MAJORITY CARTELS, DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS, 
AND INTER-PARTY RELATIONS 
IN A UNIDIMENSIONAL LEGISLATURE: 
THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 

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Prepared for delivery at the 2003 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, 
Dallas, Texas, March 27-29, 2003.
I.  INTRODUCTION

During at least the past dozen years a single policy dimension has dominated legislative politics in Argentina. Furthermore, in regard to the major policy issues of the day, legislative politics during this period was very adversarial (i.e., non-consensual) with a relatively homogenous (in terms of ideal points) legislative majority party employing its majority status to force through legislation that most often was strongly opposed by an equally homogenous principal minority party. The consequences of this dynamic were numerous important legislative victories for the majority party and numerous important legislative defeats for the minority party (as well as for most other opposition parties).

The success of the legislative majority party in Argentina stems from its functioning as an effective cartel (the other parties also function as cartels, albeit minority cartels). The origins of these cartels are distinct from those in the United States Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993). In the U.S., the members of congress are the crucial actors who delegate power to the party leadership, while in Argentina provincial-level party bosses are the key players who engage in this delegation, but the end effect on the functioning of the legislature is quite similar. The majority party leadership uses its majority status (especially agenda control) to dominate the legislative process, excluding legislation that it believes may pass.

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1 This project was supported by the National Science Foundation (SBR 9709695), the Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Institucional (CEDI) de la Fundación Gobierno y Sociedad, and the Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) Program at Michigan State University. We thank Silvina Danesi for her invaluable assistance, without which this paper would not be possible. We thank Gerardo Adrogué, Paloma Bauer de la Isla, John Carey, Jamie Carson, Alberto DiPeco, Marcela Durrieu, Charles Finocchiaro, Alberto Föhrig, Scott Gates, Ariel Godoy, James Granato, Simon Jackman, Sergio Massa, Timothy Nokken, William Reed, Baldomero Rodríguez, David Rohde, and Rossana Surballe for answering questions and providing helpful assistance, suggestions, and comments. This paper benefited enormously from the ongoing collaborative study of the Argentine Congress by Jones with Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi.
despite its objection (negative agenda control), as well as implementing legislation it desires (positive agenda control). The opposition, lacking both negative and positive agenda control, is left in a very reactive position.

This paper focuses on the years 1989 to 2001, a period of profound economic and social transformation in Argentina (Corrales 2002; Eaton 2002; Murillo 2001; Spiller and Tommasi 2000; Tommasi 2002; Weyland 2002) covering the two terms of President Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-95, 1995-99) of the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the abbreviated tenure of President Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). A brief portion of the paper (Section VII) also includes information on the first 14 months (2002-03) of the term of President Eduardo Duhalde (PJ), who was chosen by the Congress to complete most of the remainder of De la Rúa's term.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a basic overview of Argentine party politics as it pertains to the functioning of the Argentine Congress. Section III examines the applicability to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies of the most prominent theories employed to explain legislator behavior in the United States. Section IV describes the roll call vote data employed in this study. Section V discusses the Bayesian estimation procedure used to analyze the roll call data, and, in combination with Section VI, supplies evidence of the unidimensional nature of Argentine legislative politics during this period. Section VII presents evidence on majority and minority roll rates in the Argentine Chamber, which lends support to the interpretation of Argentine congressional parties as cartels. Section VIII extends the analysis presented in Section VII by exploring two key aspects of partisan politics in the Chamber: intra-party heterogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity. In this section vital aspects of inter-party dynamics in the Chamber are also examined, with particular focus on the relationship between the dominant parties (the PJ and UCR), as well as on the relationship between these two dominant parties and the principal minor national parties (Frente País Solidario [FREPASO], Unión del Centro Democrático [UCEDE]) and the most relevant provincial parties. Section IX concludes.
II. PARTY POLITICS AND THE ARGENTINE CONGRESS

The topics of Argentine political institutions and party politics have been adequately covered elsewhere (e.g., Calvo and Abal Medina 2001; Cheresky and Blanquer 2003; Corrales 2002; De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Eaton 2002; Jones 2002, 1997; Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommassi 2002; Levitsky 2001a; Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 2000; Mustapic 2002; Tommassi and Spiller 2000). In this section I provide a series of general conclusions that can be drawn from this literature regarding political parties, political careers, and the Argentine Chamber of Deputies.2

First, Argentina is a presidential republic. It has a bicameral national legislature (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) as well as a federal system of government in which provincial governors exercise substantial autonomy (Eaton 2002; Sawers 1996; Tommassi 2002; Tommassi and Spiller 2000). Every one of the 24 provinces (23 provinces and an autonomous federal capital) possesses three senators (two prior to 1995) and a number of deputies proportional to its 1980 population, with every province receiving a minimum of five legislators.3

The Argentine Congress, while certainly more of a reactive blunt veto player than a proactive agenda setter, is nevertheless an important player in the policy process (Corrales 2002; Eaton 2002; Jones 2001; Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommassi 2002; Llanos 2002; Mustapic 2002). The Argentine Congress is clearly not unimportant to the policy process as some scholars have suggested (e.g., Nino 1996; O'Donnell 1994; Weyland 2002).

Second, the locus of partisan politics in Argentina is the province (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Jones 2002; Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, Tommassi 2003,


3 For a comparative overview of the high level of Chamber malapportionment in Argentina (i.e., overreppresentation of the less populous provinces), see Samuels and Snyder (2001).
Political careers are generally provincial-based (with even positions in the national government often a consequence of provincial factors), and the base of political support for politicians and parties is concentrated at the provincial level.

Third, a single person or small group of politicians generally dominates political parties at the provincial-level (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, Tommasi 2003, 2002). In provinces where the party controls the governorship, with rare exceptions the governor is the undisputed (or at least dominant) boss of the provincial-level party. In many other provinces where the governorship is not held by the party, the party is nonetheless dominated in a comparable manner (with a greater amount of space for intra-party opponents) by a single individual (present examples include Jorge Busti of the PJ in Entre Ríos, Alberto Natale of the Partido Demócrata Progresista in Santa Fe, and José Zavalia of the UCR in Santiago del Estero). Finally, in the remaining provinces where the party does not control the governorship and there is not a single dominant leader, there is generally a small group of influential party leaders who predominate in party life.4 A good current example of the more fragmented extreme of this final category would be the PJ in the province of Chubut, where five relatively equal prominent leaders co-exist: José Manuel Corchuelo Blasco, Mario Das Neves, Marcelo Guinle, César Mac Karthy, and Osvaldo Sala. A less fragmented current example would be the UCR in the province of San Luis where three major leaders co-exist: Jorge Aguñdez, Miguel Bonino, and Walter Ceballos.

Fourth, the above-mentioned dominance of party leaders is based principally on patronage, pork barrel politics, and clientelism. Patronage is particularly important for maintaining the support of second and third tier party leaders, who in turn possess the ability to mobilize voters, especially for party primaries. The ability to engage in pork barrel politics improves the party's reputation with key constituents and aids clientelistic practices.

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4 In provinces where the party leadership is fragmented, the role of the national party (especially if it is the party of the President) in provincial-level politics is often more pronounced than is the case where the provincial-level party is united under a single leader (Jones 1997).
through the provision of jobs to party supporters and the infusion of money into the party coffers (e.g., kickbacks from contractors and suppliers, skimming off a percentage of the project budget) which in turn is employed to maintain clientelistic networks. Clientelism, that is the direct exchange of selective material incentives (Kitschelt 2000), assists party leaders at all levels in maintaining a solid base of supporters.

The provincial-level party has a large number of positions at its disposal, with the exact portfolio depending on the party's control of national, provincial, and municipal governments (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). All parties control positions (of varying number) in the national, provincial, and municipal legislatures. If the party controls the provincial government, it has further access to positions in the provincial executive branch, and likewise, where it controls municipal governments (the degree of this control varies depending on the province's province-municipality revenue-sharing system), it also has access to positions in the municipal executive branch. Finally, if their party controls the national government, provincial party leaders have access to a host of positions in the national government, both in the federal capital as well as in the provincial offices of national executive branch and agencies.

The provincial party also controls the distribution of national, provincial, and municipal level expenditures, with this control varying depending on the party's control over the national, provincial, and municipal governments. These expenditures provide a prime

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5 The size of the provincial public sector is quite large in most provinces. For example, in 2000 the ratio of private to provincial employees was above 10 in only three provinces (Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Córdoba), and as low as 3 in four provinces (Catamarca, Formosa, La Rioja, Santa Cruz), with a median value of 6 (Guido and Lazzari 2001). If one includes all public employees (national, provincial, municipal), public employees account for over 25% of the work force in six provinces, with a median percentage among the 24 provinces of 19% (Guido 2002). Finally, all but one province spends over 50% of its total revenue on provincial public employee salaries, and over half spend more than 67% (Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2003).
source of the resources needed by party leaders to engage in clientelistic activities.

Argentina's federal revenue sharing system automatically transfers funds to the provinces, which are then mostly utilized at the province's discretion. The distribution of expenditures in Argentina has been roughly equal between the national government and the provinces during the 1990s (Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2003; Saiegh and Tommasi 1998; Tommasi 2002) with, for instance, in 2000 52% of expenditures being carried out by the national government, 40% by the provincial governments, and 8% by the municipal governments (Tommasi 2002).6

Governors (and to a much lesser extent mayors) exercise considerable influence over the execution of public policy (either through their direct control of the provincial budget or their discretionary control over the execution of national government funded programs). This influence allows them to obtain/maintain the loyalty of their supporters through the granting of privileges in the distribution of material/economic subsidies, low interest loans, scholarships, etc. 7 It also allows them to construct a relationship with a wide variety of other organized groups. The above-mentioned benefits also accrue in a more limited manner to legislators (at the national, provincial, and municipal levels) who are able to allocate funds/resources given to them by the legislature or are able to directly allocate national, provincial, or municipal level funds/resources working in concert with the respective executive branch.

6 Operational control over a significant component of national government expenditures is actually delegated to provincial and municipal level officials. An excellent current example is the Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupados, which delegates most of the decisions regarding beneficiaries (1,903,855 as of January 2003 according to the Argentine Ministerio de Trabajo) to provincial and, especially, municipal level officials.

