The Political Limits to Market Reform in Peru

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In the regional context, the possibilities of sustaining market reforms depend on the construction of a sufficiently strong reform coalition, one that can survive entrenched interests and see the reform process through to the so-called “second stage.” Though certainly not free of their own difficulties, this has been the political economic trajectory of Chile, Argentina, and more recently, Mexico. Under the ten-year reign of President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), Peru never made it past the first stage. The collapse of the political party system, which occurred during the early 1990s in the context of implementing first-generation market reforms, and the consolidation of a government with increasingly authoritarian traits, impeded the formation of a coherent reform coalition. The weakening of electoral competition and social opposition under Fujimori seriously eroded the possibilities for debating alternative policy approaches, even within the market paradigm.

The launching of first-generation reforms was successful in quelling inflation and, after a couple of years of strong recession, in reactivating the economy. The problem was that market reforms also became the hallmark of a successful coup d’Etat, and the basis for consolidating an authoritarian regime. Fujimori’s adoption of the “Washington Consensus” was useful in that he had no real program of his own; in addition, he was able to use a radical version of market reforms as justification for the liquidation of social, political, and institutional norms associated with what he considered the country’s
“disastrous populist past”. The combination of the opposition’s extreme weakness, and the very nature of the social and political coalition that gained hegemony, virtually impeded the consolidation of market reforms in Peru.

Quite unexpectedly, after a highly contested 2000 presidential election in which Fujimori finagled an unprecedented third term through an unfair and controlled election, the former president resigned and found refuge in Japan—where he remains protected by a questionable Japanese nationality. New elections were held in 2001, in the midst of shocking revelations about widespread corruption under fujimorismo. In this entirely new context and with a democratic transition government in place, the main presidential candidates—including Alejandro Toledo, ultimately the victor of those elections—embraced the rhetoric of second-generation reforms. Peru suddenly has the opportunity to pursue that agenda, which includes a more assertive approach toward strengthening democratic governance and income equality. It must be noted, however, that Toledo’s party, Perú Posible, is a very weak and improvised organization which lacks a majority coalition in the new Congress. This situation could complicate the implementation of second-generation reforms, despite Toledo’s avowed commitment to that agenda during his campaign.

The Lack of Second-Generation Reforms and the Particularity of the Peruvian Situation

There is a history that is more or less common to those Latin American countries that experienced hyperinflation in the 1980s and subsequently implemented market-oriented reforms. Each began the adjustment process and rapidly developed highly presidentialist political trends—what Guillermo
O'Donnell has coined “delegative” democratic regimes.\(^1\) Political party systems were subject to tremendous change, as key actors were forced to compromise on their traditional demands. Civic organizations were generally weakened by autocratic executive leadership coalitions, although presidents like Carlos Menem and Víctor Paz Estensoro were also masterful at blending old-style politics with their market reform agendas. Once inflation was stabilized and growth restored, a certain political homeostasis followed, which made possible the continuity of those presidents that had spearheaded the adjustment process (Argentina and Brazil), or the revamping of the political party system to finally overcome extra-systematic challenges (Bolivia).\(^{ii}\)

Over time, the achievement of political and economic stability made it possible for opposition forces to reemerge, forcing governments to become more open and accountable, or less “delegative.”\(^{iii}\) By the mid-1990s, attention was drawn to long-neglected social programs and to the ineffectiveness of market reforms in achieving the goals of more equitable growth. This combination of heightened political competition and social erosion helped shift attention to the institutional problems that still remained. In Chile and Argentina, for example, a social-democratic coalition of sorts came to the fore, and advanced a second-generation reform agenda that focused on these very problems.\(^{iv}\) In essence, second-generation reforms were a response to the failures of the market and a call for public policy to rectify the market’s shortcomings. To this end, it was proposed that the state’s capacity be rebuilt, that it be consolidated institutionally, and that more stable relationships be established between the state and various civic organizations.

The second-generation reform agenda is well underway in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, even though each of these countries underwent very different adjustment processes with varying degrees of severity. In all of these
cases, relatively strong coalitions have come together around distributional and institutional issues and have even captured the presidency in highly competitive elections, as in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Peru, interestingly, has followed a much different path than the one just described. Until very recently, with the collapse of the Fujimori regime and the 2001 elections, the script for second-generation reforms was played out rhetorically in local political discourse, but it lacked actors with the power and commitment to carry it out. First-generation reforms were carried out by President Fujimori in a very swift and thoroughgoing manner, at enormous costs yet without major opposition. The other country cases in this volume readily show that the same course of action is not viable when it comes to fine-tuning market reforms along the lines of the second-generation agenda. Thus, this chapter explores the pitfalls of market reform under Fujimori, as well as the possibilities for forging ahead with the more inclusive and transparent program promised by the new government.

**Fujimorismo and the Launching of Structural Reforms**

Beginning in August 1990, the Fujimori team began implementing radical market reforms after running a campaign that had pledged a much more gradual adjustment. An independent political outsider without a formal party, Fujimori had reached the presidency almost by accident and thus quickly consolidated his power by establishing an alliance with the armed forces and the *poderes fácticos* (real powerholders). The new government faced a chaotic and highly explosive situation, and succeeded in stabilizing the economy and confronting terrorism through tight political control and firm leadership—to the point of abusing presidential prerogatives. In doing so, Fujimori and his new
allies readily marginalized those traditional political and social actors that had controlled the political rules of the game until then. Fujimori’s success in managing the economy and in quelling guerrilla violence gave broad legitimacy to his presidency and policy program. This is what made possible the April 1992 autogolpe, during which Fujimori single-handedly suspended the 1979 Constitution and disbanded the Peruvian Congress.

In retrospect, the first-generation reform agenda proved useful to this pragmatic president: it enabled him to give direction and content to his calls for a new political order. In addition, this agenda enabled him to further consolidate power within a small, impenetrable circle of advisors that did not hesitate to make decisions that entailed high social costs. Finally, this course of action enabled Fujimori to reestablish strong ties with transnational actors, such as the multilaterals and the U.S., which further bolstered the reform process. And so in Peru we witnessed, especially in the first half of the 1990s, a radical change in the economic role of the state, and the implementation of stabilization policies that conformed closely with the dictates of the market (trade liberalization, tax reform, privatization, labor reforms, and pension system reform).

