EXPLAINING CARIBBEAN REGIONALISM: TOWARD A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK*

(First Draft of a Research in Progress, Please do not Quote)

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I. Introduction

We live in a world that is increasingly organizing around regional agreements or regimes\(^1\). An important question is: under what conditions do those regional agreements are resilient? This matter is related with a major issue in international regimes\(^2\) literature, namely regime resilience and robustness\(^3\). The literature deals with the emergence of agreements based on the principle of “open regionalism”\(^4\), present in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the South American Common Market (Mercosur). An examination of conventional international relations theories show that none of them can fully explain the puzzle found with the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). That is, how an “ineffective” regional agreement can be “resilient” in the presence of major international changes.

The strategy of open regionalism tries to take advantage of free trade opportunities perceived to be available at the international level. Yet, this concept does not explain the resilience of regional agreements that seem to run counter to the goal of maximizing economic benefits from free trade. This notion of “open regionalism” does not really help to explore the theoretical question posed by the CBI. For that reason, I propose a new conceptualization, based on the inward and outward regionalism labels that will correct this problem.

I also examine four models based on the international relations literature. These models suggest different views about regime resilience in the Caribbean. The purpose is to look at the ways in which the models answer the research question. After examining the models, I conclude that the constructivist one could be the best one to examine this question.

I. Is there something about the region?

A perceptive understanding of the Caribbean\(^5\) should begin with the ethnic, linguistic, economic and political diversity of the region. Independent small states, colonial territories,  

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\(^1\)The terms preferential trade agreement, international regime, and regional agreement have been used by students of regionalism. International relations scholars give preference to the use of the regional agreement and international regime concepts, while comparative politics scholars dealing with political economy studies use the term preferential trade agreement, following the economists. To avoid a linguistic confusion similar to the one produced in the biblical Tower of Babel, I will adopt the regional agreement term in reference to the CBI and Lomé Agreements.

\(^2\)Krasner’s definition of regimes is “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1983, p.2).

\(^3\)In this context, resilience or robustness refers to the persistence of regimes “after the conditions that shaped and facilitated their creation have disappeared” (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997, p.38).

\(^4\)Van Jacob defines open regionalism as “a strategy of international economic opening which stresses regional cooperation with an emphasis on the reduction of intraregional transaction costs” (1998, p.2). Mansfield and Milner contend that open regionalism “implies a desire for nondiscriminatory trade practices and a willingness to accept new members” (1999, p.617).

\(^5\)Defining the Caribbean region has been a daunting task for scholars and policymakers. Serbín (1997) has argued that three definitions of the Caribbean can be identified. These definitions go from just including the islands between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea to others that consider Central American countries like Mexico and South American countries like Venezuela and Colombia as part of the region. This is complicated by the fact
associated states and even provinces of outside countries can be found in the region\textsuperscript{6}. It is characterized by a common historical background provided by European colonialism, diverse waves of immigration, and the dominance of a strong Afro-Caribbean culture due to the extermination of indigenous populations (Knight and Palmer, 1989). Insularity and fragmentation has been highlighted as key characteristics of a region defined in its diversity by outside powers that shaped its multiple identities (Randall and Mount, 1998). Their economies are vulnerable to changes in the international economy, they have been export-oriented for a longer time than other regions like South America, their main trading partner is the United States, and their national economic policies have been much weaker in the presence of transnational capital (Watson, 1994). Cold War lenses obscured a more sophisticated understanding of the social and economic problems that the Caribbean has faced for most of its history (Grugel, 1995). Still, economic and social development, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and political stability remain issues of concern for the region after the end of the Cold War (Pastor, 1985, Fernández de Castro and Rosales, 2000).

Based on the available literature, the researcher should expect that regional agreements such as the CBI would weaken or disappear. In this sense, the question is: why ineffective regional agreements are resilient in the presence of international changes that make them less relevant? To put it in another way: why CBI has persisted in spite of important international changes after the end of the Cold War? Why the CBI has not been substituted or transformed by a trade regime according to the post Cold War interests of the developed and developing nations with ties to the region? I will develop explanations based on factors such as interest defined as power, interest-based cooperation, historically dependent structures, and ideas about identity to explain this puzzle. These models suggest that political factors, not economic effectiveness, may explain regional agreement’s resilience in the CBI case.

A. The Cases\textsuperscript{7}

The CBI established a trade regime between the United States and most of the countries

\textsuperscript{6}Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts-Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad-Tobago are independent states. French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique are overseas departments of France. Saba, Saint Martin (also French), Saint Eustatius, Curacao, Bonaire and Aruba are self-governing territories associated with The Netherlands. The British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands are colonies of Great Britain. Puerto Rico is a Commonwealth (\textit{Estado Libre Asociado}) of the United States, a highly debated political condition in the island.

\textsuperscript{7}Those cases have a crucial variable in common, the linkage with an outside power (U.S. and the E.U.). Yet, they have significant differences in terms of the way in which the regime is constructed. A deviant case in the Caribbean region is CARICOM. The selection of this case is due to its utility in sharpening hypotheses generated by the CBI and the Lomé Agreements cases (Lijphart, 1971, Axline, 1994).
from the Caribbean Basin region, with the exception of Cuba (Table 1). It was created at the height of the Cold War period, in 1983. Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga proposed the idea to the incoming U.S. Republican administration in 1980, as a type of “mini-Marshall Plan for the Caribbean.” The Ronald Reagan administration launched it in 1982, in an address before the Organization of American States, where he promised to do whatever he could to avoid the overthrow of the region’s governments (Pastor, 1992). Dramatic events such as the Cuban Revolution, Grenada’s experiments with revolutionary socialism during the 1980s, civil wars in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, and the Jamaican experiment with democratic socialism during the same period were read by the American framers of foreign policy as part of the Soviet expansionist designs toward the region (Pastor, 1992, Smith, 1996). In this context, U.S. economic policy as manifested through trade agreements like the CBI go in hand with security interests involving the control of the Caribbean region and the isolation of Cuba (Schwab, 1999).

