

Challenges for Latin American peacekeeping in Haiti ¹

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Introduction

The goal of this paper is to analyze the participation of South American Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) in United Nations peacekeeping missions, by looking at their joint participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Due to my personal background and availability of information, the discussion presented here focuses largely, but not exclusively, in the Brazilian case.

The question that this paper seeks to answer are: What are the elements that explain Southern Cone countries participation in MINUSTAH? How does participating in MINUSTAH represent a turning point in those countries involvement in peacekeeping operations, specially in the case of Brazil? And finally, what are the possible outcomes of the joint participation in terms of increasing cooperation among Southern Cone countries?

¹ I would like to thank both Professors Monica Herz and Kai Michael Kenkel for their comments and suggestions. This paper has benefited from a field research trip conducted in Port au Prince (Haiti) between May and June 2008 in which I could interview Southern Cone officials serving in MINUSTAH both at national contingents and at MINUSTAH's headquarters. All the responsibility for flaws and omissions remain mine alone.

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The hypotheses supported here is that participating in peacekeeping operations is perceived by Southern Cone countries as a crucial element in their international presence, since participating in these kind of missions benefits these countries in very different aspects. However, we can conclude that joint participation can also provided for some regional benefits, such as increasing cooperation and coordination initiatives among these same countries.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Although the UN Charter does not mention the term peacekeeping in its text³, peacekeeping missions are a collective instrument that the UN has in its hands to promote and guarantee the maintenance of international peace and security. If we were to look at the Charter, it is possible to justify peacekeeping operations under Chapters VI and VII.

It is also important to stress that peacekeeping has evolved since the founding of the UN and ongoing peacekeeping missions tend to be based on Chapter VII. It is also important to bring here some UN documents related to peacekeeping, such as *An Agenda for Peace*⁴ and the *Brahimi Report*⁵. The first because it mentions that consent of the parties involved is no longer crucial in terms of sending troops, and the second because it draws attention to the fact that the UN might need more robust operations (in terms of use of force) in order to achieve the goals established in some of the mandates approved by the Security Council (Ulery, 2005, p 137). These two elements will have an impact on Southern Cone countries involvement in peacekeeping missions.

Country motivations for participating in peacekeeping operations

Looking at Pakistani and Indian participation in UN peacekeeping operations, Kabilan Krishnasamy stresses that financial rewards are not the only benefits that states seek when they decide to commit troops to such missions. According to Krishnasamy, other factors such as prestige, international image and institutional interests are

³ Peacekeeping involves a diversity of activities, such as promoting human security, providing electoral support and sending military and civilian personnel. See: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q1.htm>

⁴ See: <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>

⁵ See: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

important motivating elements behind state's choices. The author stresses that the expectation of rewards inside the UN system (such as being able to appoint nationals to serve in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations) is a crucial motivating factor⁶ (Krishnasamy, 2001, p 57).

The same author also points out to the importance of the concept of recognition. Receiving the acknowledgement, either by the UN or by other countries, that a country can fulfill its obligations as a peacekeeper increases this country's position among other states and also increases its willingness to commit troops to peacekeeping missions, because this satisfies the country's goal of improving its international image (Krishnasamy, 2001, p 60).

In a somewhat similar reflection, Shogo Suzuki concludes that participating in peacekeeping missions is an important element of Japan's and China's search for recognition in the international state hierarchy and their final legitimation as "legitimate great powers". Participating in peacekeeping missions presents an opportunity for these states to demonstrate their internationalist credentials, fulfilling their responsibilities as world powers. Participating in peace operations is a safe alternative to increase a country's power in the international system, since it does not involve claims towards the reordering of the *status quo*. Participating in peacekeeping missions does not generate fear among the neighbouring countries of the participating country, specially because the use of military force is seen as legitimate and attending to the interests of the international community, represented by the United Nations (Suzuki, 2008, p 54-55).

Southern Cone countries have expressed their interest in increasing their participation in the decision making process related to peacekeeping missions. They have done that by affirming that their current participation in the decision making process is not proportional to the weight of their military contributions to peacekeeping operations (Serbin & Fontana, 2005, p 217).

Historically, Southern Cone countries have participated regularly in UNPKO, specially because these countries understand this participation as part of their duties and

⁶ In regard to Brazilian participation, the commander of the Army has stressed that participating in peacekeeping missions is important in order for Brazil to appoint representatives to UN organs that supervise peacekeeping missions and humanitarian assistance (Peri, 2007, p 13).

responsabilitires as UN members. This duty to support the UN in the maintenance of peace and security is present in the Charter in articles 2⁷ and 5⁸ and 43⁹.