7 For detailed discussions of the practice of clientelism in Argentina see Auyero (2001), Levitsky (2001b), and Silveti (2003).
Fifth, the fruit of these patronage, pork barrel, and clientelistic activities is the dominance of the provincial-level political party. First and foremost, dominance of the provincial-level party requires that a party leader be able to defeat any rival in an intra-party primary (either to choose candidates for elective office or to elect the provincial-level party leadership).\textsuperscript{8} Patronage, pork barrel activities, and clientelism are important for success in general elections, but they are indispensable for success in party primary elections\textsuperscript{9} In a

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\item The party leader, through his/her control of the provincial-level party organization, has a great deal of latitude regarding when and under what conditions the primaries are held; thereby providing incumbent party leaders with an additional advantage vis-à-vis challengers.
\item Brusco, Narazreno, and Stokes (2002) provide evidence of the modest effect of clientelism on general elections behavior is provided by the innovative study of Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2002). Only 7\% of their respondents reported receiving handouts prior to the 2001 congressional elections. It should be noted however that this study examined general elections, not primaries (further, no PJ primaries were held in any of the provinces included in the study during the 2000-2002 period). Additionally, the study suffers from four design limitations that lead it to understate the effect of clientelism. First, as mentioned by the authors, the nature of the survey question regarding the receipt of handouts is likely to engender a negative socially desirable response among some respondents. Second, the sample population was limited to relatively developed provinces (Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Misiones), and in particular did not include any provinces in the Northwest where conventional wisdom suggests clientelism plays a larger role in general elections given the higher dependence on public employment in these provinces (Guido and Lazzari 2002, 2001). Third, surveys in Argentina automatically exclude residents of squatter settlements and similar areas and operationally exclude residents of many neighborhoods in the immediate surroundings of these settlements, as well as some of the most dangerous formal neighborhoods. In Gran Buenos Aires (i.e., the portion of the province of Buenos Aires adjacent to the federal capital; which accounts for a quarter of the Argentine population), approximately 15\% of the population is not represented in surveys, a percentage that drops to 10\% in urban areas elsewhere in the country. In spite of the above caveats, it still seems clear, based on the innovative Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2002) study, that no more than one-quarter of Argentine voters received handouts preceding the 2001 election.
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related manner, patronage, pork barrel, and clientelistic based support often has the same anticipated reaction effect on potential intra-party challengers that a large campaign war chest has in U.S. politics; it causes potential challengers to desist from any attempt to defeat the party leader.¹⁰

Political parties, not the government, run party primaries (for both party leadership positions and candidacies for national, provincial, and municipal public office) (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). Primaries involve a considerable amount of mobilization (get out the vote [GOTV]) efforts by the competing intra-party lists. The electorate for these contests is either party members (elections for party leadership positions are always restricted to party members) alone or party members and those not affiliated with any party (i.e., independents).¹¹

Vital to these GOTV efforts is the support of three groups (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). First, every list needs the support of its own machine composed of regional and neighborhood-level leaders (punteros) who have established ties (normally fostered and maintained via patronage) with the leader or leaders supporting the list. Second, lists seek the support of punteros not initially aligned with any of the competing lists. Third, lists seek the support of other organized groups with a strong ability to mobilize large numbers of people.¹²

¹⁰ Challenging the party boss is always an option for intra-party opponents. It is however a decision that is taken with great care, since a failed challenge often entails serious negative consequences for the challenger (Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommasi 2003).

¹¹ During the 1989-2001 period, in PJ provincial-level national deputy primaries restricted to party members and open to independents respectively, the median percentage of registered voters who participated was 7% and 13%. The comparable figures for the UCR were 3% and 5% respectively. These estimates are based on partial data, and thus should be treated with some caution. All the same, what is clear is that a relatively small percentage of the overall electorate participates in most primaries.

¹² In addition to obtaining the support of these groups, to be competitive a list must be able to carry out the following tasks (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002): engage in campaign advertising, hire a large number
When a primary is held, success thus depends almost entirely on financial/material resources. Whether or not a politician (e.g., a national deputy) will faithfully represent (or has faithfully represented) the interests of his/her constituents normally has no significant impact on success in the primary contest.

Sixth, Argentine legislators are elected from closed party lists in multi-member districts (with a median district magnitude of 3 and a mean of 5), lists that are created at the provincial-level through elite arrangement or party primary (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002).¹³ As the above-discussion would suggest, in most instances the reelection decision for members of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (as well as the decision regarding their political future) lies primarily with the provincial-level party boss(es), and not with the individual legislator. Furthermore, these party bosses practice rotation (Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi 2003, 2002), with the consequence being very low re-election rates for Chamber deputies.¹⁴ Between 1989 and 2001 (the period examined in this paper) only 20% of Chamber deputies achieved immediate re-election (the lowest re-election rate we are aware of in countries that do not prohibit immediate re-election), with an overwhelming majority of deputies returning home to political posts in their province (or going to national level posts, often in "representation" of their province).¹⁵ As documented in Jones (2002) and

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¹³ One-half (127 and 130) of the Argentine Chamber is renewed every two years, with each of the 24 electoral districts (provinces) renewing one-half (or the closest approximation) of its delegation.

¹⁴ The current practice of rotation employed in Argentina can be thought of as a substantially more robust form of the rotation that was common in the U.S. during the first half of the nineteenth century (Kernell 1977; Silbey 1991, 1967).

¹⁵ Once a deputy obtained a position on the party list, his/her probability of re-election skyrocketed to 76%, illustrating the importance of the influence exercised by the party boss(es) over the list creation process.
Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommasi (2002), Argentine deputies are amateur legislators, but professional politicians. The above is not meant to imply that deputies are helpless actors, totally dependent on the party boss. Nonetheless, deputies are in most cases dependent on the party boss (to varying degrees), and hence possess limited political autonomy (once again, to varying degrees).

Seventh, the internal rules of the Argentine Chamber provide the party leadership with a great deal of power, and in addition endow the majority party with a high level of control over the legislative agenda. The principal organizing unit in the Argentine Chamber is the party delegation. When discussing the majority and minority party delegations, it is important to place this discussion within the political context of the 1989-2003 period. First, between 1989 and 1999 and 2001 and 2003, the PJ was the dominant force in the Chamber, enjoying either an absolute majority or near-majority of the legislative seats (see Table 1). The UCR-FREPASO Alianza occupied a similar position during the 1999-2001 period. While an absolute majority was rarely achieved, throughout most of this period the majority party possessed a sufficient number of seats such that it was able to exercise

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16 As a consequence, the behavior of deputies is best explained by a modified version of progressive ambition theory (where progressive is interpreted in a more flexible manner), with static ambition and, especially, discrete ambition being uncommon (Jones 2002; Morgenstern 2002).

17 An exception to this general statement is the period from July 8 to December 9, 1989. As part of the general agreement between then President Raúl Alfonsín (UCR) and President-Elect Carlos Menem (PJ), in order to obtain the latter's early assumption of office on July 8 (under the Constitution Menem was not due to assume office until December 10, 1989), the UCR ceded control of the Chamber Presidency to the PJ as well as agreed to assist in providing a quorum until December 9 (Jones 1997; Llanos 2002). An additional component of this agreement was that the UCR would limit its presence on the Chamber Floor to a maximum of 75 deputies, the number it would have in office after December 10 (Llanos 2002). However, the UCR violated this unofficial agreement on several instances, and in fact the only times the PJ was defeated in votes during this period were when more than 75 UCR deputies voted against the PJ position.
majority control of the Chamber, either alone or through the tacit support of a subset of the numerous minor parties in the Chamber (see Table 1). This latter ability was enhanced by the fact that throughout this period the majority party in the Chamber was also the party of the President, who was in the unique position of possessing resources with which to influence the behavior of non-majority party legislators (especially those whose party controlled the governorship of their province).18

When in the majority the PJ and Alianza tended to operate in a hegemonic manner, both in the allocation of the most coveted committee presidencies and the partisan composition of the key committees as well as in the construction of the legislative agenda in the Chamber Rules Committee (Comisión de Labor Parlamentaria [CLP]) (Danesi 2003; Jones 2002; Schinelli 1996). Prior to all legislative sessions, the legislative agenda is drafted by the CLP. However when and how the CLP meets is left to the discretion of the majority party, which also will frequently change the floor agenda agreed to in the CLP meeting. Furthermore, the floor agenda generally contains far more potential topics than will actually be discussed, thereby providing additional flexibility to the majority party leaders.

The CLP members are the Chamber President and three Vice-Presidents and the leaders of all of the recognized party delegations in the Chamber (or their designated alternates).19 The CLP decides which bills will be treated during the session, who will speak during the floor debate, the hours of the session, etc. Unlike in many countries however, the

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18 The distinction between the President and his party's leadership in the Congress is not as clear cut in Argentina as is the case in the United States. The Argentine President plays a more active and influential role (either personally or through members of his cabinet) in the activities of the majority party (i.e., his party) in the Congress than does the U.S. President. For an excellent review of President Menem's proactive role in the area of privatization, see Llanos (2002).

19 Between July 8, 1989 and December 9, 1999 the President of the Chamber was Alberto Pierri (PJ). Between December 10, 1999 and December 9, 2001 the President of the Chamber was Rafael Pascual (UCR). Since December 10, 2001 the President of the Chamber has been Eduardo Camaño (PJ).
floor agenda is generally unavailable to rank-and-file deputies prior to the session, and
depuies most commonly learn the details of the agenda the night before or morning of the
session (i.e., in the party delegation meeting) (Danesi 2003). While the CLP operates in part
based on consensus, every party leader possesses a number of votes equal to the size of his/her
bloc in the Chamber. When a disagreement occurs, the majority party's position prevails.

The party leader possesses several important resources at his/her disposal with which
to influence legislator behavior. These resources are committee assignments (the position of
chair is an especially valuable perk due to the resources that come with it), delegation
leadership positions, budgetary resources, and control over the flow of legislation (Jones
2002). Deputies who generally follow party instructions receive these perks, while deputies
who frequently break party discipline are denied some or all of these benefits.