The U.S. government conceived the Caribbean Economic Recovery Act or Caribbean Basin Initiative as a program to foster economic development in Caribbean and Central American countries (Phillips, 1991, p.1-3). The proclaimed mechanism of economic development would be the expansion of private investment and the promotion of economic diversification. A crucial element of the program is having a duty-free entry of CBI-manufactured products into the United States. Such articles and products include apparel, electronics, wood, recreational and sporting goods, seafood, tropical fruit, vegetables, leather, footwear, etc. (Phillips, 1991, p.3). An amendment passed by Congress in 1990 made this duty-free access permanent.

Yet, the specialized literature has questioned its economic effectiveness, describing the regional agreement as one with “mixed results” (Deere et.al. 1990, Krueger, 1993, Grugel, 1995). For example, Krueger explains that “[t]he impact on the earnings of oil and sugar exporters [in the Caribbean] was strongly negative, while the impact on other countries that managed to increase their exports was somewhat positive”(1993, p.151). Ramnarine explains that the expected expansion of trade did not materialize for two reasons. First, the duty-free coverage of the CBI provisions was not really expanded in comparison with previous bilateral agreements. Second, the products excluded from the regional agreement were those in which Caribbean countries historically specialized or have comparative advantage (Ramnarine, 1993).

A recent report by the U.S. Trade Representative highlights the fact that CBI has been “very positive” for both the U.S. and Caribbean countries, because the U.S. has a trade surplus with the region. Yet, the same report recognizes that “a large share of their [Caribbean] exports are still not covered by [CBI] benefits” (1999, p.4). The market share of U.S. imports from CBI countries actually fell from 2.7% in 1984 to 1.9% in 1998. For this reason, the U.S. Trade Representative concludes that the CBI countries “have not participated as fully as other countries in meeting the growing U.S. demand for imports during our extended period of economic

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8 The case of apparel is interesting. Apparel products were excluded from the original CBI in 1983 but given specialized treatment in 1986. Still, “apparel products imported into the United States...were assessed an average duty of only 5.6%, as compared with average duties of 15.5% from all other sources” (Scott, 1999). Thus, U.S. apparel imports from the Caribbean have increased as a result of this 1986 legislation.
Table 1: Regional Trade Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of the Caribbean Basin Initiative</th>
<th>Members of the Lomé Agreements</th>
<th>Members of CARICOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Belize</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>Dominica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Montserrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Antilles</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>NO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>St Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>St Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of other regimes like NAFTA have posed challenges to the existence of the CBI as a viable trade agreement.

I will bring other cases to make a comparative study. The cases chosen are the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Lomé Agreements with the European Union (Table 1). The Lomé agreement was signed in 1975, with the goal of supporting former European colonies’ efforts to achieve development. With this purpose, Lomé extends preferential treatment to many products from African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. It allows these products to enter the European Community duty-free and without quotas or restrictions, based on non-reciprocal agreements. It has four special commodity protocols on sugar, beef and veal, rum, and bananas.

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9 The first Lomé Convention was signed on February 28, 1975. The other three conventions were signed in 1979, 1985, and 1990.
Also, the European Union offers development aid to its former colonies under the conditions of this convention. Some critics like Ravenhill (1985) and Tjeerdsma (1997) contend that Lomé kept developing countries as raw materials exporters, falling short of its expectations as an agreement that would advance significantly the economic development of its members. Segal explains that Lomé’s rules of origin makes Caribbean exports to the EU difficult. Moreover, the shared membership with African countries has not contributed to focus on Caribbean problems such as the improvement of air and transport links, vital for tourism (Segal, 1994, Grilli, 1997).

CARICOM is a regional organization established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973, as the result of several efforts of regional integration in the Caribbean. CARICOM has three essential components: economic integration based on a regional common market; functional cooperation in such areas as culture, education, health, labor relations, tourism, and transportation; and coordination of foreign and defense policies. The Common Market contains a number of important mechanisms for liberalizing trade. These include eliminating extra regional export duties, removing quantitative restrictions on regional exports, permitting free transit for products of members, and eliminating quantitative restrictions on imported goods. Analysts of CARICOM have pointed out that it had failed to increase intra-regional trade (El-Agraa and Nicholls, 1997). As Moore points out, “[p]rogress in regionalism was adversely affected by the two oil shocks of the 1970s, the emerging debt burden, and the increasing need for structural adjustment” (1993, p.207). Furthermore, Grugel stresses that CARICOM countries face two major challenges: the enactment of NAFTA and the result of present Lomé negotiations with the EU (1996, p.156).

On the one hand, the Lomé Agreements case shows a regional agreement that has an important external linkage, like the CBI. On the other hand, the CARICOM case shows a regime that does not have a powerful outside partner but it is located in the same region and shares some of the background characteristics of the CBI. The members of these agreements face the same challenges coming from the end of the Cold War, the establishment of regional agreements such as NAFTA, and systemic constraints such as globalization and neoliberalism. Moreover, analysts have questioned the effectiveness of these regional agreements. Thus, these cases will refine the explanations for regional agreement’s resilience coming from the CBI case, and the usefulness of concepts such as regions and open regionalism to describe them.

B. Conceptual Issues

Political scientists and economists have used the term region in multiple forms. However, the literature has not provided encouraging results regarding the appropriate use of this term. As Katzenstein explains “definitional ambiguities are a striking characteristic of the regionalism. As Mansfield and Milner recognize that definitions of regions encompass geographical proximity, and other factors such as “a disproportionate concentration of economic flows” and “policy choices made by national decision makers” (1997, p.3). Grugel and Hout say that regions “are made and re-made, and their membership and frontiers are decided through political and ideological struggle and the conscious strategies of states and social actors”. Katzenstein prefers to define regions as “a set of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions. This is often, but not always, indicated by a flow of socio-economic transactions and communications and high political salience that differentiates a group of countries from others” (1997, p.7).
international relations literature dealing with the issue of regionalism” (1997, p.6). Some definitions emphasize geography, cultural bonds, political institutions, and historical commonalities. Moreover, by emphasizing divergent factors these definitions make analytical attempts to balance the importance of them quite difficult. Particularly, these definitions do not provide a clear explanation for the institutional and management aspects of regionalism. For this reason, insights coming from the regime theory literature can be useful to refine these political variables.

