, but that the “consultations leading up to the Summit produced a progressive dilution of actions initially contemplated on a range of issues” (Morden 1995, 217). Most important, the Summit generated
no new institutions in charge of ensuring accountability, and the monitoring of policy implementation was not seriously pursued in areas such as human rights. Also, no effective means were provided for generating public participation in areas of macroeconomic policy.

Likewise, the National Audubon Society recognized the high profile status given to environmental issues, the “unprecedented” role of CSOs in the preparations for the Miami Summit, and the fact that this experience “conveyed a powerful message about the importance of citizen participation to government officials throughout the Americas” (Rogers, Minette, and Murray 1995, 306). The organization expressed disappointment regarding the lack of linkages between “trade expansion plans” and environmental goals, as well as the “continuing resistance of many governments to the participation of civil society” (Rogers, Minette, and Murray 1995, 306). Overall, the Audubon Society looked forward to the Bolivia Summit for evidence of progress on the goals set in the Miami Summit documents.

The Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano presented a fairly optimistic evaluation of the 1994 Summit, indicating that the process had maintained an impressive momentum in generating “processes of collective thought and participatory mechanisms from its preparatory phase onwards,” but recognized that the final declaration had “fallen short” in areas such as the environment and called for future summit work to show a “materialization of the hopes inscribed in Miami” (Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano 1995, 370).

In short, even as early as the Miami Summit, there was a significant division among CSOs regarding the utility and promise of the SOA process.

*The Santa Cruz Summit*
Two mechanisms were created for civil society consultation around the 1996 Bolivia Summit: one to be coordinated by the Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano (Ecuador), in cooperation with the North-South Center at the University of Miami, and the other by the Civil Society Task Force (Corporación PARTICIPA 1999; Shamsie 2000, 19). The FFL consultation was underfunded, and “the findings were presented en masse directly to the OAS in plenary,” undermining the effectiveness of the consultation (Shamsie 2000, 19). Nevertheless, with the North-South Center playing a key role, U.S. civil society organizations were able to have a number of their positions incorporated into the U.S. official document, which became the de facto negotiating document.

The second civil society consultation held in Montevideo was coordinated by Esquel, and the Civil Society Task Force also played an important role.

With the participation of twenty-nine official delegations and forty-five regional CSOs, (the conference) drafted a clear recommendation to the Summit -- that the heads of state authorize within the OAS the creation of an institutional space and strategy to promote and systematize such citizen participation. This recommendation survived intact the arduous negotiations and was signed as part of the plan of action of the Bolivia Summit (Esquel Group Foundation 1999a, 386).

Based on this recommendation, beginning in 1997, the Civil Society Task Force would undertake the implementation of such a strategy within the OAS.

Although CSO groups with more critical postures were somewhat more active in the 1996 Santa Cruz Summit, “outsider” groups still had not become a significant presence.
The May 1997 Trade Ministerial held in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, was a catalytic event in the formation of an “outsider” network, openly critical of the summitry process. With the largest Brazilian labor confederation, the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), and several large Brazilian CSOs such as ABONG and FASE playing a leading role, over 50 national and regional organizations, with 700 civil society activists, joined in Belo Horizonte to protest the closed nature of the official FTAA negotiations as well as the privileged status in those negotiations accorded to business interests organized in the Forum/Foro (ABF). In fact, the pro-business character of the official ministerial negotiations probably contributed to deepening the cleavages separating the more mainstream CSO organizations from the labor and grassroots progressive groups when the former decided to participate directly in the workshops and other events organized by the ABF.

In contrast with the Miami and Santa Cruz meetings, there was a much greater participation of progressive groups from throughout the hemisphere in Belo Horizonte, including important CSO organizations from the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Chile. Sharing a common opposition to neoliberalism, social exclusion, and corporate rule, their goal was to strengthen civil society and to propose an alternative model of economic integration for the hemisphere that would be more democratic, participatory, egalitarian, and environmentally sustainable. The underlying premise defended by these organizations was that to be legitimate, the FTAA negotiations must advance people’s rights on the basis of a socially and environmentally sound agenda, rather than based exclusively on market principles favoring
international business (see ASC 1999a). The alternative labor forum -- made possible by the CUT -- planted the seeds of what would become the Alianza Social Continental.

The Santiago Summit

Beyond the organizations active in Miami and Santa Cruz, additional groups -- both “insiders” as well as “outsiders” -- gained greater visibility at the Santiago Summit held in April 1998. By the same token, however, Santiago signified a moment of deepening division and near rupture between these two sets of groups.

Among the “insiders,” FOCAL organized five regional civil society consultations in Canada (with the reported participation of 140 individuals from civil society) in preparation for the Santiago Summit of the Americas. As a synthesis of these meetings, FOCAL produced a report that provided recommendations in each of the policy baskets of the Santiago Summit (FOCAL 1999). FOCAL was strongly criticized by other Canadian CSOs for sponsoring this consultation. Essentially, the charge was that FOCAL was acting as an instrument of the government and pretending to represent Canadian civil society. As a result of this negative reaction, FOCAL refused to coordinate a national consultation in Canada in preparation for the Québec Summit.

Parallel to the FOCAL event, Corporación PARTICIPA, with support from USAID, organized two meetings attended by several dozen civil society and government representatives. According to PARTICIPA, the first meeting “brought together 55 representatives of civil society organizations from 22 countries in the continent” (Corporación PARTICIPA 1999, 571), and the second one brought together “70 representatives from civil society organizations, 51
governmental representatives, and 10 representatives of international and/or regional organizations (Corporación PARTICIPA 1999, 572). According to one observer, “Most of the participating (civil society organizations) that had previously shown a willingness to work closely and successfully with their governments; they were also a different group from those who later organized the parallel Peoples’ Summit” (Shamsie 2000, 20). The recommendations resulting from these meetings were shared in meetings with government negotiators for the preparatory meetings, and eventually published as more specific policy recommendations to the Governments of the region (Corporación PARTICIPA 1999). The civil society language that was presented became the negotiating text for that particular initiative” (Shamsie 2000, 20).  

Additionally, the recommendations resulting from the regional consultations prior to the Santiago Summit were forwarded to the representatives of Jamaica and Uruguay who had been charged with responsibility for the relevant items for the agenda. “Thanks to the efforts of the Ambassador from Jamaica, these discussions did have some influence on the wording of the documents later discussed at the SIRG (Summit Implementation and Review Group)” (Seymoar 1999, 403). Similarly, the Leadership Council’s first report (Leadership Council 1998) influenced the U.S. government’s position and advanced discussion of the “democratic clause,” thus foreshadowing its ultimate adoption in Québec in 2001.

Notably, Santiago represented a more significant change regarding the posture of “outsiders.” The “Peoples’ Summit,” held in Santiago in April 1998 in conjunction with the official summit, energized the formation of an “oppositional” identity and strategy on the part of the CSOs belonging to the incipient Alianza network. The organizers claim that approximately 1,000 delegates, including union representatives, environmentalists, women’s groups, human rights organizations, indigenous peoples, academics, and others met in 10 sectoral workshops
and forums to debate ideas for an alternative social and economic model in the hemisphere.\textsuperscript{46}

The Final Declaration of the Peoples’ Summit articulated the explicitly contestatory posture of groups involved in the emerging “outsiders” network. For these groups, many of which represented national-level networks, neither the agendas of the various UN-sponsored conferences nor the recommendations of the Miami Summit had been implemented. Accordingly, the Final Declaration proclaimed that civil society organizations and social movements in the Americas

have no reason to believe in the fulfillment of the social commitments signed by governments. \ldots We believe the governments will go on using these proclaimed social concerns as bargaining chips in their trade negotiations. \ldots We reject the anti-democratic character of agreements such as the FTAA. Organizations that represent distinct segments of civil society in our continents are excluded from the process. We do not accept that any more of these kinds of agreements, which have negative repercussions for the populations as a whole, be signed at the cost of our peoples (ASC 1999e, 589-590).\textsuperscript{47}

The follow-up to the Santiago Peoples’ Summit was crystallized in the dissemination of the Alianza’s “living document,” Alternatives for the Americas: Building a Peoples’ Hemispheric Agreement (ASC 1999b), which gave greater substance to proposals first presented in 1997 at Belo Horizonte. This document set forth the basic programmatic platform of the still relatively new but better organized “outsiders” network:
Civil society representatives want to be heard in this debate [on the FTAA] because the very essence of democratic self-determination is at stake. Governments must maintain the right to set rules for foreign investors, to settle investment disputes under national law and to control fly-by-night, speculative capital if economic integration is to be environmentally sound and beneficial to all the citizens of the Americas, especially historically marginalized groups including women, indigenous peoples and people of colour (ASC 1999b, 15).

Affirmations such as this symbolized a significant convergence between “northern” and “southern” perspectives, particularly regarding the democratic deficit characterizing summitry and trade negotiations. Like many of the AFL-CIO unions and progressive U.S.-based CSOs (such as Development Gap, Public Citizen, and the Sierra Club), by the time of the Peoples’ Summit in Santiago, many grassroots-oriented Latin American CSOs also expressed deep disappointment in post-1994 events, concluding that participation in official summitry was not useful to their interests. Consequently, beginning in Santiago, many progressive civil society groups distanced themselves from the summit process. Again, as suggested by theoretical considerations, the closure of channels of access facilitated the acceleration of network activities and strengthened a common oppositional identity among “outsider” groups. Still, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the degree of consensus within the Alianza. There were significant differences reported concerning labor rights and environmental protection between northern and southern Alianza members and affiliated CSOs. Some southern activists accused their northern counterparts of taking advantage of their greater expertise and access to governments and the media to advance their own sectoral or national interests and to tilt the Alianza’s positions in
their own favor. These differences were secondary, however, compared to their strong agreement on core issues.

The San José Trade Ministerial

Both mainstream “insider” and “outsider” organizations mobilized in considerable force for the Trade Ministerial Meeting held in San José, Costa Rica, in March 1999. This was a difficult moment for the more moderate civil society groups. The U.S. National Audubon Society (with support from the North-South Center and the Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano) sponsored a hemisphere-wide forum involving at least 40 environmental CSOs, which issued a report to the trade ministers containing fairly strong criticism of the official process. Because of the Costa Rican government’s decision to limit discussion to the official FTAA agenda -- focused on trade and investment -- there was little opportunity in the official working groups for these ideas to be debated (Rosenberg 2000). As in the past, this neglect of their issues confirmed the belief of many CSO groups that little was to be gained from moderating their stance in order to seek a voice in official forums.