III. CARTEL AND CPG THEORY: AN APPLICATION TO THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER

This section links the Argentine political context to the most prominent theories
developed to explain legislator behavior in the U.S. Congress. The two most prominent
theories of congressional organization in the United States are the Cartel and Conditional
Party Government (CPG) theories.20 Under Cartel and CPG theory, U.S. House members are
considered to be relatively autonomous actors, exercising a great deal of independent control
over their political careers. Aldrich (1995), Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002), Aldrich and
Rohde (2000), Brady and McCubbins (2002), Campbell, Cox, and McCubbins (2002), Cox and
Rohde (1991) and others have highlighted the manner in which individual legislators in the
U.S. House of Representatives delegate power to the House party leadership in order to

20 Other prominent theories are those of Krehbiel (1998, 1991) (Informational) and of Shepsle and
parties are irrelevant in the Informational and Distributive approaches (Cox and McCubbins 2002a). Jones,
Saiegh, Spiller and Tommasi (2002) have demonstrated the inapplicability of these latter two theories to
the Argentine Chamber through an analysis of committee careers.
further their own re-election efforts both generally (party reputation) and specifically (pork, perks of office) as well as to achieve policy goals (passage of legislation, especially distributive policy that benefits their district). This delegation to the party leadership helps the legislators to achieve their collective goals.

Argentine deputies do not possess a level of autonomy comparable to that of U.S. House members, but most Argentine provincial-level party bosses do. Hence, in both legislatures delegation occurs. But whereas delegation is by the legislators to the party leadership in the U.S., delegation is by the provincial-level party bosses to the party leadership in Argentina.

In Argentina the electoral goals of the party bosses are best served by distributive policy (since their hold on power is based primarily on patronage, pork, and clientelism). In Argentina there is thus an enhanced interest in the passage of distributive policy compared to the U.S., although distributive policy is also quite relevant in the U.S. case (Cox and McCubbins 1993). In Argentina there is also a greater tendency by party bosses to parlay their legislative support (i.e., the support of their deputies) in exchange for financial benefits from the national executive branch in the form of transfers, subsidies, government posts, or pork.

However, as Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi (1999) demonstrate, Argentine provincial-level party bosses (in this case governors) are also (similar to the case among U.S. legislators) concerned with the national reputation of their party, since its success at the national level affects them in three ways. First, the success of their party at the national level is vital to its maintaining (or obtaining) control of the presidency, and hence the distributive benefits they receive from "their" president. A similar argument applies to control of the legislature, and the benefits majority control of this institution provides (e.g., agenda control, committee presidencies, distributive policy). Finally, the party's reputation in the province is affected by the national party's reputation, which in turn can influence the

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21 Following Finocchiaro and Rohde (2002), Cartel theory and CPG theory are considered complementary.
provincial-level party's potential for retaining or taking control of the governorship; the most important prize of all (after the presidency).

Thus whereas majority control of the legislature in the United States is based on a ideological, reputational, and distributive logic, in Argentina majority control of the legislature is based on a similar mix, but with the distributive incentives easily dominating ideology and party reputation (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991). This difference is due more than anything else to the fundamental importance of patronage, pork, and clientelism to Argentine politics in contrast to their more modest importance in present-day U.S. politics (where ideology and party reputation tend to dominate) (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002).

In the United States, Cartel and CPG theory suggest there is a constant level of majority party agenda control that stems primarily from the distributive benefits that majority control provides the members of the majority party (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002). CPG theory further suggests that there will be variation in this level of majority control depending on the level of inter-party and majority intra-party heterogeneity.

As mentioned previously, there is considerable variance in the level of control exercised by party bosses over the political careers of deputies and other politicians. At one extreme are governors without any immediate constraints on their re-election, followed by governors with immediate re-election constraints, followed by undisputed party bosses who are not governors, ending with situations where no one person exercises dominance over the provincial-level party. The Argentine Chamber is occupied by legislators whose respective provincial-level parties fall into all four categories, with many of the party bosses in the latter two categories holding the office of Chamber deputy (particularly in the UCR).22

An overwhelming majority of PJ deputies come from provinces in which there was a PJ governor, who in all but a few instances was also the undisputed party boss. Between 1989

22 For an empirical operationalization of the varying power of party bosses in the Argentine provinces, see Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommasi (2003).
and 2001 an average of 75% of the PJ delegation came from provinces with a PJ governor (with a range of 71% to 83%). In contrast, only an average of 24% of the UCR delegation came from provinces where the UCR held the governorship (with a range of 11% to 38%; 33% during the De la Rúa presidency). Thus, in the PJ an overwhelming majority of delegation was by provincial-level party bosses to the party leadership, with the individual deputies essentially following orders from the provinces. In the case of the UCR, there was a broader mix in the distribution of legislators for whom party bosses were delegating power on their behalf and who themselves were the actual party bosses delegating power, although the former easily represented the majority of the party's Chamber delegation.

IV. ROLL CALL VOTES IN THE ARGENTINE CHAMBER

Roll call votes provide an unparalleled empirical source of information on legislators and their political parties. As Krehbiel (1998, 1991) notes, roll call vote data are imperfect, given the fact that they occur at the very end of the legislative process. Nonetheless, as the seminal work of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and the over one hundred published articles, edited volume chapters, and books that employ Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores make abundantly clear, there is a tremendous amount deal of useful information that can be obtained from the analysis of roll call vote data.

The Argentine Chamber of Deputies possesses an electronic voting system (overhauled in 2001) that is used for both recorded (roll call) and unrecorded votes. The

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other common method of voting involves a simple show of hands. Roll call votes are relatively rare and are most commonly taken on conflictual issues where party leaders want to use them to enforce discipline and on controversial issues where deputies or parties want their vote (or the vote of others) to be public knowledge. Despite their infrequent occurrence, a majority of the most important legislative initiatives during the 1989-2003 period were at least partially adopted (or rejected) based on a roll call vote. A final use of roll calls is for votes related to the Chamber rules or specific constitutional duties of Congress.

A roll call vote is taken when a motion for a roll call vote has been made and then supported by at least one-fifth (1989-1996) or one-tenth (1997-2003) of the deputies in attendance. Several different types of votes are conducted in the Argentine Chamber. Most of these votes require a majority of only a plurality of those voting, while others require a majority of two-thirds or three-quarters of those voting. A few remaining votes are based on a percentage of the 257 (254 prior to 1991) Chamber members (either two-thirds or an absolute majority).

In addition to the above voting rules, the Chamber cannot take a vote without a quorum, which is equal to 50% + 1 of the total number of legislators. For the period 1983-1991 the number necessary to achieve quorum was 128, while between 1991 and 1996 the number was 130. Since December 1996 the number has been 129

For every session of the Argentine Chamber an attendance list is compiled. There are five principal categories: Present, On Leave, On Leave (vote on leave pending Chamber approval), Absent With Notice, and On A Official Mission. For those voting, there are three categories: Yes, No, and Abstain. Deputies who at some point were present at the session,

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25 Information on the Chamber rules and the administrative functioning of the Chamber come primarily from Danesi (2003), Jones (2002), and Schinelli (1996).

26 When the roll call vote is constitutionally mandated, no such motion is required.

27 A deputy technically must obtain permission from the Chamber to abstain. Most abstain without seeking permission (the median percentage of legislators who abstained from the votes examined here is
but were not on the Chamber floor at the time of the vote (or chose not to vote) are considered to be Present But Not Voting.\textsuperscript{28}

As mentioned earlier, roll call vote analysis has its limitations, limitations that are particularly severe if the analyst lacks a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of the legislative process and party politics in the legislature being studies. In Argentina, for example, the Rice Scores (the average absolute values of the percentage of the party delegation voting "Yes" minus the percentage of the party delegation voting "No") for the major parties are very high (Rice 1925). During the 1989-2001 period, the mean Rice Score for the PJ was 92\% while that for the UCR also was 92\%. The median Rice Scores are even higher (98\% for the PJ and 100\% for the UCR).\textsuperscript{29} These scores indicate that a PJ or UCR deputy seldom votes against his/her party in the Chamber. This is not surprising since the party delegations normally meet the night before (or morning of) the day of the session to establish the way the party will vote in the session. Or perhaps better said, the party leadership informs the deputies, with levels of debate varying from intense to subdued, what the party position will be.

Those party members who oppose the position taken by the party generally will leave the floor at the time of the vote or less frequently will abstain. Only on rare occasions, and usually only when the deputy is voting as part of an organized larger group such as a provincial or regional delegation, an intra-party faction, or an ideological group will

\textsuperscript{4\%}) However, in the event those abstaining (who did not receive permission) could have changed the outcome of a vote, the result of the vote generally is annulled and a new vote taken.

\textsuperscript{28} For the votes held during the 1989-2001 period, the median percentage of deputies who were "Present But Not Voting" is 9\%

legislators actively register a "No" vote; unless of course the deputy received permission to cast a "No" vote in the delegation meeting (e.g., for reasons of personal conviction or constituency interests). Extensive qualitative analysis of the Argentine Chamber leads to the conclusion that the most common method of opposing the party position on a vote is to be absent from the floor at the time of the vote or stay away from the session entirely.\textsuperscript{30}

In terms of analyzing roll call vote analysis, there are three principal ways to deal with the reality of voting in the Argentine Congress. The first is to only include votes cast as "Yes" or "No", and code all other cases as missing. Such an approach excludes valuable information on legislator preferences as well as fails to account for the most prominent method of expressing dissent with the official party position.

A second method is to follow the strategy employed by Ames (2001) and Haspel, Remington, and Smith (1998) in which deputies who were present at the session, but left the floor at the time of the vote (or abstained) (Present But Not Voting, Abstain), are coded as voting contrary to the majority of their party (except in the rare case that the majority of their party left the floor or abstained, in which case they are coded as missing).\textsuperscript{31} All other deputies would be coded as missing. An alternative way to view voting under this coding rule is that it measures whether or not the legislator supported the party leadership's position on the vote.