When it comes to why Southern Cone countries value participating in peacekeeping missions, in a article published previously from the Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH, then Brazilian Army Commander General Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque stated that participation in peacekeeping misions could be an intrusment for Brazil to increase its power. The General also mentioned that the participation in peacekeeping missions could function as a confidende building measure in Latin America, since it would project Brazil's image as a cooperative, efficient and trustworthy country(Albuquerque, 2003).

In an official Brazilian Army publication, Major Alexandre da Silva Pinto affirmed that the importance of participation in PKO was the fact of that these missions allow to for the professionalization of the contigenet as well as a valorization of the members of the Armed Forces before the society (Silva Pinto, 2004, p 9).

Other analysts mention some of the advantages of participating in UNPKO. Besides the opportunity to project power at the international level, participating in such missions provides for recognition of military professionalism from the Armed Forces of other countries. According to Aguillar, participating in PKO also improves the Armed Forces cultural level, because the troops are exposed to different cultures and to travel abroad. The troops also have the opportunity of training in a real conflict situation (Aguillar, 2002, p 438).

For Southern Cone countries, besides from improving the country's image abroad, participating in peacekeepig missions keeps the military oriented towards externals goals, distancing the Armed Forces from involvement in domestic affairs. Participating in peacekeeping missions can be a way to redirect the Armed Forces institutional role in the country, but this has generated different results in different countries, some countries have managed to keep the military with a focus on the outside

⁷ All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

⁸ All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter. See: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

⁹ All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. See: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>

better than others¹⁰. Peacekeeping missions can also prove to be a form of prestige and resource for the Armed Forces (as in the case of Uruguay) . According to Ulery, these prestige gains are important because they continue even after the mission is no longer in action (Uziel, 2006, p 98).

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

On April 30th, 2004, the United Nations Security Council authorized the creation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) by way of resolution 1542¹¹. MINUSTAH were to take over on June 1st, 2004 from the previous *Multinational Interim Force (MIF)*. MINUSTAH was going to be the eight mission in the country .

The *Multinational Interim Force* had been authorized by Security Council resolution 1529¹² of February 29th, 2004. The mission arrived in Haiti on March 15th and was authorized to stay for a 3 month period, its functions would be to restore peace and stability in the country, to help with humanitarian aid and to support the political and constitutional process in Haiti (Lopez, 2005, p 161). Haiti had been in a chaotic situation since early February 2004, with armed gangs and groups operating throughout the country, including the capital, Port au Prince. The crisis in Haiti led to the withdraw of Haitian president Jean Bertrand Aristide¹³. The MIF was composed of troops from Chile, the United States, France and Canada.

As for MINUSTAH, the use of force according to the mission's mandate goes beyond self-defense and is allowed in circumstances such as the protection of civilians facing and immediate threat of violence and the protection of UN personnel, equipment and installations. The reference to Chapter VII in resolution 1542¹⁴ is very clear.

¹⁰ Arturo Sotomayor offers an analysis of different domestic impacts of participation in peacekeeping operations, specifically in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay. See Sotomayor, 2007.

¹¹ See: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/332/98/PDF/N0433298.pdf?OpenElement>

¹² See: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/254/10/PDF/N0425410.pdf?OpenElement> acesso em 26 de outubro de 2008

¹³ Aristide currently lives in exile in South Africa. Circumstances related to his departure from Haiti area till unclear. Both the hypotheses of him having resigned (which he denies) and him having suffered a *coup d'etat* remain blurred. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has decided to set up an investigation to verify if Aristide was in fact removed from the country and if there was US participation in the episode

¹⁴ “7. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to Section I below, decides that MINUSTAH should have the following mandate ”.

See : <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/332/98/PDF/N0433298.pdf?OpenElement>

In regards to MINUSTAH and the use of force, Malone & von Eisenfeld believe that the peace keeping troops responded to violence coming from the gangs in Port au Prince with a series of incursions into the city's slums, and that showed that UN forces were willing to confront spoilers in a violent way, if it was necessary (Malone & von Eisenfeld, 2007, p 187).

According to Morneau, MINUSTAH is not a traditional peacekeeping operation, but a complex mission, based on Chapter VII, since there was no cease fire, and the gangs had not agreed to disarm when the mission was created. In accordance with the author, the mission can be understood as a peace enforcement mission, involving offensive missions (in relation to the gangs), traditional peacekeeping and stabilization, and distribution of humanitarian assistance (Morneau, 2006, p 74).

The mandate of resolution 1542 also reflects this mission complexity. The mandate is divided in three spheres: creating a secure and stable environment, guaranteeing respect for human rights and supporting the political process in Haiti (Morneau, 2006, p 74-75).

Regarding the mandate, in a simplified way, resolution 1542 affirms that MINUSTAH should work towards promoting a safe and stable environment in Haiti (by helping the Haitian National Police and the Haitian government), promoting the political and constitutional process in Haiti (by helping in elections and promoting dialogue among political actors) and guaranteeing the respect of human rights in the country.