Fujimori’s initial success in implementing market reforms meant that those same international actors were willing to cut him some slack when it came to restoring democratic norms in Peru after the 1992 coup. Nevertheless, the international consensus was that democracy would be a necessary condition for Peru’s full reintegration into the world economy. Thus, the country entered a protracted transition that included the election of the Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD) in late 1992, the approval of a new Constitution in 1993, and the 1995 elections for president and Congress. However, these new institutions and elections did not exactly mark the return
to democracy, despite the broad electoral legitimation of *fujimorismo*. It was the consolidation of a “democratic regime” with strong authoritarian tendencies that seriously limited the possibilities for establishing effective political competition. This pattern continued and became more acute throughout Fujimori’s second presidential term (1995–2000), which saw strong executive tutelage over the operation of government institutions, and a symbiosis between the Fujimori administration and the Peruvian state. Because of these blurred lines, I argue that *fujimorismo* should be categorized as authoritarian because elections in and of themselves did not add up to a representative democracy; on the contrary, they legitimated an authoritarian caudillo who consciously sought to control all major state institutions in order to continue in power.

During the first half of the 1990s, the market reform agenda was functional to *fujimorismo* in that it produced concrete results: the economy stabilized and began to grow, the terrorist groups were defeated, and the investment climate was favorable for the first time since the 1979 mineral price boom. All of this translated into impressive electoral support and very high approval ratings for President Fujimori across the social and political spectrum. Yet, beginning in 1996, in the early days of Fujimori’s second term, things began to change. Not only did a recession kick in due to the Asian financial crisis and another El Niño shock, but the administration suffered a growing loss of legitimacy, as a consequence of the maneuvers followed in order to obtain a third inconstitutional term in office. Even more serious, with the exhaustion of the arsenal of first-generation reforms, Fujimori increasingly relied on short-term social spending which subordinated the government’s agenda to his personal objective of remaining in power. All of this was hard to reconcile with the launching of second-generation reforms.
As slower growth came to plague Fujimori’s second term, this marked the end of the honeymoon between the citizenry and fujimorismo. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, approval for the economic program began to fall steadily from early 1996, after two-and-a-half years of a steady climb (since mid-1993, and throughout all of 1994 and 1995). As of mid-1996, disapproval ratings began to overtake approval ratings, which continued to drop through 1999, by which time the 2000 presidential campaign was well underway. The perception of economic crisis and recession also undermined approval of the president’s performance, which began to fall steadily as of mid-1996. Between April 1992 and mid-1996, Fujimori’s approval rating had rarely fallen below 60 percent.

These growing economic difficulties were compounded by the President’s political problems. As I noted above, throughout Fujimori’s second administration one of the key issues on the political agenda was his intention to seek election to a third term. As of August 1996, with the “law on the authentic interpretation” (“ley de interpretación auténtica”) of the Constitution, the disputes over this third term began and continued up until the April 2000 election. Because Fujimori’s reelection in 2000 was unconstitutional, practically the entire institutional order had to be subjugated to this end. For example, the Judiciary was overhauled (June 1996), as was the Public Ministry (January 1997); the Constitutional Court was then purged, with the removal of three of its seven members (May 1997); the functions of the National Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura) were curtailed (March 1998); the holding of a referendum on the reelection of the president was stopped by Fujimori’s cronies in Congress (August 1998); and the possibilities of the
electoral authorities declaring Fujimori’s candidacy illegal had to be limited (May 1999). All of these actions were condemned in public opinion polls, and damaged the regime’s legitimacy.

One might think that to secure his own reelection the taking on of second-generation reforms could have proved useful to Fujimori, insofar as this might have boosted the legitimacy that the regime had been losing since 1996; this might also have given direction to a spent and excessively short-term approach to economic management, and it could have rallied political support for the president’s reelection within valid democratic circles. To understand why that path was not taken requires understanding the nature of the regime and those political coalitions that supported fujimorismo.

<A>Fujimorismo: The Regime and Accompanying Coalition of Interests</A>

The initial logic of closed and isolated decisionmaking at the top became a trademark of the Fujimori era. This was comprised of a small circle, with Fujimori at the center, surrounded by a select group of advisers that included Vladimiro Montesinos from the National Intelligence Service (SIN). Montesinos quickly became a central figure, and responsible for the execution of most political decisions. This circle became impenetrable even to the cabinet ministers. Whereas under more democratic circumstances everyday political decisions are negotiated via party leaders and interest group factions, in this case it was conducted mainly with SIN and the top-ranking officers of the armed forces. Without them, Fujimori would have had to enter openly into negotiations and compromise with various actors, which was not his style of decisionmaking.
Fujimorismo then, was a very personalistic regime, based on the control of state resources. Its anti-institutional nature lay in the fact that there was not, properly speaking, any political movement behind it. The various incarnations of this movement—Cambio 90, or Nueva Mayoría, or Vamos Vecinos, or Perú 2000—were only electoral vehicles, and not authentic representational organizations. As there was no movement or organization that benefited from his political capital, the survival of fujimorismo depended exclusively on staying in power. This, in turn, required access to state resources, so as to maintain vertical clientelistic relations with the popular sectors. Hindsight shows how quickly these imperatives turned into political manipulation, as Fujimori’s political survival meant avoiding the uncertainty of electoral mechanisms at all costs. Reelection was thus a crucial issue, and this had become all too clear by the time of the 2000 presidential elections.

Fujimorismo, unable to resolve the reelection question by legitimate institutional means, simply ran roughshod over the prevailing legal order. This had high political costs, especially given the context of economic slowdown, which further diminished the regime’s legitimacy. In such a scenario, it would have been difficult to push the agenda of second-generation reforms, which frequently entail, at least in the short run, some economic pain for benefits that are dispersed and medium term. In addition, by their very nature, second-phase reforms demand a more democratic approach. Such mechanisms of coordination and consensus-building with political and social groups were incompatible with the nature of the Fujimori administration.