A third method is, in addition to employing the second method above, to also code all legislators who were absent without leave (Absent With Notice) as voting contrary to the majority of their party. These legislators would receive this coding regardless of the reason for their absence, given the inability to distinguish between deputies who were absent for valid

\textsuperscript{30} Unlike the case during the past thirty years in the U.S., Argentine deputies receive virtually no public or media censure for failing to vote.

\textsuperscript{31} An exception is made for the acting president of the Chamber, who only casts a vote in the event of a tie. All of these instances are coded as missing.
reasons (e.g., illness, transportation problems, district emergency) from those who were absent out of a desire to miss the vote. All other deputies would be coded as missing.

In this paper we adopt the second method above. In doing so we are explicitly assuming that the amount of additional information provided by this method (compared to the first method) outweighs any error introduced through the coding of legislators as opposing the party position when in fact their absence from the floor at the time of the vote was due to some other factor. However, based on a dozen years of study of the Argentine Congress, we are confident that this methodology provides the most valid measure of true Argentine legislator preferences regarding roll call votes.

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32 The Chamber leadership manages the floor agenda in a very discretionul and secretive manner. Often rank-and-file legislators have no information (other than unfounded rumors) on what specific bills will be actually voted on in a upcoming session, and even when they do obtain some information on the proposed agenda for the upcoming session (normally the night before or morning of the session in the party delegation meeting), there is no guarantee that this proposed agenda will bear any resemblance to the one they encounter on the floor. Hence, it is difficult in most instances for deputies to sufficiently anticipate the legislation that will be debated in a manner that would allow them to avoid the session through a formal absence (i.e., Absent With Notice). The discretion, secrecy, and malleability of the floor agenda hence limit the ability of legislators to employ absences strategically. Furthermore, this strategy is somewhat unnecessary given the option of simply leaving the floor.

33 The one instance where this methodology creates some difficulties is with a portion of the votes that took place between July 8 and December 9 of 1989 in which the behavior of the UCR deputies was in part conditioned by the broader early transition agreement made between Alfonsín and Menem.

34 The consequence of this methodology is that we are likely slightly overstating the level of intra-party heterogeneity and understating the level of inter-party heterogeneity. Any error introduced will however be constant throughout this period, thereby not affecting inter-temporal comparisons. As noted above however, the error introduced by this methodology is much less severe than that introduced by limiting the analysis to instances of "Yes" and "No" votes (which would severely understate the level of intra-party heterogeneity and overstate the level of inter-party heterogeneity). Analysis using this latter
This paper employs roll call votes taken between July 8, 1989 (from the date President Menem assumed office and the PJ assumed the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies) and February 28, 2003. These data represent six full two-year legislative periods, corresponding to the biannual partial renovations of the Chamber (1989-91, 1991-93, 1993-95, 1995-97, 1997-99, 1999-2001), and two partial periods (July 8, 1989 to December 9, 1989 and December 10, 2001 to February 28, 2003); although the data for the final period are for the most part excluded from the current analysis.

Included in the initial analysis population are all valid roll call votes held during the legislative period. Due to problems of convergence stemming from unanimous or near-unanimous votes, following the general logic of Jackman (2001) and Poole and Rosenthal (1997) we exclude all roll call votes in which fewer than 5% of the deputies were on the losing side of the vote.

V. A BAYESIAN ESTIMATION PROCEDURE FOR ROLL CALL VOTE ANALYSIS

Until recently the analysis of roll call votes in Argentina was hindered by the fact that the standard methodology for analyzing roll call vote data (Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE) could not be employed given the comparatively small number of roll call votes methodology is less precise and provides reliable information on a fewer number of deputies (due to the greater number of missing votes per legislator). It on average provides results that unsurprisingly suggest a lower level of intra-party heterogeneity and a greater level of inter-party heterogeneity than those provided in this paper.

35 All roll call vote data and information on session attendance and delegation affiliation were obtained from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Only 39 roll call votes were held between December 10, 1983 and July 7, 1989 (Jones 2002).

36 An exception was made if a binary logit analysis of major party (PJ, UCR, FREPASO) legislators detected a significant relationship between party affiliation and a legislator's strategic absence (Present But Not Voting) from the floor (or abstention) at the time of voting. In those cases where a significant difference was detected, the roll call vote was retained in the final analysis population.
that take place in Argentina during any given two-year legislative period (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2001). Fortunately, path breaking advancements by Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2001; Jackman 2001, 2000a, 2000b) have provided a Bayesian estimation procedure for spatial models of roll call voting. The Bayesian approach allows for the analysis of legislatures with a small number of roll call votes, as well as provides the investigator with the ability to incorporate ancillary information into their analytic strategy. This latter feature is especially beneficial for scholars who possess an intricate knowledge of the functioning of a specific legislature and politics in a country, since it allows them to bring to bear additional information gained from qualitative study to improve the accuracy of their econometric analysis.

In this paper the analysis was conducted using the Bayesian estimation procedure developed by Jackman and his colleagues (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2001; Jackman 2001 2000a). This innovative methodology allows us to employ roll call vote data to identify legislator ideal points and discrimination parameters. With a one-dimensional model, the roll call vote analysis can be expressed as:

\[ y_{ij}^{*} = U_i(\zeta_j) - U_i(\psi_j) = X_i\beta_j - \alpha_j + \epsilon_y \]  

\[ y_{ij} = 1 \text{ if } y_{ij}^{*} > 0 \]

\[ y_{ij} = 0 \text{ otherwise} \]

37 Similar problems are encountered with the less frequently used methodology developed by Heckman and Snyder (1997).

38 Bayesian estimation procedures provide a rich and potentially very fruitful method of analysis for scholars with a considerable level of knowledge about a specific institution (e.g., a legislative branch, a judicial branch) in a country, since they allow them to incorporate their "prior" knowledge into their analysis in a much more effective manner than is commonly the case.

39 For additional information on these procedures see the cited authors as well as Simon Jackman's website (http://jackman.stanford.edu/mcmc/index.html), and on Bayesian methods more generally (Gill 2000).
where \( y_{ij}^* \) is a choice between a "Yes" position, \( \zeta_j \), and a "No" position, \( \psi_j \), for each deputy \( i \) on each bill \( j \). In this one-dimensional context, equation (1) for \( y_{ij}^* \) is a linear regression with the unobserved ideal points \( X_i \), and unknown parameters \( \beta_j \) and \( \alpha_j \). We assume \( \epsilon_{ij} \sim N(0,1) \). \( X \) is a \((n \times 1)\) matrix of ideal points, \( \beta_j \) is a \((1 \times m)\) matrix of discrimination parameters, and \( \alpha_j \) is a \( m \)-vector of intercepts. Using a hierarchical probit model that is estimated by a Bayesian simulation, we obtain the parameters. We use truncated normal sampling to operationalize the probit model (i.e., negative and positive infinity are respectively operationalized as –10 and +10). Using a Gibbs sampler, we generate a large number of samples from the joint posterior density of the parameters and obtain the summary statistics used for inference. In our models, we let the Gibbs sampler run for between 80,000 and 290,000 iterations, and then saved the last 10,000 (or 5000) iterations for inference.40

To identify both ideal points and discrimination parameters, we assign priors to the parameters.41 Uniform (1.0, -1.0) priors are given to the density over the ideal points \( X_i \). These uniform priors result in ideal points located within the intervals of 1.0 and -1.0. For one-dimensional fits, based on our dozen years of qualitative study of Chamber dynamics, we assigned initial values for the ideal points, with the PJ at 1.0 (and three other parties for 1999-2001), and the UCR (as well as other parties considered to be closer to that end of the

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40 The decision to save the last 10,000 or 5000 iterations was based on technical considerations, and, especially given the long burn-in period, has no effect on the results (i.e., virtually identical results are obtained whether 10,000 or 5000 iterations are saved).

41 The identification of these priors helps to solve the granularity problem present in roll call analysis identified by Londregan (2000) (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2001).
political spectrum such as FREPASO) at -1.0.\(^{42}\) Most other parties were placed at 0.0. Normal priors are given for the discrimination parameters \(\beta_j\): \(\beta_j \sim N(0,2)\).\(^{43}\)

After obtaining discrimination parameters for roll calls in each time period, we can examine how many discrimination parameters are distinguishable from zero. The discrimination parameters \(\beta_j\) show "how change in \(X_i\) translates into support for proposal \(j\)" (Jackman 2001, p. 229). Therefore, if only a small number of discrimination parameters are distinguishable from zero in a one-dimensional model, it means there may exist higher dimensions in the data.

Table 2 provides information on the extent to which the roll call votes achieved discrimination on this single dimension for each of the seven legislative periods. In the seven different time periods, the lowest percentage of votes that achieved discrimination is 86.2% (1997-99), while the highest percentage is 100% (1989). The mean percentage of votes that achieved discrimination is 94% (the median is 95%) in the seven time periods. In other words, on average 94% of the roll calls discriminate with respect to the recovered policy.

\(^{42}\) The reader should be aware that the priors merely provide starting values. The procedure is sufficiently robust that if a legislator’s prior does not match his or her actual vote behavior, the latter will determine the results obtained. Two excellent examples of this result come from errors made in our initial analysis. In one case a PJ deputy was mistakenly given the prior of a UCR deputy (-1.0). In the other, a UCR deputy was mistakenly given the prior of a PJ deputy (1.0). In both cases, the actual ideal points of both legislators were 0.90 and -0.84 respectively (results that did not change when the correct priors were given and new analysis was run).

\(^{43}\) The variance prior of 2.0 was the highest possible while still allowing us to achieve convergence in all seven legislative periods (given infinite time and infinite computer capacity, this problem could be resolved, although the present results suggest the benefit would be very modest). It is worth noting that for those legislative periods where convergence was achieved with higher variance priors (e.g., 5.0 and 8.0), the results were substantively similar to those obtained with a variance prior of 2.0. In any event, a variance prior of 2.0 is not overly informative.
continuum. These results indicate there exists only one-dimension underlying the policy space in the Argentine Chamber during the 1989-2001 period.

