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This paper focuses on the effects of the mode of transition on post-transition democratic governance. I focus on pacted transitions, as this is the mode of transition currently favored in the democratization literature. Pacted transitions are those in which incumbent political elites from the authoritarian regime, who maintain control over the transition process, engage in multilateral negotiation and compromise with the democratic opposition. A review of the democratization literature reveals two general hypotheses about the effects of pacted transitions. On the one hand, many theorists argue that pacted transitions offer the most viable path to the installation of democracy (Karl, 1990; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). On the other hand, many claim that there are longer-term, possibly negative, effects of pactimg (Hagopian, 1990; Hagopian, 1996; Karl, 1987; O'Donnell, 1992; Przeworski, 1991).

One of the negative effects cited in the democratization literature is that pacted transitions may depress access to positions of political leadership under the new democracy. For example, Przeworski argues that "the danger inherent in such substantive pacts is that they will become cartels of incumbents against contenders, cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and distribute the benefits of political power among the insiders. Democracy would then turn into a private project of leaders of some political parties and corporatist associations, an oligopoly in which leaders of some organizations collude to prevent outsiders from entering (Przeworski, 1991, 90-1)." Along these same lines, Karl argues that pacts may tend to demobilize new social forces and circumscribe the participation of certain actors in the future (Karl, 1987, p.88).

It is not difficult to see how reduced access to positions of political leadership could jeopardize democracy. Access is a fundamental element of political democracy (Dahl, 1971). However, theorists also argue that a degree of elite continuity is a positive sign of institutionalization (Polsby, 1968). Therefore, it is important not to draw conclusions prematurely. We need to discover if pactimg depresses access to positions of political leadership, and, if so, determine the mechanism through which this occurs. We can then evaluate whether or not this positively or negatively affects the quality of democracy.

This paper draws on a twelve-year cross-national study of the degree of elite continuity established after the Spanish (1976/77) pacted transition and the Argentine (1982/83) transition by collapse. I have chosen the Spanish case, as Spain is the prototype of a pacted transition. If pactimg produces the effect hypothesized, it should do so in the Spanish case. If pactimg does not produce this effect, it would strongly refute the above hypothesis, despite being a single case of pactimg. The comparison of Spain and Argentina varies the mode of transition. Argentina experienced a transition by collapse. In this study, transitions by collapse are those in which the incumbent regime is left without the legitimacy to maintain authoritarian rule or to impose the terms of transition, and the outgoing authoritarian elites and the opposition do not engage in negotiation.  

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1 It should be noted that Przeworski distinguishes between institutional pacts and substantive pacts. However, given that pacts are often not made public, it is difficult to assess the degree to which a pact is institutional or substantive.  
2 Polsby uses the continuity of legislators as a measure of parliamentary institutionalization.  
3 However, transition by collapse is different from revolution in that the opposition does not overthrow the incumbent regime, but rather takes control of the state by default. There is no significant violence, nor is there multilateral negotiation between the opposition and the ancien regime. The masses are ascendant only due to the internal disintegration of the regime; they do not bring about the regime’s disintegration.
The transition in Spain was negotiated by a reformist sector of the authoritarian regime, led by President Adolfo Suárez, with hard-line sectors within the authoritarian regime and with representatives of the democratic opposition. Neither the Suárez government nor the democratic opposition had the ability to entirely impose the terms of the transition. However, the Suárez government negotiated from a position of strength and did not lose control of the process at any time.

Argentine transition actors did not engage in pacting during the transition. The transition was not planned by the military regime, and the democratic opposition did not force a transition to democracy. Rather, the transition resulted from divisions within and the weakening of the military regime following the Malvinas/Falkland Islands war. The debilitated military regime failed in its attempt to pact with the democratic opposition.

In order to assess the degree of elite continuity, I focus on the continuity of legislators, particularly deputies in the lower houses, under the new democratic regimes in Spain (1977-1989) and Argentina (1983-1995). I focus on the legislative branch, as this will provide a greater degree of information than an analysis of the executive branch. The legislative branch includes all politically significant political parties whereas an analysis of elite continuity in the executive branch would only allow for a discussion of the governing party or coalition. Also, legislators themselves are politically significant. Though actual policy may be formulated elsewhere, legislator support must normally be attained for the policy to become law.

In both Spain and Argentina, the governing parties turned over government power to the principal opposition party within six years of the founding election. However, when we analyze the degree of deputy continuity, the empirical results show that Spain had significantly higher levels of continuity than Argentina. Furthermore, the degree of legislator continuity, on average, has increased over time in Spain, and declined over time in Argentina. Is this related to the mode of transition?

This paper will make two arguments. First, it will argue that the higher level of deputy continuity in Spain is, at least partially, the result of candidate selection procedures voluntarily adopted by the principal political parties. More specifically, the Spanish candidate selection procedures allow a lower degree of rank-and-file participation and a higher degree of national political party elite control than the Argentine procedures. Furthermore, the Spanish party rules did not allow for the formal representation of internal party factions on candidate lists whereas the Argentine parties permit the representation of factions.

Second, this paper will argue that the choice of candidate selection procedures in Spain was constrained by the pacted nature of the transition. Inter-party pacting required a reasonable expectation that the terms of the pact would be respected. Therefore, pacting required the existence of parties and party representatives willing to follow (or unable to oppose) the national party leadership involved in pacting. In short, successful pacting required disciplined political parties. This encouraged the adoption of internal party rules and regulations that facilitated

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4 Capo Giol (1981) first argued that the nature of the transition in Spain led to disciplined political parties.
pacting elites’ control over their parties and representatives.\(^5\) One vitally important means of ensuring party discipline is control over candidate selection. Therefore, the causal mechanisms that connect pacting and higher levels of legislator continuity are political party rules and regulations for candidate selection.

This paper is divided into three sections. (1) The first section will establish the degree of deputy continuity in each country. (2) The second section will discuss how party rules affect the degree of deputy continuity. (3) The final section will discuss the impact of pacting on the choice of candidate selection procedures in Spain.


A comparison of deputy continuity in Argentina and Spain controls for two variables that could affect the degree of deputy continuity.\(^6\) First, the lower houses enjoy similar levels of authority, which controls for the potential impact of the attractiveness of the office. Second, the Spanish and Argentine electoral laws are very similar, which allows us to control for their potential effects.

Both countries elect their lower houses on the basis of the d’Hondt method of proportional representation and both have a minimum threshold at the district level.\(^7\) There are no term limits in either case, and both countries adopted a system of closed-party lists. In Spain, the Congress of Deputies has 350 members directly elected from 50 multi-member districts and two single-member districts.\(^8\) The Spanish electoral laws also stipulate that each province is guaranteed a minimum of two deputies.\(^9\) Deputies serve four-year terms (or until parliamentary elections are called), and all are renewed at the same time.\(^10\)

Between 1983 and 1995, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had 257 deputies (254 prior to 1991) directly elected from 24 multi-member districts. Similar to the Spanish case, the Argentine electoral laws provide for minimum levels of representation, namely that no district will have fewer than five deputies, and that no district will have fewer deputies than it had during

\(^5\) I am not arguing that pacting is a necessary explanation for the reduction of party democracy. However, I am arguing that it is sufficient; those parties that engage in pacting will have a tendency to reduce internal party democracy.

\(^6\) A comparison of the levels of continuity in the lower chambers is more interesting politically and more justifiable methodologically than a comparison of the continuity in the upper chambers. First, the lower houses enjoy similar levels of authority, whereas the Argentine Senate is significantly more powerful than the Spanish Senate. Second, the Spanish and Argentine electoral laws with regard to the election of deputies are very similar, whereas the election of senators occurs quite differently. Finally, the electoral laws for the lower houses have not fundamentally changed during the period studied, whereas the laws for the election of senators have changed over time in the Spanish case. For a complete discussion, please see Appendix 1.