The literature about regionalism often points out the concept of open regionalism in reference to agreements like NAFTA and Mercosur (Stallings, 1995, Gamble and Payne, 1996, Van Jacob, 1998, Mansfield and Milner, 1999). This concept is misleading because it does not distinguish clearly between several types of regionalism. Mansfield and Milner establish a difference between open (Asian) and closed (European and American) regionalism that is somewhat helpful but not too much because it can be confused with the variants of regionalism that were present before the advent of the second wave (1999, p.617). Bergsten (1997) contends that several definitions of regionalism can be proposed, according to the degree of openness that a regional agreement shows: open membership, unconditional Most Favored Nation status (MNF), conditional MFN, and global liberalization. He recognizes that agreements such as the EU, NAFTA and Mercosur cannot be categorized strictly as favoring open regionalism because they have regional exclusivity in their membership. However, their proclaimed adherence to the principles of borderless free trade would overcome that inconsistency. Yet, he fails to save the concept of open regionalism as an useful analytical tool. Examining the regulation of petrochemicals and steel sectors in Mercosur, Sánchez Bajo (1999) argues that open regionalism is a set of values and a vision that justifies economic and political liberalism. Viewed as a discourse that would rationalize unregulated capitalism, open regionalism as a concept makes more sense. Still, it is not enough to describe the real configuration of regional agreements.

In my view, another conceptualization is necessary. Arrangements like the CBI and the Lomé Agreements can be placed under a category labeled outward-oriented regionalism. The outward-oriented regionalism is one that stresses the linkages with countries outside of the region and the elimination of barriers with those countries. The determining fact is the relation with the outside country, not the relation with other countries in the region. I differentiate it from inward-oriented regionalism, where the efforts are directed toward the creation of a regional bloc where economic and political barriers have been eliminated. The concepts of inward and outward regionalism cannot be found in the existing literature about regimes and regions, so this would be a contribution to the development of a theoretical framework to explain cases like the ones mentioned previously.

III. How to address the puzzle

Based on the literature, the researcher should expect that regional agreements such as the CBI would weaken or disappear. The puzzle is that an economically ineffective regional agreement, like the CBI, is resilient in spite of important international changes that make it less relevant. This poses a major challenge to the literature, because having ineffective regional agreements that are resilient is contrary to what the literature and a researchers’ intuition would
say. Moreover, it is possible to deduce that the CBI should have been substituted or transformed by a trade regime according to the post Cold War interests of the developed and developing nations with ties to the region. To address this puzzle, I suggest that politics matter to explain regional resilience. Yet, my contention is that politics matter in ways not contemplated by the conventional international relations literature. At least, not in the way that scholars coming from a structuralist, realist or neoliberal tradition would do.

I challenge the literature dealing with regionalism\textsuperscript{11} and international regimes (Hurrell, 1995, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997) to address the puzzle that guides this research. Understanding the puzzle of having an international regime that is not effective, and is “resilient”, requires an examination of systemic and domestic factors. The literature would predict that actors lose interest in the regime when their self-interest cannot be achieved anymore (Keohane, 1984). Systemic factors that are relevant include changes such as the end of the Cold War, globalization trends as manifested through neoliberalism and the formation of competing economic regimes like NAFTA (Stallings, 1995, Pantojas-García, 1995, González Vilaseca, 1997). In this sense, this research builds on recent scholarship exploring the connections between the international and domestic levels (Évans, 1983, Stallings, 1995).

Two sets of literatures from the international relations subfield can help to address the questions set for this project: the new regionalism literature and the international regimes literature. The new regionalism literature explores changes in the international system coming as a result of the end of the Cold War\textsuperscript{12}. That literature examines the factors that lead to the formation of regional trade agreements. Such factors include the preferences of national policymakers and interest groups, the role of domestic institutions, global power relations and multilateral institutions (Mansfield and Milner, 1999, p.589-590). Scholars specializing in the study of regionalism have recognized the usefulness of the international regimes literature for analyzing these trends (Hurrell, 1995, p.42). International regimes literature, particularly discussion about regime effectiveness\textsuperscript{13} and resilience provides important insights to examine the questions that guide this research. The formation of regional trade agreements involves foreign policy decisions to “reduce or remove barriers to mutual exchange of goods, services, capital, and people”(Hurrell, 1995, p.43).

Most of the literature examining regionalism has been written from the economists’ viewpoint according to the international trade theory framework\textsuperscript{14}. However, political scientists

\textsuperscript{11}Authors like Hurrell and Gamble and Payne recognize the difficulties providing a clear definition of regionalism. Instead, Hurrell prefers to deal with the concept of regionalization, defining it as “the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction” ([1995], 1997, p.39).

\textsuperscript{12}Those changes include new attitudes toward international cooperation, decentralization of the international system, globalization processes, the decline of ideological notions promoting collective solidarity in the Second and the Third World, and democratization trends. See Fawcett, [1995] 1998, p.17-30.

\textsuperscript{13}In the context of this project, regime effectiveness refers to “the extent that it achieves certain objectives or fulfills certain purposes” See Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997, p.2.