On October 14th 2008, the Security Council decided by means of resolution 1840 to renew MINUSTAH's mandate until October 15th, 2009.

Southern Cone countries participation

We can observe a similar pattern in terms of Southern Cone countries historical involvement in PKO. This participation evolved from sending a few military observers towards incorporating participation in PKO as one of the elements of the country's foreign policy strategy.

When it comes to the principle of non-intervention, Monica Serrano observes that Latin American countries have adopted a more flexible position regarding such principle. According to the author, a series of events, such as democratization in the

region, the opening of the economies and the end of conflicts in Central America have led Latin American countries to adopt a different perspective regarding sovereignty (this of course is not universal for all countries of the region and happens on different scales for each country) (Serrano, 2000, p 224). When looking at Southern Cone countries position towards NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, Serrano shows how Brazil, Argentina and Chile showed concern on the lack of approval by the Security Council, but at the same time, these countries have not rejected NATO's action, by believing that sovereignty should be related to respect for human rights (Serrano, 2000, p 235).

In terms of participation, Ulery reminds us that 85% of the Latin American contributions for peacekeeping missions come from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (Ulery, 2005, p 60). RESDAL's security and defense information website mentions that according to the DPKO participation in peacekeeping operations by Latin American countries increased 747% in the year 2000, while other regions' participation increased in only 123%¹⁵.

Aguilar emphasizes that Southern Cone lead the South American participation in peacekeeping missions in the period of 1948 up to 2001

Table 1. South American participation in UN peacekeeping missions (1948-2001)

Country	Participation (number of missions)	Country	Participation (number of missions)	Country	Participation (number of missions)
Argentina	32	Peru	7	Bolivia	5
Brazil	24	Ecuador	6	Guyana	5
Uruguay	18	Colombia	6	Paraguay	2
Chile	8	Venezuela	6	Surinam	1

Source: Aguilar, 2002, p 414.

Before we look at Southern Cone countries involvement in the current UNPKO in Haiti, we must look at how these same countries positioned themselves in regard to

¹⁵ See <http://www.resdal.org/genero-y-paz/main-genero-operaciones-paz.html>

peacekeeping in Haiti in the 1990's in regards to the mission authorized by resolution 940. David Malone's (1998) offers us an account of how they acted then.

In that context, the Brazilian position was that a formal request on the part of president Aristide would be necessary in order for the UN to send in a mission. The Brazilian representative at the Council abstained during the voting, affirming that while the resolution could be seen as supporting the strengthening of democracy, Brazil, in accordance with its constitution and tradition politics could not support a military intervention at that moment (Malone, 1998, p 109). Brazil abstained in the resolutions that followed regarding the situation in Haiti : 944, 948 and 964, all from 1994 (Valler Filho, 2007, p 147).

In regards to debate on resolution 940¹⁶, Uruguay affirmed that it could not support a resolution based on Chapter VII in the Western Hemisphere (it was the first time that the UN was going to consider a peace enforcement mission in the Americas). At that time, Argentina was in a different position than the other Southern Cone countries, the country was one of the resolution's co-sponsors. Argentina's position reflected its foreign policy at the time, a policy that involved favouring relations with the United States, which led to Argentina being appointed a non-NATO major ally by the US (Malone, 1998, p 154).

In regards to the Brazilian position concerning resolution 940, Brazilian diplomat Irene de Lima Câmara¹⁷ argues that Brazil positioned itself against the mission because it would set a dangerous precedent of Council action in the internal affairs of an American country (Lima Câmara, 1998, p 168). According to Lima Câmara, Brazil abstained from resolution 940, which authorized the use of "*all means necessary*" in relation to the Haitian crisis, because the intervention had a unilateral component that was against the Brazilian constitutional principles of non-intervention. The diplomat also stressed that the resolution had unpredictable consequences and risks, not only for Haiti, but for all Latin American countries.

The diplomat concludes her analysis by affirming that when Brazil abstained from resolution 940 it decided to follow a position that was not only of self-defense (out of fear of suffering an intervention) but also one that would be the most appropriate

¹⁶ See: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/312/22/PDF/N9431222.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁷ Irene de Lima Câmara was Chief of Staff for the Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) between 1990-1994. Lima Câmara was also the head of the OAS's working group on UN-OAS cooperation in Haiti.

way for Brazil to position itself in a post-Cold War world of uncertainties (Lima Câmara, 1998, p 175).

After this brief introduction on past Southern Cone reaction to UNPKO in Haiti, we can now discuss their current position regarding MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH is the first UN mission in which the military component is composed in its majority of countries of the region in which the mission is taking place (Latin America), and specially Southern Cone countries

Table 2. Percentage of Southern Cone's contributions to MINUSTAH in relation to Southern Cone's general contributions to UNPKO (including troops and policemen)

Country	MINUSTAH	Total	Percentage
Argentina	562	893	62,9%
Brasil	1283	1352	94,89%
Chile	519	525	98,85%
Uruguai	1143	2538	45,03%

Source: UNDPKO, December 2008.