Disappointment over official indifference to their issues at San José spurred the decision of the more militant CSOs and social movements, cooperating actively since Belo Horizonte and Santiago, to take advantage of the momentum gained from parallel mobilization in Costa Rica to constitute formally, in March 1999, the Alianza Social Continental. The Alianza presented itself as “a forum where progressive organizations and movements from around the Americas can gather, strategize, share information and plan joint actions. As the base and strength of this movement grows, we will be in an even better position to fight for an alternative and democratic
development model for our societies” (ASC 1999a). The Alianza’s stated objectives included the following:

1. Strengthening civil society within and between countries in the Americas;

2. Being recognized as the legitimate interlocutor representing a dynamic movement which can mobilize its members and where the different views and positions of civil society can be represented;

3. Implementing agreed upon common strategies while, at the same time, respecting diversity;

4. Supporting and strengthening the efforts of the different sectors at the local, national and regional levels;

5. Promoting the enforcement of the basic standards approved by the International Labour Organizations (ILO); and

6. Campaigning on behalf of demands for the enforcement of all rights already recognized in the many international instruments, covenants and declarations already signed (ASC 1999a).

In addition to calling attention to its core principles, the Alianza’s formal constitution also provides the opportunity for a fundamental transformation in its heretofore rather informal network operations. The Red Mexicana de Acción Frente al Libre Comercio (RMALC) was designated to become the Alianza’s secretariat. Responsibility for the network’s strategy planning was entrusted to a Coordinating Council, which would meet at least once a year. The Coordinating Committee was comprised of representatives of the network’s core organizations:
RMALC; Common Frontiers; Iniciativa Civil para la Integración Centroamericana (ICIC); Reseau Québécois d’Integration Continentale (RQIC); Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART); Congreso Latinoamericano de Organizaciones Campesinas (CLOC); Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos (REBRIP); Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT); the Brazilian Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), and the Canadian Labour Congress.

Troubled by the deepening polarization and alienation on the part of many CSOs following the San José ministerial, USAID requested that the Esquel Foundation organize an FTAA consultation process. The National Wildlife Federation also played a key role in this effort to promote a civil society participation track. Seventy submissions were forthcoming, but the U.S. governmental representative on the Committee of Government Representatives on Civil Society did not convince the representatives of the other regional governments to go along with any of the recommendations put forth in the consultation process. This failure impacted both the “insider” and “outsider” networks by confirming what many had suspected since Santiago, namely, the existence of two separate tracks for civil society participation, one for the SOA and one for the FTAA. The “insiders” were delegitimatized, and the San José failure reinforced the hardening line taken by the “outsiders.” This polarization strengthened the perception that the region’s governments were not serious about CSO participation in the FTAA, that the FTAA’s Civil Society committee (consisting only of official representatives) was powerless, that the negotiating process would remain closed to civil society groups, and that the governments’ intransigent refusal to provide real information about the progress of the negotiations would remain unaltered.

The lessons from San José must be placed within the larger perspective of the defeat
administered to the Clinton administration when the U.S. Congress twice rejected “fast-track” authority in 1997 and 1998. This victory over the advocates of the FTAA emboldened the AFL-CIO, labor activists, and the U.S. environmental community. It particularly strengthened groups such as Public Citizen and the Alliance for Responsible Trade and encouraged them to deepen their ties to the Alianza and to similar “outsider” groups in Canada and throughout Latin America. The defeat of fast-track also diminished the interest of the Brazilian and Chilean governments in the FTAA process and slowed the pace of the negotiations significantly.50

The Toronto Trade Ministerial

The Trade Ministerial Meeting held in Toronto, Canada, in November 1999 was unusual. First, like the Costa Rican government officials in San José, the Canadian organizers of the Business Forum closed their event to discussion of topics outside the agenda of the official negotiating groups, thus giving short shrift to the labor, environmental, and democratic governance concerns of many of the mainstream CSOs. Second, in contrast with the practice at previous ministerials, the Canadian government, perhaps instigated by Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, provided relatively generous financial and logistical support to a parallel Civil Society Forum of the Americas (Foro de la Sociedad Civil de las Americas) and, in a significant overture to “outsider” groups, gave Common Frontiers, one of the most militant core members of the Alianza (ASC) network, a leadership role in the organization of this forum.

The participation of Common Frontiers (and, indirectly, of the Alianza) in the Toronto Forum had significant implications for the future role of the “outsider” groups in hemispheric negotiations. By the time of the Toronto meeting, the Alianza was showing some tentative signs
of greater moderation and had articulated a series of tactics seeking to reconcile the network’s origins in social movements wedded to popular mobilization and an opposition identity with efforts to achieve greater influence with the broader public. The Canadian government’s support of the alternative Forum, and its efforts to develop “alternative” foreign policy distinct from Washington’s, provided an incentive for this tentative shift in tactics. The Canadian government’s openness to Common Frontiers appeared to offer a way for the Alianza network to continue its strategy of popular mobilization while seeking to become more engaged and to exercise greater influence in hemispheric negotiations.

Both the elite and the popular mobilization aspects of the Alianza’s strategy were on display in Toronto. A week of events, including the Civil Society Forum of the Americas and a conference on “Our Americas: Toward a Peoples’ Vision of the Hemisphere,” were organized with representatives participating from over 40 affiliated CSOs from 20 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (Common Frontiers 1999). At these events, the Alianza network presented two programmatic documents for the consideration of the representatives of hemispheric governments: Social Exclusion, Labor, and Poverty in the Americas (ASC 1999c) and Social Investment, Finances, and Debt in the Americas (ASC 1999d). Similarly, the network’s earlier document, Alternatives for the Americas, was updated again and widely distributed to government ministers and FTAA negotiators.

Simultaneously, the Alianza’s leaders sought a dialogue with relevant policymakers involved in the official summitry process and the FTAA negotiations. This strategy placed greater emphasis on many of the skills – for example, research and presentation of policy proposals and articulation of media strategies to reach both elite and mass publics -- developed previously by national networks such as RMALC, RCJR, ART, and Common Frontiers. The
Alianza group was initially quite pleased after attending a meeting with a large, high-level group of Latin American governmental representatives. This meeting gave the Alianza the opportunity to present its detailed position papers (including the *Alternatives for the Americas* document) on a wide range of subjects. The meeting’s dialogue was supposed to have been the high point of efforts by the Alianza to engage governmental interlocutors in discussions on the strategy and content of hemispheric integration. However, as it turned out, the governmental representatives offered only vague remarks and platitudes. In their final Declaration, the ministers specifically mentioned the participation of the Business Forum but completely ignored the Alianza and the Civil Society Forum. For the Alianza, including the more moderate members, this omission was the last straw (Jay 2001).

Moreover, even as some Alianza affiliates gave signs of desiring to position themselves as legitimate interlocutors in a dialogue with more mainstream organizations, the failure of the meeting with governmental representatives actually reinforced the network’s identity as “outsiders” opposed to the official FTAA agenda with the ability to mobilize hundreds of CSOs. The conflict among CSOs came into the open when some of the more intransigent Alianza people tried to prevent representatives from more moderate “insider” CSOs from participating in the parallel forum. The reason for this move was that in the eyes of the leaders of the progressive “outsider” organizations linked to the Alianza network, the “insider” status of those excluded rendered them de facto government proxies.51

*The Windsor OAS Meeting and “Uncivil Society”*

The strategic ambiguity demonstrated by Common Frontiers and the Alianza in Toronto
foreshadowed difficult days ahead for the participation of civil society in future hemispheric negotiations. The conflicts in Toronto, coming on the heels of the anti-globalization protests at the "Battle of Seattle" in November 1999 at the meeting of the World Trade Organization and the protests in Washington, D.C., at the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in April 2000, fostered a hardening of attitudes on the part of both the "outsiders" and many governmental delegations. Even those diplomats and summiteers, like the Canadians, who had previously advocated greater civil society participation in hemispheric negotiations began to adopt a defensive and increasingly exasperated attitude toward what they perceived as the "intolerance" of "uncivil society" (Rosenberg 2000).

The meeting of the OAS, held in Windsor, Canada, in June 2000, bore out these concerns. While there were some interesting parallel events, including a town hall meeting featuring many of the leaders of the Alianza, the turnout of civil society groups, particularly those from Latin America, was fewer than the number expected. Although the Royal Canadian Mounted Police planned for about 35,000 demonstrators, actual turnout probably did not exceed 5,000 people. Nevertheless, the violent repression that took place when demonstrators surrounded a busload of official delegates, triggering a mass charge against the protesters by the RCMP, was extremely troubling. With fears of Seattle lurking in the background, Canadian planners for the 2001 Québec City Summit began talking about "security first."

In this context, the Alianza’s continuing campaign -- demanding the “liberation” of the texts of the nine FTAA negotiating groups -- received excellent press coverage but had no impact on the region’s trade ministers. Moreover, polarization between “insiders” and “outsiders” continued to intensify. For example, the Rights and Democracy group succeeded in bringing the human rights groups that had long worked with the Inter-American Court of Justice,
which had never before participated, into the summitry process. The “insiders” saw this initiative as a very important achievement (Pagés 2001). At the same time, however, Rights and Democracy organized an officially sponsored workshop during the Windsor events where an attempt was made to bring the Alianza and the FOCAL/Esquel/PARTICIPA groups together to discuss common concerns and to coordinate strategies vis-à-vis the SOA and FTAA processes. This effort proved a total failure. Alianza spokespersons claimed that the “insiders” were illegitimate and unrepresentative of civil society. In this context, the Alianza clearly stated that it has no interest in offers of collaboration from more mainstream groups.

For its part, after Seattle and Windsor, FOCAL raised the issue of the very legitimacy of summitry for civil society, noting that it is imperative that citizens be actively involved in policy making, for as costly and chaotic as this involvement may be, without it only hollow, undemocratic institutions remain. Recent protests against the perceived forces of globalization indicate a growing sense of alienation from high-level processes such as the Summit of the Americas on the part of civil society (2000b, 1).

By mid-2000, the Alianza and even more militant groups had already begun to plan for the 2001 Québec Summit. The issues of security and police repression had begun to loom as central concerns both for the Canadian government and for civil society activists. Concerns were no doubt heightened by the massive mobilizations against globalization at the “anti-Davos” World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in late January 2001, which was followed in
early April by the Trade Ministerial Meeting in Buenos Aires (held to reach final agreement on the FTAA agenda prior to Québec).

By all accounts, the Porto Alegre World Social Forum, in January 2001, was a huge success. In addition to organizational support from the influential Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, the Forum received significant political and financial support from the state and the Porto Alegre municipal governments, both controlled by the Partido do Trabalhadores. Approximately 15,000 people, including labor activists, environmentalists, human rights workers, and a variety of other activists from dozens of countries worldwide participated in numerous workshops and conferences. Among the dozens of manifestos issued on countless topics, those related to the perceived predatory aspects of globalization occupied a central place. The FTAA was specifically singled out for criticism, highlighting its role as a lightning rod attracting all forms of disenchantment with globalization.  