\(^7\) The minimum threshold in Spain is 3% of the valid votes. In Argentina, the minimum threshold is 3% of registered voters.

\(^8\) Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish territories in northern Africa, elect only one deputy each.

\(^9\) This does not include Ceuta and Melilla.

the previous democratic period (1973-76). Deputies serve four-year terms, and half of the Chamber is renewed every two years.\footnote{It should be noted that all 254 deputies were elected in 1983, half of which served two-year terms and the other half of which served full four-year terms (Jones, 1997, 262-4).}

Tables 1 and 2 present reelection rates for Spanish deputies between 1977 and 1989, and for Argentine deputies between 1983 and 1993. On average, 54 percent of Spanish deputies were reelected versus 22 percent of the Argentine deputies. Therefore, Spain’s deputy continuity rate is thirty-two percentage points higher than Argentina’s.

**Table 1: Deputy Continuity, % Reelected, Spain, 1977-1989\footnote{Deputy reelection data was taken from Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993).}**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Deputy Continuity, % Reelected, Congress, Argentina, 1983-1993\footnote{The reelection rates were elaborated by the author based on deputy lists provided by the Argentine Congress. The Argentine data include deputies elect that held a seat in the previous legislative period regardless of whether or not they were in office at the close of the prior legislative term. Though this only affects the calculations in two elections, 1989 and 1991, the inclusion of only those deputies that were sitting at the close of the prior legislative term would only slightly reduce the level of reelection.}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The higher continuity rate in the Spanish Congress of Deputies holds true regardless of which election we examine. For example, Spain experienced the lowest degree of deputy continuity in 1982 (40 percent) when the entire party system realigned. This election produced the dramatic electoral defeat of the governing \textit{Unión de Centro Democrático} (UCD). Electoral support for the UCD declined more than 28 percentage points. This decline resulted not only in the turnover of government to the opposition \textit{Partido Socialista Obrero Español} (PSOE), but also in the rise of the \textit{Alianza Popular} (AP) as the largest opposition party. If we compare this to the highest Argentine deputy continuity rate in 1985 (30 percent), we still find that the Spanish continuity rate is 10 points higher than the Argentine rate.\footnote{This election did not coincide with a presidential election, but rather confirmed the relative popularity of the governing \textit{Unión Cívica Radical}.}

Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 1, aside from a decline in continuity in 1982, reelection rates consistently climbed in the Spanish case—reaching 62 percent in 1989. In contrast, reelection rates consistently fell in the Argentine case – reaching a low of 15 percent in 1993.
This pattern remains when we take out the consecutive nature of the reelection measure and determine the number of terms that each deputy served. As can be seen in Table 3, 558 or 36 percent of the Spanish deputies served only one term during this period, while the percentage rises to 70 percent of the Argentine deputies. Furthermore, forty-six Spanish deputies held their seat throughout the entire period whereas this number drops to just four of the Argentine deputies.

Table 3: Terms in Office, Deputies, Spain (1977-1989) and Argentina (1983-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Term</th>
<th>2 Terms</th>
<th>3 Terms</th>
<th>4 Terms</th>
<th>Entire Period</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 The data was elaborated by the author based on deputy lists provided by the Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, and the Congress of Deputies, Spain. Terms may be partial as the analysis includes all deputies elect and substitutes. These figures only include deputies prior to the 1989 elections in Spain, and prior to the 1995 elections in Argentina.

16 In Argentina, those that were deputies during the entire period could have been deputies during four terms (1983/85, 1985/89, 1989/93, 1993/97) or three (1983/87, 1987/91, 1991/95).

17 The Spanish data include deputies elect (1400) and substitutes (139). There were 11 substitutes in the 1977/79 legislative term; 42 during 1979/82; 42 during 1982/86; and 44 during the 1986/89 term. The Argentine data includes deputies elect (892) and substitutes (119).
What accounts for the cross-national variation in levels of deputy continuity? The next section will argue that the candidate selection procedures, at least partially, explain the higher degree of deputy continuity in Spain vis-à-vis Argentina. In Appendix 2, I argue that party splits and defections, deputy career paths, and electoral volatility cannot account for the cross-national difference in deputy continuity.

**Political Parties and Deputy Continuity**

The electoral laws in both countries stipulate the use of closed-party lists for elections to the lower house, which means that the political parties control which candidates appear on the election ballot and the order in which they appear. The voter cannot designate whether her vote goes for a particular candidate, alter the order of the list or cross out any candidates. The voter must vote for the entire list as presented by the party. Closed-list systems give parties the greatest degree of control over candidates and, in turn, encourage party discipline (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, 421-29). For our purposes, closed-lists also allow parties a great deal of influence over the level of candidate and deputy continuity.

Despite the fact that the electoral laws in both countries stipulate the use of closed party-lists for the election of deputies, this does not determine the means by which the parties will choose those candidates. According to Richard Katz (2001, 277),

> Candidate selection is a vital activity in the life of any political party. It is the primary screening device in the process through which the party in public office is reproduced. As such, it raises central questions about the ideological and sociological identities of the party as a whole. Moreover, because different modes of selection are likely to privilege different elements of the party and different types of candidates, they may raise questions about the nature of the party as an organization as well.

Therefore, we must examine the candidate selection procedures. The different levels of continuity may, in fact, be the result of internal party rules and regulations that are voluntarily adopted by the political parties themselves.

During the period studied, both countries produced party systems in which two parties dominated. The 1977 parliamentary elections in Spain produced two main political parties, the UCD and the PSOE. In the 1977 and 1979 elections, these two parties captured an average of 82 percent of the seats in Congress. Following the 1982 elections, the two largest political parties changed with the AP replacing the UCD. However, the combined representation of the PSOE and AP increased. In the 1982 and 1986 elections, they captured 85 percent of the seats. In

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19 The election results were elaborated by the author based on data provided by the Junta Electoral Central, Ministerio del Interior, Spain.
Argentina, the two largest parties were the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). These two parties attained a combined maximum of 95 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and a minimum of 80 percent (Molinelli, Palanza and Sin, 1999, 268-75).

The discussion of the Spanish parties will largely focus on the PSOE and UCD as these parties emerged out of the transition as the principal political parties and were the main actors involved in transition pacting. I will show that the Spanish candidate selection procedures permit a lower degree of rank-and-file participation and a higher degree of national political party elite control than the Argentine procedures. Furthermore, the Spanish party rules did not allow for the formal representation of internal party factions on candidate lists whereas the Argentine parties permit the representation of factions. These rules lead to a greater degree of deputy continuity in Spain than in Argentina.

In Argentina, the provincial level party organization has a greater degree of control over the selection of party candidates than the national level party (Jones, 2002; Jones et al, 2002). The local party boss plays a particularly important role in candidate selection. This influential role of the local party boss contributes to the high rate of deputy turnover. According to Jones et al (2002, 658), “the threat of challenge by popular legislators provides local party bosses with a strong incentive to reduce the national and provincial visibility of their local underlings by rotating them among the various jobs the provincial party can offer.” However, the local party boss does not always control candidate selection.

The candidate selection procedures adopted by the PJ and the UCR also permit direct participation by rank-and-file party members through the use of party primaries to determine candidate lists. Party primaries may be used to determine the candidates when the political party cannot agree on a common list, either because there is disagreement between the provincial and national party organizations or because the provincial party organization cannot agree on a single list (Jones, 1997, 270-75). Furthermore, sitting UCR deputies, competing in internal primaries, must attain 2/3 of the vote in these internal primaries in order to be, again, presented on the party list.20

While the UCR has a history of using primary elections to choose candidates, the use of primaries within the PJ is a historical departure - the PJ rarely used primaries to select candidates before 1985 (De Luca, Jones, and Tula, 2002). It is thus not a mere resurrection of previous procedures. The use of primaries came about in response to internal challengers, known as the renovadores, to the then existing party leadership. The calls for internal democracy gained support from many party members and affiliates particularly after the PJ’s historic loss to the UCR in the 1983 presidential elections (Gutiérrez, 1998).