\textsuperscript{14}Essentially, international trade theory emphasizes the presence of factors like land, labor and capital (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1988, Gilpin, 2001). According to these economists, labor and capital are the mobile factors. The mobility of these factors depends on the comparative advantage that a particular country has. Capital may move to a place where it can have more profits and labor may move somewhere to get better conditions.
doing comparative political economy and new institutionalism have tried to bring the relevance of politics to economic regional processes. Some previous attempts to deal with regionalism from a political science perspective include the functionalist literature that influenced European integration processes and some attempts to introduce regions as a concept in the international systems literature (Cantori and Spiegel, 1970). The presence of a “second wave” of regionalism after the end of the Cold War has stimulated some political scientists to revisit the earlier literature dealing with regionalism (Fawcett, 1995, Mansfield and Milner, 1999). For other international relations specialists, globalization creates an international environment for transactions of goods and services (Fernández Jilberto and Mommen, 1998). In this context, the decision to configure regional trade agreements depends on the preferences that domestic policymakers and interest groups have to face globalization challenges.

Political scientists highlight to international management of economic flows, based on realist geopolitical considerations, as relevant to analyze regional agreements. In their view, the success of regional trade agreements would depend on these power relations defined by security considerations. Mansfield and Milner (1997) argue that benefits coming from free trade strengthen the potential power of the partners, bringing force to the alliance. In this context, geographical proximity defines what they call “regional orders” (Lake and Morgan, 1997). They contend that regionalism should explain concentrations of economic flows, or the coordination of foreign economic policies, in a geographical area composed of countries close to each other. Geopolitical specialists like to emphasize the military and political aspects of this closeness (Solingen, 1998). Thus, realists would stress the pertinence of affinities with political and military alliances to provide a basis for the establishment of regional agreements (Mansfield and Bronson, 1997).

Scholars such as Gilpin (1987) and Grieco (1997) address directly the issue of hegemony as related to international political economy in general and regionalism in particular. They suggest that regionalism is just a way to improve the bargaining positions of states that are members of these arrangements. Gilpin explains, “the existence of a hegemonic or dominant liberal power is a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) condition for the full development of a world market economy” (1987, p.86). Expanding on this reasoning, Grieco contends that the presence of a regional hegemon is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the configuration of regional institutions. Other variables should be taken into account. His “relative disparity” hypothesis contends that if power capabilities within a region shifts over time, the most disadvantaged states would be opposed to the development of regional institutions. In this sense, variables such as relative gains from regional cooperation and the expectation of that arrangement matter to the establishment and strength of regional institutions. Gilpin (2001) characterizes the increasing movement toward regional integration as a response to a security dilemma created by the proliferation of regional trade agreements. Responding to European

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integration, the United States would create NAFTA and the response by Asian and South American regions was to design their own regional agreements.

Summing up, the realist approach brings up the importance of power relations for the configuration of regional trade agreements. It seems to fit the CBI case, because military and geopolitical security considerations were present at the stage of regime formation during the Cold War. An interest defined as power approach would highlight the fact that new security concerns are present for powerful countries after the end of the Cold War. These security concerns include illegal immigration, drug trafficking and political stability of Caribbean countries. Moreover, weaker developing countries in the region would like to improve their bargaining position with the U.S. by staying in the CBI. With the U.S. and Europe (through Lomé) as powerful partners, regional agreements like CARICOM would not have so much importance. An important insight provided by realism is that unless there is a power shift in the region from the outside partners, regional trade agreements like CBI and Lomé would matter more for Caribbean countries than inward-oriented ones like CARICOM.

A liberal approach to regionalism goes beyond state-centered considerations and takes into account the role of institutions, preferences of policymakers, the influence of domestic groups, and the market structure of various economic sectors. Liberal approaches to regionalism follow the logic of analysis of liberal economists in the sense of viewing the effects of free trade as essentially positive. Moreover, liberals view the establishment of regional institutions as a way to deal with the collective action problems posed by the expansion of economic activity (Haggard, 1997). This expansion generates pressures for regional coordination of activities or to perform functions that states alone cannot do (Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1997). Therefore, the establishment of regional regimes in certain issue areas is not necessarily related to geographical proximity. They respond to functional needs defined by market networks of economic transactions such as currencies (Cohen, 1997). Furthermore, the pressures of specific industrial sectors such as apparel and textile can be important to explain the establishment of regional trade agreements (Milner, 1997).

A crucial point made by liberals is that international institutions such as regimes matter to deal with issue-areas such as trade. Thus, the international regime literature is relevant to understand liberal approaches to regionalism. Specially, Keohane’s approach to hegemonic

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16 The emergence of regional economic institutions has provoked a proliferation of studies that deal with the consequences of regionalism for multilateralism and the prospects of having an open trading system. Establishing a preferential trade agreement would improve the terms of trade of its members against outsiders. However, Krugman argues that trying to exploit market power against other blocs may be counterproductive. The reason is that trade wars may make everybody worse off due to the debilitating effects of trying to take advantage. Other studies criticize these assumptions and contend that the effects of regionalism are not so bad as liberal economists claim. Global economic welfare may be so limited that regional organizations may engage in multilateral negotiations and agree to remove barriers, moving forward to global free trade (Frankel, 1997). These economic approaches recognize the importance of political and cultural variables for the creation of regional trade agreements. Yet, the study of those variables is not the main focus of their research.

17 Hurrell explains that neoliberal institutionalism, particularly the contributions made by regime theory, have been quite influential to examine international cooperation problems related to regionalism. Specially, he contends that it “represents a highly plausible and generalizable theory for understanding the resurgence of regionalism” ([1995], 1996, p.61). Even though regime theory has been criticized for reflecting a liberal bias toward international
leadership issues can be helpful to address the role of the U.S. in establishing and keeping regional agreements such as the CBI\textsuperscript{18}. A state needs resources such as raw materials, sources of capital, markets and competitive advantages in producing goods, to gain a salient position over others (1984, p.32). As Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger emphasize, this approach “links the existence of effective international institutions to a unipolar configuration of power in the issue-area in question” (1997, p.84). In this sense, Keohane emphasizes, “[t]he hegemon seeks to persuade others to conform to its vision of world order and to defer to its leadership” (1984, p.137). A way to seek conformity with a particular vision of world order is to create international regimes that provide benefits to its members. Cooperation is a result of conditions that rest on mutual interests and adjustments. It is achieved through negative and positive inducements like threats, punishments, promises and rewards (Keohane, 1984, p.53). Keohane also explains that actors lose interest in the regime when their self-interest goals cannot be achieved anymore. As this author puts it, “[r]egimes would be abandoned when governments calculate . . . that the opportunity costs of belonging to a regime [are] higher than those of some feasible alternative course of action” (1984, p.104).