Fujimorismo always had the support of the “winners” of the reform process: that sector of the business community which is linked to large-scale mining interests, finance, and commerce, who benefited from trade liberalization, privatization, and foreign investment. Yet this sector, while
strategic, is extremely small and thus not able to deliver the electoral gains sought by Fujimori in 2000. For this, the regime’s legitimacy depended on the support of the poor, who make up the lion’s share of the electorate. Thus, state spending grew considerably in those categories that increased coverage for the poor. This may seem paradoxical given the anti-statist tone of neoliberalism. But thanks to privatization, the upturn in tax revenues, and greater access to loans from abroad, the Peruvian state has renewed its economic presence. According to Adrianzén, between 1992 and 1998 the public budget expanded nearly fivefold.

Most significantly, per capita social spending climbed from $12 in 1990 to $158 in 1996, while also increasing as a percentage of GDP. In fact, the second Fujimori administration saw the highest social expenditure levels in more than two decades, and this helps explain the regime’s greater support from the poorest of the poor. This social spending was not executed through the social ministries (education and health), but rather through the Ministry of the Presidency, which rendered it highly subject to clientelism rather than state initiatives. The high political dividends reaped by these anti-poverty policies were readily apparent when comparing the results of the much contested 1993 referendum on the new constitution with the outcome of the 1995 presidential and congressional elections, where Fujimori won a clear majority.

Yet, as mentioned earlier, fujimorismo faced steadily mounting opposition by 1996. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, approval ratings for the opposition came to equal those of the president by mid-1997, with the trend continuing into late 1998. When these data are examined in more detail, it becomes clear that the legitimacy of fujimorismo varied in this period by social sector. Five major stages stand out in terms of gauging the legitimacy of fujimorismo in the 1990s. The first is the “honeymoon,” right after Fujimori’s election in 1990; the second
is the adjustment crisis, from January to September 1991, when the Fujimori government faced considerable opposition; the third, the long stage of hegemony, extended from October 1991 to October 1996; the fourth, that of mounting political and economic crisis, from November 1996 to December 1998; and the last is marked by the 2000 elections, which I examine below.

Here I would like to emphasize that the end of the third stage, marked by hegemony, ushered in the fourth stage: average approval ratings for the president fell from about 65 percent to 39 percent. Nonetheless, when disaggregating that information by social group there emerges a difference of almost 10 percent between the B sector (middle) and the D sector (lower), with the latter voicing stronger support for the president. The differences between these two sectors reached 15 percent from 1999 to early 2000, the period leading up to the 2000 elections.\textsuperscript{xix}

[Table 8.1 near here]

In aggregate terms the greatest opposition to \textit{fujimorismo} came from the middle sectors, who were hard hit by the crisis, and who benefited only marginally from the numerous public works and state assistance; the same holds for the wage-earning popular sectors, hard-hit by more flexible labor rules and the expansion of temporary and other precarious forms of employment. If we analyze, for example, wage trends in the private-sector economically active population (EAP), we find it has been falling steadily. The same can be said for the ratio of the number of unionized workers to the members of the EAP who could potentially be unionized.

[Table 8.2 near here]
This led to a notable loss in workers’ bargaining power, reflected in the steady decline in real wages, which had been high even by regional standards. This prompted the existing unions to be highly critical of the government, and to seek entrance to the political arena to defend their interests. Trade union leaders, for example, sought elected office in the 2000 congressional race, although with little success given the enormous size of Peru’s informal sector.

The middle class and other members of the formal labor market residing in the main urban areas were not the only ones to distance themselves from fujimorismo. Ever larger sectors of the business class did so as well. In general, profits increased much faster than salaries and wages in recent years, but those producers whose fortunes were bound up with the domestic market displayed ever more autonomy vis-à-vis the government, in some cases openly opposing it. This rising opposition from business was based on other economic complaints—a contraction in demand, high interest rates, low exchange rates, a heavy tax burden, and the absence of constructive dialogue with the government when voicing their concerns.

Over time, the business component of Fujimori’s coalition—which had been relatively solid until early 1997—fragmented. It is interesting to note that the CONFIEP (Confederación de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas), the highest-level business association, had clearly split in two because of controversies about how to face the government policies by March 1998. The split was reflected in the controversial election of Manuel Sotomayor as president of the CONFIEP. Behind Sotomayor were the associations favored by Fujimori’s economic policy: large companies linked to primary exports and financial activities (e.g. the Sociedad Nacional de Minería y Petróleo, the Sociedad Nacional de Exportadores, the Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería, the
Asociación de Banca y Seguros). On the other side were those businesses linked to production and trade in the domestic market, and medium-scale exporting concerns (the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias, SNI; the Asociación de Exportadores, ADEX; and the Cámara de Comercio de Lima, CCL). Once Sotomayor was elected, the latter associations announced that they would not participate in the meetings of the Executive Committee of CONFIEP, something which was until then unthinkable. In late 1998, ADEX, SNI, and CCL formed the Coordinadora Gremial de Producción, which directly competed with CONFIEP in representing private interests before the state. In addition, these associations began to distance themselves from Fujimori’s campaign for reelection in 2000.

The breakaway of this sector of business found its highest expression when well-known business leaders sided with opposition political movements in the 2000 elections. Thus, Eduardo Farah, former president of the SNI, ran for first vice-president and congressman on the opposition ticket of Solidaridad Nacional; Carlos Bruce, former president of ADEX, was a candidate for Congress on the Somos Perú ticket, another opposition faction; similarly, David Waisman, representative of the small business committee (COPEME) of the SNI, ran for Congress and for second vice president on the Perú Posible ticket; and finally, Eduardo McBride, also a former president of ADEX, ran for Congress, also on the Perú Posible ticket. It is interesting to note that these businessmen took on as their own the discourse the need for second-generation reforms, which had practically become a matter of common sense in the business world. One expression of this was the invitation to Moisés Naím, the author of an influential article on this very subject, to be the keynote speaker at the Annual Conference of Executives in January 2000. In addition, the leading presidential candidates, except for President Fujimori, attended that meeting in
order to lay out their proposals; Fujimori had figured that the business environment, where the emphasis was on strengthening institutions, would be hostile to him.

In sum, *fujimorismo* faced mounting opposition from the middle sectors, the trade unions, and business interests linked to the domestic market. As such, in the 1997–1999 period, the ideal conditions existed for the formation of a reformist coalition to back second-generation reforms that promised to correct for the policy weaknesses inherent in *fujimorismo*. The themes of debate increasingly centered on the need to institutionalize the state, to overcome poverty, to improve the distribution of wealth, and to generate greater consensus on various issues. It is in this context that several political movements emerged, which claimed to be “independent” (i.e. not affiliated with any political party), and embodying the aspirations for change. The most important of these was Somos Perú, the movement built around Lima mayor Alberto Andrade, who was elected in 1995 and reelected in 1998. The polls leading up to the 2000 elections suggested from mid-1997 to mid-1999 that the next president would be Alberto Andrade.