Though the Argentine parties can hold primary elections to choose their candidates, what is the frequency with which they do so? According to De Luca, Jones and Tula (2002), the principal Argentine parties select candidates by three procedures: elite arrangement, assembly

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20 Unión Cívica Radical, “Carta Orgánica Nacional,” (1985, 1989, 1993 and 1997), Art. 31. The list on which the candidate appears must receive 2/3 of the vote in the primary. If the list does not receive the required 2/3, then the next person on the list replaces the sitting deputy. I thank Mark Jones for his clarification of this matter.
election and direct primary. They found that elite arrangement initially dominated the selection candidates for deputy. However, they also found that the use of primaries progressively increased between 1983 and 1993. In 1983, 13% of UCR provincial party branches used primaries to choose their candidates. A majority of UCR provincial party branches used this method by 1985, and by 1993, this had increased to 71%. In 1983, no PJ provincial party branch used primaries to choose their candidates. However, a majority of provinces used this method by 1989, and 71% used the method in 1993. On average, 67% of UCR provincial party branches used primaries between 1985 and 1993. The PJ average is 50%. The use of open versus closed primaries has also been on the rise in both parties (De Luca, Jones, and Tula, 2000, 21).

Finally, the Argentine parties often incorporate the representation of minority party factions for both party offices and candidacies for public office. There are a variety of formulas used to allocate list positions after a primary:

These include winner-take-all arrangements in which the list that wins the plurality of the vote in the primary wins all of the positions and semiproportional methods in which the runner-up list (if it surpasses a threshold, normally 25% of the vote) receives every fourth (PJ in large districts) or third (UCR of PJ in small districts) position on the party list. Other district-level parties use the d’Hondt PR formula, often with a 25% threshold. (De Luca et al, 2002, 420)

Furthermore, when primaries to determine deputy lists occur, the minority list usually receives enough votes to obtain a position on the list.

In contrast, the principal Spanish political parties, the UCD and PSOE, did not establish a system of primaries to choose their candidates, that is, rank-and-file party members did not determine candidates for public office at any point during the period studied. There were no formal hurdles placed on the reelection of sitting deputies. There has also been a tendency to formalize the national leadership’s control over the selection of candidates vis-à-vis the

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21 All data in this paragraph are taken from De Luca, Jones and Tula (2002, 425).
23 According to Mark Jones, this occurs in approximately 2/3 of the cases. Personal communication.

It was only in 1998 that the PSOE decided to use primaries to select some candidates, particularly the heads of the candidate lists, as part of the party’s strategy to renew itself. (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, “Regulations for the Selection of Candidates for Public Office,” Approved by the PSOE Federal Committee in March 1998, modified in July 1998, and used for the 2000 elections.) However, the future of these primaries is unclear as they slipped out of control when put into practice to determine the party candidate for Prime Minister. Josep Borrell defeated the party hierarchy candidate, Joaquín Almunia. Borrell later stepped down and was replaced by the loser of the party primary - Almunia. Almunia, in the parliamentary elections held on March 12, 2000, led the party to its worst electoral result since 1979.
provincial leadership. Finally, the parties established no formal means of representing minority factions.

Though PSOE party statutes did not formally permit the national level party organization to alter candidate lists until following the 1979 elections, the national party leadership in 1979 intervened to “influence the composition of party electoral lists, which were supposedly the responsibility of provincial federations (Gillespie, 1989, 343).” In 1979, the party congress revised the party statutes to formally allow party elites at the national level to alter candidate lists. Party statutes state that the party hierarchies at both the local and regional levels develop preliminary candidate lists. These lists then require the approval of the national level party organization, the Federal Committee. If there is a disagreement between the national and regional party organizations, the final decision is left to the Federal Committee. Though the Federal Committee is supposed to be the most important party body after the party congress, “in practice, its role has been reduced to discussing and ratifying Executive Committee postures and decisions (Méndez Lago, 2000, 124).” These candidate selection procedures remained in place for the elections between 1979 and 1996.

It should also be noted that national elite control over the selection of candidates is a historical departure for the PSOE. During the Second Spanish Republic (1936-39), PSOE statutes stated that candidates for national deputy would be designated by all of the affiliates within the district that meet in an assembly. When that was not possible due to the district comprising several distinct populations, then each collectivity was to elect a representative and then those representatives were to meet to designate the candidate or candidates.

The UCD is a very interesting case in that it started during the transition as an electoral coalition of various formally recognized political parties. As a coalition, it functioned differently from the PSOE. The candidate selection process, at least informally, required the inclusion of candidates from the distinct political families that made up the UCD. Nevertheless, the leadership of Adolfo Suárez, the last president of the authoritarian regime and leader of the UCD, dominated this process of candidate selection. According to Jonathan Hopkin (1999, 25) this process further reduces the participation of rank-and-file party members, as they are most likely to influence outcomes at the local level.


It should also be noted that the candidate selection procedures for Alianza Popular/Partido Popular were very similar to those of the UCD and PSOE. Between 1979 and 1996, regional or provincial party organs proposed candidate lists, but a national level party organ had the ability to alter the lists and make the final determinations (García-Guereta, 2001, 486).

The Federal Committee is composed of members of regional party federations and members of the executive committee.

My own translation.


This led to a great deal of continuity between authoritarian political class and UCD politicians under the new democracy (Field, 2002). One of the reasons for the high degree of continuity was that Suárez largely determined
“ultimately the Suárez government made all of the key decisions on the electoral lists,” and he quotes Calvo-Sotelo, who was designated by Suárez to negotiate the 1977 lists, to confirm this:

It was so impossible to reach agreements in the first two or three days that I decided to take a dictatorial line, because the deadline for the nomination of candidates was approaching…I proposed that one person, which would be me, should decide the lists in all 52 provinces. At that moment Suárez had all the votes, and I represented him, so they had no choice but to accept those conditions.

This control over the candidate lists led to significant revisions of candidates initially proposed by the nascent coalition, Centro Democrático (Gunther, Sani, Shabad, 1988, 100). Therefore, for the first elections, Suárez’s control over candidate selection was largely informal.

Immediately following the founding election, the UCD took formal steps to transform the coalition into a unified political party, and it held its first conference in 1978. The party statutes passed at the conference formalized national political control over candidate selection. The statutes indicated that it was the responsibility of the Provincial Executive Committees “to propose…the names of the candidates for Deputy and Senator for their province.” However, the party statutes also gave the party president formal control over “electoral matters.” According to Hopkin (1999, 89), this would allow the party leader “to exercise control over candidates presented in elections, and therefore in practice choose (voters willing) the elected representatives of the party.” Suárez’s control was not merely theoretical. According to an interview conducted by Hopkin (1999, 96), for the 1979 lists “there was an electoral committee whose views were heard, but in the end Suárez himself and the secretary general decided – that was a matter which Suárez paid a lot of attention to.” Furthermore, provincial participation in the process was largely ignored (Hopkin 1999, 97).

The party statutes passed at the 1981 party conference changed the candidate selection procedures slightly. Article 51.2.C. re-stated that the Provincial Executive Committees “propose…the names of the candidates for Deputy and Senator.” However, Article 22.3 stated that “a National Electoral Committee will be formed to decide on electoral matters…and will be made up of the President and Secretary General of the Party, who will be its President and Secretary, respectively, and three members elected by the Executive Committee of the Party from amongst its members.” Whereas the party president had previously decided electoral

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31 Unión de Centro Democrático, “Estatutos de Unión de Centro Democrático,” passed in the first (October 1978) party congress, Art. 45.2.C.
32 Ibid., Art. 21.1.
33 Unión de Centro Democrático, “Estatutos de Unión de Centro Democrático,” passed at the second (February 1981) party congress. Also, see Hopkin (1999, 203).
matters, they were now to be decided by a National Electoral Committee, largely under his control. Similar to the PSOE, the control over candidate selection was concentrated in the hands of the national party leadership.  