In addition, by plotting discrimination parameters (posterior means) against the number of deputies voting "Yes", we obtain two figures (for each period); one for the roll call votes that achieved discrimination on the single dimension, and one for those that did not. By examining these figures (see Appendix I), we can determine if a one-dimensional model is a reasonable fit to the data (Jackman 2001). Since there are few proposals that result in close roll calls and fail to discriminate among deputies simultaneously (see Appendix I), it is very unlikely that a higher-dimensional model would provide a better fit to the data. This finding provides additional support for the view of Argentine legislative politics being unidimensional.

In order to increase our confidence in the existence of a single policy dimension, all votes that failed to discriminate on this first dimension were examined in detail (through an analysis of the parliamentary debate on the bill/vote in question, review newspaper coverage of the vote's topic, and interviews with deputies who were in office at the time of the vote) in search of any common trait shared among any of them. No conceivable second dimension was detected, with the general conclusion reached that the votes that did not discriminate on the first dimension did so for idiosyncratic reasons.44

Additionally, we calculated the classification success rate for this one-dimensional model for each time period. The rate of correct classification functions as an additional measure of goodness of fit. Classifications are performed by generating predicted probabilities $P_i$ of each individual deputy voting decision with all model parameters set to their posterior means. The classification threshold $c$ is 0.5. Therefore, if there are cases that have predicted probabilities lying on the correct side of a classification

44 The roll calls that did not discriminate in the one-dimensional model are most likely a stochastic term. In other words, the roll calls are on transient topics that do not belong to any consistent dimension.
threshold, $p_i > c$, when $y_i = 1$, these cases are recoded as correct predictions. Likewise, if $p_i \leq c$ when $y_i = 0$, these cases also are considered correct predictions (Herron 1999; Jackman 2001, 2000a). In Argentina, the rate of correct classification for the one-dimensional model varies from 73% to 84% in the seven time periods. For example, 84% of the individual legislator votes are correctly classified in the 1989 legislative period.

In most previous methods of ideal point estimation, the uncertainty inherent in ideal point estimates has been ignored (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2001). In the Bayesian context, however, estimation and inference require computing the posterior density $\pi(X, \beta, \alpha|Y)$, which means we can solve the uncertainty problem to a great extent by obtaining the location of the joint posterior mean/median and the width of the interval containing the 95% posterior probability. The Bayesian simulation approach possesses the added advantage that "our inferences are arbitrarily exact, based on a computer intensive exploration of the joint posterior density of all model parameters, rather than relying on an asymptotically-valid normal approximation to its shape, or some other approximation such as bootstrapping" (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2001, p. 11).

The estimation procedure provides us with the deputies' mean and median (the latter is used throughout the paper) ideal points and their 95% posterior confidence interval. Each deputy's ideal point represents the median of 10,000 (or 5000) draws from the posterior for each deputy's ideal point.

To insure that the sample obtained through the Gibbs sampler is representative of the underlying stationary distribution, we employ a combination of convergence diagnostics as well as a visual inspection of the trace plots. These steps allow us to place a considerable amount of confidence in our results.

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45 The classification rates improve considerably if legislators who voted on a relatively small share of the roll call votes (e.g., less than 20%) are excluded. For more on this point, see note 48.
To perform convergence diagnostics and statistical and graphical output analysis of Gibbs sampling output, CODA (Convergence Diagnosis and Output Analysis Software for Gibbs sampling output) often is used (Best, Cowles, and Vines 1995). We, however, use BOA (Bayesian Output Analysis program) instead of CODA (Smith 2003). BOA is based on CODA and thus includes all of the analytic options found in CODA. However, BOA is more efficient and flexible than CODA in terms of data management. Since BOA is an S-PLUS/R program for carrying out convergence diagnostics and statistical and graphical analysis of Monte Carlo sampling output, we used R for our analysis. We utilize two distinct convergence diagnostics: the Geweke and Heidelbergen and Welch (HW) diagnostics (Smith 2003).46

These diagnostics indicate that, in all the time periods, the sample output almost perfectly converges to the posterior distribution. More than 95% of the parameters (in the case of both bills and deputies) are statistically significant at the 5% significance level in the convergence tests. With a few exceptions, legislators who did not achieve convergence did so due to the small percentage of roll calls on which they voted. Following the general methodology of Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2001), legislators who had missing values for more than 80% of the votes were excluded from the remainder of the analysis in which Bayesian ideal points are employed.47 With these cases excluded, the rate of correct classification improves considerably.

46 For a more detailed explanation and comparison of these methods, see Brooks and Roberts (1998) and Cowles and Carlin (1996).

47 Three groups account for virtually all of these excluded cases: deputies who resigned (e.g., to assume another post) or died during the two-year period, deputies who replaced others as alternates late in the term, and party switchers. Presidents of the Chamber, who only vote in the case of ties, also are excluded. Many of the legislators in the former two groups were not in office for a substantial period, and hence did not generate a sufficient number of votes. Since legislators who switched parties are (following Poole and Rosenthal 1997) considered to be "new" legislators, in many instances party switchers failed to have a
VI. THE STRUCTURE OF ROLL CALL VOTING: A SINGLE DIMENSION

In the United States, the dominant "first" dimension "almost always picks up the fundamental economic issues that separate the two major parties of the time" (Poole and Rosenthal (p. 27, 1997). This dominant dimension "can be thought of as ranging from strong loyalty to one party (Jeffersonian Republicans or the Democrats) to weak loyalty to either party and to strong loyalty to the second, opposing party (Federalists, Whigs, or Republicans)" (Poole and Rosenthal 1997, p. 46).

In Argentina, there is a similar partisan dimension. However, unlike the case in the United States (where a much less salient second regional dimension has coexisted with the dominant partisan dimension), virtually all policy in the legislature is decided along this single dimension. The analysis presented in the previous section demonstrates quite clearly that the roll call votes in the Argentine Chamber can be successfully accounted for by a one-dimensional spatial model.

Given the limited time frame under analysis, the data do not allow us to definitively determine to what extent this policy dimension reflects differences between the parties based on economic issues, differences based on the historic Peronist vs. Anti-Peronist cleavage, or differences based on the governing status of the parties; that is the governing majority party vs. the opposition minority party (and other minority opposition parties).48 The likely explanation involves a mixture of all three of the above, although our tentative conclusion is that the latter description most accurately defines the true nature of his dimension. Under this scenario, and very consistent with a Cartel and CPG theory of legislative behavior, the majority party uses its control of government to advance its electoral and policy agenda. As the opposition parties benefit little from the majority's legislative agenda, they tend to sufficient number of votes. Party switching is uncommon in Argentina however, with only 3% of legislators switching parties during their four year term between 1989 and 2001.

48 For a discussion of the Peronist vs. Anti-Peronist cleavage, see Halperin Donghi (1994). This polarization also has been referred to as populist vs. liberal (Corrales 2002).
oppose much of it. Certainly economic policy differences between the parties and the ingrained dislike of Peronism among some legislators contributes to the formation of this dimension. However, factors such as the dramatic shift seen in support of and in opposition to the same types of economic policies during short time periods by the PJ between 1987 and 1990 and the UCR and FREPASO between 1997 and 2000 suggest the economic differences were secondary. For example, neoliberal bills that were vehemently rejected by the party when in the opposition, are, a few years later strongly supported by the party when in government (and vice-versa). Similarly, the ability of numerous traditionally "Peronist" and "Anti-Peronist" politicians to successfully work in concert over the past decade suggests this cleavage is not as relevant for Argentine politics as it once was. What is clear however is that legislative politics in Argentina during this period was decidedly unidimensional.

Most scholars working on Argentine political parties tend to highlight the lack of strong levels of ideological/programmatic differences (or conversely the considerable ideological variance and overlap) between the PJ and UCR (Coppedge 1998; De Riz 1995; Gibson and Calvo 2000; Manzetti 1993; McGuire 1995) Surveys of Argentine deputies (Escudero 2001; PPAL 1997-2000) provide similar conclusions of a high-level of ideological overlap between the PJ and UCR. Given the distributive nature of Argentine politics discussed previously, the general absence of programmatic party politics in Argentina is not especially surprising (Kitschelt 2000).

A Krehbiel (1998, 1991) type argument (that a legislator's preferences, not party, drives their voting behavior) is highly divergent with Argentine reality. However, we nonetheless briefly provide the results of a quasi-experiment where we can observe the effect of party switching on a deputy's ideal points. We restrict the analysis to situations where we

49 The reliable and valid measures used in legislator surveys conducted during the 1990s generally locate the PJ median to the right of the UCR on a left-right scale. However there is considerable overlap between the two parties, and the inter-party differences are not statistically significant. FREPASO is generally located to the left of both parties, most commonly significantly to the left of the PJ.
have at least two legislative periods in which the deputy belonged to two separate parties (or at least switched at a very early date in the second period), one of which was the majority party. These criteria provide three deputies who switched from the majority PJ to the opposition: Patricia Bullrich (from the PJ to her own party), Rafael Flores, and Juan González Gaviola (the latter two switched from the PJ to PAIS [Política Abierta por la Integridad Social] and then to FREPASO).

The median ideal points of these three deputies as well as those of the PJ, UCR, and FREPASO (1995-97) are provided in Figure 1. Both Flores and González Gaviola were members of the PJ delegation in 1991-93 and during the first half of the 1993-95 period (i.e., 1993-95a), with respective ideal points of 0.00 and 0.43 for Flores and 0.38 and 0.18 for González Gaviola. Upon defecting to PAIS during the latter half of the 1993-95 period (i.e., 1993-95b), their respective ideal points dropped to -0.53 and -0.88. In 1995-97, as members of FREPASO (following the Frente Grande-PAIS merger), their respective ideal points were -0.65 and -0.69. During the entire 1993-95 period, Patricia Bullrich was a member of the PJ, with an ideal point of 0.90. Upon leaving the PJ early in the 1995-97 period to form her own party, Bullrich's ideal point dropped to -0.69.