Peru could have continued down a path like that of Argentina, where *el menemismo* entered into crisis and lost legitimacy. Despite Menem’s efforts to secure a third term in 1999, the opposition effectively regrouped around second-generation social and institutional issues, which finally led to an opposition victory. Nonetheless, this did not happen in Peru. The 2000 elections, although a sham, resulted in a very high vote in favor of Fujimori’s reelection. There was also a strong showing for opposition candidate, Alejandro Toledo; however, this was not the result of the consolidation of a cohesive opposition front, but rather a surprising and spontaneous movement by the electorate akin to Fujimori’s 1990 “flash candidacy.” Like Fujimori’s 1990
victory, Toledo drew mainly on ethnic and symbolic themes in his 2000 bid for the presidency, raising the need to promote the creation of more jobs as a slogan, but without infusing much serious policy debate into the race.

**The 2000 Elections in Retrospect**

The election that was held on April 9, 2000, was preceded by several clearly marked stages. As Figure 8.2 shows, from 1997 to mid-1999 it appeared that the elections would be highly disputed. Given the crisis of *fujimorismo*, it seemed at this time that there was a greater potential for an opposition movement to win. In the second stage, Fujimori pulled ahead as the clear favorite, far ahead of his nearest rival; the third stage was marked by the “Toledo phenomenon,” as this candidate skyrocketed in the polls just five or six weeks prior to the election, capturing 37 percent of the votes cast on April 9. Below I review each of these stages and their implications.

**[Figures 8.2 and 8.3 near here]**

As illustrated in Figure 8.2, from mid-1997 to the first quarter of 1999, Lima mayor Alberto Andrade led Fujimori in the polls, in some months with quite a substantial lead. In December 1998, just after the municipal elections in which Andrade was reelected mayor of Lima, he led Fujimori by 15 percentage points. Nonetheless, Fujimori clearly began to overtake his rivals in the polls as of the second half of 1999 and up to February 2000, when Toledo quickly appeared as a significant challenger.

As noted above, the crisis of *fujimorismo* from 1996 to 1998 was associated, first, with the economic slowdown, and, second, with the scandals
related to the President’s reelection bid. Fujimori’s recovery in 1999 was due mainly to political factors, although it also occurred in the context of a slight economic recovery. According to official estimates, national output grew 3.8 percent in 1999; the trend toward recovery up through the April 2000 elections may be seen clearly when analyzing the monthly data (see Figure 8.3). Even though these figures have been hotly debated, a fiscal stimulus helped create the image that the recession had come to an end. In a 2000 survey administered by myself and Patricia Zárate, we found that from 1998 to 1999 pessimism regarding Peru’s economic future and families’ welfare had diminished, and there was increased optimism, at least regarding to the country’s short term prospects.

But the main explanation for the revival of support for *fujimorismo* is to be found in politics. The notable increase in Fujimori’s standing in the polls resulted from some of the government’s achievements that went together with dirty political maneuvers, that proved the authoritarian nature of the government. They bolstered its legitimacy, especially given the weakness of the political opposition.

Some of the government’s pre-election achievements throughout 1999 included the signing of a peace accord with Ecuador; the resolution of some pending border problems with Chile; the capture of the main Shining Path leader that was still free, “comrade Feliciano”; and also the skillful political handling of certain situations that enabled Fujimori to exploit citizens’ fears and prejudices. One example was Peru’s withdrawal from its membership in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, over Fujimori’s dispute concerning the Court’s rulings on Peru. The Court handed down a ruling requiring the government to re-try several Chilean terrorists who are members of the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) (who had been given life
sentences), but this time with respect for the provisions of “due process.”. With the withdrawal, Fujimori’s approval augmented in the polls. The reaction of the opposition revealed its myopia, facing this discussion in legal terms, without offering a political stand on security issues and antisubversive policies. xxv

This leads us to the discussion about the weakness of the political opposition. To fully understand this, we should recall a little the story of the re-election referendum. In response to the regime’s strategies to win reelection, the opposition convoked a referendum in September 1996 that called into question the law approving Fujimori’s third presidential bid that had been adopted a month earlier by the Congress. Thus, in the lengthy and conflictive period from September 1996 to July 1998, the opposition collected 1,441,535 signatures of citizens who questioned Fujimori’s third candidacy, and asked that a referendum be called. During this period, the opposition projected a clear identity, articulated a common discourse, and focused on this concrete objective—which helped to increase its legitimacy. As of mid-1998, the struggle for the referendum coincided with municipal elections in November, in which it was expected (and later confirmed) that the government was not capable of winning a majority in the major cities.

At any rate, the struggle for the referendum ended in August 1998 when the regime, having manipulated all possible legal remedies, blocked it in Congress. Even though this clearly discredited the president, the opposition suffered an even worse fate: it suddenly had no identity, and no rallying cries. The opposition had relied too much on anti-fujimorismo, and it fragmented in the absence of a cohesive program that represented a credible alternative to the regime. The 1998 municipal elections revealed the cleavages within the opposition, as each political faction went into that contest independently.
This splintering of the political opposition persisted through 1999, in anticipation of the 2000 elections. The opposition vote was divided among several weak candidates, neither of whom was able to adopt a clear stance and catalyze the anti-fujimorista vote or cater to the average voter and attract the undecideds. In fact, these turned out to be contradictory goals. If we take the approval rating of the opposition as an indicator of the anti-fujimorista vote, it came to nearly 38 percent in 1997 and 1998; during this same period, approximately 40 percent approved of the president’s performance. This indicated that about 20 percent of all voters were undecided, and it was this group that would determine the results of the 2000 elections. The problem was that, in order to attract the undecided, it was necessary to adopt a centrist and moderate discourse, while the antifujimorista vote expected a hard line discourse. In addition, the opposition was dispersed among various candidates. For Fujimori, things were easier. His discourse stressed the importance of order, stability and continuity, and only minor changes in his style of government.