Finally, minority party factions are not formally guaranteed positions on PSOE and UCD candidate lists. This provides the existing party leadership with an additional degree of insulation from internal challengers. Though internal party dissidents in PSOE, the críticos, attempted to introduce the representation of minority factions at the party congress in 1979, they were unable to do so (Gillespie, 1989, 346). The PSOE statutes explicitly stated that the party would not tolerate ‘organized tendencies,’ which Gillespie (1995, 47) argues were understood as “factions with independent structures and the ambition to take control of the party.” This was the case throughout the period studied.

Despite the fact that the UCD had begun as an electoral coalition of independent political parties, Article 12.3 of the party statutes forbid the existence of organized groups or factions. Though factions existed de facto, along the lines of the founding parties, the inclusion of various groups on party lists and in governmental positions was left to informal negotiation amongst party barons (Hopkin, 1999, 91, 138).

The fact that ultimate control over candidate lists resided with the national party elites and that minority factions were not guaranteed representation provided a degree of insulation and control that was not available to the Argentine national party leaders. In Argentina, the party rules provided more room for internal challengers to affect outcomes and a greater degree of provincial party influence. Though list systems may facilitate party discipline, the rules adopted by the Spanish parties meant that the national party elites would have a greater degree of control over the direction of party strategies and positions.

In order to demonstrate that these candidate selection procedures indeed affected the degree of continuity, I will measure the degree of candidate continuity. I conducted the

34 While the PSOE and UCD candidate selection procedures permit national elite control over candidate lists, it is difficult to systematically measure the degree to which national political elites intervened in the selection of candidates. Any measure would have to take into account formal intervention as well as the effect of potential intervention on the selection of candidates and the order in which they appeared.


36 In 1984, however, the party explicitly began to permit, regulate, and provide for the representation of ‘currents of opinion’ within the party. (“corrientes de opinión.” Partido Socialista Obrero Español, “Estatutos del Partido Socialista Obrero Español,” 30th Party Convention (1984), Art. 3.) Most importantly for our analysis, the party regulations provided for their representation on non-executive bodies, such as Convention Delegations, and Provincial, Regional and Federal Committees. These bodies would be elected in a way that facilitated the representation of these ‘currents.’ A minority that obtained at least 20 percent of the votes would attain 25 percent of the positions up for election, and, if two minorities achieved 20 percent of the vote, then each would obtain 20 percent of the positions. However, this did not include lists for public office, nor did it include executive bodies, which would continue to be elected using a majoritarian system.

37 Unión de Centro Democrático, “Estatutos de Unión de Centro Democrático,” passed at the first (October 1978) and second (February 1981) party congresses. Also, see Hopkin (1999, 89).

38 For each election studied below, the candidates are presented by electoral district, and then within each electoral district by political party or electoral coalition. Each political party presents their candidates and alternates in the
analysis by political party and, at each point in time, the measures include the two main political parties. Given the change in the dominant Spanish political parties, the measures for 1979 and 1982 include continuity figures for the UCD and PSOE, and the 1986 and 1989 measures include continuity figures for the PSOE and AP/PP.

Tables 4 and 5 present the average proportion of candidates re-nominated by the two largest parties in each country. The data show that the principal Spanish parties re-nominate significantly more candidates than the principal Argentine parties, 30 percent versus 18 percent.

### Table 4: Candidate Continuity, 1979-1989, Two Largest Parties, Congress of Deputies, Spain

(Proportion of candidates that were also candidates in the previous elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>% Re-nominated</th>
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<tr>
<td>Average 1979</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average 1982</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average 1986</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1989</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average 1979-89</td>
<td>30.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

order in which the seats will be distributed. The data include those candidates on the list that equal the number of seats available in that district, i.e. alternates are not included. For the parties analyzed, the data include the party-list itself or any list presented by a formal electoral coalition in which the party under study took part. Independents that are included on the party-list are also included in the analysis.

39 The two largest parties were determined by looking at the two largest parties (% of seats) in the previous election, i.e. the 1982 parliamentary election average in Spain included the two largest parties from the 1979 parliamentary elections. If the analysis were to include the two largest parties resulting from the election under scrutiny, the candidate continuity in Spain would decline to 29%, but the degree of continuity would remain significantly higher in Spain vis-à-vis Argentina.

40 There is not a directly comparable measure of candidate continuity in both cases. All Spanish deputies are elected when parliamentary elections are called. However, Argentine deputies are elected for a four-year term, and half of the Chamber is renewed every two years (except in 1983 when the entire Chamber was elected, half of the Chamber served for 2 years and the other half for 4 years). This means that if a candidate is not elected on the list presented in 1985, he can be placed on the list again in 1987, and again in 1989. Therefore, we cannot simply compare candidate lists that are four years apart because we would miss those that reappear in between. I have, therefore, compared the proportion of Spanish candidates on the list under scrutiny that were also candidates in the previous election to the proportion of Argentine candidates that were candidates in either of the previous two elections. Though this measure is not directly comparable, it represents a more difficult test of whether pacting produces democracies in which there is a greater degree of elite continuity.

41 The data were elaborated by the author based on candidate lists published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado. June 15, 1977 elections: Candidate lists were published May 20, 1977, and corrections were published May 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, and June 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 20. March 1, 1979 elections: Candidate lists and corrections were reproduced in Esteban and López Guerra (1979). October 28, 1982 elections: Candidate lists were published October 2, 1982, and corrections were published October 9, 14, 16, 27 and 28. June 22, 1986 elections: Candidate lists were published May 21, 1986, and corrections were published May 27, 28, 29, 30, and June 3, 6, 14, 20 and 21. October 29, 1989 elections: Candidate lists were published September 30, 1989, and corrections were published October 7, 14, 21, 28.
This supports the hypothesis that the candidate selection procedures partially account for the cross-national difference in the level of deputy continuity.

Moreover, continuity in Spain is under-stated in these results. This measure does not take into account candidates that left one of the main parties to become a candidate for another political party. For example, the PSOE, between 1979 and 1986, incorporated seven UCD candidates. AP, during the same period, nominated forty-one candidates that had previously appeared on UCD lists. Though candidates in Argentina may defect from one political party to join another, they are unlikely to switch from the PJ to the UCR or vice versa, given the strong personal and historical connection that many of these deputies have to their party (Jones, 2002, 177-78). Therefore, the gap between the two cases is probably larger than the above results indicate.

We find further evidence of the importance of candidate selection procedures by looking at the Argentine data over time.

Table 5: Candidate Continuity, 1985-1993, Two Largest Parties, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Re-nominated</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though I cannot control for the influence of other factors, the relationship between party primaries and candidate renovation in Argentina is illustrated by the fact the use of primaries has increased over time, while candidate continuity has largely declined. Furthermore, unlike the Argentine parties that progressively increased the voice of rank-and-file members through the use of primaries, the Spanish parties made no attempt to do so. Rather, the parties progressively reduced the participation of regional party organizations (which are most likely to be influenced by rank-and-file members) by centralizing the selection of party candidates in the hands of elites.

42 The data were elaborated by the author based on candidate lists collected from the Departamento de Estadísticas, Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior, Argentina.
43 The data were calculated by the author based on candidate lists published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado.
44 The data were elaborated by the author based on candidate lists collected from the Departamento de Estadísticas, Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior, Argentina.
at the national level. The data presented in this section support the argument that the level of deputy continuity is influenced by candidate selection procedures.