The Ministerial Meeting in Buenos Aires, in March 2001, barely two months after the World Social Forum, continued to attract mobilization against the FTAA. The strikes, mass meetings, and marches by thousands of protesters were organized by the three principal union confederations -- the official CGT, the dissident CGT, and the more militant CTA -- with a significant presence of union leaders from the MERCOSUR countries, plus a diverse array of civil society groups who apparently hoped to create a “Seattle in the South.” The Trade Ministers’ Meeting took place practically under siege by protesters who were confronted by heavily armed police backed by armored cars and police dogs on blockaded streets. The tone of the protests was set by João Felício, the general secretary of the Brazilian CUT, who condemned the FTAA as, in fact, an “area of free exploitation” and said that the working people of the Americas should oppose the FTAA “regardless of the date chosen, 2003, 2005 or 2010 [because]
with the FTAA we have everything to lose and nothing to gain.” A number of protest leaders also reiterated the demand that, in addition to ratification by the region’s parliaments, the FTAA be put to a popular referendum in each country.\textsuperscript{58} An Alianza Social Continental spokesperson charged that the

\begin{quote}
FTAA implies the final renunciation of the Latin American ruling classes to any sort of autonomous project of integration of their societies, their cultures, their economies. The secret dealings and the signing of the FTAA accords by the [trade] ministers . . . and by the presidents of the 34 countries (all with the exception of Cuba) in Québec . . . implicates them as infamous traitors of the Peoples and Fatherlands of Latin America (Página/12 2001c).
\end{quote}

\textit{The Québec Summit}

After the turmoil in Toronto and especially at the OAS meeting in Windsor, the Canadian government made a concerted effort to heal the breach that had opened with civil society activists. The Canadian authorities wrestled with difficult choices regarding the appropriate theme for the summit discussions of the presidents and heads of state. Miami had been the “Trade Summit,” and Chile had hosted the “Education Summit.” What would be the theme for the Canadian Summit? Motivated in part by the internal logic of their own partisan politics, the Canadians were determined to host a summit with a substantive legacy, rather than merely a photo opportunity. There was reason for concern. Momentum toward the establishment of the FTAA by 2005 had stalled. Several Latin American countries (such as Peru, Ecuador, and
Venezuela) seemed to be backsliding on democracy. And controversies over Plan Colombia and the implications of the U.S. “war on drugs” for the region were mounting. Consequently, the Canadians decided to make Québec the “Democracy Summit,” with the intention that it would have substantial as well as symbolic significance. Moreover, shifting the focus from a trade-driven agenda also might attenuate opposition from grassroots anti-trade and environmental activists (Cooper 2001; Dymond 2001; FOCAL 2001).

With these considerations in mind, the Canadians made a deliberate effort to broaden discussions to include a focus on three “baskets” of interrelated issues: 1) strengthening democracy; 2) creating prosperity; and 3) realizing human potential. In addition, human security and connectivity issues were placed on the agenda. In this way, it was hoped that “promoting democracy” (always on the SOA agenda) could be linked directly in the same negotiating track with the objective of “creating prosperity” (the focus of the FTAA agenda). If successful, it was thought that this approach might bring the governments’ trade and economic ministers into closer alignment with the goals pursued by the foreign ministries. It might also placate the civil society groups who were growing more alienated from the summitry and FTAA processes. With these concerns in mind, the Canadian federal government and the Québec provincial government sponsored an extensive series of academic conferences and civil society meetings in the months prior to the summit itself. In addition, the federal provincial authorities each allocated $300,000 to support the activities for the parallel, officially sponsored Second Peoples’ Summit.59

In addition to the Canadian government’s own commitment to making the Québec Summit a success, there were some other reasons for optimism. The inclusion of labor and environmental standards in the main body of the preliminary text, instead of in separate “side-agreements,” raised hopes. The cause of workers’ rights had also advanced on other fronts. For
example, efforts to promote social and labor rights within MERCOSUR seemed promising, and the end of seven decades of the reign of the PRI also raised similar expectations for progress in Mexico. And although the pledge by President Ricardo Lagos and President-elect Bush to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement was a cause for concern among labor and trade activists, the Chilean government also had recently promoted public debate on the social implications of trade. In short, workers’ rights seemed to have forced their way onto the official trade agenda. CSO representatives hoped that debates on the enforcement of international labor standards and environmental protection would effectively enhance civil society participation in the SOA and FTAA processes (Jay 2001).

By the same token, however, this optimism was tempered by the fresh memories of the recent disturbances in Toronto, Windsor, and Buenos Aires, as well as by the huge mobilizations in Porto Alegre for the World Social Forum. Consequently, the Canadians undertook extensive precautions to control planned demonstrations against the 34 presidents and heads of state. These precautions included a massive security operation carried out by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), backed by more than 6,000 police officers, with several thousand army troops deployed to carry out logistical tasks. Public attention focused on what critics described as a “Wall of Shame,” a 3-meter high, 4.5-kilometer long security perimeter, constructed of wire and concrete crowd-control barricades, to protect Québec City’s convention area. This “textbook operation for Canadian and allied security services” reportedly included the cooperation of the U.S. Department of Justices’ six regional centers to combat organized crime and terrorism, which were given the task of monitoring anti-globalization groups that might attempt to disrupt summit events.

While these preparations were taking place, the “insider” CSOs engaged in their own
careful preparations for the Québec Summit. Corporación PARTICIPA, together with FOCAL and the Esquel Group, assumed responsibility for coordinating an elaborate series of national and regional civil society consultations to generate specific proposals they hoped to see included on the official summit agenda. The first round of these encounters was organized in Argentina (in collaboration with Conciencia and Poder Ciudadano); in Colombia (by the Departamento de Ciencias Políticas, Universidad de Los Andes); in Chile (where PARTICIPA took the lead); and Peru (with the Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo playing the leading role). A second round brought the total number of national consultations to 17. These consultations culminated with a final hemispheric meeting in Miami on January 19-20, 2001, including representatives from CSOs from all the countries of the region, as well as the national coordinators of the Summit Implementation Review Group (SIRG), ambassadors to the OAS, and other officials involved in summit preparations. The product of these consultations was a final report, Recommendations by Civil Society Organizations for the 2001 Québec City Summit (Corporación PARTICIPA 2001), released in March 2001, containing a wide range of specific recommendations on enhancing civil society participation, women’s issues, corruption, education, sustainable development, human rights, indigenous issues, and trade and micro enterprises. The insistence of some participants that FTAA issues should be made part of the agenda triggered some controversy. Indeed, trade issues were barely evident in the final PARTICIPA document.

On a more modest scale, the network of 100 women leaders from 18 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Canada, and the United States belonging to the Women’s Leadership Conference of the Americas (WLCA), sponsored by the Inter-American Dialogue, also took advantage of the summit to release a report on Women and Power in the Americas, as
part of its continuing efforts to monitor governments’ progress in fulfilling their international obligations and commitments to women. The WLCA found that although the “gains have been enormous in the last decade,” much remains to be done. Consequently, the WLCA called upon the presidents and prime ministers to appoint more women to cabinet posts and to promote greater representation of women in electoral politics. They also urged the hemisphere’s leaders to focus more attention on gaining equal opportunities for women throughout society.63

For its part, the North-South Center, in partnership with the Washington-based Institute for International Economics, FOCAL, and the APEC Study Center (located at the University of California, San Diego), continued the work of its Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry. The Council’s second Report, issued in March 1999, had warned of an erosion of senior-level focus on summitry and offered suggestions for more effective execution of summit mandates (Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry, 1999). In preparation for its third Report, the Council expanded its membership to some two-dozen “distinguished citizens” from throughout the Americas. This report, Advancing Toward Quebec City and Beyond, released in March 2001, reviewed the lessons of Miami and Santiago and advanced seven recommendations for Québec:

1. Create the conditions for completing negotiations for the FTAA by end-2003, so that the FTAA can be approved by national legislatures by end-2004 and implementation can commence in 2005;

2. Adopt a democracy clause that limits participation in future Summits and in the FTAA to nations with democratic rule;

3. Develop a credible multilateral mechanism for counter-narcotics cooperation;
4. Establish a $100-million "Summit Fund" (to promote the implementation of summit initiatives);

5. Strive to further empower women;

6. Encourage funding to overcome the digital divide in the Americas;

7. Institutionalize formally summitry in the Americas by holding summits biannually

(Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry 2001, 2-3).

Simultaneously, the labor unions and the outsider groups were fully occupied with their extensive preparations. For example, the Canadian Auto Workers and the Ontario Federation of Labor provided buses, buildings, and personnel to handle the thousands of union workers and students expected to flock to Québec (Miami Herald 2001a). Spearheaded by Common Frontiers and the Reseau Québécois, the Alianza Social Continental also began extensive preparations one year in advance of the Québec Summit (ASC 2001). The Alianza’s priorities focused on plans to protest the official events and to participate actively in the three-day forum of debates on social democracy and alternative forms of hemispheric integration. These events were to culminate with a teach-in, a concert, and “taking to the streets” in a large demonstration. The Alianza was determined to resist the Canadian government’s plans to deflate criticism that the FTAA process and the summit meeting itself were too secretive. Placing priority on the street protests, marches, and teach-ins, the Alianza warned its members and other activist groups “not to fall for the game of simulation” represented, in its view, by plans to attract civil society groups to the officially sponsored Peoples’ Summit. The spirit of this approach was captured in its declaration issued on the eve of the summit: “Alianza Social Continental Dice NO al ALCA. OTRAS AMÉRICAS SON POSIBLES!!!” (The Hemispheric Social Alliance Says NO to the FTAA. Other Americas
are possible!!)\(^{64}\)

The Alianza was also fully engaged in the policy debates. For example, the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART) was very active in these activities, having prepared a comprehensive 26-page document entitled *America’s Plan for the Americas: A Critical Analysis of the U.S. Negotiating Positions on the FTAA* (Anderson and Hansen-Kuhn 2001) for release shortly before the summit.\(^{65}\) Together with other groups, the Alianza also hammered home one of its principal central demands, namely, the public “liberation” of the FTAA negotiating documents. As the Alianza’s General Secretary, Hector de la Cueva, put it, “Year after year, one after one, we give them our documents, our resolutions, our proposals . . . and up to now we have no answer to any of these documents.” Numerous Canadian legislators and Latin American parliamentarians also decried the lack of transparency and participation and echoed this demand for access to the FTAA negotiating documents (*Globe and Mail* 2001).