All three deputies' departure from the PJ was accompanied by a massive (and highly significant) shift in their ideal points. Given that the political context of the 1991-1997 was relatively similar, the principal explanation for these shifts is the influence exercised by a deputy's partisan affiliation on their voting behavior in the Chamber.

VII. AGENDA POWER IN THE CHAMBER: MAJORITY AND MINORITY ROLL RATES

Campbell, Cox, and McCubbins (2002) and Cox and McCubbins (2002) employ data on majority and minority roll rates (in committees and on the floor) to assess the agenda control (both negative and positive) exercised by the majority party over the legislative process. A complete information model derived from their Cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993) predicts the majority party will never be rolled (although empirically rolls
do occur, for reasons related to alternative sources of influence on voting behavior).\(^{50}\)

Through negative agenda control the majority party leadership is able to keep legislation that divides the party (and whose legislative treatment might lead to the party being rolled) off the floor via its control of the legislative agenda (the CLP in Argentina). Through positive agenda control the majority party leadership is able to obtain the passage of legislation by drafting it so as to achieve the minimum threshold of party support necessary. In this latter case, the positions of the provincial-level party bosses (particularly the governors) are those which the Chamber party leadership must take into account when attempting to obtain the passage of legislation. This behavior suggests that we should find relatively few inter-provincial differences among the PJ legislators during this period, since given the narrow PJ majorities or quasi-majorities the PJ leadership needed most of the delegation's support to obtain the passage of legislation, and thus generally had to consider the policy desires of most (though not all) PJ provincial party bosses.

Neither the PJ nor UCR/Alianza possessed an absolute majority of the seats during most of the 1989-2003 period. However, the combination of the majority party's at least near-majority status in all instances, the fact that the opposition was fragmented among a large number of parties, and the fact that the majority party was also the party of the President (who possesses substantial resources with which to obtain opposition support), turned these near-majorities into absolute majorities in terms of negative agenda control and functionally absolute majorities in most instances for positive agenda control. The one exception is the July 8 to December 9, 1989 period, which, as mentioned earlier, was highly convoluted due to the UCR's majority status but the PJ's de facto majority control. This period is thus not discussed in the following analysis, although the results from the period are included in Table 3.

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\(^{50}\) A party delegation is rolled when a majority of its members are on the losing side of a vote that results in legislation being passed.
Table 3 provides the majority and minority roll rates for the 1989-2003 period. During this time the PJ was the majority party except for 1999-2001 when the UCR-FREPASO Alianza held the majority. The principal minority party is the UCR throughout, except for 1999-2001, when the PJ occupied this role.

Three important conclusions can be drawn from Table 3. First, in line with Cartel theory, the majority party is almost never rolled in Argentina. For the 1989-2003 period, the majority roll rate ranges from 0% to 2.8%, with a median roll rate of 0%. These numbers are indicative of a majority party with very strong agenda control.

Second, with the exception of the 2001-03 period, the minority roll rates are extremely high, ranging from 55% to 83%, with a median roll rate of 60%. Third, incomplete evidence for the 2001-03 period suggests a considerable change in patterns of

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51 Following Cox and McCubbins (2002), the analysis is restricted to majority final passage votes. Because the Cox and McCubbins model is based on majority voting, all super-majority votes (two-thirds, three-quarters) are excluded from the analysis.

52 This excludes the two rolls (out of six votes) suffered by the Alianza in November of 2001 as the alliance between the UCR and FREPASO unraveled and the Alianza ceased to be a functional majority party. Six weeks after these rolls occurred, President De la Rúa was forced to resign from office in response to popular and partisan protest. If these seven votes are included, the roll rate for the majority goes up to 3.7% for 1999-2001, while that for the minority drops to 74.1%.

53 In the event that the Majority Party could not bring a piece of legislation to the floor during this period if it thought it would be rolled, an option open to it (i.e., to the President) was to implement the legislation via an executive decree. Decrees are problematic from a legal and legitimacy perspective (Corrales 2002; Eaton 2002; Llanos 2002), but nevertheless represent an option not open to most Presidents/Majority parties in the world (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1998; Magar 2001; Negretto 2001).

54 FREPASO's roll rates are very similar to those of the UCR (83.7% for 1995-97 and 78.3% for 1997-99).
majority and minority delegation behavior. In particular, the minority roll rate is significantly lower than that during any other period.  

This section provides evidence suggesting the majority party in the Argentine Chamber behaves as a Cartel (as described by Cox and McCubbins 2002, 1993), with the majority party's control over the agenda resulting it being rolled very infrequently, while the minority party suffers rolls on a consistent basis. While comparisons with the U.S. House of Representatives should be made cautiously, it is informative to note that in Argentina the majority party was rolled somewhat frequently than its counterpart in the U.S. House (Cox and McCubbins 2002). Given the distinct composition of the denominators in the two countries, a valid comparison of roll rates cannot be made.

VIII. INTRA- AND INTER-PARTY HETEROGENEITY

As mentioned earlier, the Bayesian estimation procedure provides the deputies' mean and median (the latter is used throughout the paper) ideal points and their 95% posterior confidence interval. Each deputy's ideal point represents the median of 10,000 (or 5000) draws from the deputy's posterior distribution of ideal points. In this section, we use these ideal points to examine the evolution of intra-party and inter-party heterogeneity in the Argentine Chamber between 1989 and 2001. The measures used that are drawn from the U.S. Congress literature (where NOMINATE data lacking reliable confidence intervals are used) do not take advantage of the additional information provided by the 95% posterior confidence interval. Other original measures however also are employed that do take advantage of this information. In general, the use of both sets of measures results in comparable conclusions.

Intra-Party Heterogeneity

The first portion of this section examines the evolution of intra-party heterogeneity in the three principal Argentine parties that at one time occupied at least 10% of the seats in

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55 This deviation will be investigated in greater detail upon the termination of the Duhalde Presidency on May 25 (including all additional roll call votes that occur between March 1 and this date).
the Chamber during the 1989-2001 period: PJ, UCR, and FREPASO (1995-2001).\textsuperscript{56} Two different measures are employed. The first is drawn from Aldrich and Rohde (1998) and Aldrich, Berger and Rohde (2002), and focuses on the standard deviation of the party delegation's deputies’ ideal points. The second incorporates information on the posterior confidence intervals provided by the Bayesian approach to identify the percentage of deputies in a party who have ideal points that are significantly different from those of the party's median deputy (i.e., the 95\% posterior confidence intervals of the median deputy and the deputy do not overlap).

Figure 2 provides information on intra-party heterogeneity measured using the standard deviation of the ideal points of the party's deputies.\textsuperscript{57} Figure 3 provides information on the percentage of deputies whose ideal points (and confidence intervals) were not encompassed by those of the party's median deputy.\textsuperscript{58} Three principal conclusions can be drawn from these figures.

First, both figures indicate that the PJ's level of heterogeneity was highest during the 1989 and 1989-91 periods. Given the profound policy shift (i.e., Menem's neoliberal agenda) engaged in by the governing PJ between 1989 and 1991 (Corrales 2002; Murillo 2001; Palermo and Novaro 1996), this high level of heterogeneity is unsurprising. The figures differ however in terms of the evolution of the PJ's level of intra-party heterogeneity in the

\textsuperscript{56} Due to the small number of seats it occupied (see Table 1), the UCEDE is excluded from this portion of the analysis. The standard deviation of the party's ideal points for the 1989-95 period were: 1989 (0.35), 1989-91 (0.14), 1991-93 (0.11), 1993-95 (0.11). With the exception of 1989, none of the party's deputies had ideal points that were significantly different from that of the median UCEDE deputy.

\textsuperscript{57} Given the extremely limited variation in the Chamber standard deviation during this period (it ranges from 0.58 to 0.61), there is no need to normalize the legislative period standard deviations by this value.

\textsuperscript{58} In both figures the Alianza's (1999-01) level of intra-"party" heterogeneity was not significantly different from that of the UCR or FREPASO, and hence is excluded.
1990s, with Figure 2 showing a continued decline in the 1997-2001 period, while Figure 3 indicates a modest upsurge in heterogeneity during this same period.

Second, the UCR on average had a lower level of intra-party heterogeneity than the PJ, although this level was significantly lower only during the first half of the 1990s (1989 and 1989-91 for certain, and possibly in 1991-93 as well). However, the UCR also has the most variance in intra-party heterogeneity, with both figures (particularly Figure 3) registering significant increases in 1993-95 (especially) and 1997-99. The former spike stems from the Pact of Olivos between President Menem and former President Raúl Alfonsín (UCR, 1983-89) that paved the way for the 1994 constitutional reform, which in turn allowed Menem to achieve re-election in 1995 (Jones 1997). Both the actual votes approving the Pact in Congress as well as the sharp divisions the Pact and the subsequent national-party intervention in the selection of candidates in some provinces for the 1994 Constituent Assembly (in order to insure UCR compliance with the Pact's stipulations) caused severe conflict within the UCR, conflict that is reflected in both figures. The increase in heterogeneity in the 1997-99 period corresponds to the formation of the alliance between the UCR and FREPASO, a decision that sparked debate and caused divisions in both parties, especially the UCR, with numerous prominent Radicals strongly opposed to the alliance.

Third, both figures suggest similar levels of intra-party heterogeneity in the PJ and UCR throughout most of this period. In particular, since 1995 the two parties' average levels of intra-party heterogeneity are statistically indistinct using both measures.

Inter-Party Heterogeneity

Two measures of inter-party heterogeneity are employed. They are adapted from Aldrich and Rohde (1998) and Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde (2002). Figure 4 provides the evolution of the median ideal points for the four principal parties during this period.\footnote{We also created a figure (similar to Figure 2 in the intra-party heterogeneity analysis) that takes advantage of the information provided by the deputies' posterior confidence intervals to construct a measure of inter-party overlap. The figure provides the percentage of members of the UCR, UCEDE, and}
5 provides the level of overlap between the PJ and UCR. Overlap is measured as the minimum percentage of the members of the two delegations whose ideal points would have to be changed in order to yield complete separation between the two parties.