Therefore, liberal approaches to regionalism and regime theory suggest that hegemony is important for regional agreements’ formation and resilience. The CBI was a unilateral concession by the United States to Caribbean countries. Yet, the purpose was to foster cooperation with U.S. foreign policy goals and to keep Caribbean countries on the American side of the Cold War. That was done not by using the stick, but utilizing the carrot. The U.S. has the preponderance of material resources in the entire American continent, and provides a crucial source of capital and markets. Moreover, the United States can use its competitive advantages and resources to coerce or persuade Caribbean countries to follow its leadership. Yet, leadership cannot be imposed unilaterally according to Keohane. Thus, the hegemon has to convince its partners that engaging in cooperation through the CBI is also in their interests. Promises and rewards would be made to Caribbean countries that promote free enterprise, along with threats and punishments to those countries that do not go along with these principles. Expecting important concessions from the hegemon, Caribbean countries will be willing to engage in cooperation through the CBI. Consequently, policy coordination will be possible among the American hegemon and its Caribbean partners to establish the regime. Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism also predicts that if the actors lose interest, the regional trade agreement will be weakened. Thus, the receding interest of the hegemon or its partners could explain the weakness of the CBI. In the changing conditions created by the end of the Cold War, the CBI as a feasible regime should be weakened.

Constructivist accounts of regionalism and international regimes have been gaining salience in the literature (Katzenstein, 1993, 1997, Job, 1997, Kupchan, 1997, Naurine, 2000). Knowledge-based, cognitive or constructivist theories refer to ideology, the values of actors, their beliefs, and the knowledge available to them (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1997). According to them, the presence of a hegemon, or just reference

\textsuperscript{18}Hegemony refers to a particular situation where a strong state defines and maintains the rules for governance (Keohane, 1984, p.34-35).
to power capabilities, is not sufficient to explain the conditions for the emergence of a regime. Actors may require norms to enable calculation of costs and benefits of actions. As Finnemore explains, “[s]tates are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world. States are socialized to want certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them live” (1996, p.2). These considerations provided the basis for evaluation of other factors, such as the role of ideas, in the emergence, development and robustness of international regimes. Definition of state interests goes beyond material interests. Actors’ perception of global problems is important to the articulation of national interests (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997, p.137). National interests are elaborated “in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate” (Finnemore, 1996, p.2). Policy makers and their economic advisors share similar understandings about the best way to address their respective countries’ problems. These ideas were common knowledge that led to similar policies across borders. Therefore, national interest is constructed as promoting free trade and opening the borders for the exchange of goods and services. Thus, the emergence of regional trade agreements can be traced to shared understandings policymakers had about the alternatives to face the economic and social problems of their countries.

Gramscian and neo-Marxist critical approaches have also been used to criticize mainstream ideas about regionalism and international regimes. For neo-Marxists, the creation of regional orders should be understood within the context of the theory of imperialism19. Authors like Biel view liberal regionalism and regime analysis as tool for American hegemony (2000, p.276). Open regionalism is equivalent to wider exploitation using the world markets. Regional structures provide new forms of capitalist management that complement the existence of trade regimes as encompassed in WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. An important insight provided by Biel is that “given the viciousness of the North-South divide, some states might prefer semi-periphery status to being outer limbo” (2000, p.277). According to the author, the ruling class’ preference for some sort of linkage with the core countries would lead them to favor transnational corporations’ penetration of their peripheral economies and to support regional trade agreements such as Lomé and the CBI (2000, p.274, 277-278).

For Gramscian critical theorists like Hettne, the formation of international regimes and the creation of regional orders constitute systems of management to deal with particular issue-areas such as trade (1995, p17-19). In this sense, they should be viewed as part of an emerging world order in which ideas; institutions and material aspects should be taken into account20. Regional agreements are historical structures that are sponsored by a hegemon, according to a neoliberal worldview that punishes those states that do not go along with them. According to Cox, history is crucial to understand world orders because it shows how hegemony has developed ([1993], 1994). At the present historical juncture, neoliberalism has led to a “new

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19 Some variants of this theory, developed by J.Galtung and I.Wallerstein, contend that the world can be divided in a core, semi-periphery, and a periphery.

20 A world order is defined by Gill as “a relatively persistent pattern of ideas, institutions and material forces which form historical structures over time, where structures can transcend particular societies or civilizational forms, in both space and time” (Gill, 1995, p.68).
constitutionalism” characterized by the establishment of rules and institutions that support
global policies designed by the owners of corporate capital\textsuperscript{21}.

Summing up, regional trade agreements like CBI and Lomé would be perceived by
Gramscian critical and neo-Marxist theorists as the result of global orders established by powers
such as Europe and the United States. Yet, Gramscian critical theory would give a different twist
to the research problem that I am addressing. An emphasis on the historical construction of
regional orders would highlight variables such as colonial past as relevant. In this sense, CBI
and Lomé are regional trade agreements that are results of the history of the Caribbean region.
This historical background emphasizes the importance of colonialism, capitalist socio-economic
forces, and hegemonic discourses as part of a historic bloc established in the region.

II. Some tentative answers

This research will address a fundamental question: what factors explain regional
agreements’ resilience when the effectiveness of the regime is eroded by a changing global
context? In other words, why has the CBI been resilient despite international changes that have
highlighted its ineffectiveness? The schools that I had examined propose some explanations that
will be critically examined. My own perspective, favoring a constructivist approach to this issue,
is presented afterwards.