Consistent with this position, the Alianza and 60 other like-minded groups, including representatives of the Canadian Labour Congress and leaders of aboriginal groups, demanded a public meeting with media coverage with the presidents and heads of state. When only the labor union groups were invited to a roundtable discussion with four Canadian cabinet ministers, including Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew and Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley, but without the press, the Alianza and other “outsiders” privileged solidarity with the CSOs organizing the Peoples’ Summit and thereby turned down the government’s invitation. As the Common Frontiers spokesperson explained, “We will not meet within the walls” out of solidarity with the protesters outside the fenced perimeter (*Globe and Mail* 2001b; *National Ottawa Citizen Online* 2001b).

This event exemplified on a small scale the surrealistic events taking place elsewhere.
The dignitaries gave speeches that were broadcast on television. The lower part of the city, where the parallel Peoples’ Summit took place, was filled with teach-ins, concerts, and hundreds of groups peacefully proclaiming their views to thousands of strolling pedestrians. Crowds estimated at 30,000 peacefully marched in protest. On the perimeter protecting the provincial parliament building and the convention area, just above the historic area in the upper city, however, the TV cameras captured scenes of violence perpetrated by small groups of protesters. These radicals, referred to by one journalist as the “Jurassic left,” included the Black Bloc affinity groups, whose members dressed in black and spray-painted graffiti with their logo (a capital A in a circle with a slash through it) on walls and buildings. They also included the CLAC (whose initials in French stand for Anti-Capitalist Convergence), which called for a “revolutionary offensive,” and other direct-action groups waving red, black, and Cuban flags while confronting police, who were deployed in armored cars and used water cannons and tear gas to repel those who threatened to breach the “Wall of Shame” (Moberg 2001; New York Times 2001a; National Ottawa Citizen Online 2001c). In this exhilarating, albeit confusing, context, on April 21, the 34 presidents and heads of state brought the Québec Summit to a somewhat anticlimactic close. Similar to the Miami and Santiago Summits’ participants, the Canadian summiteers issued a long Final Declaration, with accompanying documents and dozens of action items.

The Québec Summit made modest progress, creating a new momentum toward getting the FTAA back on track. U.S. President George Bush indicated that he would lobby Congress to grant his administration “fast-track” negotiating authority by the end of 2001. Even Brazil’s President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who in Québec expressed the most doubts about the idea of a hemisphere-wide free trade zone, at least agreed to continue the negotiations.
Beyond the rhetoric, the Final Declaration was predictable -- the “Democracy Summit” turned out to be principally about free trade after all. The hemisphere’s leaders agreed to

1. conclude by January 2005 a Free Trade Area of the Americas, which would take effect (if ratified by the countries’ legislative bodies) by December 31 of that year;
2. release the preliminary draft of the FTAA negotiating texts as part of a commitment to “transparency and to increasing and sustained communication with civil society”;
3. consult on whether any country that suffers a “disruption” of its democratic system should be allowed to participate in the summit process; and
4. promote compliance with core labor standards and to “consider the ratification of or accession to the fundamental agreements of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work . . . as appropriate.”

The early post-mortems were somewhat mixed. Evaluations of the progress made in Québec hinged essentially on pre-established views of the FTAA. For pro-business advocates of the FTAA, the Québec Summit was portrayed as somewhat disappointing and as advancing too slowly toward a kind of “NAFTA lite” that needed to be made more robust. According to supporters of summity and trade integration in the policy community and among newspaper editorial writers and columnists, significant progress was made; special praise was given for the inclusion of the “democracy clause” that limits participation in the FTAA process to countries with democratic governments. However, even some of the “insiders” were critical of the weak endorsements of labor rights and environmental protection together with lip service paid to the rest of the social agenda defended by most civil society activists.68
In contrast, there was no doubt about the reaction of organized labor and most of the “outsiders,” who viewed Québec and the summit process as leading toward a “NAFTA clone” or a “NAFTA on steroids.” These groups were quite caustic in their condemnation of the Final Declaration. Although some “outsiders” grudgingly acknowledged the mainly symbolic statements in favor of labor rights and protection of the environment by President Bush and his colleagues, they generally gave credit to the effectiveness of the peaceful mobilizations in shifting public opinion on their priority issues. For example, Lori Wallach, of the Ralph Nader-affiliated group Public Citizen/Global Trade Watch sarcastically observed:

You could have dialed 911 when I heard what Bush said -- I needed to be resuscitated. When we started organizing and educating on trade in the early ‘90s, no one but a handful of progressive Democrats understood what we were talking about. And now comes Mister trade Uber alles Bush, saying we need to respect labor and environmental concerns. It shows the political shift, now we’ve got to see the policy shift. . . . Every week, every trade negotiation, hundreds of thousands more people become aware of the problems that this model is causing in their lives, and they’re educating and organizing themselves to fight. Each of these events gets bigger and bigger with less and less organizing (Washington Post 2001c).

In a similar vein, John Cavanaugh, of the Institute for Policy Studies, a left of center think-tank located in Washington, D.C., claimed that the protesters in Québec represented 45 million people throughout the Americas. Specifically mentioning the Alianza Social Continental, Cavanaugh placed a positive connotation on the evolution of the groups critical of the FTAA:
“The movement has evolved a great deal since 1990, [when] we were labeled protectionist. We're more sophisticated now. We're no longer opposed to a free trade agreement. Now we have developed our own detailed alternative. And now we want a dialogue, not a confrontation” (Los Angeles Times 2001).

In what must have been one of the first times the Alianza Social Continental had ever been mentioned in a positive light by a major U.S. newspaper, the same Los Angeles Times also cited the Alianza’s most widely distributed document, Alternatives for the Americas, to emphasize that the anti-FTAA movement's goals were widely shared by many citizens of various ideological persuasions:

No country can nor should remain isolated from the global economy. . . . The issue for us is not one of free trade versus protection or integration versus isolation, but whose rules will prevail and who will benefit from those rules. Any form of economic integration among our nations must serve first and foremost to promote equitable and sustainable development for all of our peoples (Los Angeles Times 2001).

Organized labor immediately went on the political offensive against the Québec Summit and the FTAA. The Brussels-based International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT) held their XV Continental Congress in Washington, D.C., immediately following the Québec Summit. ICFTU President Bill Jordan condemned the Final Declaration’s recommendation that the hemispheric governments should merely “consider” ratifying ILO core labor standards “as appropriate”: 
Leaders must acknowledge that without the involvement of civil society, without a strong participation of trade unions, the deal won’t work. Over all the Americas, the heads of states and governments clearly do not have support from their own populations when they make empty pledges to achieve trade liberalization. The governments must remedy this situation, put social development ahead of free trade, and listen to the voice of the people and their trade unions.69

The AFL-CIO attacked President Bush’s equivocations on labor standards and the environment in equally harsh language as “words without substance.” AFL-CIO President John Sweeney charged that “the FTAA, as it is presently drafted, is a disaster.”70 This hard-line posture was consistent, however, with the initiative pursued by labor groups and Alianza’s affiliates throughout Latin America to lobby progressive parliamentarians intensely and to promote the idea of holding referenda throughout the region on the implications of joining the FTAA for national sovereignty.

Strategic Relationships -- Convergence or Polarization?

The transnational issue and advocacy networks analyzed in this paper manifest a wide range of strategic postures. Although both “insiders” and “outsiders” form networks, the former are obviously more intimately linked to governmental authorities and international organizations, and some (such as the North-South Center) are actually quasi-public institutions rather than CSOs. The “outsiders,” particularly those with a strong rejectionist orientation, more closely resemble the ideal type of civil society network described in the literature. They usually are less
institutionalized and more likely to consist of a shifting array of groups and individuals working internationally, bound by shared values, a common discourse, and reciprocal exchanges of information. These regional networks -- and the local and national grassroots movements from which they emerge -- clearly exemplify organizational logics quite different from those of either markets or bureaucratic hierarchies. As a corollary, they tend to emphasize voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of exchange and communication.

There is a problem, however, with this description of the “outsider” networks. While these networks are strongly movimentista in many respects, their partners in the organized labor movement epitomize all the opposite characteristics. In fact, labor’s organizational modus operandi resembles Michel’s “iron law of oligarchy” more than the idealized horizontal and relatively non-hierarchical traits attributed to networks. It was with this crucial distinction in mind that we insisted at the outset that “outsider” networks frequently encompass two segments, with different organizational characteristics and somewhat different strategic conceptions and tactical preferences.

This combination of “participatory” and “bureaucratic” elements gives coalitions between network activists and organized labor certain significant advantages. For example, network activists can use their links to organized labor to claim greater legitimacy and representation. As a top RMALC leader explained, in comparison with the more elitist “insiders,” their labor alliances permit “outsider” networks to crear bases sociales de masas -- to create mass social bases with democratic legitimacy. Similarly, without obliging networks activists to sacrifice their social movement rhetoric, ties to organized labor can provide significant material resources as well as facilitate access to political, media, and even corporate elites. Moreover, the services of organized labor’s corps of professional bureaucrats can prove
crucial in assuring the success of campaigns and mobilizations. This flexibility allows the two cooperating segments of “outsider” networks to accommodate themselves to changing circumstances by alternately, or even simultaneously, emphasizing gradualism, moderation, and bargaining or deploying more militant “rejectionist” strategies. This resemblance to the venerable tactics of golpear y negociar, long ago mastered by Latin American unions, is anything but coincidental, and their aggironamento in the context of globalization should not be surprising.

The representation issue is complex and frequently comes back to haunt relations between the networks and organized labor. Union organizations are much more united than their “networked” allies in civil society, and the unions are still unsure of how to deal with the CSOs in their midst. Many union leaders, particularly in Latin America, do not appreciate the CSOs and activist networks because the latter are perceived as not representing a mass base. Labor organizations and CSO networks, in fact, are quite different in terms of political clout, and the discourses of representation they appeal to for legitimacy are distinct. These differences can and frequently do create tensions. For example, some international labor leaders have been known to refer negatively to NGOs and to network activists as NGIs, “non-governmental individuals.”

Similarly, many network activists experience constant frustration and great impatience with their “labor bureaucrat” allies. Clearly, the many differences between the CSO activists and organized labor will continue to create tensions and obstacles to collaboration. The internecine battles among rival labor organizations in Argentina, for example, clearly are making it extremely difficult for the Alianza to establish a viable affiliate in that country. Sometimes collaboration between organized labor groups and civil society activists may not be possible, ruptures may occur, and each will go its own way. Nevertheless, challenged by free trade and
globalization, both labor and network leaders experience great pressure to cooperate and to form alliances at the national and transnational levels.

Despite these obstacles, activists and labor leaders are learning to work together, whether in the United States, Chile, or Québec. In a sense, the union movement and the networks face similar problems in cooperating on a hemisphere-wide scale. Perhaps the unions even have something to teach the networks in this regard. Recently, an Anglo AFL-CIO officer was elected as the new president of ORIT, just as the days of U.S. labor’s dominance over its Latin counterparts is ending. Although some networks, such as the Alianza, have placed major leadership responsibilities with Latin American affiliates, major counterparts located in Latin America have experienced huge asymmetries (in terms of financial resources and linkages to foundations, think tanks, and so on), favoring network members based in the United States and Canada. The implications of these asymmetries of hierarchy and the exercise of power within the networks remain to be adequately understood and addressed.