Table 3. MINUSTAH troop and policemen contribution by region

Region	Troops	Policemen	Percentage
Asia, Africa, Europe, Oceania and Americas	7,036	2,053	100%
Latin America	4102	38	45,54% of the total contributions
South America	3985	34	97,07% of Latin American contributions
Southern Cone (including Paraguay with 31 troops)	3504	27	87,85 % of the South American contributions

Source: UN's DPKO, December 2008.

Southern Cone countries participation is also important because Southern Cone nations have also taken crucial positions in the mission's chain of command. Since 2004, all Force Commanders have been Brazilians, and a Chilean, an Argentinian and an Uruguayan served as Deputy Force Commanders. The first Special Representative of the Secretary General (2004-2006) was the Chilean diplomat Juan Valdes and the Principal Deputy Special Representative¹⁸ is a Brazilian career UN civil servant .

In the specific case of each state, the Chilean participation is a special case, since the country was already present in Haiti before MINUSTAH. Chile's participation in a peace enforcement mission, represents a turning point in terms of Chilean participation which was traditionally characterized by small contingents¹⁹. According to Jorge Heine, Chilean presence in the MIF contributed to bringing legitimacy to the mission and also to facilitate Southern Cone countries presence in the mission that followed MIF's presence in Haiti (Heine, 2006, p 496).

In the Chilean case, MINUSTAH is also a landmark, because it represents the first time women were been sent to fulfill operative functions (as commanders in the logistic support section) in a PKO and the first time where journalists (official of the reserve and used civil of the masculine and feminine sex) were sent in a contingent (Clavel, 2006, p 211).

In 1996, Chile's position on PKO stated that the country would only participate in Chapter VI missions. In 1999, the Chilean government changed its position and decided that the country could participate in Chapter VII missions (Garcia & Cresta, 2005, p 69). Criteria that were defined for Chile's participation involve the fact that the missions would be related to the country's national interest (including the country's duties as UN members²⁰) and that the Chilean government would decide on a case by case basis in regards to wheter participate or not, and that the president would have the final say (Garcia Pino, 2008, p 49).

As for Chile, some analysts believe that participating in Chapter VII operations would be a way for the country to increase it's international presence. Elsa Llenderozas

¹⁸ MINUSTAH's Chief Police Commissioner, the mission's Electoral Section and MINUSTAH's Chief Administrative Officer are all subordinated to the *Principal Deputy Special Representative* .

¹⁹ In terms of Chilean participation, the country's involvement evolved from 50 military between 1981-1990, to 186 between 1990-2000 and 2,057 between 2001 – 2006 (Clavel, 2006).

²⁰ Garcia & Cresta believe that international trade and Chile's dependence on international trade routes has an impact on Chile's contributions to peacekeeping missions. The country would have an interest in sending troops since peacekeeping missions would be a way of bringing stability to several areas in the globe and therefore allowing for free trade to flow (Garcia & Cresta, 2005, p 60).

believes that Chile's involvement is a way of responding to claims that Chile is indifferent to Latin American problems (such as Haiti for example) and that the country is more concerned about commercial and economic issues than issues related to security (Llenderrozas, 2006, p 14).

As for Argentina, participation in peacekeeping missions is valued because of its professional and financial benefits , as well as for the opportunity for the Armed Forces to interact with other countries' troops and because participating in such a mission improves the Armed Forces image both internally and internationally (Andres & Fontana, 2005, p 212). In Argentina, the Armed Forces suffered from low prestige due to the Falklands/Malinas conflict in the 1980's and from lack of opportunities for financing and training. Peacekeeping operations have emerged in the 1990's as a partial solution to those problems.

However, it was harder for the Argentinian government to gather support in congress to send troops to Haiti in 2004 because the policy of participating in PKOs had become deeply associated with the Menem government and with a policy of automatic alignment with the USA. However, it is important to stress that, in terms of Southern Cone countries, Argentina is the one with more experience in Haiti, having participated in the 1993-1996 previous UN mission.

When commenting on the Argentinean position, Lengyel describes that after Chile and Brazil quickly committed troops to MINUSTAH, Argentina was concerned that these countries would increase their regional influence by having troops in the mission and therefore, the Argentinean government decided that it should also join MINUSTAH (Lengyel, 2006, p 4). The same analyst also highlights that the country's involvement in the mission could also be interpreted as due to the perception that there was a genuine cooperation effort emerging in the region, an effort based on Argentinian, Brazilian and Chilean leadership (Lengyel, 2006, p 9).