Neo-Marxist and Critical theory approaches form the core of a structural approach. From
a structural viewpoint, it is possible to contend that the greater the extent to which the historical
and structural conditions of a region influence policymakers of developing and developed
countries, the more resilient a regional agreement would be. This explanation emphasizes the
relevance of history and social structures for the formation of global orders like regions and
international regimes (Cox, 1993, 1994, Gamble and Payne, 1996). Caribbean countries have
been historically more vulnerable to changes in the international context than other regions in the
world. These countries share a colonial past that has influenced their economic systems and
political institutions. Caribbean regionalism has been developed in close connection with
hegemonic\textsuperscript{22} countries from Europe and the United States. Hegemonic orders are present in
international regimes like the CBI and the Lomé Agreements that lay down rules of behavior for
states that sustain the dominance of transnational capital. Thus, these regional agreements would
provide the basis for the historical structures prevalent in the Caribbean region.

There is some basis to contend that an explanation based on the history and structures of
the region is plausible. The development of plantation economies in the Caribbean Basin set up
societies that are still dependent on the international economic changes. Most of the historians
examining Caribbean issues have agreed with this explanation. Following the world system
framework of I. Wallerstein, Randall and Mount argue that the impact of capitalism on the

\textsuperscript{21} Gill defines this new constitutionalism as “the varied and complex efforts, especially by forces of the political
right and those of neo-classical economists and financial capital, to develop a politico-legal framework for the
reconstitution of capital on a world scale, and thus for the intensification of market forms of discipline” (1995, p.78).
\textsuperscript{22} The four models that I described, though defined in different form, share the concept of hegemony. Essentially, it
describes the control or domination of some states by a powerful state.
region has defined structural core-periphery relations that explain Caribbean’s perennial
dependence on outside powers (1998, p.4). Capitalism showed its face in the region through
colonial processes that ended in the establishment of plantation societies. Those societies
brought class divisions that shaped Caribbean elites’ dependent vision of the world. Imperialist
considerations present in the region’s conflicts for most of its history would define the presence
of political institutions such as regionalism. Yet, the primacy of capitalist interests is clear for
these analysts.

In this sense, the role of capital in the configuration of regionalism would be paramount.
Thus, the explanation for the resilience of regional agreements like CBI and Lomé would be that
is it convenient for the economic interests of European countries and the United States. An
example of this type of explanation is the one provided by Ramnarine: “the CBI was deemed
beneficial to U.S. economic interests on the grounds that the cheaper, unskilled labour of
Caribbean Basin workers could supplement the skilled labour of U.S. workers to produce goods
that would be competitive, without incurring the loss of U.S. jobs”(1993, p.111). Another
example is this early conclusion about the CBI by Pantojas-García: “[a]lthough neither
investments nor trade have increased significantly in CBI countries, this policy has begun a
reorientation of economic policy throughout the region consistent with the interests of U.S.
capital” (1988, p.33). Some truth is present in these explanations. Certainly, economic interests
of some sectors in the developed countries can explain the resilience of regional agreements.
Yet, he fact that trade concessions and investment have not increased significantly in the region
since the establishment of the CBI should tell the researcher that resilience cannot be attributed
mainly to the interests of international capital.

However, this explanation is insufficient to account for the resilience of regional
agreements in the Caribbean. It gives an undue salience to the role of material factors, making
them determinant of the configuration and fate of regionalism. Regional forms would be
reduced to economic factors, treating cultural contexts and power considerations as derivations
of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, the causal relation suggested by neo-Marxist
and Critical theorists is not sufficient to address the puzzle posed by the resilience of regional
agreements. In fact, these schools have long underestimated the independent role of political and
institutional variables in social analyses. As Wendt has suggested, material factors should not be
overestimated or underestimated (Wendt, 1991, p.136). If other factors such as culture and
power are isolated, then it is possible to know the relevance of material factors in the
configuration and resilience of regional agreements.

Therefore, it can be argued that interest defined as power matters. This provides the basis
for a political explanation of regional resilience in the Caribbean. In this sense, the greater the
extent to which policymakers in developed countries view a regional agreement as fostering their
own security interests, the more resilient that regional agreement will be even when the purpose
of the agreement is not a security one. This factor emphasizes the distribution of power in
response to national security considerations (Grieco, 1997). U.S. and European hegemonic
interests are closely tied with the economic and political development of the Caribbean region,
including international regimes like the CBI, the Lomé Agreements and CARICOM. These
interests provides a good reason for regime resilience, since the consequences could be unwanted
immigration, political instability, difficulties in dealing with threats like drug trafficking, and the endangerment of foreign policy goals for the region, like liberal democracy and free trade. Caribbean countries would be willing to stay in an apparently ineffective regime if they can get relative gains from these regional agreements. Relative gains will include limited access to the U.S. and European markets.

The realist perspective also has some ground in reality. As a matter of fact, it has influenced scholars working on the comparative political economy field. As Stallings emphasizes, trade is a mechanism used by nation-states to influence over others (1995, p.356). In the case of powerful states, open markets are one of those gains that can be offered in exchange for geopolitical or geoeconomic concessions. The Lomé Agreements and the CBI are examples of agreements sponsored by powerful states to achieve their national interests. Access to markets is not free. In the case of CBI, a national security objective was present with the exclusion of communist countries from the outset. Moreover, the imposition of a particular model of development based on open markets is just a form of achieving another goal. That is, geopolitical control and political influence over the Caribbean region (Mansfield and Milner, 1997, p.611). Thus, explanations for state resilience would be traced to the geopolitics of the Caribbean region. The interests in excluding adversaries such as the Soviet Union, during the Cold War era and gaining new ground in the “war against drugs” and curbing down illegal immigration are national security objectives that guide the establishment of regional agreements. In fact, the crude form of the hegemonic stability theory would stress that the effectiveness and the resilience or robustness of a regional agreement is dependent on the power relations underlying the institution. The interest of powerful countries such as the United States and the European countries gathered in the EU, and their coercive influence upon Caribbean countries, should be enough to keep the regional agreement in spite of its economic ineffectiveness.