Keeping these complexities of network organizations in mind and reflecting on events from Miami to Québec, how can the strategic relationships between the “insider” and “outsider” networks be characterized? Have their institutional trajectories tended toward greater convergence in strategies, tactics, and objectives? Or has greater polarization prevailed?

First, it is clear that the networks in question are becoming increasingly specialized in their strategies and tactics, but their strategies and tactics are far from random. On the contrary, participation in either the SOA or the FTAA track requires significantly different resources and capacities that are usually in short supply; it is difficult for one type of network to excel at everything. For example, at the Miami Summit, some environmental CSOs that would go on to be become “insiders” were particularly effective in making their voices heard in the preparation
of the official agenda because they “had the requisite resources (both human and financial) to
devote to the process and the political savvy to determine where best to focus their efforts,”
while also being “fluent in the language of bureaucratic politics” (Thorup 1995, xvii). In
contrast, particularly in Latin America, where CSOs are less well-organized and politics and
institutional arrangements are more elitist and exclusionary, there is less capacity to mobilize
local support at the grassroots community level, rather than assuring access to the corridors of
power, which frequently is a handicap and may provoke the authorities to attempt to deprive
“outsiders” of a voice in debates on hemispheric issues.

This differentiation highlights a recurring theme in our analysis of the formation and
evolution of transnational networks in the Americas -- the role of states and the enduring
significance of domestic political opportunity structures and institutional arrangements. Our
analysis bears out arguments (see Pratt 2001) that states have strong incentives to provide
support, including material resources, to societal actors possessing specialized expertise or the
capacity to oversee or participate in the policy implementation process. Rather than acting
themselves, states frequently find it more efficient to address certain types of international issues
through delegation and self-monitoring by societal actors.

This logic may be clearly observed in the activities of U.S. governmental agencies such
as the Department of State and USAID, which have not only subsidized the activities of U.S.-
based “insider” CSOs, such as the Esquel Foundation and the North-South Center, but also have
assisted foreign CSOs, such as the Chilean Corporación PARTICIPA and the Canadian FOCAL
(both of which also have received support from private foundations and from their own
governments). International intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of
American States and the Inter-American Development Bank have also supported civil society
participation by these and other CSOs. Consistent with theoretical expectations, these networks usually focus on the provision of collective or public goods central to the SOA track, such as the promotion of democracy, education, gender equity, transparency, the rule of law, and so on.

Similarly, we also have observed that domestic opportunity structures and institutional arrangements also have shaped the formation and activities of the “outsiders,” but the valence in terms of state incentives generally works in the opposite direction. As we have noted, the FTAA track is characterized by the blockage of domestic access to societal groups. Since the Miami Summit, the FTAA negotiations have been highly centralized and monopolized by the ministries of trade and finance. This has, in part, been the logical consequence of the domestic political opportunity structures across the region, with most Latin American countries particularly exclusionary in this regard, which is quite different from the institutional arrangements prevailing in CSOs in Canada and the United States. The closed and opaque style of FTAA negotiation proved antithetical to significant civil society participation (even business interests have been only sporadically invited into the discussions dominated by governmental officials). Moreover, trade officials are confident they possess the requisite expertise and have made it clear that they have no need for outside experts, certainly not from labor or environmental groups, thus precluding the options of delegation and self-monitoring.

In addition, again in contrast to the SOA agenda, the most contentious FTAA issues -- foreign investment; which countries will benefit from speculative capital flows, tariffs and non-tariff barriers; intellectual property; and so on -- are not subject to democratic debate. In fact, they entail winners and losers and can have severe distributional consequences and major externalities for third parties, including other governments, firms, workers, farmers, consumers, and others. In view of these fundamental differences, it is hardly surprising that the FTAA track
has given rise to militant and confrontational strategies on the part of “outsider” networks and their labor allies. Consonant with their programmatic agendas and driven by their exclusion from the negotiations, the CSO networks working on trade-related issues have been impelled to overcome their collective action problems by strengthening their ties with organized labor and grassroots constituencies in their own countries and by forming coalitions with like-minded groups throughout the hemisphere.

Is convergence or polarization between networks likely under these conditions? Some observers have defended the view that, although they may not be aware of it, the activities of the “insider” and “outsider” networks complement one another and, therefore, “it is essential for [networks] to maintain open lines of communication and . . . to act in a coordinated manner” (Pagés 2000, 9). However, as we have seen, by the time of the Santiago Summit, a significant divide had emerged between organizations involved in official summit consultations, where “the CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) attending were approved by and quite closely aligned with their governments,” while labor and environmental activists participated in more contestatory alternative events such as the Peoples’ Summit (Seymoar 1999, 403). Some individuals and groups, of course, have sought to operate at the middle of the spectrum. Generally speaking, however, as the post-Santiago Summit and trade ministerial meetings demonstrate, this middle ground is often untenable. Some of these differences are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Convergence/Divergence in Regional Civil Society Networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Insider Networks</th>
<th>Outsider Networks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional</strong></td>
<td>Privilege close links with governmental agencies and international organizations (such as the OAS) on SOA issues. Domestic politics and institutional arrangements facilitate delegation and self-monitoring by networks regarding the provision of public goods.</td>
<td>Privilege ties to labor unions, grassroots social movements. Development of confrontational strategies and oppositional identities vis-à-vis FTAA and globalization. Blockage of access by domestic institutional arrangements and focus on issues with strong externalities and distributional consequences lead networks to seek allies in other countries by forming transnational coalitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structures &amp;</strong></td>
<td><strong>Organizational Path Dependence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective</strong></td>
<td>Strategies of cooperation &amp; collaboration. Policy-oriented research, policy papers addressed to influential political elites. Consultations focused on the official agenda.</td>
<td>Strategies of confrontation, contestation &amp; mobilization. Action-oriented research, critical manifestos addressed to key activists and broad mass publics. Coalition-building with other civil society groups; teach-ins, street protests, and demonstrations. Priority on accumulation of forces and systemic transformation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action Repertoire</strong></td>
<td>Priority on gradual reform of existing institutions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impacts</strong></td>
<td>Relative success in influencing the rhetoric of policy elites on hemispheric issues of the SOA by the politics of information, with less emphasis on generating broad public support.</td>
<td>Relative success in mobilizing grassroots sectors against the FTAA but likely to exercise only indirect influence in shaping the agenda of hemispheric integration through the politics of leverage, symbolic framing, and demands for accountability.</td>
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<td><strong>on the Hemispheric</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Political Agenda</strong></td>
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Source: Authors’ analysis.

One way to think about this issue is to focus on collective action repertoires. Strategic choices by different types of networks combine over time to configure quite distinct patterns of institutional path dependence. “Insider” CSOs and regional networks, whose origins stem from close linkages with governmental agencies committed to summity, quite naturally develop “collaborative” collective action frames. Their specific action repertoires generally focus almost
exclusively on policy-oriented research, the preparation of policy papers, the organization of
civil society consultations around official agendas, and networking with like-minded CSOs from
other countries. In contrast, the collective action frames of “outsider” CSO networks privilege
the politics of “oppositional” identities, and their action repertoires stress contestation -- the
mobilization of grassroots support, the issuance of critical manifestos, public teach-ins, protests,
and demonstrations. They also seek out network partners from other countries with similar
institutional histories and world views.

Hence, we are led to a second conclusion, namely that polarization in terms of strategies
and collective action repertoires, rather than convergence and collaboration, may be the more
likely scenario in future practices of regional networks on issues related to hemispheric
integration. A corollary is that, as the summits and the FTAA negotiations reveal, the risks
entailed in the divergence of trajectories between the different networks is that their contrasting
strategies may foreclose many more opportunities for influence than they ever open.

Instead of fluid lines of communication and potential complementarities implied by an
implicit division of labor (see Pagés 2000), defined by their divergent strategies for collective
action, “insider” and “outsider” groups may inadvertently place their goals at risk because of
growing conflicts and animosity. Were this to occur, it is likely that the “insiders” will opt for
effectiveness and influence vis-à-vis policy elites. While in some cases this might imply
sacrificing popular mobilization, it is also possible that in certain countries their reformist
positions might garner broad public support. In contrast, the “outsiders” may prove capable of
mobilizing considerable popular support (although these mobilizations and their consequences
may be quite episodic and evanescent), but this probably will come at a high price in terms of
lost opportunities to shape the political agenda. This tradeoff between participation and
effectiveness has been an important subtext since Miami and certainly was present at the recent Québec Summit. Moreover, these tensions, and the tradeoffs they entail, can be expected to occupy center stage as preparations for the third Summit, to be held in 2004 in Buenos Aires, proceed and as the planned completion of the FTAA in 2005 nears.

**Conclusions: The Impact of Networks and Emergent Forms of Regulation and Governance**

How effective have regional civil society networks really been in influencing -- and perhaps even transforming -- the national and regional agendas regarding hemispheric integration? Evaluation of the influence and impacts of social movements is a complex task for which there are few theoretical and methodological guidelines.\(^7\) To a very great extent, the answers given hinge on how the questions are asked. Let's begin with a speculative counterfactual question. What if networks of civil society activists had never existed? In their absence, what would the post-Miami trajectory of summitry and FTAA negotiations have looked like?

Merely posing the question in this fashion underscores the obvious inference that without the intense deployment of thousands of people and countless months of “networking” since 1994, the process of hemispheric integration almost certainly would have played out in an entirely different fashion. It is possible that a free trade zone of the Americas might already have become a reality. But what would it look like? What about labor standards and environmental protection? What about the commitments, even if largely rhetorical, that presidents and heads of state have made on issues such as education, gender equity, transparency and corruption, the rule of law, and so many other issues? In the absence of civil society activists and the transnational coalitions they have formed with organized labor and other groups, who doubts that government
officials and corporate leaders, if left to their own devices behind closed doors, would have largely ignored these “non-trade” issues?

Consider the following quotation from an article entitled “Hemispheric Free Trade Is Still a World Away,” published immediately following the Québec Summit by the influential magazine Business Week:

So who gets to write the rules for globalization -- if anyone? How will those rules be enforced? And who loses, and who wins? That was the real debate on the barricades and in the meeting rooms in Quebec. Will the winners be the subsistence farmers of Guatemala and the maquiladoras factory workers in Mexico, or the multinational corporations of the U.S. and Canada? Or will the process of globalization just play itself out without rules? (Business Week Online 2001).