Like Chile, Argentina also used the participation in MINUSTAH as a gesture of reconciliation towards the United States (relations were shaken in the case of Chile by the country's decision not to back the US on the Iraqi war issue, when the country was serving at the Security Council in 2003). However, the official position of the Argentinian government was to emphasize the regional motivation, presenting the

decision to participate of the MINUSTAH as a joint decision of the extended Mercosur²¹ (including Chile) of which the country could not stay out.

Regarding the Uruguayan participation in Chapter VII peace missions, Ulery calls attention for the concern on the part of the Uruguayan government that its troops could be seen as impartial. However, the author identifies that the solution on whether or not to participate in such missions involved the fact that the Uruguayan government resorted to the argument that some peacekeeping missions could be characterized as Chapter VI and half (mandate of Chapter VII, but with Chapter VI characteristics). It was this solution that allowed for the Uruguayan participation in the United Nations Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 2001 (Ulery, 2005, p 36).

Concerning Uruguayan participation in peacekeeping missions, the same author believes that Uruguay should not refrain from participating in Chapter VII missions since these missions allow for the Uruguayan Armed Forces to train in real conflict situations and also, that Chapter VII missions are consistent with the principles of preventive diplomacy and peaceful resolution of controversies which are present in the Uruguayan constitution. Ulery's analysis is also important since he observes in the region (Southern Cone) the confluence of a series of left wing governments and argues that the participation in chapter VII missions is compatible with ideals sponsored by left wing parties, mainly the ideals of multilateralism and international solidarity (Ulery, 2005, p 16).

According to Wins, in 2003 there was a debate in Uruguay concerning the country's participation in the Congo mission, due to the fact that the mission's mandate had changed from Chapter VI to Chapter VII . However, the prevailing position was that Uruguay should continue to support the principle of non-intervention, but that in situations where there were armed actors inside the state that were preventing the peace agreements to succeed, Uruguay could not refuse to participate in the mission since such mission was a legitimate operation, with a UN mandate (Wins, 2005, p 7).

Finally, when it comes to Uruguayan participation, it's crucial to remember the financial component related to UN reimbursement. From 1991 to 2001, Uruguay received approximately 129 million dollars from the UN and in 2002 alone, the country

²¹ The Southern Cone Common Market, a regional bloc association between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay. Venezuela's entrance into the bloc has not being approved by all of the founding member states' national parliaments yet. See: <http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/pt/index.htm>

received 20 million dollars²². Reimbursement has functioned as a parallel source of income for the Uruguayan Armed Forces, leading the country to consider sending troops to Darfur²³ (Ulery, 2005, p 124-125).

Brazilian participation in MINUSTAH

In the document “Política de Defesa Nacional” (National Defense Policy) approved on July 2005 by presidential decree n 5484, contributing to the maintenance of world peace and security appears as one of the country’s main goals . The same document sets some standarts regarding the country’s defense policy strategies, these standards include that the partipation in peacekeeping missions should be related to the country’s national interest. These two aspects (that Brazil wants to contribute to international security and that participating in peacekeeping missions should be related to the national interest) were already present in previous documents, such as the National Defense Policy published in 1996²⁴. Both national defense documents and the Brazilian constitution (1988) state that Brazil guides its international affairs by supporting the principles of self-determination, non-intervention and the pacific resolution of conflicts

When it comes to justifying Brazil’s presence in Haiti, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry has used the following arguments: that Brazil is fullfilling its duties and obligations as a UN member state and that Brazil was demonstrating its solidarity towards a fellow American nation (MRE, 2008, p 214).

In regards to the Brazilian decision to take part in MINUSTAH, Elsa Llenderrozas identifies a change in Brazilian foreign policy orientation. This change would involle abandoning a position of mistrust in multilateral organs (such as the Security Council) that were perceived as being dominated by the great powers and adopting a position which is more related towards working whithin multilateral institutions in order to gain more bargaining power at the international level (Llenderrozas, 2006, p 18).

²² UN reimbursement is crucial for the survival of the Uruguayan Armed Forcesd. In the year 2002, the country gained US18 million with lamb’s meta exports and 16 million with exporting minerals (Ulery, 2005, p 126).

²³ The economic motivation behind Uruguay’s participation was emphasized by Uruguay Captain Andrea Arenales who was serving on MINUSTAH’s *Deputy Force Commander staff*.