Thus, from mid-1999 until just six weeks prior to the elections, Fujimori’s triumph seemed inevitable, in both the first and second rounds, as the incumbent faced off against a line-up of highly divided opposition candidates. Nonetheless, total support expressed for the various opposition candidates continued to outstrip that garnered by Fujimori. This, of course, provided a strong incentive for the opposition to seek the kind of electoral coalition witnessed in Argentina, which readily handed De la Rúa the presidency. In November 1999, the entire opposition did sign an “Agreement on Governability to Guarantee Democracy, Justice, and Development in Peru,” which was considered a first step towards a broader coalition, and the possibility of nominating a single opposition candidate. This possibility was
discussed extensively from November 1999 to January 2000; however, it never came to pass.

Why did the opposition fail to unite for the 2000 elections, virtually handing Fujimori another triumph? As can be seen in Figure 8.2, in January 2000, just three months before the elections, Fujimori stood at 45 percent in the polls, while his closest competitor, Alberto Andrade, was at only 19 percent. That same month, the polls showed the sum of all the opposition candidates almost equal to Fujimori. How did the opposition let this political opportunity slip through its fingers, and instead succumb to a sort of collective suicide? Why, with a major programmatic platform explicitly expressed in the Agreement on Governability, was it not possible for the opposition to craft a political pact?

I believe that the answer lies in Peru’s electoral system, and in the nature of the political opposition. First, according to the 1993 Constitution, if no candidate obtains an absolute majority in the first round of voting then there must be a second runoff election between the two leading candidates. Even though Fujimori appeared quite close to winning the first round with an absolute majority, this was far from guaranteed. This meant that for the opposition candidates taken together, the main fight would be for second place; in a second-round scenario it was projected that the sum of the opposition votes could overtake support for Fujimori. Hence, the struggle for second place was highly disputed from mid-1999 to March 2000, just one month prior to the elections, as can be seen in Figure 8.2.

It could be said, then, that the opposition faced a typical collective action problem: that individual preferences prevailed, producing a decidedly less-than-optimal outcome. It is interesting to compare the Peruvian case with Argentina, where the opposition formed a “Democratic Alliance” between the Partido Radical and FREPASO. Why, in that case, was it possible to reach agreements,
and not in Peru? Indeed, the Peruvian Agreement on Governability was clearly
inspired by the Argentine alliance. My answer is, first, that in Argentina there
is also a two-round system for the presidential election, but absolute majority is
not required to win in the first round. This raises the costs of fragmentation for
the opposition. Second, I believe that in Argentina, for a party with a long
history such as the Partido Radical, and with solid constituencies to satisfy, the
cost of remaining out of power indefinitely was far too high. In addition, for the
Radicals it was an attractive alliance because they could lead it, given their
greater organizational strength vis-à-vis FREPASO, a relatively new movement
without broad national representation. For FREPASO, precisely because it was
new, just entering the national government within an electoral coalition was
already a tremendous gain.

The Peruvian case is worlds apart from this scenario: political parties
have been completely eclipsed by new, weak, and inexperienced movements
without well-defined positions, and for which even a small parliamentary
representation would be a sufficient reward. Again, this logic was encouraged
by the electoral system, whereby the Congress was elected in a single national
district, with low barriers to entry based on a proportional representation
formula which requires just 0.8 percent of all votes just to get a seat.

In the end, opposition movements became pawns of the public opinion
polls. These movements begin with the repeated mention of certain persons
with regard to voter intent. Once a name begins to appear as *presidenciable*,
the “candidate” tries to rally a movement in order to participate in the election.
Most of these candidates built their public image as that of an independent
pragmatist capable of undertaking the major tasks of public administration,
with no ties to political parties. It was, then, a certain expectation on the part
of the citizenry that gave rise to these movements, rather than the specific
proposals put forth by the opposition leaders. This explains the absence of clear political positions, the extreme personalism of some of these movements, and why they avoided getting too close to the “traditional parties.” This, of course, made it all the more difficult to form a united front in opposition to fujimorismo. As they were highly conditioned by the polls, these movements were overly reliant on the shifting moods of public opinion. Accordingly, their insertion into media politics, in particular electoral marketing, explains their measured success, but also their great weakness, subject to the volatility of the opinion polls.xxvi

This made them highly vulnerable to the systematic campaign of discredit sponsored by the regime, through a handful of sensationalist daily newspapers and control of the main broadcast media. The regime also benefited from the open use of state resources in favor of the Fujimori campaign; they even developed strategies to harass or buy opposition candidates. All this made it impossible to speak of “free and fair” elections by international standards. This has been extensively verified by a series of outside observers: the mission from the Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute, the U.S. State Department, the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), the Electoral Reform International Service, and the Washington Office on Latin America.xxvii Corresponding Peruvian observers such as Transparencia, Foro Democrático, the Consejo por la Paz, and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), have reached the same conclusion.

Few doubted that the third candidacy of President Fujimori was basically a sham: the situation within the legal institutions was highly irregular and government resources were used to favor the candidate already occupying the presidency. These watchdog groups also criticized the limits on opposition
candidates’ access to the mass media, especially television, and the systematic campaigns of discredit and harassment that opposition candidates suffered. Irregularities in voter registration and in the workings of the election authorities were also found. This made the April 2000 election the least credible of the 14 elections held since Peru’s transition to democracy in 1978. On the one hand, was a government that controlled all aspects of the process necessary to remain in power, while at the same time attempting to maintain its image of fulfilling the democratic will of the people; on the other hand, through its very participation, the opposition did not know if it was legitimizing a vitiated process, or whether it could actually take advantage of existing democratic spaces, despite the regime’s tight control.

The deepening of authoritarianism and weakness of the opposition tended to eclipse the issue of second-generation reforms now facing the country. As a result, the campaign was sorely lacking in ideas, proposals, and programs for advancing the country’s development. Instead, most of the spotlight fell on the irregularities of the elections, so much so that president-candidate Fujimori never bothered to present a government plan for the 2000–2005 period, and made sure not to participate in any of the forums organized to debate the candidates’ proposals.