**Pacting and Political Party Rules**

The argument that party rules for the selection of candidates affect the degree of continuity may not be particularly surprising or counter-intuitive. However, why parties in new democracies choose to adopt particular candidate selection procedures is an interesting and unexplored question. As we learned from the discussion of the Spanish and Argentine political parties, existing parties do not always maintain previous procedures. Furthermore, new parties develop without a historic tradition. Why are certain procedures chosen over others? Why are they maintained or altered? I will argue that the choice of candidate selection procedures in Spain, which permitted a greater degree of control by national party elites, was constrained by the pacted nature of the transition to democracy. While several scholars have explored the effects of the mode of transition on political parties in Spain. To my knowledge, no one has directly addressed the effect of the mode of transition on the choice of candidate selection procedures, and how those procedures, in turn, facilitate elite continuity.

Successful pacting required that the terms of the pact be respected. As Stepan argues, “party pacts by their very nature have two indispensable requirements: first, leaders with the organizational and ideological capacity to negotiate a grand coalition among themselves; second, the allegiance of their political followers to the terms of the pact (Stepan, 1986, 80).” Pacting, by definition, also required compromise on both sides. Compromise required that the main negotiating partners reduce the distance between their positions. This resulted in the move to the right by the PSOE and the corresponding move to the left by the UCD (Field, 2002). Pacting elites needed to count on party executive committees, governmental appointees and parliamentary groups that supported (or could not oppose) their actions. One implication is that pacting encouraged the adoption of internal party rules and regulations that facilitated pacting elites’ control over their parties. Pacting elites had to organize their parties in such a way as to isolate internal dissent.

The literature on Spanish political parties has demonstrated that this was indeed the case. According to Capo (1981, 159), pacting allowed the participants to think in terms of adversaries instead of enemies, which was positive for democratic consolidation. However, he also points out that the form of reaching agreements, pacted by the leadership of the parties, strengthened internal party discipline. The parties adopted internal party rules and parliamentary procedures to foster party discipline.45

Capo (1981, 159) also argues that pacting cut the ties between elites, party activists and the electorate, and facilitated a distancing between the state and society. The continuation of elite negotiations during the 1977-79 period meant that leaders put little emphasis on mobilization and that party organizational development occurred from the top down. Caciagli (1984, 85) concurs that the mode of transition “conditioned the parties’ capacity for solid political and organisational development.”

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45 For a discussion of party discipline in the Congress of Deputies, see Sánchez de Dios (1996).
My argument is consistent with both of the arguments discussed above. The candidate selection procedures adopted in Spain were those most likely to produce party discipline. Furthermore, these procedures were clearly not mobilizational. Control over the party in parliament was fundamental to the success of pacting, and national elite control over candidate selection meant that their supporters were more likely to maintain (or attain) positions in parliament. Though from distinct starting points, the political parties involved in transition pacting rapidly implemented mechanisms to encourage party discipline. The following pages will demonstrate that candidate selection procedures were a fundamental part of the hierarchicalization of Spanish political parties.

Prior to tracing the influence of the mode of transition on political parties in Spain, it is important to recall the historical context in which party development took place. The formal beginning of the transition started with the appointment of Adolfo Suárez by King Juan Carlos on July 3, 1976. The transition can be broken down into two phases. The first phase began with Suárez’s appointment and ended with the founding elections on June 15, 1977. Upon his appointment, Suárez initiated a transition to democracy from within the regime and used the established rules of the Francoist state. The initial days of this phase of the transition were marked by negotiations with various elites within the regime. True negotiations with the opposition began following the approval of the Law for Political Reform, the government’s framework for political transition.

The second phase began following the 1977 founding elections and ended with the second parliamentary elections in March 1979. Suárez’s UCD emerged as the largest party and formed a minority government. The PSOE emerged as the largest party of the left and the principal opposition party. This second phase of the transition coincided with the consensual negotiations of socio-economic accords (Pactos de la Moncloa), regional devolution of power to the historic regions of Catalunya (Cataluña) and Euskadi (País Vasco), and the new constitution approved in 1978. This period was marked by the moderate stances of the principal political parties. Following the approval of the Constitution by referendum in December 1978, the government called new elections for March 1979.

The March 1979 elections largely confirmed the results of the founding elections, and the UCD once again formed a minority government between 1979 and 1982. This period corresponded with the ‘crisis of the parties’ – during which the PCE, PSOE and UCD suffered severe internal divisions. The period also saw the resignation of Adolfo Suárez and the dramatic coup attempt on February 23, 1981, when members of the civil guard captured the Congress of Deputies during the investiture vote of new prime ministerial candidate, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo. The coup was thwarted, and Calvo-Sotelo was elected as Prime Minister. In 1982, elections were called, which led to the victory of the PSOE with an absolute majority in the parliament.

The establishment of elite control over candidate selection in the PSOE reflects a larger process of the concentration of power in the hands of pacting elites. Unlike the UCD, the PSOE was not a new political party. In fact, the PSOE was the largest party of the left in the Spanish Second Republic (1931-6). However, organizationally, the party was tremendously weak. The party claimed two thousand members in 1974, which rose to only eight thousand in 1976.
Furthermore, the party leadership had been in exile in France, and dominated by exiled leaders.

This changed in 1974 when Felipe González was elected Secretary General, definitively taking control of the PSOE from the exiled PSOE leadership. The new executive formed under his leadership was made up exclusively of representatives of the party in Spain (Méndez Lago, 2000, 56). By 1976, control of the party organization was largely concentrated in the hands of the Sevillanos, led by González and Alfonso Guerra, who consolidated the party apparatus and discipline in the interior (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 117). After its legalization in 1977, González and Guerra gained increasing influence over the Executive Committee, which in turn dominated the much larger and statutorily more important Federal Committee (Heywood, 1987, 206). While low membership levels characterize the Spanish parties, PSOE membership numbers grew rapidly to 65,000 by the founding elections in June 1977 (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 116).

Though the parliamentary group elected in 1977 was heterogeneous, for the most part it was inclined toward pragmatism (Caciagli, 1986, 209). Felipe González led the Socialist Parliamentary group as spokesperson in the Congress of Deputies, and decisions during the 1977/79 period were largely taken without consultation of the party or parliamentary group. This included the signing of the Pactos de la Moncloa and the compromises reached with the UCD on the Constitution (Gillespie, 1989, 338).

This period was also marked by expulsions from the party of more radical members and the incorporation of new, less politically experienced members. According to Gillespie (1989, 395),

Altogether, the left suffered several hundred expulsions and suspensions. Other militants left in disgust, unable to stomach the moderate course being steered by the party leaders. Disciplinary action against dissenters, often for criticizing leading members, making declarations to the media or selling unofficial socialist papers, was taken with no prevarication and was often initiated by the central party apparatus headed by Alfonso Guerra.

The party executive also intervened in the selection of candidate lists for the Cortes in 1979. The intervention of the party leadership generated a great degree of controversy within the party (Caciagli, 1986, 211; Gillespie, 1989, 343, 401). Though many significant organizational changes occurred following the 1979 elections, we can see that during the negotiations with the UCD government, considerable steps were taken to assure the maintenance of the party line established by pacting elites.

Though the formal transition ended with the approval of the 1978 Constitution and the calling of elections under the new rules of the game, we must remember that the transition took place without dismantling or reforming the coercive and military apparatus of the state. This meant that the military and security forces were still significant actors - powerfully illustrated by

\[46\] Members in the interior of Spain.

\[47\] Guerra was first named Secretary of Party Organization and then Vice-Secretary General.
the attempted coup in February 1981. Therefore, for the parties of the left, the move to the right and the importance of party discipline were not simply due to reaching agreements with the UCD. They also had to be concerned with the military’s reactions. This and increasing internal dissent partially explain why the PSOE continued the process of moderation and increasing hierarchicalization of the party following the formal end of the transition in 1979.