We agree that these indeed are the key questions. And, although frequently derided and ridiculed, it is the “globophobes” -- in all the colors and hues as represented by many (but not all) the “outsiders” and a few (but not most) “insiders” but also the more radical anti-globalization protesters -- who can rightly claim considerable credit for helping place these questions on the hemispheric agenda: Who governs? Who has the power to make and enforce the rules? Who benefits? And how can regional integration be implemented so that it can be made to work on behalf of the majority of the population of the Americas?

There is no shortage of proposals to address these issues. The problem is that many of the proposals designed to make globalization and integration compatible with greater democracy and social justice have not been considered or have never been fully enacted. At least in the short
run, it seems that rules written to promote trade and to protect property rights trump the need for a greater emphasis on investment in basic education and the extension of urgently needed social services. Similarly, the exigencies of flexible labor markets win out over providing unemployment insurance and opportunities to upgrade skills to those displaced by privatization, deregulation, and technological modernization. And guarantees for the free flow of capital are essential, while the right of laborers to migrate across national boundaries has not been discussed formally. The problem is that global markets and free trade really are not “free.” Politically powerful interests -- investors, framers, and even organized labor in some instances -- manage to build all sorts of state protection into free trade agreements. Are these priorities written in stone or inscribed in an inexorable logic of globalization? Or are they about power and the biases of specific institutional arrangements that favor some groups while depriving others of the effective exercise of their voices?

Power -- and the institutional arrangements in which it is inscribed and reproduced -- operates in a sphere in which both “insider” and “outsider” civil society networks appear to be at a significant disadvantage in dealing with governments and the transnational corporate actors that dominate hemispheric politics. Networks do not wield much power, at least not as conventionally defined. They are not political parties, nor do they exercise mandates legitimated in democratic elections, and they certainly do not command impressive material resources. But networks are not without power of a different sort, the power that stems from their specialized knowledge, their values, their ideas, and their moral and ethical convictions. Particularly given the skills they have acquired in recent years in playing the politics of information, symbols, leverage, and accountability, their ability to exercise this second form of power has grown significantly (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).
In the case of the “insiders,” their power and ability to influence national and regional agendas stems primarily from the politics of knowledge that comes with specialized expertise. This knowledge has won them limited access to the decision-making arena, where SOA issues are debated and action agendas are hammered out and then implemented. Their influence is considerable and, to some extent, rests on the considerable mutuality of beliefs and interests they share with many political elites in positions of governmental power. The “insiders” want to make progress more rapidly, and they are frequently frustrated with the resistance they face. However, fundamentally, they want to improve and reform the institutions of hemispheric governance, not overturn them.

The capacity of the “outsiders” to shape national and regional agendas is more nebulous and difficult to pin down. The “outsider” networks frequently excel at critique, pointing out the cynicism, contradictions, and shortsightedness of governmental and corporate elites and calling attention to the timidity of the more ameliorative proposals advocated by their “insider” counterparts. The criticism of the “outsiders” (and more generally of all those who resist the apparent inexorability of globalization) is that they allegedly have no “workable alternative.” The frequently heard refrain is that civil society activists -- particularly the more militant “outsiders” -- should either come up with fully fleshed-out alternative blueprints or cease their political agitation and allow integration to proceed. Seen from the perspective of the longue durée, however, this view misunderstands the historical role that anti-systemic or counter-hegemonic groups have always played. Their task is to critique what exists, raise doubts about elite proposals for reform, and push for more democratic and inclusionary projects that are more respectful of majoritarian interests.
Notes

1 We have analyzed aspects of these transformations in Acuña and Smith (1994); Korzeniewicz and Smith (1996; 2000a; and 2000b); and Smith and Korzeniewicz (1997).

2 We want to make clear that globalization should not be thought of in economistic fashion. As Stark (1998, 69) notes, globalization “refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole. It is a social process in which the constraints of geography on political, economic, social, and cultural arrangements and practices recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding.”

3 The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, for example, now regularly promote the “mainstreaming” and “upstreaming” NGOs, which now are involved in approximately 50 percent of all bank projects (Marc and Schmidt 1995). See Tussie (2000) for an analysis of the different conception of civil society held by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. With some exaggeration, Drainville (2001, 7) refers to the groups and organizations choosing to engage the neoliberal agenda through dialogue in intergovernmental settings as co-opted representatives of an “idealized representation of global order.”

4 Wapner (1995, 313) similarly defines global civil society as “the domain that exists above the individual and below the state but also across national boundaries, where people voluntarily organize themselves to pursue various aims.” In contrast to some earlier, very enthusiastic assessments, recently many authors sound a note of caution regarding the strength of global civil society. Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler (1998, 5), for example, note that “we do find evidence that the construction of a global society is under way but is far from complete.” Different conceptualizations of global civil society alternatively stress elements taken from the Marxist, Hegelian, Lockean, Tocquevillean, and Habermasian “critical theory” traditions. See Lipschutz (1992 and 1996), Wapner (1997), Kaldor (1999), Cohen and Arato (1992).

5 This characterization is probably less true of feminist movements, which have somewhat different origins that are less well captured by a focus on organizational dimensions.

6 Notwithstanding this stress on commonalities in values, we want to emphasize the diversity of these movements and do not wish to ascribe to them any overarching ideological orientation or objectives.

7 Review of the debate and burgeoning literature on transnational civil society networks exceeds the scope of this paper. On the important differences among networks, markets, and hierarchies, see Powell (1990). Transnational advocacy networks are simultaneously principled and strategic actors that “frame” issues. For influential contributions to the literature on transnational issue and advocacy networks, see Keck and Sikkink (1994 and 1998). Castells (1997) offers a series of sweeping arguments about the role of networks in contemporary societies. For preliminary discussion on emergent coalitions involving CSOs and other national and supranational actors, see Korzeniewicz and Smith (2000a and 2000b). The authors are currently engaged in a research project supported by a Ford Foundation grant that provides a more empirically grounded evaluation of a wide variety of regional CSO networks in Latin America.

8 Here we are borrowing freely from a recent paper by Susan Pratt (2001), who provides numerous examples and testable hypotheses grounded in rationalist approaches to collective

9 The Task Force was created by USAID in 1993 prior to the Miami Summit under the leadership of Ramón Daubon. Subsequently, the Esquel Foundation took over responsibility for the Task Force when Daubon left USAID to join Esquel. Since 1998 the Task Force has received USAID funding as well as support from the Mott Foundation. Between the Miami and Santiago Summits, informal negotiating mechanisms operated, but at the Santiago Summit, the creation of the Office of Summit Follow-Up within the Organization of American States was mandated for the purpose of creating a space for civil society participation. For background on these mechanisms, see Esquel Group Foundation (1999a and 1999b).

10 PREAL was created in 1994 with funding from USAID, the Canadian International Development Research Centre, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the GE Fund and is jointly managed by the Corporation for Development Research (CINDE) in Santiago, Chile.

11 It has been more difficult to generate substantial private foundation monies for these civil society initiatives, with the exception of the Ford Foundation, which has supported the work of the North-South Center, PARTICIPA, and many of the regional civil society meetings to generate suggestions for the summit agendas.

12 The objective was to “build political constituencies for the Summit initiatives and foster public support for broader U.S. foreign policy goals in the region” (Thorup 1995, xiv).

13 See <http://www.sociedadcivil.org/eng/proyecto.htm> for extensive documentation on this project.

14 Initially the follow-up initiative included only five countries but was subsequently expanded to encompass all the countries of the region.

15 This is essentially a pragmatic posture since the Council’s membership largely shares the “outsider” view that trade and investment issues are the driving forces of hemispheric integration (see the Council’s working papers on civil society participation available through the North-South Center). Certainly many persons in the U.S. and Canadian governments share this perspective, and this explains why they have promoted, albeit sporadically, CSO participation in the negotiations. Parenthetically, considering the huge turning point signified by the defeat of “fast-track” legislation in the U.S. Congress in 1997 and 1998, it became clear that their concerns certainly were not misplaced.

16 Follow-up for the Santa Cruz Summit was left to the Organization of American States, which had few resources and was only able to implement a few action items (such as biodiversity and the creation of an electronic network of legal experts in environmental law), thereby ignoring most of the agenda.

17 In explaining this mandate, the trade ministers stated, “We recognize and welcome the interests and concerns that different sectors of society have expressed in relation to the FTAA. Business and other sectors of production, labor, environmental and academic groups have been particularly active in this matter. We encourage these and other sectors of civil societies to
present their views on trade matters in a constructive manner.” See the official FTAA website <www.ftaa-alca.org>.

As some of the civil society people noted, the government representatives in the FTAA process would tomarnos el pelo (take us as fools), and the invitation to participate was “at best a buzón (a mailbox) and at worst a lata de basura (a trashcan)” (Pagés 2001 personal communication). Documentation on the CSO submissions can be found on the New Economy Information Service website <www.newecon.org>. Also see the documentation on submissions available on the official FTAA website <www.ftaa-alca.org>.

Our emphasis on “rooted in rationalist arguments” should not be interpreted as implying that concern over material outcomes was the sole, or even necessarily the most important, motivation for networks operating to influence the FTAA trade negotiations. For some groups, “trade,” in this context, is a signifier for broader concerns with challenges to the “corporate logic” of commodification that silences issues related to voice, power, and social justice.

In addition to the Council of the Americas, headquartered in New York, a number of other business networks participate in the Forum/Foro, including, among others, the Consejo Interamericano de Comercio y Producción (CICYP); Caribbean Latin American Action; Red Empresarial para la Integración Hemisférica (REIH), Consejo Industrial del Mercosur; and Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce. See Casaburi and Zalazar (2000).

This is not to say that environmental and labor issues were totally absent at Forum-sponsored discussions held in conjunction with the ministerial meetings. For example, at the Denver Forum some environmental groups did participate, while others organized their own, parallel workshops. The Cartagena and Belo Horizonte Forums had full-scale workshops on labor and environmental issues. At the Costa Rica ministerial meeting, workshops were limited strictly to the FTAA working groups. At the Canadian meetings, the workshops also paralleled the FTAA negotiating groups, while the Canadian government provided support for the parallel Peoples’ Summit, which was dominated by labor and environmental CSOs.

There is a large literature on this topic; for recent discussions see Cook (1997) and Carr (1999).

Again, perspectives vary. Even the more militant “outsider” groups we analyze can be seen by other groups and analysts with other theoretical orientations as merely “would-be representatives of civil society.” See, for example, Drainville (2001).

The full range of the worldwide campaigns on behalf of democratic development, human rights and globalization, and related issues, as well as the extensive list of organizations with which Rights and Democracy maintains linkages can be found on the organization’s website at <www.ichrdd.ca>.