Surprisingly, just six weeks before the elections, the “Toledo phenomenon” took off, as registered in Figure 8.2 and Table 8.3. A candidate who three months prior to the elections barely made a showing in the polls ended up with 37 percent of the votes cast. As the data show, practically the entire opposition vote quickly and spontaneously went to a single candidate, an outcome that opposition leaders had been unable to achieve through collective unity. Who is Alejandro Toledo? Toledo is another “independent” figure, an economist with a technocratic bent, who had already mounted an unsuccessful
bid for the presidency in 1995. Toledo headed up a movement, Perú Posible, an improvised organization, built around this caudillo, at a moment when no one could have foreseen that he was going to be the main actor of the democratic transition. This helps us understand why his movement was even less consistent than other movements like Somos Perú or Solidaridad Nacional, insofar as, at the outset of the campaign, the possibilities of success seemed minimal.

[Table 8.3 near here]

The official election results are summarized in Table 8.4. Several things stand out: First is the very high vote for Fujimori, even after a series of political mishaps and an economic slowdown from 1996 to 1999 (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2) (note that fujimorismo came very close to winning an absolute majority in the Congress); second, the very high vote for Toledo, which materialized in a matter of weeks, shows the extreme fragility and volatility of political party affiliations; third, the very low vote for all of the other candidates reflected the electorate’s disillusionment concerning the inability of these figures to present a cohesive alternative to fujimorismo. Especially striking is the virtual disappearance of votes for candidates once deemed viable, such as Andrade and Castañeda, in just a matter of weeks.

[Table 8.4 near here]

There has been considerable debate about the validity of these figures, and widespread talk of voting fraud. I believe we had an absolutely unfair, controlled and manipulated electoral campaign on behalf of the government,
due to its authoritarian nature, and this was widely registered by all impartial observers. However, the results cited do not differ substantially from the counts done by electoral observation groups of unquestionable independence, such as Transparencia. In other words, on April 9, 2000 no gross fraud was committed, even though in general the electoral process was absolutely rigged.

It should be noted that Fujimori was just 0.13 percent from winning the necessary majority to avoid a second-round vote, and we have evidence that there was a machinery in place ready to manipulate the outcome, through the ONPE (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales). That this did not happen is only because of the broad mobilization inside Peru and strong external pressures. These were catalyzed by a fortuitous event: On April 9, at 4 p.m., all exit polls showed Alejandro Toledo the winner (46 percent, to 42 percent for Fujimori); but at 9 p.m., the same pollsters, with information from the tallied votes, reported the opposite results. This sparked the sensation that there had been intentional fraud, and public distrust was further fueled by the fact that there was no way to oversee the official vote count, which, moreover, was plagued by irregularities.

The U.S. State Department and the U.S. Congress spoke out against the possible electoral fraud, as did the governments of the European Union. It appears that these internal mobilizations and external pressures together deterred the government from proclaiming a first-round victory on April 9. Everyone—especially the government—was surprised by how strong and sustained the pressures were for a legitimate vote count. This pressure on the external front, which until then had been relatively complacent toward Fujimori, kept the government from trying to repeat an April 1992–type strategy: strike first and then negotiate later. This change in attitude of
foreign governments towards Peru was key, especially because it upset the
domestic alliances on which fujimorismo had always been based.

In the days leading up to the May 28 runoff election, the OAS observation
mission, in response to requests from almost all independent Peruvian and
foreign observers, recommended that the election be put off for just 10 days, to
overcome some technical problems so as to make it possible for the balloting to
be characterized by the OAS as free and fair (at the core of these problems was
a review of the vote counting program). The request by the OAS mission was
quickly backed by the United States, the European Union, and many countries
in the region. This was a minimalist requirement, in regard of the major
irregularities registered in the process. Despite this, the government insisted on
going forward with the vote on May 28; this led to the withdrawal of opposition
candidate Alejandro Toledo, who called on people to stay away from the polls
(voting is compulsory in Peru) or to nullify their vote by writing “no to the fraud”
on the ballot.

Accordingly, on Sunday, May 28, 2000, the voting proceeded with a
single candidate, Fujimori, and without the presence of Peruvian and foreign
election observers or opposition poll-watchers, who had retreated in protest.
The “official” results gave Alberto Fujimori 51.2 percent of all votes cast, and
Alejandro Toledo 17.7 percent; the nullified votes came to approximately 30
percent; and abstentions 17.2 percent, slightly higher than in the first round.
In other words, even with these unreliable data, the votes obtained by Fujimori
and those we can interpret as backing Toledo were close to even. The regime,
faced with the possibility of losing an election in which the votes were reliably
counted, even though some polls gave it the edge, opted for a strategy involving
direct confrontation with just about everyone. In the midst of it all, the agenda
of second-generation reforms was quite far from the public realm. However, in
the following weeks, just when \textit{fujimorismo} appeared to be settling into a third term, things changed dramatically.

\textbf{The Collapse of Fujimorismo, the 2001 Elections, and Second-Generation Reforms}

The collapse of \textit{fujimorismo} came as a complete shock. After the farce of the May 2000 elections, Fujimori certainly had to face down strong criticism and pressures on both the domestic and the international front. However, despite everything, it appeared that by mid-August his government was successfully managing the situation. Fujimori forged a majority coalition in Congress and mitigated foreign tensions by agreeing to a dialogue mechanism (\textit{Mesa de Diálogo}) with the opposition backed by the OAS. With a dialogue about democratization underway, the various protest movements waned for lack of a clear political alternative.

It is too simple, even erroneous, to assume that \textit{fujimorismo} collapsed because it was extremely weakened and delegitimized. The analysis \textit{ex-ante} does not support that argument. I believe that the answer lies in the combination of external pressures (mainly from the U.S.), and internal inconsistencies within the regime itself. These developments are briefly discussed below.

On August 21, 2000, Fujimori and his advisor Vladimiro Montesinos announced in a press conference that the government would be dismantling an arms trafficking organization that sold weapons to the Colombian FARC guerrillas. Immediately after the announcement, the independent press disclosed that Montesinos himself was in charge of the operation. Because Plan Colombia was of the highest regional priority for the U.S., Montesinos began to
seem more like an adversary than the ally the U.S. had heretofore considered him to be. Perhaps a necessary evil from the U.S. standpoint, Montesinos had proved useful in the anti-narcotics effort.