²⁴ See http://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/COLECAO/DEFES3.HTM

Eugenio Diniz illustrates how the Brazilian participation was placed as not being a rupture with the country's traditional involvement in peace missions. According to Diniz, the Brazilian government argues that resolution 1529 brings reference to Chapter VII already in its preamble, but resolution 1542 make reference to Chapter VII in paragraph 7, therefore, only this article would be based on Chapter VII and not all of resolution 1542, and MINUSTAH could be considered a peacekeeping and not a peace enforcement mission²⁵. The same author perceives on the part of the Brazilian government a rhetorical effort to differentiate the two resolutions and an effort of entailing the UN presence in Haiti with the necessity of if facing what would be the root causes of the conflict in Haiti(according to the Brazilian perspective): hunger, poverty and fragility of the democratic institutions (Diniz, 2006, p 331-332).

It is important here to refer to Brazil's previous involvement in Chapter VII missions . According to Santos & Russo, Brazil participated²⁶ in INTERFET in East Timor in 1999, and although INTERFET was based on Chapter VII, it had the consent of the parties involved in the conflict (Santos & Russo, 2007, p 334). Also concerning Brazilian participation in East Timor, Diniz mentions that UNMISET, in which Brazil participated in 2002, only had reference to Chapter VII in one of the articles and not in the preambulatory clauses of the resolution that authorized the mission (Diniz, 2006, p 331).

Regarding the Brazilian participation in INTERFET, Aguillar affirms that at the same time where it can be understood as a Brazilian participation a peace imposition mission, Brazil's involvement in the mission can be justified more due to the cultural bonds between Brazil and East Timor, than in an acceptance of new criteria for participation. However, Aguillar also states that in the same period, Brazil voted for the continuity of NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, for considering it an humanitarian intervention (Aguillar, 2002, p 430).

In a Brazilian Army publication, Captain Denílson Santos Leitão²⁷ commented in the singular aspects concerning participation in the Timor mission. Santos Leitão

²⁵ The difference between resolution 1529 and resolution 1542 is that in the first, the reference to Chapter II appears in the preamble and that in the second it only appears in a specific paragraph (Valler Filho, 2007, p 156).

²⁶ Brazilian participation involved an Army Police platoon and a commanding officer. It was the first Brazilian participation in a multinational coalition (Santos e Russo, 2007, p 334).

²⁷ Officer in the Army Police Battalion that served in East Timor between September 1999 and March 2000

mentioned that the Brazilian Army normally took part in peacekeeping missions, but that participating in the East Timor mission was something that Brazil could not abstain from doing, since the mission was ratifying the right to self-determination of a Portuguese speaking people (Santos Leitão, 2002, p 9).

Analysts such as Wrobel & Herz identify in Brazilian diplomats and military an acceptance of the traditional peacekeeping principles such as consent of the parties, impartiality and minimum use of force. According to these authors, there's a concern among diplomats and the military about the redefinition of the principles that legitimize humanitarian interventions, this concern is reflected in the Brazilian rejection of supporting more coercive interventions, while the country served as a non-permanent member in the Security Council during the 1990's. Wrobel and Herz highlight that then permanent representative at the United Nations and now Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim distanced himself from the *An agenda for peace* document. Amorim alleged that the document had a militarizing bias and that the UN's advantage was that it constituted a space of negotiation, and that even the most robust interventions would have to be only means to the promotion of dialogue and negotiation and that interventions alone were not going to bring the solution to conflicts (Wrobel & Herz, 2002, p 309-310).

Elsa Llenderrozas believes that the Brazilian diplomatic posture remains critical of peacekeeping operations since the country's foreign policy establishment believes that peacekeeping operations can only be understood as part of a larger conflict resolution frame. In that sense, Brazil states that the UN should prioritize conflict prevention rather than peacekeeping, and also that the organization should also address the reduction of poverty and social and economic inequality as well as development promotion. While looking at Brazilian presidential decree n 5848²⁸, the author points out at how Brazil understands that peacekeeping operations are useful tools for solving conflicts but that the final solution for these conflicts relies on the political will of the parties involved (Llenderrozas, 2006, p 8).

Commenting on the Brazilian tradition, Carlos Santiso highlights that one example of Brazilian respect of the principle of sovereignty is the fact that the country traditionally abstained from condemning human rights violations by states such as Cuba, Iran or China in the former UN Human Rights Commission (Santiso, 2003, p 355).

²⁸ See: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2004-2006/2005/Decreto/D5484.htm

In 1999, Brazilian general Ulisses Lisboa Perazzo Lannes, then chief of special and international affairs at the Brazilian Army High Command mentioned that Brazil would support the implementation of the *Stand By Arrangements* and *Rapid Deployment Mission Headquarters* systems, but that in regards to committing troops, Brazil would keep its sovereign right to decide on sending troops on a case by case basis (Lannes, 1999, p 116).

In an academic work concerning peacekeeping operations, published by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in 1998, Brazilian diplomat Afonso José Sena Cardoso expressed his concern that the growing involvement of UN peacekeeping operations in intra-states conflicts could compromise both the efficiency and the execution of these operations. Sena Cardoso also presented his concerns that these operations could compromise the principle of non-interference in a member state's internal affairs (Sena Cardoso, 1998, p 149).