Three principal conclusions can be drawn from the two figures. First, focusing on the two dominant parties during this period (the PJ and UCR), Figure 4 indicates the level of inter-party heterogeneity has remained both high and relatively constant (with the partial exception of the UCR shift during the 1993-95 period), with the difference in the two parties' median ideal points ranging from 0.95 (1993-95) to 1.37 (1999-2001, perhaps not coincidentally the one period when the PJ was in the minority and the UCR/Alianza in the majority), with a median of 1.14. The PJ's median ideal point ranged between 0.49 and 0.63 throughout this period, while the UCR's ranged from -0.34 to -0.74. As Figure 5 details, there was little overlap between the ideal points of PJ and UCR legislators (always less than 10%, with a median of 6%). In sum, there is little variation in the inter-party differences, with the consistent large gap between the two parties suggesting that members of the majority party throughout this entire period would want to endow their party's leadership with substantial powers in order to achieve their distributive goals (Aldrich, Berger, and Rohde 2002; Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Second, initially the UCEDE had a median ideal point that was very close to that of the PJ, indicating substantial policy agreement between these two parties. As the 1990s progressed, the gap between the UCEDE and the PJ grew substantially, with the PJ median

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FREPASO delegations whose ideal points were encompassed (i.e., not significantly different) by the lower confidence interval (i.e., closest to -1.0) of the PJ legislator occupying the 25% quartile position (cutoff point), that is the quartile that is closest to the non-PJ extreme (i.e., -1.0) on the scale. Since the results using this methodology are very similar to those provided in Figures 3 and 4, this figure was excluded. Aldrich and Rohde's (1998) R2 measure does not work well in a multi-party environment, and thus is not used. The Overlap measure does not work well for comparisons of multiple parties, and hence its use is restricted to analysis of the two dominant parties.
ideal point remaining relatively constant and the UCEDE's median ideal point moving increasingly towards the negative extreme of the continuum. During the party's zenith (1989-1991), it actually occupied a median ideal point position that was equidistant between the two major parties. As it entered its twilight as a relevant political force in the 1993-95 period, the party adopted a position that was increasingly distinct from that of the PJ, with its 1993-95 median ideal point actually more negative than that of the UCR.

These results thus cast some doubts on views of the PJ and UCEDE as "coalition partners" in terms of legislative coordination, and suggest that to the extent there was an alliance between individual UCEDE members (e.g., Alvaro Alsogaray, María Julia Alsogaray, Adelina Dalesio de Viola) and the Menem government, that it was oriented much more towards obtaining the support (or at least neutrality) of the economic and social elite for Menem and his policies (Acuña 1993; Gibson 1996), and less focused on insuring the party's consistent support for PJ legislation in the Chamber. In terms of the nature of the single dimension along which legislative activity occurred during this period, it is useful to note that the UCEDE is on average a "centrist" party on this dimension, whereas in terms of its policy preferences it is significantly to the right of the PJ and UCR (Gibson 1996). This finding buttresses the view of this dimension as corresponding to a Government vs. Opposition policy dimension.

Third, FREPASO was a relevant actor in the Chamber of Deputies between 1995 and 2001, occupying between 9% (1995-97) and 15% (1997-99) of the seats. During this period, FREPASO formed an electoral (but not legislative) alliance with the UCR for the 1997-99 period, and finally established both an electoral, legislative, and governmental alliance with the UCR for most of the 1999-2001 period, during which time the UCR-FREPASO Alianza was the majority "party" in the Chamber as well as occupied the presidency (i.e., President Fernando de la Rúa of the UCR). During the 1995-99 period, when the UCR and FREPASO were both minority parties in the Chamber as well as were not the party of government (which was President Menem's PJ), the UCR and FREPASO had virtually identical median
ideal points (see Figure 4). For the 1999-2001 period we find the "leftist" FREPASO moving significantly away from the UCR towards the center of this policy dimension. This finding adds greater weight to the idea of a Government vs. Opposition dimension.

In 1999 the Alianza took control of the Presidency and the Chamber. As such it faced many of the dilemmas that the PJ had faced during the previous ten years: the need to pass legislation that was not always popular with the public and with many party members. Confronted with a UCR President who often did not consult with FREPASO regarding major policy decisions, and generally more comfortable playing the much easier role of the opposition in Argentina's adversarial legislative environment, a majority of the FREPASO deputies adopted positions that placed the delegation significantly more towards the positive side of the continuum than the UCR. Despite growing internal unrest over the direction of the De la Rúa government, the UCR legislators remained relatively homogenous (see Figures 2 and 3) as well as generally supportive (at least on those issues that made it to the floor) of the government until the last two months of the De la Rúa administration.

In sum, the Alianza coalition worked very well when both parties were in the opposition and united in their opposition to the PJ government of President Menem. When however this Alianza became responsible for actually governing (through its control of the Presidency and the Chamber), it showed itself to not be up to the task. While the UCR remained united (albeit increasingly grudgingly so in 2001), only a minority of FREPASO legislators maintained ideal points close to the UCR median. The result was a gap of 0.45 (UCR: -0.74, FREPASO: -0.29), when the difference during the previous legislative period had been 0.02. This difference was in spite of the fact that in contrast to the 1999-2001 period, the UCR and FREPASO maintained completely separate delegations in the Chamber (with no institutionalized mechanisms of joint-consultation) during the 1997-99 period.
The impact of having to assume the responsibilities of government on the Alianza is displayed graphically in Figures 6 and 7 (the two figures are not labeled as 6 and 7). Figure 6 shows the distribution of the Alianza (UCR: Red, FREPASO: Blue) deputies' median ideal points (the lines in the figures cover the 95% posterior confidence intervals) during the 1997-99 period, while Figure 7 shows the same distribution for the 1999-2001 period. Whereas the deputies from the two parties were relatively interspersed during the 1997-99 period, once in control of the government and the Chamber, separation occurred, with FREPASO dominating the positive end of the Alianza distribution and the UCR the negative end as well as the middle. The defeat suffered by the Alianza in the 2001 congressional elections resulted in its loss of majority status in the Chamber, and ten days later the governmental option represented by the Alianza ended in failure with President De la Rúa's resignation from office.

Unique to most of Latin America, Argentina has a large number of parties that compete either solely (or effectively) in only one province (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002; Sin and Palanza 1997). This diverse group of parties is collectively referred to as "provincial parties", parties which are generally considered to be located on the center-right/conservative of the political spectrum given either their origins, base of support, or both (Gibson 1996). Here we examine the 12 most prominent provincial parties active during the 1989-2001 period: Acción Chaqueña (ACH), Cruzada Renovadora (CR), Fuerza Republicana (FR), Movimiento Popular Fueguino (MOPOF), Movimiento Popular Jujeño (MPJ), Movimiento

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60 It would appear that the optimism of scholars such as Novaro (1999) regarding the potential for success of coalition government in Argentina was, at least in the case of the Alianza, misguided.

61 This center-right characterization holds best for the majority of these parties that trace their origins to Argentina's oligarchic period, were founded by former military governors during the 1980s, and/or collaborated actively with the military government during the 1976-83 period. It applies less well for some other parties (e.g., the MPN, in spite of some collaboration, and the MOPOF) (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002).
Popular Neuquino (MPN), Pacto Autonomista Liberal (PAL, an alliance between the Partido Autonomista and Partido Liberal in the province of Corrientes), Partido Bloquista (PB), Partido Demócrata de Mendoza (PDM), Partido Demócrata Progresista (PDP), Partido Nuevo (PANU), and the Partido Renovador de Salta (PRS).\textsuperscript{62}

These 12 parties are divided into two groups. The evolution of the median ideal points of the first group (MPJ, PAL, PB, PDM, PDP, PRS) are provided in Figure 8, along with the median ideal points of the PJ and UCR.\textsuperscript{63} The Figure displays how these parties initially had median ideal points that were quite close to the PJ. However, as the 1990s progressed, all of these parties adopted positions that moved them further and further away from the PJ, and closer and closer to the position occupied by the opposition UCR (with some of these "center-right/conservative" parties at times occupying a position further from the PJ than that of occupied by the UCR). While initially these parties occupied a centrist position on this single dimension, by 1989-91 most, and by 1993-95, all, of these parties were clearly occupying positions that represented more of an adversarial position vis-à-vis the PJ legislative agenda than a consensual position.

Strong support for a view of Argentine politics as divided along a Government vs. Opposition continuum is provided by an analysis of the behavior of these parties. One, after an initial period of alignment close to the median of the PJ (due in part to policy congruence

\textsuperscript{62} We limit the discussion to 12 parties for reasons of space. The parties included account for 91% of the provincial party deputies who held office during this period. None of the remaining parties accounted for more than 2% of the provincial party deputies. In Figure 9, the CR's median ideal point for 1997-99 is interpolated, since there were no CR deputies that period.

\textsuperscript{63} The "center-right" CR, MPJ, PAL, PB, PDP, and PRS all officially supported the "center-left" Alianza presidential candidate (Fernando de la Rúa) in the 1999 election. The CR, MPJ, PB and PRS shared a joint list with the UCR and FREPASO for the national deputy elections, while the PAL and PDP presented separate lists for national deputy with De la Rúa as their presidential candidate; Argentine electoral law allows fusion candidacies.
regarding the neoliberal reforms implemented during this period), these parties quickly assumed a position distant from that of the PJ.\textsuperscript{64} Two, when control of the Chamber and national government shifted from the PJ to the Alianza in 1999, these parties moved en masse away from the median ideal point of the UCR (which during the previous two legislative periods they had been substantively equal to) to a position that was closer to that of the PJ than to the UCR (the PJ median ideal point remained essentially unchanged).\textsuperscript{65} As had been the case for the PJ during most of the 1990s, the governing party was left alone, with all of the provincial parties assuming a median ideal point that was much closer to that of the principal opposition party than to that of the majority governing party.

Figure 9 provides information comparable to that in Figure 8 for the second group of parties (ACH, CR, FR, MOPOF, MPN, PANU). A similar, albeit more modest, pattern of flight from the PJ towards the opposition during the 1989-99 period, and then flight from the UCR towards the opposition for 1999-2001, also is observed here. Different from the previous six parties however, these parties were never as close to the PJ (in part because only one held seats in 1989), but also never moved as far away from the PJ's median ideal point.