Despite Montesinos’ infractions with arms trafficking, his strong control over the armed forces made it difficult for Fujimori to dismiss him. As infighting erupted within the Fujimori clique, the president found that he himself could be disposed of by an “institutionalist” military coup led by Montesinos that would call for new elections. Suddenly, Fujimori faced the real possibility of becoming a scapegoat for Montesinos. In order to prevent such a scenario, and admitting that he had lost control of the government, the newly reelected Fujimori broke ties with Montesinos and, on September 16, unexpectedly called for new elections. Tensions between Fujimori and Montesinos boiled over in the weeks that followed, and finally on September 24 Montesinos left the country and sought political asylum in Panama. He effectively became a fugitive until his arrest in Caracas in June 2001.

This turn of events destroyed any semblance of a fujimorista alliance in Congress. In November 2000, the fujimorista presidency of the Congress was censored and Valentín Paniagua, a member of the opposition, was elected president of a reorganized Congress. It became clear that Fujimori’s days in office were numbered. On November 20, during an official visit in Asia, Fujimori surprisingly and without authorization flight to Japan, faxed his resignation to the Peruvian people, and found shelter in that country behind a questionable Japanese nationality. On November 22 Paniagua was elected as interim President by the Congress.

It is in this surprising and unexpected context that Peru entered a new electoral process, as shocking scandals involving revelations of corruption in the last years of the Fujimori government exploded, and the public learned of
MONTEZINOS' INVOLVEMENT IN AN INTRICATE WEB OF CORRUPTION.

Although the scandals overshadowed the electoral process, and distracted from debates over the policy programs of the various candidates, an agenda of second-generation reform was clearly present in the discourse of all the major protagonists in the campaign. With Fujimori out of the picture, and his authoritarian political style and self-serving platform discredited, public discourse finally centered on the country's most pressing problems: the need to strengthen state institutions, to instill greater transparency, to implement vertical and horizontal mechanisms of accountability, to fight corruption, and to develop sectoral “fine tuning” policies.

The first round of elections took place on May 20, 2001, and Alejandro Toledo, Fujimori's main opponent in the 2000 elections, obtained 36.6 percent of the valid vote; in second place, with 25.8 percent of the valid vote, was Alan García, Peruvian president from 1985–1990 and candidate of one remaining political party, the APRA; Lourdes Flores surprisingly fell behind García, with only 24.2 percent of the valid vote, after occupying the second place during most of the campaign. On the political spectrum, Flores occupied the right, García the left, and Toledo the center, yet their platforms were not markedly different. The second round of elections took place on June 3, and Toledo won the presidency with 53.1 percent of the valid vote, with García coming in at 46.9 percent.

The greatest surprise in the 2001 elections was the institutional revival of the APRA as a party, and the reemergence of Alan García as a credible political figure, despite his disastrous government between 1985-1990, signed by hyperinflation and a questionable record regarding human right abuses. In fact, in February, at the beginning of the electoral campaign, opinion polls showed García well behind Toledo and Flores. The support he garnered at the
beginning was more in tune with his disastrous track record as president, something around 15 percent of the vote. How is it that García’s opinion ratings and vote-gathering skills improved so exponentially and in such a short time?

[Figure 8.4 near here]

Several factors appeared to be at work here. First, García benefited from Fujimori’s downfall, which weakened the discourse against García and his own discredited administration, which in comparison to Fujimori’s scandals was not looking so bad. Second, García benefited from the harsh infighting between Toledo and Flores, as these two candidates effectively canceled votes for each other but proved ineffective in attracting new votes. García, still the consummate politician that had risen to be Peru’s youngest president in 1985, offered a moderate discourse. He expressed remorse for the mistakes of his first government and stressed the need for social policies that are compatible with a market economy. While García emerged as a surprisingly attractive alternative for an important segment of the electorate, nonetheless, he was not able to entirely surmount the distrust that he still generated from his past record.

To assess the challenges that Toledo faces and the prospects for implementing second-generation reforms it is important to keep in mind that he, like all of the other contenders in the 2001 elections, is still the leader of an improvised electoral movement without a clear political identity or programmatic platform. Only two political movements survived beyond the 2000 election, one of them being Toledo's Perú Posible, which is still a very personalistic organization at heart. Perú Posible, rather than working to
develop the internal cohesion and discipline of a political party proper, simply absorbed former militants of other organizations that had failed in 2000.

In the May 20 election, Perú Posible obtained 20.7 percent of the congressional vote, the APRA 15.5 percent, and Flores’ Unidad Nacional 10.9 percent. Thus, out of 120 congressional seats, Perú Posible obtained 45, APRA 28, and Unidad Nacional 17. This means that Peruvian politics will have to return to daily life in the post-Fujimori era. Toledo, in particular, will have to negotiate support for his legislative agenda, trade votes, make democratic deals, and compromise on an ongoing basis. Finally, Toledo will have to address enormous pent-up demands, both social and representational, that were contained under the authoritarian regime of the Fujimori government and under the transition government of Valentín Paniagua.

Given these continued organizational weaknesses, will Toledo build the capacity and muster the strength to pursue second-generation reforms? Up to this moment, what seems to characterize Toledo’s government is improvisation, short term responses to immediate problems. This is the consequence of the weakness of Toledo’s leadership and the lack of organization behind Perú Posible. This improvisation also appears in the contradictory nature of his team, and the recently named officials, from very different political backgrounds and expertise. The government seems to lack a general purpose, a clear orientation, and Toledo seems to be still in campaign, trying to satisfy all kinds of contradictory demands. It is certainly too early to make an adequate assessment and try to foresee the future, but what is clear is that at some point in the near future, major political definitions could not be postponed any longer.

<Conclusion>
In this chapter I have explained how Fujimori’s election in 1990 occurred in a context of the exhaustion of state-centered policies and populist politics. The “first generation” of market-oriented reforms, with its strengthening of the executive vis-à-vis all political and social actors, proved useful for an isolated president, an outsider that consolidated his power by fighting against the institutional order and the traditional political class that supported it. First-generation reforms gave meaning and purpose to an authoritarian leadership that tried to establish a new personalistic order. However, as the Argentine case has also shown, the initiators of first-generation reforms proved incapable of building the kind of interest coalitions that could consolidate the reform agenda. Fujimorismo, ironically, became the main obstacle to reform completion, and opposition forces were unable to offer a social-democratic alternative.