A difficulty with the realist-oriented approach is that it assumes states’ intentions to make deductions about their behavior. Certainly, states act following their interests. Yet, defining exactly what constitutes national interests has been always difficult for realists or for scholars that follow them. It doesn’t help to say that the CBI or the Lomé Agreements are resilient due to power considerations of the U.S. and Europe, and to leave the explanation that way. It is important to look for other variables that may be more useful in explaining the resilience of these agreements. Power considerations alone, be geopolitical or geoeconomic, are insufficient to explain Caribbean regionalism. The Soviet threat is gone with the end of the Cold War. Having agreements like the CBI or Lomé could not be viable just to help in the “war with drugs” or fighting illegal immigration. In other words, power interests on the part of the American or European hegemon alone cannot provide a good explanation for the puzzle that I have been addressing.

The insufficiency of power oriented explanations leads me to explore cooperation-oriented ideas. From a neoliberal perspective, it is possible to contend that the greater the economic effectiveness and expectations of future gains through institutional cooperation, the more resilient regional trade agreements will be. This view deals with the insights provided by international cooperation theories, regarding the incentives created by free trade and the expansion of “the shadow of the future”, namely the possibilities of future cooperation that
would favor both developed and developing countries’ interests. (Keohane, 1984). As regional hegemons, the U.S. and the E.U. has a preponderance of material resources in the entire American continent, and provides a crucial source of capital and markets that are attractive for Caribbean countries. The interest of the U.S. and Europe would be to stimulate free trade and political stability in the region, explaining the willingness to make concessions through the CBI and Lomé Agreements. Yet, the hegemon has to convince its partners that engaging in cooperation through the CBI also is in their interests. Promises and rewards would be made to Caribbean countries that promote free enterprise in those countries. The “mixed results” of CBI and the relative success of the Lomé Agreements would be viewed as relative gains (economic effectiveness) from the developed and developing countries’ perspective. In this context, CARICOM would be viewed as a providing an alternative framework to give flexibility to Caribbean policymakers.

As with the other models, some empirical ground that sustains them is present. This is the perspective reflected on some economists’ writings and by policy makers from the U.S. Trade Representative Office. For example, Krueger explains that “[b]ecause CBI countries depend heavily on nontraditional exports, especially labor-intensive manufactured goods, the U.S. initiative arguably increased export growth more than would otherwise have been possible” (1993, p.146). Yet, even this liberal author has to criticize the confusion and conflict provoked by the CBI. On the other hand, government officials view the “mixed results” of the CBI as good for both the hegemon and the weaker partners. An example of this view is what we find in the a report of the USTR: “[a]lthough the CBI was initially envisioned as a program to facilitate the economic development and export diversification of the Caribbean Basin economies, U.S. export growth to the region has been a welcome development” (1999, p.22). Especially nice for the USTR office is the fact that the United States has run a trade surplus with Caribbean countries since 1985. Holding an optimistic perspective, characteristic of these government reports, the USTR office proclaims that the revival of the Caribbean began by the early 1990s due to economic adjustment programs. This revival has been proclaimed, especially in relation to the presence of the CBI, since the mid 1980s.

I would not deny that the moderate growth experimented by Caribbean countries during most of the CBI ’s period of existence. Yet, the mixed results of CBI are not sufficient to explain this agreement’s resilience. In fact, the permanence of the CBI since the 1990s just serves to underscore the fact that the Caribbean would be in a stage of perpetual reconstruction. The high expectations that Caribbean leaders had in relation with the emergence of the CBI were not fulfilled. Even some academics have alerted since the mid 1980s that those expectations were out of place, taking into account the course of the Puerto Rican experience with Operation Bootstrap (Frambes-Buxeda, 1990, Pantojas-García, 1985). Apparently, the desire of further cooperation with the U.S. and Europe has not been fulfilled by the presence of economic agreements like the CBI and Lomé.

Yet, Caribbean countries have not balked out of CBI and Lomé. Moreover, there is no apparent signal by the United States and Europe to put aside those agreements and negotiate new, more significant, ones with the Caribbean countries. The question keeps coming to haunt researchers like me: why these agreements keep standing up in the presence of apparent failure?
The theoretical models, based on the international relations literature that I have discussed, do not provide satisfactory answers. My point is that we have to look for other answers beyond the traditional international relations literature.

More accurate answers to the puzzle could be provided by constructivist approaches to regionalism. From a constructivist perspective, it is possible to argue that the greater the extent to which policy making elites conceive the identity of the region as linked to countries outside the region, the more resilient regional agreements will be. Factors dealing with regional identity, mutual responsiveness and trust are explored by authors following this school (Hurrell, [1995], 1998). The role of ideas in configuring the interests of this regional arrangement is important. By ideas, I mean visions about regional identity, the role of the region in global affairs, notions about social and economic development, and the foreign policy priorities established according to these interests. What do states want in pursuing regional agreements? Constructivists would say that states follow their interests. Yet, the meaning of interests is different from the structuralist, realist or liberal one. As Wendt contends, what actors want defines interests (Wendt, 1999, p.231). States must know what they want, so “interests presuppose identities”. Identities provide direction to states, while interests provide their motivational force. Due to the fact that national interests are social constructions, they can be diverse. Diversity comes out of the multiple identities that states have, like individuals. Wendt identifies four types of national interests that can be found in states: physical survival, autonomy, economic well being, and collective self-esteem.