The organizations making up the ART network include the AFL-CIO; American Friends Service Committee; Campaign for Labor Rights; Center of Concern; Committee for New Priorities; Development Gap; Friends of the Earth- U.S.; Global Exchange; Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy; Institute for Policy Studies; Global Economy Project; International Labor Rights Fund; Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns; Mexico Solidarity Network; Preamble Center; Public Services International, Inter-American Regional Office; Resource Center of the Americas; Rural Coalition/Coalición Rural; Tennessee Industrial Renewal
Network; Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees; United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America; United Methodist Women’s Office for Economic Justice; Women of Color Resource Center; and Women’s EDGE. For additional information, see <http://www.art-us.org>.

One example of RMALC’s mobilization strategy during this period was its participation in organizing a 1995 “Referendum de la Libertad,” which gathered support from 430,000 people. RMALC also assumed the leadership of an array of “self-convoked” Mexican CSOs who mobilized on behalf of various anti-globalization campaigns. Among these national organizations most closely linked to RMALC are Centro Mexicano de Legislación Ambiental (the Mexican counterpart of the Institute for Sustainable Development); Centro de Investigación y Solidaridad Obrera; Casa de la Mujer -- Grupo Factor X (a member of the RMALC network); Alianza de Comunidades y Trabajadores de la Industria Química, Atómica y Petrolera; La Neta; and Red de Acción sobre Plaguicidas y Alternativas en México. RMALC also is more loosely linked to an even broader array of CSOs. See De la Cueva (2001), Martínez (2000, 3-4) and RMALC’s web site <www.rmalc.org.mx/rmalc.html>.

See Martínez (2000, 11) for an extensive list of RMALC’s international partners.

Some of the most active Canadian organizations in this national network include Americas Policy Group of Canadian Council for International Cooperation (APG); Canadian Auto Workers (CAW); Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA); Canadian Labour Congress (CLC); Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP); Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice (ECEJ); Inter Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHR/LA); Rights and Democracy; Inter Pares; Low Income Families Together (LIFT); Maquila Solidarity Network; Oxfam Canada; and the Steelworkers Humanity Fund (SHF). Common Frontiers also cooperates closely with the Réseau Québécois sur l’Integration Continentale (RQIC). See <http://www.web.net/comfront/> for additional information.

This support for Common Frontiers clearly stems from the fact that many in the Canadian government believe in participation per se, thereby underscoring that rationalist arguments about delegation, self-regulation, and exclusion cannot provide a complete explanation for state behavior vis-à-vis CSOs.

For the ACJR’s position, see its Carta Social de las Americas (ACJR 1999), especially Chapter 6 (“Nuestra propuesta para una carta social”).

For example, in January 2000 the ACJR proposed to the to Foreign Ministry the creation of a working group -- the Foro Social de la Integración -- on civil society participation in ALCA (Rojas 2000, 28). This initiative led to a public forum in Santiago in June 2000 at which government negotiators led by Under Secretary Heraldo Muñoz (Dirección de Relaciones Económicas) received ACJR proposals regarding investment, services, and agriculture (see <www.art-us.org/HAS.html> and “Propuesta de la Alianza Chilena por un Comercio Justo y Responsable, ACJR, sobre la creación de una instancia de la Sociedad Civil con el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile / Dirección de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (ACJR 2000).

Chilean and Chilean-based CSOs linked to the ACJR include Instituto de Ecologia (IEP); Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo (CENDA); Red Latinoamericana de
Mujeres Transformando la Economía (Sección Chile); Consejo Nacional de Consumidores y Usuarios (CONADECUS); La Liga de Consumidores Conscientes; Grupo de Estudios Agro Regionales (GEA); Red Interamericana de Agricultura y Democracia (RIAD). Several years ago the ACJR experienced a schism over ideology and rejectionism. The current leadership is more inclined toward maintaining channels of dialogue. See <http://www.comerciojusto.terra.cl/> for additional background on the ACJR.

33 For valuable material regarding the origins of the RQIC’s development, particularly its relations with RMALC and the development of a trinational perspective and later with the Brazilian CUT, see the detailed documentation available on the Alternatives website <www.alternatives.ca/rqic/pages/anglais/doc>. Members of the Réseau Québécois include a variety of labor-related groups in Québec, including the Association Canadienne des Avocats du Mouvement Syndical, the Centrale des Syndicats Démocratiques, the Centrale des Syndicats du Québec, the Centre International de Solidarité Ouvrière, the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux, the Fédération des Travailleurs et Travailleuses du Québec. Environmental groups that belong to the Réseau include the Centre Québécois du Droit d’Environnement and the Réseau Québécois des Groupes Écologistes. Development and international solidarity groups include the Association Québécois des Organismes de Coopération Internationale, the Centre D’Études sur les Régions en Développement, Développement et Paix, Fédération des Femmes du Québec, the Groupe de Recherche sur l’Intégration Continentale, and Solidarité Populaire Québec. For a full listing of members, see the Réseau Québécois website: <www.alternatives.ca/rqic/>.

34 Many of these CSOs actively engage in public campaigns to inform public opinion about FTAA-related issues. See, for example, the recent issue (no. 87) of Revista Proposta published by FASE on “ALCA, Questão Democrática e Projeto Nacional.” This special issue includes two articles by REBRIP activists.

35 Indicative of REBRIP’s embryonic organizational existence is that it works out of FASE’s multistory headquarters and does not have an office or website of its own. According to one of its key figures (Mello 2001), REBRIP’s aspiration, when “we’ve become adults,” is to attain the level of organizational consolidation that characterizes RMALC, although it is recognized that this remains a “distant” goal. REBRIP’s work relies on “permanent improvisation” and is dependent on the dedication of a few militants employed by other organizations who are willing to grant them time and the use of their infrastructure.

36 REBRIP’s pro-MERCOSUR stance demonstrates that Alianza members do not necessarily reject all forms of economic integration, particularly when there are well thought out alternatives. Similarly, organized labor need not necessarily adopt protectionist positions vis-à-vis integration efforts. Moreover, in contrast with the situation in other countries with Alianza members, one of the interesting peculiarities of the Brazilian case is the relative absence of “insider” organizations interested in the SOA and FTAA negotiations. This results in a less ideological polarization, which perhaps explains REBRIP’s ability to cooperate with moderate, mainstream organizations as well as with government agencies such as the Foreign Ministry. This also conforms to Itamarty’s practice of reaching out to civil society on an as “as needed” basis, as exemplified in the run-up to the UN conferences on population in Cairo and the Beijing conference on women.
FOCO participated in the 1998 Santiago Summit and had established contacts with the SAPRIN network, which put FOCO into contact with RMALC and Common Frontiers (Carpio 2001; FOCO 2000). Dialogo 2000 was created to support the Jubilee 2000 initiative and has close contacts with human rights groups. It is interesting to note that in December 2000, FOCO, Dialogo 2000, and the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo participated in a delegation with other groups headed by Nobel prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel that met with Foreign Minister Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini to present the Alianza Social Continental’s demand for greater transparency and the liberation of the FTAA documents. Giavarini defended the necessity for secrecy. See “Argentina: Reconoce Canciller el derecho de la sociedad a estar informada sobre negociaciones del ALCA” <www.asc-has.org/noticias.html>.

Prior to the Alianza initiative in late 2000, informal contacts among Dialogo 2000, FOCO, ATTAC, and other groups had led to a growing convergence and informal cooperation.

At present, the principal rivalry for leadership pits FOCO against Dialogo 2000. Instead of selecting a single organization, one alternative under review is to convert the Foro Multisectorial into the Alianza’s Argentine chapter. In any case, the resolution of the union problem will be central, leading civil society activists (Carpio 2001) to consider the possibility of “saying goodbye to the unions” and to give priority to mobilizing CSOs. By the same token, in an interview, a CTA labor activist (Lozano 2001) opined that such a despedida would be a serious error by the Alianza. In his view, FOCO is “irrelevant” and only the presence of Nobel prizewinner Pérez Esquivel gives Dialogo 2000 and Serpaj any significance.

See the websites operated by CLOC <www.irc-online.org/cbl/fairtrade/la/cloc.html> and ASOCODE <www.irc-online.org/cb/fairtrade/la/asocode.html> for additional information on CLOC and ICIC, both of which are extensively networked with other CSOs working on rural and environmental issues.

Reportedly, much of the early civil society language contributed by the environmental groups and the Task Force was consistently rejected by many governments but was put back on the table by Richard Feinberg, then the Clinton administration’s point man for hemispheric summity. In this regard, it is interesting that some people associated with U.S.-based CSOs were essentially “on-loan” to the U.S. government and accompanied official representatives on consultation trips to Latin America, although apparently some of these individuals were asked to leave the room during negotiations in Brazil and Mexico. See Thorup 1995, xx; and Rosenberg 2000).

However, FFL claims that more than 5,000 people from 23 countries participated in its consultation see <http://sociedadcivil.org/eng/osc3.htm>. The Summit itself was coordinated by a civil society organization, the World Resource Institute (WRI) (Shamsie 2000). Notwithstanding the meager results of the Santa Cruz meeting, the Bolivian Summit represented a significant precedent for subsequent civil society “consultas,” such as those that Corporación PARTICIPA would organize, the last of which took place in Miami in early 2001 in preparation for the Québec Summit (see below for details).

We thank Robin Rosenberg of the North-South Center for explaining the politics of the Santa Cruz Summit. Rosenberg occupied the U.S. chair during the talks, thus marking the first time that someone other than an official governmental representative participated in negotiating an official document in a Summit plenary session. See Robin L. Rosenberg, 2001, “The OAS and the Summit of the Americas: Coexistence or Integration of Forces for Multilateralism?” Latin
This meeting was “organized by the task force under official sanction of the OAS and the Technical Advisory Committee for the Bolivia Summit, with added support from USAID’s Latin America and Caribbean Bureau, the Inter-American Foundation and the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDEC)” (Esquel Group Foundation 1999a, 386).

Some observers (Pagés 2001) opine that the Santiago Summit represented a setback for Corporación PARTICIPA and, more generally, for civil society participation. In part this may have been the result of decisions made by the Chilean government. Originally responsibility for civil society participation had been allocated to the Ministry of Planning, which was very open to promoting OSC participation. Subsequently, however, the Ministry of Foreign Relations took over and was more resistant to consultations. As a result, PARTICIPA’s credibility with other OSCs suffered.

See, for example, the initiative put forward at the “foro ambiental” held during the Peoples’ Summit (RCJR 1998a and 1998b).

The most active organizations in the Peoples’ Summit and the signatories of the Summit’s Final Declaration included Common Frontiers (Canada); ART (USA); RMALC (Mexico); Reseau Québécois (Canada); Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT-Brazil); Canadian Labour Congress; Iniciativa Civil por la Integración Centroamericana; ABONG (Brazil); Red Chile de Acción por una Iniciativa de los Pueblos (RECHIP, Chile); Movimiento Unitario Campesino y de las Etnias de Chile (MUCECH); and Colegio de Profesores de Chile.