Surprisingly, the Fujimori regime collapsed shortly after his highly contested 2000 reelection not because of the strength of the opposition, but because of external pressures and internal contradictions. Policy improvisation and institutional weaknesses still plague Peruvian politics, making the prospects for the newly inaugurated Toledo government very uncertain. The future is of course impossible to foresee. As in Mexico with the new Fox government and in Argentina with De la Rúa, the implementation of second-generation reforms will be difficult but not impossible. The costs of second-generation reforms tend to be more tangible than first-generation reforms, and the benefits more diffuse and medium term, therefore making it difficult to build a viable coalition to support their implementation.

Nonetheless, the situation that Toledo faces has some elements which allow for modest optimism. First, an unprecedented consensus on what has to
be done and what should be avoided has emerged in Peru. The widespread rejection of Fujimori’s policies and authoritarian decision-making style has led to a broad consensus on the importance of rebuilding state institutions, developing sectorial policies, and emphasizing social investment, all within a democratic and participatory framework that includes civil society and the popular sector. Moreover, such initiatives are being debated within the context of preserving a competitive market economy. This kind of consensus is absolutely unprecedented in Peru. During most of the 20th century, one of Peru’s central problems was the acute polarization of various social and political projects. This distance between groups, sectors, and regions led to pendular and contradictory policies which in the long run made sustainable growth and equitable development impossible to attain. Now at least Peru has the possibility to follow a consistent policy course regardless of the differences among political parties and social classes.

Second, Peru’s macroeconomic situation is not too bad, which means the new administration has considerable room to maneuver in implementing new policies. The economy is still struggling against contagion from the recent Argentine meltdown, but Peru’s financial system has not been as hard hit as those of other Latin American countries. Paniagua’s transition government made a “soft landing” economically possible, and it removed most of the authoritarian obstacles left behind by Fujimori. Paniagua’s short administration restored the credibility of the Peruvian state, as well as democratic legitimacy; it established a new political style based on dialogue with civil society and the search for political consensus. In sum, Toledo has to surmount very important obstacles, but he also has the chance to launch a new era in Peru, and to escape the path of political instability and economic stagnation.
<A>Notes</A>


Venezuela is the only case with similarities to Peru. However, as the chapter by Kenneth Roberts in this volume shows, Venezuelan voters and political leaders continue to resist and delay in the implementation of even first-generation reforms. Thus, despite the similarities, Venezuela is at a very different moment than Peru in its reform process.

We can not have democracy without some degree of political competition. This point of view is elaborated in Seymour M. Lipset, “La necesidad de los partidos políticos,” Letras Libres, no. 14 (February 2000), pp. 24–28.

On this situation, see Cynthia McClintock, “¿Es autoritario el gobierno de Fujimori?”, and Martín Tanaka, “Consolidación democrática y competencia política en América Latina. Lecciones desde la experiencia peruana”, in Fernando Tuesta, ed., El juego político: Fujimori, la oposición y las reglas (Lima, Peru: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1999).


Under the 1993 Constitution, the executive can be reelected president for one successive term; this law provided that Fujimori’s first term was the one beginning in 1995, not the term that began in 1990 (because in 1990 Fujimori was elected under the 1979 Constitution).

Eloquently, in the 2001 elections, without Fujimori, the presidential candidate associated with the government, former minister Carlos Boloña, obtained only 1.69% of the vote. In congress, movements identified with fujimorismo obtained only four seats.


This paradox was pointed out by Bruce Kay, “‘Fujipopulism’ and the Liberal State in Peru, 1994–1995,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 38, no. 4.

The revenues for privatization reached some $7.5 billion, see Gonzáles de Olarte, ibid.

All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.

A critical analysis of the government’s social policy, which highlights a major increase in funds invested in social policy in recent years, can be found in Adrianzén, “El gasto social.”

In Carrión et al. we show that the system enjoys greater legitimacy among the poorest of the poor, and in the rural areas. Julio Carrión, Martín Tanaka, and Patricia Zárate, “Participación democrática en el Perú: Informe final,” (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos [IEP] and U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], 1999), unpublished document.


According to APOYO, sector A is the wealthiest, B and C are the middle and lower classes, and D is the poorest. An interesting study on political attitudes in sectors C and D can be found in Yusuke Murakami, La política según C y D: un estudio de la conciencia y el comportamiento político de los sectores populares de Lima (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos-JCAS, 2000).


Another important movement that had a chance of winning from late 1998 to mid-1999 was Solidaridad Nacional, led by former social security administration director Luis Castañeda.

In a national poll we conducted, when asked “How do you envision your family’s economic situation next year?” in November 1998, 33.5 percent of the respondents answered “worse,” while in November 1999 only 26 percent answered “worse.” When asked “How do you envision the country’s economic situation next year?” 38.9 percent answered “worse” in 1998, whereas in 1999 33.5 percent answered “worse.” This trend continued in 2000: according to data from Apoyo for the city of Lima, the average percentage of persons who approved of the economic policy in 1999 was 22.83 percent, while in the first four months of 2000 the average rose to 34.75 percent.

The government alleged that it would absolutely not accept a judgment that endangered the country’s security, and withdrew from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. What the government did not say was that the Inter-American Court also had several proceedings pending over various human rights infractions in Peru, and violations of the constitutional order. Amidst the controversy, the opposition chose to defend legal principles such as “due process” and “respect for international treaties” when the majority of public opinion rejected having a new trial for the terrorists.

On the other hand, the “traditional” parties, more consolidated in terms of their political and organizational identity, were isolated and powerless. After the 1995 elections, the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) lost its recognition as a political
movement, and couldn’t meet the formal requirements for registering as one (the left did not even try); those who presented presidential candidates in 1995, APRA and AP, obtained barely 1.4 percent and 0.4 percent of the valid votes, while their congressional slates garnered 5.5 percent and 2.5 percent of the valid votes, respectively.

The reports from these institutions’ observation missions can be found on the web page of Transparencia: <http://www.transparencia.org.pe>.

In 1995, Toledo obtained 3.2 percent of the presidential votes, and his congressional slate won 4.1 percent of the vote.

Transparencia’s quick count yielded 48.7 percent for Fujimori and 41 percent for Toledo. In terms of the Congress, Transparencia calculated 51 seats for Perú 2000, and 28 for Perú Posible.

Regarding the Fujimori regime’s relations with the international community, especially the United States, see Cotler, 1999