With these notions, I can articulate some ideas about regional resilience in the Caribbean. As Knight argues, significant differences can be found among the countries of the region. As the author points out, “to deny these differences would be to deny the political realities of the Caribbean. The separate political identities of the Caribbean are as patently strong as they are inescapable” ([1978] 2000, p.xvi). In spite of their historical commonalities, grounded in their colonization processes and their weakness toward outside countries, the sense of isolation is pretty clear. Scholars seem amazed at the distance between Caribbean countries in spite of their common ways of perceiving the world. This is what Knight contends is the Caribbean Weltanschauung.

It is no coincidence that in the absence of a strong sense of Caribbean identity, efforts to articulate inward regionalism have been weak. The identities of the countries in the region have been fragmented in multiple insularities. The island comprising the Caribbean could be described as “islands with their backs to the sea”, using the explicit phrase coined by Domínguez (1997, p.6). Certainly, the peoples and the governments of the Caribbean had chosen to live with their hopes placed in some regional agreement that would commit an external power. Those factors would explain why Caribbean policymakers have more “faith” or “trust” in the outside linkages provided by CBI and the Lomé Agreements, and do not follow strongly the intra regional option represented by CARICOM. Notwithstanding the efforts of CARICOM to provide an institutional foundation for regional efforts to face common problems, it is not in the position “to secure the economic viability of any individual Caribbean country at this time in history” (Watson, 1997, p.81).
In my view, the constructivist explanation provides more light about the resilience or robustness of arrangements like the CBI. Contrary to other regions like Europe, Asia and South America, an outward orientation has been prevalent in the construction of their identity. The Caribbean looks more like Africa in the weakness of its identity. As Mayall points out, “regionalism represents a weak and thin form of identification, generally recognizable only at a distance from heart to home” ([1995] 1998). That is particularly true with the cases of regions, like the Caribbean, whose history has been shaped by outside forces. The paradox is that the Caribbean is a region that still has a lot in common but centrifugal forces had made elites to look outside instead of inside to solve their economic and social problems. In spite of the efforts by some political leaders, especially from the English-speaking Caribbean, inward regionalism does not seem to advance.

It is important to understand, from a constructivist viewpoint, that states define their identities in relation to other states at the international level. For this reason, states can have divergent identities depending on the situations in which they get involved. Thus, their identification as “Caribbean” states may be weak but it has a symbolic importance. The presence of CARICOM is a living testimony of that symbolism. However, the presence of institutions that are more important for their material survival alters their social identity to make them closer to Europe or the United States. The presence of CBI and Lomé makes the construction of the Caribbean identity more confusing. Moreover, the human reality of immigrant communities in Europe and the U.S. that keep in touch with their original countries makes the issue of identity quite a complicated one. Caribbean regionalism is not isolated from these realities.

It should not be inferred that Caribbean identity is irrelevant for the elites or the mass population inhabiting the islands. On the contrary, it is a projection of the particular construction of its social identity. The point is that Caribbean countries have developed multiple identities according to their diverse social and material interests. Thus, the resilience of CBI and Lomé shows that these agreements may have created a collective identity that makes them more crucial for their material existence than other inward regional agreements. This is a result of the presence of ideas and material forces that have configured the human realities of the Caribbean region.

However, the relation between ideas and material forces still needs to be worked out more clearly by constructivists. In this sense, Gramscian critical approaches provide an important corrective to realist and constructivist approaches. They highlight the importance of history, giving another dimension to the role of ideas and identity construction. Thus, they supplement the insights provided by realism and constructivism in their critiques of neoliberal institutionalism. Particularly, it helps to understand the role of power as a factor in the configuration of ideas.

These clusters of explanations can help us understand why the CBI is still present as a policymaking alternative, and has not been eliminated (as was the Alliance for Progress) or replaced by a more effective instrument (expansion of NAFTA to the Caribbean?). Moreover, these models try to remedy the problems posed by concepts like regions and open regionalism. In my view, the identity variables suggested by the constructivist model are more appropriate to
address the puzzle posed by the CBI. Figure 1 suggests that the best way to explain regional resilience in the Caribbean would be with the constructivist model. The models will be refined using other agreements like the Lomé Agreements and CARICOM to see if some factors suggested as explanations can be eliminated and see which ones can be sustained.

IV. Conclusions: Toward a New Theoretical Framework to Explain Caribbean Regionalism

To address real world issues like regionalization processes in the Caribbean, we need other theoretical frameworks. An account for explaining regional agreements’ resilience in the presence of international changes that challenge them must take into consideration relevant insights from the applicable literature. As the literature suggests, regionalism is a response to the problems of international management in the context of economic globalization. Yet, economists have set the guidelines in the analyses of these issues with political scientists following their path.

Conventional analyses of regional agreements such as CBI, Lomé and CARICOM have followed the economists’ perspective. Still, they also show their theoretical and conceptual shortcomings. The problem with economic approaches is that they cannot account for other variables like identity and cultural issues or the role of history. In their analysis of regionalism, international relations specialists had followed functional explanations of international organization to provide the missing institutional explanation link (Hurrell [1995], 1998).

In my view, this is insufficient to provide a comprehensive political analysis of regionalism. For this reason, I contend that regime theory supplements general accounts of regionalism that are ambiguous and lack analytical precision. Analysts using regime theory have contributed a theoretical framework that can be used to develop useful models to address regional agreements like CBI, Lomé and CARICOM. Gramscian critical theory insights would help considering the role of history in the configuration of the world order that regional agreements represent. From my viewpoint, it is crucial that political aspects of regionalism be analyzed using a conceptual and methodological framework that explain better these political consequences of regionalization. As a particular form of political management, a comprehensive analysis of regional agreements’ resilience is the relevant project for this task.
FIGURE 1: MODELS EXPLAINING REGIONAL AGREEMENT’S RESILIENCE

Global Structures:
- Capitalist economy, history (neo-Marxism, Critical theory)

Security Interests (Realism)

Regional Agreement’s resilience (Regime Theory)

Identity linked to outside powers (Constructivism)

Economic effectiveness, expectation of future gains (liberalism)
VII. Bibliography