During the 1990's, Brazil expressed a strong position that resorting to Chapter VII of the Charter should be approached with caution and should be done only if taking into consideration the following principles: that there should be strong and clear mandates and goals and that there should be a previous political settlement between the parties involved in the conflict. At the same time, Brazil expressed its concern that the growing incorporation of a humanitarian component in peacekeeping operations could bring along logistical and planning complications, since humanitarian activities should only be fulfilled by the competent organs and mechanisms (Sena Cardoso, 1998, p 146).

Having the previous elements in mind, the involvement in Haiti would be the result of a perception that a leadership role (a role that Brazil seeks in South America) is guaranteed by the active participation in the resolution of problems and tensions that affect the international system. In order for Brazil to consolidate its image of regional leadership it is necessary the involvement in Haiti. However, when placing (not in an explicit way) the involvement in the MINUSTAH as a measure of the country being able to take international responsibilities of the level of a permanent member of the Council, the country takes a risk, because it relies on the success of the mission to back its candidacy to a permanent seat.

It is also curious to mention that already in 2002, Roodettes anticipated that Brazil could participate in a peacekeeping mission in the Western Hemisphere, and that this would happen specially if Brazil could take the lead in the mission (Roodettes,

2002, p 50). Brazilian participation in the mission would function as a platform to promote Brazil's capacity to lead, and the acknowledgement on the part of the other countries in the region that Brazil has the means to lead, would legitimize Brazilian leadership, since Brazil would be seen as coordinating the South American response to the crisis in the region (Torchiaro, 2007, p 33).

Regional cooperation perspectives

We will come now to discuss regional aspects of the Southern Cone countries participation in MINUSTAH. In a speech at the 2006 UN General Assembly, Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim recognized that the participation of the Southern Cone countries in the mission was without precedent, as much for the presence of the military forces and also for political coordination between the countries (MRE, 2008, p 213).

Political coordination regarding participation in MINUSTAH involved the creation of a coordination mechanism (the 2x9 mechanism). This mechanism evolved from a 2x3 format of which the vice-ministers of foreign affairs and defense of Brazil, Argentina participated and Chile As of February 2007 in a 2x9 format, the mechanism includes beyond the Southern Cone countries, representatives of the Latin Americans that send troops to e MINUSTAH: Paraguay, Peru, Guatemala, Bolivia, Ecuador. Rut Diamint places as positive factor in the mechanism, the presence of Haitian authorities in the meetings, that serves, according to the author, to move away concerns that the mission might have an invasive character (Diamint, 2007, p 5).

Elsa Llenderrozas recognizes that the joint participation in MINUSTAH has favored an increase in the regional capacity of committing troops to peacekeeping operations, allowing for these new capacities to be used in different and future missions. However, it is important to raise the question if a similar initiative of joint participation could occur in relation to a intra-state crisis in South America? That is an important argument to raise here, since the capacity acquired with the participation in the MINUSTAH is not applied in na automatic way. Southern Cone countries participation in peacekeeping operations is sufficiently selective and relies on elements as national interest, strategical motivations and circumstantial political interests (Llenderrozas, 2006, p 27).

Joint participation can also be understood as an element that promotes coordinated policies in multilateral forums related to peacekeeping, such as donor

conferences and UN organs. According to Hirst, in 2004, while Brazil and Chile were serving as non-permanent members in the Security Council they have acted together in order to extend MINUSTAH's mandate. The same coordination effort related to MINUSTAH took place when Argentina and Peru were serving in the Council between 2005 and 2006 (Hirst, 2007, p 7).

According to Luciana Tochiaro, Southern Cone countries participation in MINUSTAH involves political coordination and regular consultation between these countries, which lead to Southern Cone countries to develop an identity of their own inside the mission and for these countries to be viewed as key actors in the process of reconstructing Haiti.

Daniel Fledes believes that the military cooperation at the practical and political level in MINUSTAH has the potential to introduce a multilateral dimension in the regional cooperation in the scope of defense, characterized for traditionally bilateral efforts (Fledes, 2005, p 152).

Besides from political coordination there is also military coordination between Southern Cone countries. In December 2005, both Argentina and Chile agreed on the creation of bilateral joint peacekeeping force ²⁹, which would be trained and commanded by a bi-national command (Mathias et al, 2008, p 82). According to Gonzalo Garcia Pino³⁰, the Cruz Del Sur Force (Forza Cruz del Sul) is a symbol of the new strategic interaction between Chile and Argentina. A Combined High Command would take care of the operational elements and once the force is constituted, it would be available for the UN according to UNSAS (United Nations Stand-By Arrangement System)³¹ . The Force will be mobilized if there's a request from the UN and if the two countries agreed to give their approval. Garcia Pino also recognizes that the initiative has some challenges to overcome, such as financial problems and problems related to compatibility of training and availability of equipments (Garcia Pino, 2008, p 61).