The MPN is the only provincial party to have held the governorship of its province (Neuquén) throughout this entire period. It is also the only provincial party with a large mass base of support (De Luca, Jones, and Tula 2002). The MPN followed a policy during this period of equidistance between the PJ and UCR, in one respect representing Argentina's only consistently "centrist" party along this dimension. The MPN's median ideal point was always closer to (or not significantly further from) that of the President's party than the median ideal point of any of the eleven other provincial parties during the 1991-2001 period (see

\textsuperscript{64} A complementary reason for the increased distance between the parties was the growing size and increasing homogeneity of the PJ delegation during this period, which meant that the level of demand by the PJ for additional legislative support, as well as the price it was willing to pay for this support, dropped as the 1990s progressed (at least until the 1997-99 period).

\textsuperscript{65} The Alianza median ideal point for 1999-2001 was -0.62.
Figures 8 and 9). The MPN was also the only provincial party in the 1999-2001 period whose median ideal point was closer to the governing UCR than it was to the PJ.

IX. CONCLUSION

Employing a unique source of information on partisan interaction, this study has presented empirical evidence of the nature of intra-party and inter-party legislative behavior in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies during the 1989-2003 period. These data have provided three important insights regarding Argentine politics and the generalizability of legislative theories developed to explain the functioning of the U.S. Congress.

First, during the past dozen years (at least) Argentine legislative politics has operated along a single policy dimension. This dimension can be described in several manners, however the description that tentatively appears most accurate is one that views this continuum in terms of a Government vs. Opposition cleavage. Under this interpretation, legislative voting separates legislators into government and opposition camps based on their partisan affiliation, with the governing party (also the majority in the Chamber) functioning as a Cartel that effectively controls the agenda in both a negative and positive manner, effectively reducing the ability of the opposition to influence policy (especially in a positive manner). Furthermore, given the fact that much of the legislation being discussed during this time was not especially popular with voters, a common response by the minority parties has been to assume a consistent opposition to the majority party's legislative agenda, given the reputational benefits that accrue to the party from its opposition to unpopular policies. In this respect, the 2001-03 period is intriguing, since this pattern appears to have changed substantially.

Second, when it came to the most salient public policy/legislative initiatives of the day, on average the majority parties have tended to govern alone, with the president's party's (which was always the majority party) median ideal points significantly distinct from those of virtually all other parties. Even Argentina's only experience with a coalition government (1999-2001) revealed the system's inherent majoritarian tendency. With a few exceptions,
most of the members of the Alianza except those from the president's party (UCR) moved
during this period towards the opposition (the contrast is even sharper if the first and second
years of the Alianza majority period are examined separately). Furthermore, in the case of
the Alianza it is likely that formal and modestly institutionalized status of the coalition
prevented an even greater divergence between the UCR legislators and their FREPASO
colleagues than would have been the case in the absence of these institutions.\footnote{For instance if the FREPASO's Darío Alessandro had not been the Alianza delegation leader
(Alessandro was also the FREPASO sub-delegation leader, while Horacio Pernasetti was the UCR sub-
delegation leader).}

Third, four leading theories of legislative politics in the United States are the Cartel,
CPG, Informational, and Distributive theories. The latter two theories (both highly
questioned even in terms of the case they were developed to explain) do not even pass a face
validity evaluation in Argentina, and can be quickly discarded from consideration (further
evidence on this point can be found in Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002). Given the
complementary nature of CPG and Cartel Theory (Finocchiaro and Rohde 2002), both are
applicable to the Argentine case.

The very low majority roll rates, high minority roll rates and considerable distance
(inter-party heterogeneity) between the majority party and the main opposition parties are
consistent with Cartel and CPG theory. The majority party legislators (acting based on
instructions received from the provincial party bosses) delegate a considerable amount of
power to the party leadership. This leadership in turns uses its majority power to obtain
policy and electoral benefits for its members. Given the highly distributive nature of most of
these benefits (i.e., the principal focus of legislative policy is distributive and to a lesser
extent reputational and ideological), the opposition parties often have little incentive to
support the majority party's agenda, and strong incentives to oppose it (given the general
lack of distributive benefits for them as well as the reputational benefits that can be achieved through opposing some policies).  

Under both CPG (particularly) and Cartel Theory we would expect majority roll rates to be highest under conditions of high intra-party heterogeneity and low inter-party heterogeneity and lowest under conditions of low intra-party heterogeneity and high inter-party heterogeneity. Given the small number of cases, conclusive results are difficult to make. Two conclusions do however emerge. The first is that there appears to be no relationship between inter-party heterogeneity and roll rates. The lack of any real variance in inter-party heterogeneity suggests it does not provide a great deal of explanatory power for varying roll rates. The second is that there also appears to be no relationship between intra-party heterogeneity and roll rates.

This paper is a work in progress, and thus all of the conclusions reached above should be considered tentative pending further analysis. This is especially the case regarding the application of CPG and Cartel Theory to Argentine legislative politics, as these theories cover far more than legislative voting behavior, and before any definitive conclusion is reached more study must be conducted of majority party agenda control, the inner-workings of the committee system, and the development and reform of Chamber rules and procedures.

In addition, our major effort thus far has been devoted to gathering the necessary roll call data and ancillary data and conducting the ideal point estimation. There still remains a great deal of work to be done in terms of taking advantage of these unique data to provide further insights into the nature of Argentine partisan and legislative politics during the 1989-2003 period. For example, the data provide an invaluable source of information that can be employed to better understand factors such as the relationship between legislative behavior and career paths (Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommasi 2003), between aggregate provincial

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67 During this period much of the opposition behavior also can be explained based on ideology, with many opposition deputies strongly opposed to the neoliberal and at times populist/anti-liberal policies promoted by the PJ.
delegation legislative behavior and distributive politics (Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 2003), between party bosses and deputy behavior, between the president and his party delegation in the Chamber, between the Chamber party delegation leadership and the delegation's members, between deputy committee voting behavior and deputy floor voting behavior, and between gender and legislative behavior. Just as Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE data have opened numerous previously obstructed avenues of inquiry in the United States to rigorous empirical analysis, thanks to the recent advances in Bayesian estimation procedures, a similar source of information is now available for Argentina.
X. REFERENCES


XI. APPENDIX I.
<table>
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NOTE 1: All parties that in at least one period held more than 2% of the seats are listed separately above. Parties that failed to surpass this threshold are included either in the Provincial Parties (see the text for the definition) or Others categories. The Frente Grande II represents former FREPASO deputies who reverted to this name following FREPASO’s disintegration in 2001.

NOTE 2: Included here are all instances where more than two deputies defected from one of the parties listed above during the two year legislative period. 1989-91: The PJ lost 11 deputies (during the first quarter of 1991); 1993-95: The PJ lost 4 deputies (during the third quarter of 1994); 1999-2001: FREPASO lost 15 deputies (4 during the fourth quarter of 2000, and 11 during the second and third quarters of 2001).

## TABLE 2: ONE-DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF CHAMBER ROLL CALL DATA VIA BAYESIAN SIMULATION

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<tr>
<th>LEGISLATIVE PERIOD</th>
<th>NUMBER OF BILLS</th>
<th>CORRECT CLASSIFICATION (% OF DEPUTIES)</th>
<th>RATE OF DISCRIMINATION (% OF BILLS)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ITERATIONS</th>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>78.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>98.8%</td>
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### TABLE 3: CHAMBER ROLLS AND ROLL RATES FOR THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY PARTIES: 1989-2003

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<th>MAJORITY ROLL RATE</th>
<th>MINORITY ROLLS</th>
<th>MINORITY ROLL RATE</th>
<th>TOTAL VOTES</th>
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<td>1991-1993</td>
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<td>UCR</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>UCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>40*</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>48*</td>
<td>ALIANZA</td>
<td>PJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>UCR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE 1:** The 1989 period was peculiar given that the UCR held the majority of the seats, but due to the early transfer of power agreement, the PJ was the "majority" party. For more details see the text.

**NOTE 2:** Six votes took place during the final six weeks of the De la Rúa government, at which time a majority of the FREPASO deputies had officially (or unofficially) left FREPASO and/or the Alianza, thereby effectively eliminating the Alianza's majority status. Of the six votes that took place during this period, the Alianza "Majority" was rolled twice while the PJ "Minority" was not rolled at all. These six votes are not included in the table above.

**NOTE 3:** FREPASO was rolled 31 (86.1%) times during the 1995-97 period and 15 (80.0%) times during the 1997-99 period.
FIGURE 1: THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTY, A STUDY OF THREE PJ DEFECTORS
FIGURE 2: INTRA-PARTY HETEROGENEITY I

LEGISLATIVE PERIOD

STANDARD DEVIATION OF PARTY'S IDEAL POINTS


PJ  UCR  FREPASO
FIGURE 3: INTRA-PARTY HETEROGENEITY II

LEGISLATIVE PERIOD

PERCENTAGE OF THE PARTY’S DELEGATION NOT ENCOMPASSED BY THE MEDIAN PARTY DEPUTY’S POSTERIOR CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (95%)

- PJ
- UCR
- FREPASO
FIGURE 4: INTER-PARTY HETEROGENEITY I

LEGISLATIVE PERIOD


MEDIAN IDEAL POINT

PJ
UCR
UCEDE
FREPASO
FIGURE 5: INTER-PARTY HETEROGENEITY II

The graph illustrates the minimum percentage of the PJ and UCR deputies' ideal points that would have to be changed to yield complete separation of the two parties throughout various legislative periods. The periods considered are 1989, 1989-91, 1991-93, 1993-95, 1995-97, 1997-99, and 1999-01. The data is represented by the line graph, with the x-axis indicating the legislative periods and the y-axis showing the percentage change.
FIGURE 8: PROVINCIAL PARTIES I
FIGURE 9: PROVINCIAL PARTIES II

LEGISLATIVE PERIOD

PJ
UCR
ACH
CR
MOPOF
MPN
PANU