The Alianza para un Comercio Justo y Responsable (Chile), which had recently divided into two rival groups, was not included in the Coordinating Committee (De la Cueva 2001). Beyond this core group, the Alianza had the support of an additional 300 member groups from virtually all countries in the hemisphere. For details see ART’s website <www.art-us.org/liberatetxt.html> and the Common Frontiers’ website <www.web.net.comfront/>.

An interesting counterfactual hypothesis could be advanced: had the initiative to incorporate significant civil society input into the FTAA negotiations prospered, perhaps it would have proved possible to create a single track for CSO participation. This, in turn, might have tempered, if not reversed, the growing polarization by giving the “outsiders” greater incentive to accept participation in officially sponsored channels.

Again a counterfactual hypothesis may help elucidate the meaning of these events. Had “fast-track” legislation been approved, things might have taken a significantly different course. For example, more collaboration between “insiders” and “outsiders” might have been feasible. In any case, the U.S. government -- and probably the Canadian government as the future host of the Québec Summit -- seemed to learn the lesson that civil society participation is important if the FTAA process is to be politically viable. This may explain, at least in part, the USAID initiative via Esquel to try to stimulate a consultative track for the FTAA. In short, it may be necessary for political reasons to abrir más to greater participation, particularly in countries with strong institutions and activist civil society groups. Unfortunately, some Latin American governments may have learned the opposite lesson -- that “closing” the channels to participation may be preferable to opening them and risking losing control over popular mobilizations. This choice would be revisited in 1999 in Toronto, in Windsor in 2000, and again in early 2001 in Buenos
The situation was complicated. Although a representative of the North-South Center was blocked from participating, more moderate Alianza people did manage to gain entrance on behalf of a representative from the Esquel Foundation, although she was unable to attend for personal reasons (Rosenberg 2000 and Pagés 2001).

The significance of the cresting wave of anti-globalization protests culminating in Seattle (at least 20 meetings and demonstrations took place in the three years prior to Seattle) cannot be underestimated in evaluating the growing confidence of the “outsiders.” For analyses of Seattle and the larger context of anti-globalization protests against the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the World Economic Forum at Davos and similar elite gatherings, see Bello (2001); Chossudovsky (2000); Cockburn, St. Clair, and Sekula (2000); Drainville (2001); Faux (1999); Houtart (2001); and Seone and Taddei (2001).

Similar strategies were implemented elsewhere, including the “Grito de los Excluidos” mobilizations staged in various countries in the hemisphere during October 2000, organized by CLOC, an Alianza network affiliate group, and participation in the World Women’s March in New York City, also held in October 2000.

For details on the protests, see the website of the Coalition to Shutdown the OAS/FTAA <www.tao.ca>.

See, for example, the November 3, 2000 letter to the trade ministers of all the countries participating in the FTAA negotiations (ASC 2000). This letter was signed by 300 groups from Americas, demonstrating the Alianza’s broad potential support base. Later in November, REBRIP, together with the CUT, FASE, the labor research center DIIIESE, the CEDEC social science research center, and the INESC legislative research group, organized a public forum in São Paulo on the “Area de Livre Comércio das Américas: Atores sociais e políticos nos processos de integração” to mobilize support against the FTAA; see <www.asc-has.org/noticias.html>.

Once the Office of Summit Follow-Up was created and the Santiago Summit called upon the OAS to create spaces for civil society participation, it became possible for groups such as Rights and Democracy, the Esquel Foundation, and other Civil Society Task Force members to lobby successfully for the creation of an accreditation mechanism that permits CSOs to receive and submit documents to all OAS meetings (see the information on the OAS website at <www.civil-society.oas.org>). Similarly, when Peter Boehm, Canada’s ambassador to the OAS, became chair of the SIRG he moved to open up the meetings of the OAS Special Committee on Inter-American Summit Management (CEGCI) to presentations by civil society representatives. These recommendations are received by all government representatives and also included in the chair’s report to the SIRG, thus creating an official mechanism for civil society input. (See <www.ameriquescanada.org/politics/civilsociety> for these reports).

The Forum’s Brazilian organizers included ABONG, ATTAC, the Comissão Brasileira Paz e Justiça, the Associação Brasileira de Empresários pela Cidadania, the CUT, the Instituto Brasileiro de Análise Socio-Econômica (IBASE), the Centro de Justiça Global, and the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST). See the final document, “Porto Alegre Call for Mobilisation,” for the proposals for future anti-globalization mobilizations, including a second Forum also to be held in Brazil. The best source on the World Social Forum is the conference’s official website,
<www.forumsocialmundial.org.br>, which has an immense amount of detail on conferences, workshops, manifestos, and other activities. The edited volume by Seone and Taddei (2001) places the Porto Alegre Forum in the larger historical perspective. The Alianza Social Continental, which was well represented in Porto Alegre, specifically linked the Forum to the call for mobilizations in Buenos Aires. See its “Declaración de la ASC sobre el ALCA,” issued in March 2001 <www.asc-has.org/declaracion.html>.

Planning for the Buenos Aires mobilizations against the FTAA began in 2000, with the Comando Central de los Sindicatos del Cono Sur taking the lead. Disputes among the three labor confederations resulted in separate mobilizations and probably actually magnified the scale of the protests. On the background to the Buenos Aires mobilizations, see Lozano (2001) and Carpio (2001). On the strikes and protests themselves, see the press coverage in Página/12 (2001a, 2001b, and 2001b); Clarín (2001); and Inter Press Service (2000 and 2001).

See the impressive website organized by AmericasCanada.org. This site, <www.ameriquescanada.org>, contains invaluable background documents, explanations of participation mechanisms, information on civil society initiatives, information on parallel events, and useful links.

See the joint letter by the Alianza Chilena por un Comercio Justo y Responsable (ACJR) and the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART) dated January 12, 2001, sent to Presidents Lagos and Bush <www.art-us.org/alianza_chilena.htm>.

These consultations took place in collaboration with national CSOs with which PARTICIPA has had long-standing formal and informal contacts. For example, Guiñazú (2000, 6) indicates that “the previously existing level of ties and relationships between PARTICIPA, Conciencia, and Poder Ciudadano to a great extent explains the fact that these latter organizations became PARTICIPA’s privileged interlocutors in Argentina.” The same is true in all the countries where members of PARTICIPA network are active.

One of the participants confided to the authors, “When it became evident that the majority considered the FTAA essential, maneuvering started to diminish the part of the consultation process that would touch on FTAA issues and relate them to the rest of the baskets. As the FTAA and trade kept creeping into the debates, stronger efforts were made [to exclude these issues]. . . . Since the Québec Summit recognized these connections [to the FTAA], it shows how some of the ‘insider’ organizers [of the consultation process organized by PARTICIPA and its partners] were out of step with the process.”


On April 4, 2001, the secretariat in Mexico City sent an e-mail message addressed to the Alianza’s “compañeros” on April 4, warning of the dangers of the government’s plans for a “simulation” of consultation and participation. This e-mail message (INTERNET:asc-1@mail.web.net) was sent to all subscribers to the ASC’s listserv. For the April 19th declaration, see <www.members.tripod.com/~redchile>. In an interview with the authors in Mexico City in February 2001, Hector de la Cueva explained how post-Toronto events had led the Alianza to oppose efforts at the a “simulation” of dialogue and consultation of the type sponsored by the FTAA government representatives and the OAS. He also noted that in September 2000, the Alianza had decided to expel any ASC members who participated in such consultations.
We cannot deal here with the dozens of Canadian CSOs and networks that mobilized for the Québec Summit, many of whom also prepared extensive documents critiquing the FTAA. Simply as one example, we might mention the Canadian Alliance on Trade and the Environment (CATE), a coalition of public and labor groups in existence since the mid-1990s and fully engaged in the struggles against the WTO. Their critique of the Summit and the FTAA (<www.sierraclub.ca/national/trade-env/>) was equally as impressive as those produced by ART and other CSOs.

In addition to speeches by dignitaries, the televised coverage promoted by the Canadian coverage also included statements by representatives of many “insider” CSOs.

For background, see the Black Bloc website (<www.inoshop.org/text/blackbloc_history.html>) and the CLAC site (<www.quebec2001.net.htm>). Not all the protest groups, however, were so radical. See, for example, the “strategy papers” entitled “Mobilizing & Resisting the Summit of the Americas and the FTAA” and “Weaving a Web of Solidarity: A Feminist Action Against the FTAA” put out by Operation SalAMI!, a direct action network born out of the protests against the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) and the WTO. SalAMI!’s goal is “to create a new form of social power with the potential to counter and even reverse the dynamics of impoverishment and destruction” caused by predatory globalization. For SalAMI!’s documents, see the Alternatives website (<www.alternatives.ca/salami>). Confirming what we said earlier, some of these radical groups perceived the “outsider” networks we analyze as “insiders” who had been co-opted by the system. In any case, these groups expressed much of Québec’s continuity with other global protest events such as Seattle and Porto Alegre.

For early post-mortems, see Economist (2001); New York Times (2001b); National Ottawa Citizen Online (2001c); Montreal Gazette.com (2001b); and Washington Post (2001b). See also Feinberg (2001) and two generally upbeat articles by Inter-American Dialogue President Peter Hakim (Christian Science Monitor 2001) and Dialogue member Ambassador Richard Fisher (Dallas Morning News 2001). For more critical reviews, see Kuttner (2001); The Nation (2001); and the denunciation of the FTAA by Brazilian intellectual Helio Jaguaribe in Página/12 (2001d).

For Jordan’s statement, see the ICFTU-ORIT document, “Global Union Demands Stronger Labour Protection in the FTAA,” released on April 24, 2000 (<www.icftu.org>). The ICFTU-ORIT document insisted on strong core labor standards, the creation of a social fund to support the development of the poorer regions in the hemisphere, and the strengthening of subregional accords like MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, and CARICOM before moving toward an FTAA.


Interview with Héctor de la Cueva (2001).

These reflections were stimulated by e-mail exchanges with Bruce Jay. We are indebted to him for sharing his insights on labor and CSOs. Of course, he is not responsible for how we have appropriated -- and, we hope, not distorted -- his ideas. We analyze the relations between CSO

73 For example, the deputy director of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) was both a participant in the Project Advisory Group (PAC) of the OAS’ ISP and in the parallel Peoples’ Summit (Seymoar 1999).

74 See Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly (1999) for a sophisticated survey of the literature on the evaluation of the impacts of social movements.

75 As Keck and Sikkink (1998) and others have pointed out, this is why CSOs should attempt to hold governments to their words, rather than dismissing official commitments as mere rhetoric.
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