Significant changes in party organization occurred between 1979 and 1982. First, the party changed the manner in which delegates to the federal Congress were elected. Though a majority list system, in which the most voted list sent all of the delegates to the federal Congress, was used until 1984, there were other significant changes in May 1979. Prior to 1979, local party branches directly elected the delegates. However, after the May Congress, the local branches elected delegates to the regional Congress, which in turn elected the delegates to the federal Congress. Furthermore, the regional Congress decided whether their delegates would vote as a block or individually. The establishment of indirect elections meant that the central party apparatus was better able to influence the choice of Congressional delegates (Méndez Lago, 2000, 112). The choice of congressional delegates was vital to the party as the Congress elects the executive bodies of the party, and approves party statutes and resolutions.

Despite internal controversy over these issues, the party also maintained its prohibition of organized internal factions and a majority list electoral system for Executive Committee elections. Finally, in 1981, power was further concentrated in a Permanent Committee within the Executive Committee. The Permanent Committee included the Secretary General, Vice-secretary General, and the Area Secretaries (Méndez Lago, 2000, 127). González and Guerra dominated the Permanent Committee, which was responsible for the daily functioning of the party (Heywood, 1987, 206-7).

In 1979, the party congress also revised the party statutes to formally allow party elites at the national level to alter candidate lists. These candidate selection procedures remained in place for the elections between 1979 and 1996. As the discussion of PSOE party development illustrates, candidate selection was one of the key mechanisms used to bolster the position of the party leadership. This allowed the dominant leadership to maintain a greater degree of control over their party representatives, and, in turn, fostered continuity.

The importance of candidate selection for transition pacting is also demonstrated by the UCD party development. The development of the UCD coincided with the first phase of the transition, from Suárez’s appointment by King Juan Carlos on July 3, 1976 to the founding elections of June 15, 1977. The UCD began as the Centro Democrático, which was a nascent electoral coalition of center-right proto-parties largely organized by the Partido Popular. The Partido Popular was presented to the public in December 1976 and was led by former regime ministers Pío Cabanillas and José María de Areilza.48 The parties of the Centro Democrático organized in response to regime reforms and around reformist Francoist politicians and members of the moderate opposition to the Franco regime. However, these were parties in name only - none of them had a mass following. On May 3, 1977 and following the successful initiation of regime reform from within, Suárez publicly announced that he would run as the prime

48 This Partido Popular should not be confused with the Partido Popular that emerged in 1989. The latter was the name adopted by Alianza Popular due to its re-founding.
Suárez’s decision to join the Centro Democrático had several organizational consequences. Suárez and his followers were given a great degree of control over the coalition. He was able to demand that his potential challenger, José María Areilza, be removed from the coalition’s leadership (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 87). In April 1977, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, Suárez’s Minister of Public Works, resigned his position in order to organize the UCD. Calvo-Sotelo decided on the UCD’s foundational text and gained a great degree of control over the selection of candidates for the upcoming parliamentary elections (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 91).

Suárez dominated “the process of candidate selection, imposing candidates close to him and other key members of the government (especially Martín Villa). This left many of the centre leaders unhappy at their representation in parliament, and limited their ability to influence the development of the UCD (Hopkin, 1999, 53).” Three of the original fifteen parties left the coalition in protest (Caciagli, 1986, 252). By influencing the makeup of candidate lists, Suárez attempted to assure his domination of the coalition and the incorporation of his followers. However, given the UCD’s coalitional nature, the various political families gained representation on the lists and subsequently in the Congress of Deputies. The coalition’s campaign was centered on Adolfo Suárez. “Its hope of electoral victory was based on the popularity of the head of government and the identification of the UCD with his policy of ‘reform within continuity’ (Kohler, 1982, 31).”

The second phase of the transition between June 15, 1977 and March 1979 was marked by the transformation of the coalition into a formal political party with a hierarchical structure. The organizational model of the UCD at this time was characterized by the predominance of the government, and more precisely by Suárez and a small group of supporters (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 93). Immediately following the founding elections, the various parties committed to turning the UCD into a formal political party, and the deputies and senators elected formed a single parliamentary group in each chamber (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 92). The coalition partners also “committed themselves to vote as a group on the defense of democracy, the monarchy, the unity of the state, the recognition of the autonomies and the social market economy (Attard, 1983, 56).” In order to facilitate integration, Suárez gave ministerial positions to the leaders of the various coalition groups in July 1977.

The first party Congress, celebrated in October 1978, formalized the centralization of power. The party adopted a presidentialist structure, and confirmed Suárez as the uncontested leader of the party (Kohler, 1982, 32). The party statutes established a majoritarian electoral system for the party executive committee, and Suárez was able to place personal friends on the executive committee (Kohler, 1982, 32). Also, according to Jonathan Hopkin, government ministers dominated the party executive committee. This meant “the executive committee was in effect the Council of Ministers in another guise…This allowed Suárez to share decision-making with ministers whom he himself had chosen, rather than with an executive which was more

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49 Also cited in Hopkin (1999, 77).
representative of the original UCD parties (Hopkin, 1999, 86).” The statutes also established the predominance of the national party organization over the provincial and regional organizations (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 94).

Party factions were prohibited, and Suárez demanded and received a greater degree of control over the candidate lists for the 1979 elections. Once again, a group close to Adolfo Suárez determined the candidate lists for the 1979 elections. In many cases, the leaders of the original parties were placed in locations on the lists that did not correspond with their hopes (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 95). Following the electoral victory of 1979, Suárez did not follow the previous pattern of incorporating the leaders of the original coalition parties into the government, but rather chose personal supporters (Esteban and López Guerra, 1982, 95).

Why did this rapid transformation occur? Also, why did the party choose this organizational model as opposed to one that accommodated the diverse nature of its origins? In order to explain the UCD’s decision to form a single parliamentary group and to vote together, Esteban and López Guerra (1982, 93) argue that at a time when the dictatorship was being dismantled and the constitution was being written, “the existence of UCD as a unified organization was the only alternative facing the disciplined parties of the left: its division would have meant leaving the moderate Spanish right without a qualified spokesperson, which would have possibly affected the entire process of writing the Constitution.” Along these same lines, the requirements of transition pacting facilitated the rapid transformation of the UCD from a diverse coalition into a hierarchically organized political party. A fundamental aspect of that transformation was national party elite control over candidate selection.

Can the length of the previous regime better explain the candidate selection procedures adopted by the Spanish parties? After more than forty years of authoritarian rule, the Spanish political parties were poorly organized and not deeply rooted in Spanish society. In fact, Caciagli (1984, 85) states that “organised parties in the real sense did not exist in the country, except for the communists.” Furthermore, the Spanish political parties were legalized just a few months prior to the first election. This may have encouraged the initial choice of candidate selection procedures. Without the existence of a significant number of party members or infrastructure, the parties may have been less likely to adopt a primary system or a system in which regional party branches played a larger role. The situation may have encouraged a greater degree of national elite control. This can also be partially applied to the Argentine case. Though Argentina had a more recent experience with democracy, the Argentine parties also faced the challenges of party re-organization and the development of party infrastructure. This is illustrated by the fact that only 13% of UCR provincial party branches used primaries to select their candidates for deputy in the first election in 1983 (De Luca, Jones, and Tula, 2002, 425). This is a party with a history of primaries.

However, the length of the previous regime in Spain cannot explain why the candidate selection procedures were maintained, or why national elite control was formalized. The fact that Spanish parties were not deeply rooted in Spanish society would not preclude the use of party primaries or a system of candidate selection that concentrated power at the regional level in future elections. Furthermore, it could certainly be argued that the opportunity for participation within the parties could strengthen party organization, membership development and electoral
prospects. Though political parties in Spain were very weak at the time of transition, different strategies were compatible with the organizational development of the parties.

Caciagli (1984, 89) argues that “the major responsibility of the Spanish parties vis-à-vis society during this period was to regulate the mode of behavior of their elites,” which he calls “the style of politics.” A fundamental means of regulating elite behavior was controlling who would represent the parties. Pacting explains not only why elites (versus the rank-and-file) dominated the candidate selection process, but also why candidate selection was ultimately decided by national political elites – these were the very individuals responsible for negotiating the transition.

**Conclusion**

This paper demonstrates that the candidate selection procedures adopted by the principal political parties in Spain encourage a greater degree of continuity vis-à-vis the procedures adopted by the principal Argentine parties. Furthermore, I argue that pacting constrained the choice of candidate selection procedures. Pacting encourages the adoption of internal party rules and regulations that facilitated pacting elites’ control over their parties and representatives. One vitally important means of ensuring party discipline is control over candidate selection. The stakes involved with maintaining party discipline constrained the choice of candidate selection procedures, and encouraged national party elite control over the selection of candidates, the prohibition of internal factions, and the limitation of rank-and-file participation.

The PSOE and UCD party leadership, led by Felipe González and Adolfo Suárez, respectively, had already begun pacting prior to the first democratic elections. However, following the 1977 elections there were fundamental issues to be addressed, such as the writing of a new constitution, demands for regional autonomy, a growing economic crisis, military reform and rising terrorism. In order to continue pacting and avoid a backlash from those opposed to the transition (and from those within their own parties that disagreed with the consensual strategy), they needed to maintain control of their parties. They needed to ensure that their supporters were represented in their parliamentary groups, which needed to ratify many of the agreements. If they did not have support from their parliamentary groups, the transition process would be put in jeopardy. The fact that pacting elites were concerned with maintaining parliamentary groups that would support their strategies and positions combined with the degree of control over candidate selection explains the relationship between pacting and the higher degree of elite continuity in Spain vis-à-vis Argentina.

While this study only includes an analysis of two cases, it nonetheless generates a viable hypothesis, namely that pacting encourages the adoption of political party rules for candidate selection that facilitate pacting elites’ control over their parties. Future research needs to determine whether elite continuity compromises the quality of democracy and expand the number of cases to determine the effects of various modes of transition on internal party rules and regulations.
Appendix 1

The tables below present reelection rates for Spanish parliamentarians between 1979 and 1989, and for Argentine members of Congress between 1985 and 1993. The average percentage of Spanish deputies reelected to the Congress of Deputies between 1979 and 1989 was 54 percent, and the average percentage of senators reelected was 40 percent.

**Legislator Continuity, % Reelected, Parliament, Spain, 1977-1989**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senators</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legislator Continuity, % Reelected, Congress, Argentina, 1983-1993**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senators</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>35%</td>
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</table>

In the Argentine case, these averages decrease to 22 percent in the lower house and 35 percent in the Senate. Spain’s deputy continuity rate is thirty-two percentage points higher than Argentina’s and its senator continuity rate is five points higher. It is clear from the results that the degree of continuity in the Spanish case is higher than in the Argentine case.

Although on average continuity is higher in both chambers of the Spanish parliament vis-à-vis the Argentine Congress, a comparison of the levels of continuity in the lower houses is more interesting politically and more justifiable methodologically. First, the lower houses enjoy similar levels of authority, whereas the Argentine Senate is significantly more powerful than the Spanish Senate. The two chambers of the Argentine Congress, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, have relatively equal powers. However, the powers of the two chambers of the Spanish Parliament, the Cortes, are not equal. The Spanish lower house, the Congress of Deputies, is far more powerful than the Senate. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 gave the Congress the sole power to elect the prime minister and remove the prime minister from office, as well as the power to over-ride vetoes or amendments placed on legislation by the Senate. As the Spanish 50 Deputy reelection data were taken from Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993, 248). Senator reelection data (1979-1986) were taken from Morán (1989). The 1989 senator reelection rate was calculated by the author based on data provided by Mariano Baena.

51 The reelection rates were elaborated by the author based on deputy and senator lists provided by the Argentine Congress. The Argentine data include deputies elect that held a seat in the previous legislative period regardless of whether or not they were in office at the close of the prior legislative term. Though this only affects the calculations in two elections, 1989 and 1991, the inclusion of only those deputies that were sitting at the close of the prior legislative term would only slightly reduce the level of reelection.

52 If the Senate vetoes a bill passed by the Congress, the Congress will debate the Senate veto, and then the initial text of the bill approved by the Congress will be submitted for a vote. The Senate veto will be lifted with the favorable vote of the absolute majority of the members of the Congress. If the initial text does not receive an
Congress is clearly the more powerful chamber of the Cortes, the level of continuity is more politically significant. This comparison also controls for the potential impact of the importance of the office on continuity.

Second, the Spanish and Argentine electoral laws with regard to the election of deputies are very similar, which allows us to control for their potential effects. Furthermore, the electoral laws have not fundamentally changed during the period studied. The election of senators, however, occurs quite differently. The Spanish Senate is composed of 208 senators that are directly elected, and a variable number of senators that are indirectly elected by the assemblies of the Autonomous Communities, currently fifty-one senators. The directly elected senators are elected from fifty-nine electoral districts, forty-seven of which are elected on the basis of a limited vote system, and the remaining districts function as plurality systems. The indirectly elected senators are elected by the regional assemblies through a system that reflects the population size of the regions and the political composition of the assemblies.\(^{53}\) These rules have changed somewhat over time. In 1977, 207 senators were directly elected and the King appointed forty-one.\(^{54}\) Following the approval of the Constitution in 1978 and parliamentary elections in 1979, senators who were to be elected by the assemblies of the Autonomous Communities were incorporated as decentralization and regional elections occurred. Full incorporation of these representatives did not occur until midway through the 1982/86 legislature.\(^{55}\) Senators are elected for a maximum four-year term (or until parliamentary elections are called).

Between 1983 and 1992, Argentine senators, on the other hand, were all indirectly elected by the legislatures of the country’s 22 provinces (23 after 1990), and by an electoral college in the Federal Capital, and each elected two senators. Senators are elected for nine-year terms, with partial renewal every three years. Aside from the addition of a province after 1990, the Senate election laws were constant throughout the period studied. Given the very different forms of election and changing rules in the Spanish case, a comparison of the levels of continuity in the lower houses presents fewer methodological problems, and controls for other variables that may affect the degree of continuity.

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\(^{53}\) There is one senator for each of the seventeen Autonomous Communities and an additional one per million inhabitants.

\(^{54}\) There were 207 versus the current 208 because La Gomera and Hierro formed one electoral district (Crespo, 1997, 235).

\(^{55}\) Representatives from the Catalan and Basque parliaments were incorporated as early as 1980 and 1981, respectively. However, the remaining autonomous community assemblies did not send senators until the Second Legislature (1982/86), and they did so in a staggered manner.
Appendix 2

The following paragraphs address three alternative explanations for the higher level of continuity in Spain vis-à-vis Argentina. These explanations are party splits and defections, deputy career paths, and electoral volatility.

Cross-nationally, deputy reelection largely captures party splits and defections. For example, the Frente Renovador (FR), a break-off faction of the Argentine Partido Justicialista (PJ), presented a separate list of candidates for deputy in 1985, and the 11 deputies elected from the FR list are included in the above results and counted as repeating if they had previously attained a seat on a PJ list. There may be legislators that defect to minor parties, and therefore reduce their chances of reelection. This likely occurs in both cases. However, Spain has been more affected by splits and defections particularly with regard to the UCD and the PCE.

Deputy career paths within the governmental institutions also do not appear to explain the difference in deputy continuity. Deputies that abandon their chamber careers to occupy positions in the national government may be comparatively significant. Jones (1997, 277) found that four of President Menem’s eight ministers had previously been Chamber deputies. At least at the ministerial level, this factor does not operate in the Spanish system given that deputies can be members of parliament and ministers at the same time. However, given the small number of ministerial positions, this factor can only account for a very small portion of the lower continuity rate in Argentina.

However, more Spanish deputies abandon their chamber to later occupy seats in the Senate than in Argentina. Morán (1989, 84) found that 51 Spanish deputies (1977/79, 1979/82, 1982/86) later occupied positions in the national Senate (1979/82, 1982/86, 1986/89). This represents approximately 4.5 percent of the deputies during that period. On the other hand, Argentine deputies (1983-1995) abandoned the chamber to later occupy seats in the Senate (prior to 1998) at a rate of only 2.9 percent.

Do Argentine deputies disproportionately abandon their chamber to hold political office at the regional level? Both countries have decentralized systems of government, which may attract national deputies either to hold positions in the regional executive or in the regional legislature. Spain has 17 autonomous communities that also function as parliamentary systems with unicameral legislatures that, in turn, elect the “president” of their regional governments. Argentina has 23 provinces that directly elect regional legislators and a governor. Between 1977 and 1989, seventeen Spanish deputies later became presidents of autonomous communities.

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56 The PJ is also known as the Peronist Party.
57 As of January 1995.
58 Art. 70, Constitution of 1978. In fact, 40% of the ministers during the Constituent legislature (1977/79) were also deputies. In the Socialist governments between 1982 and 1993, 70% of the ministers were deputies (López Nieto, 1997, 197).
59 This is the case despite the fact that the Argentine Senate is significantly more powerful than its Spanish counterpart.
60 There were 22 provinces before 1990 when Tierra del Fuego became a province.
communities.\textsuperscript{61} This represents 1.10 percent of all deputies. Similarly, 1.09 percent, or eleven, of the Argentine deputies (1983-95) were later elected governor.\textsuperscript{62} Therefore, it is unlikely that the draw of regional office can explain the difference between the two cases. Overall, deputy career paths within the governmental institutions do not explain the lower level of continuity in Argentina vis-à-vis Spain.

Electoral volatility can account for a large degree of within country variation in reelection rates in both cases, but it cannot explain the difference in continuity rates. Let us first examine the election results for the main parties in Spain and Argentina. The Spanish electoral results, presented in the table below, reveal some dramatic changes over time, particularly with the realignment of 1982. The UCD, for example, dropped from 35 percent of the popular vote in 1979 to 6.5 percent of the popular vote in 1982. The PSOE, on the other hand, saw its support jump 18 points between 1979 and 1982, and decline slowly after the 1982 election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE/IU</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP/PP\textsuperscript{64}</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC/CIU</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNV</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático); PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español); PCE/IU (Partido Comunista de España/Izquierda Unida); AP/PP (Alianza Popular/Partido Popular); PDC/CIU (Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya/Convergència i Unió); PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco).

The AP also saw a dramatic rise in support (more than 20 points) in 1982, while the PCE lost more than half of their vote share, only to recover in 1989. This jump in electoral volatility in 1982 partially accounts for the one time decline in deputy continuity in Spain.

In the table below, the Argentine electoral results are presented in their most volatile light. That is, no Peronists that presented a separate list from the official PJ list are included in

\textsuperscript{61} This includes deputies that served at any point prior to the 1989 parliamentary elections. These findings were calculated by the author based on data provided by the governments of the autonomous communities.

\textsuperscript{62} This includes deputies that served at any point prior to the 1995 Chamber elections. This also includes two deputies that were not immediately elected to the office of governor: Eduardo Duhalde was a Chamber deputy between 1987 and 1989, vice-president between 1989 and 1991, and then governor of Buenos Aires beginning in 1995. Rubén Marín was governor of La Pampa from 1983 to 1987, Chamber deputy from 1987 to 1989, national senator from 1989 to 1991, and then governor of La Pampa again beginning in 1991. These findings were calculated by the author based on data provided by the Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio de Interior.

\textsuperscript{63} The election results were elaborated by the author based on data provided by the Junta Electoral Central, Ministerio del Interior, Spain.

\textsuperscript{64} Alianza Popular presented candidates in coalition as Coalición Democrática in 1979, and as Coalición Popular in 1982 and 1986. In 1989, Alianza Popular was renamed Partido Popular.
the electoral results.\textsuperscript{65} The results show that the PJ sharply declined in the 1985 election, but later recovered and saw its support remain relatively constant during the rest of the period.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{% of Vote by Election, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina (1983-93)\textsuperscript{67}}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
UCR & 48.0 & 43.6 & 37.2 & 28.8 & 29.0 & 30.2 \\
PJ & 38.5 & 24.5 & 41.5 & 44.8 & 40.2 & 42.5 \\
Others & 13.5 & 31.9 & 21.3 & 26.4 & 30.8 & 27.3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

UCR (Unión Cívica Radical); PJ (Partido Justicialista).

We also observe the steady decline of the \textit{Unión Cívica Radical} (UCR) from a high of 48 percent in 1983 to 30 percent in 1993. These results illustrate that Argentina has experienced electoral volatility, but this electoral volatility does not compare to the disappearance of the UCD and the dramatic rise of AP in Spain.\textsuperscript{68}

A comparison of the formal levels of electoral volatility, using the Pedersen index, confirms the higher level of electoral volatility in Spain.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{Deputy Continuity and Electoral Volatility, Congress of Deputies, Spain, 1979-1989\textsuperscript{70}}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & %Reelected & Volatility \\
\hline
1977 & - & - \\
1979 & 55 & 7 \\
1982 & 40 & 43 \\
1986 & 57 & 12 \\
1989 & 62 & 6 \\
Average & 53.5 & 17 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{65} Only official party lists and coalitions are included.

\textsuperscript{66} However, this sharp decline was the result of a faction of the PJ presenting their own list of candidates and not the result of the electorate transferring their votes from Peronists to another political formation. In fact, most analysts will include both lists in their calculations for the PJ.

\textsuperscript{67} Molinelli, Palanza and Sin, 1999, 268-73. The UCR data includes the UCR-MPC alliance that attained two seats in 1985. PJ presented candidates as PJ and in coalition as the \textit{Frente Justicialista de Libertad} in 1985, and in coalition as \textit{Frente Justicialista Popular} in 1989. The \textit{Frente Renovador}, which presented a separate list of candidates in 1985, is not included in PJ data.

\textsuperscript{68} It should be noted that the decline of the UCR has clearly transformed Argentine politics.

\textsuperscript{69} The Pedersen index of electoral volatility “measures the net change in the seat (or vote) shares of all parties from one election to the next. The index is derived by adding the net change in percentage of seats (or votes) gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two. An index of 15, for example, means that some parties experienced an aggregate gain of 15 percent of the seats from one election to the next while others lost a total of 15 percent (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, 6).”

\textsuperscript{70} The reelection data were taken from Alda Fernández and López Nieto (1993). The volatility indexes were taken from Anduiza and Méndez (1997).
The average volatility index for elections to the Spanish Congress of Deputies during this period is seventeen whereas the average for Argentine Chamber elections declines to eleven. The 6-point difference clearly demonstrates the higher level of electoral volatility in the Spanish case.

**Deputy Continuity and Electoral Volatility, Chamber of Deputies, Argentina, 1985-1993**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Reelected</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we were to predict the level of continuity solely on the basis of electoral volatility, i.e. the greater degree of electoral volatility, the lower level of continuity, we would predict that Spain would have a lower degree of continuity than Argentina. As the tables above demonstrate, this was not the case.

If we were to exclude the 1982 “outlier”, the average for the Spanish case would decline to 8 and put the level of volatility below the Argentine average. However, the Spanish elections in 1986 had the same degree of volatility as the 1987 elections in Argentina, and 57 percent of the Spanish deputies were reelected versus only 24 percent of the Argentine deputies. Furthermore, the extremely volatile 1982 Spanish elections (43 volatility) produced a reelection rate of 40 percent, a level of reelection never reached in Argentina despite significantly lower levels of volatility.

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71 The Spanish volatility index was taken from Anduiza and Méndez (1997). They calculated the index using vote shares. Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, University of New Mexico made the volatility indexes for Argentina available. Also see Roberts and Wibbels (1999).

72 The reelection rates were elaborated by the author. Kenneth M. Roberts and Erik Wibbels, University of New Mexico, made the volatility indexes available.
REFERENCES