According to General Heleno, MINUSTAH's first *Force Commander* ³², Brazilian interaction with the Armed Forces of the region is unprecedented and is a symbol of the high level of cooperation and synergy in the region (Pereira, 2005, p 45).

²⁹ In 2006, Chile and Peru agreed to set up a working to formulate a plan in the creation of a joint peacekeeping force to act in UNPKO (MRE, 2007, p 112). It is important to highlight that in Haiti, Chile and Ecuador share a joint Army Engineering Company (Clavel, 2006, p 2120).

³⁰ Under Secretary of War at the Chilean Ministry of Defense.

³² General Heleno was MINUSTAH's Force Commander from June 1st, 2004 until August 31st, 2005.

It is important to stress that the proximity between the country's language (Portuguese in Brazil and Spanish in the rest of the Southern Cone) have helped create a South American way of participating in peacekeeping missions. Another important element is the exchange between peacekeeping training centers in the region. A growing number of Southern Cone military have also started to take correspondence courses organized by UNITAR³³.

Concluding remarks

Although we can acknowledge that after several peacekeeping missions in Haiti, MINUSTAH is the first to have a strong majority of countries from the region in which Haiti is located (Latin America) and that this new element has a positive impact among the local population , there is also the need to acknowledge that if the solutions to the social, political, economic and environmental problems that Haiti faces are not found, this popular support for the troop's presence will diminish (Garcia & Cresta, 2005, p 82). As Paul Diehl reminds us, even as conditions in Haiti have been improving since 2004, the country is still far from being a stable and functioning democracy (Diehl, 2008, p 125).

MINUSTAH can also be understood as a laboratory in which Southern Cone countries have done considerable efforts in order for the mission to be successful. It is important to highlight that these countries are fully aware that success cannot rely only in the mission's military aspects but also in its social and political aspects, such as economic and social development and in rebuilding the country's infra-structure (Benitez Manuat, 2005, p 141).

Analysts such as Gratius have highlighted some of MINUSTAH's positive aspects. For the author, even if we consider all of it's limitations, MINUSTAH is the first mission with more of a social and political mandate than a military one . It is the first mision in Latin America that seeks to address both the deep causes (the fragility of the Haitian state) and the consequences of the probleen (violent conflit in the country).

³³ United Nations Institute for Training and Research. The Peace Operations Training Institute, formerly UNITAR POCI is the UN's agency with the responsibility of providing standardized universal training for peacekeepers form around the world. The institute has 46 experts, 5 from Latin American countries, 2 colonels from the Chilean Armed Forces and 2 female civilians (1 from Bolivia and 1 from Chile). The institute has recently inaugurated an *E-Learning for Latin American and Caribbean Peacekeepers (ELPLAC)* course due to the increase in the involvement of Latin American soldiers in peacekeeping missions. The course is organized in a similar way as a pre-existing course destined to African soldiers. The Latin American course is supported financially by the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

Still according to the author, South American countries commitment towards MINUSTAH allowed for the first time to tie Haiti with the Latin American agenda and to perceive it as part of the geography and the cultural identity of the region and not as a misplaced African nation (Gratius, 2008, p 6).

Antonio Palá points out that Southern Cone countries participation presents the UN with some advantages, like language skills and the fact that these countries Armed Forces don't have a background of intervention in Haiti, which makes their presence in Haiti somewhat more productive (Palá, 1995).

Southern Cone countries do not have a background of colonization and intervention in Haiti and that has helped these countries to articulate a different approach towards promoting peace and stability in the country, by way of seeking close contact with the local population. Southern Cone countries have placed establishing a connection with the Haitian population as their priority, and have done that by promoting civilian-social activities such as donating school supplies for children, donating water, painting houses and buildings, promoting theater activities and other educational activities in Port au Prince's slums . All these measures are related to these countries interests in trying to make MINUSTAH not to be considered an occupying mission (Hirst & Llenderozas, 2008, p 10).

For Tapia, the fact that MINUSTAH is the first UN mission in Haiti without major powers participation is a proof of responsibility for Latin American countries, and also a proof that these countries have matured in terms of solving themselves the region's security issues (Tapia, 2005, p 319). This transfer of responsibility from the United States to Latin American is also due to an evidence of the lack of interest on the part of the United States towards the region (Sepulveda, 2005). In a broader perspective, MINUSTAH can be understood as inaugurating a regional commitment towards solving the region's own security issues (Garcia Pino, 2008, p 62).

However, some analysts also present some criticism concerning Southern Cone countries participation in MINUSTAH, specially because these countries have no experience in reconstructing infra-structure and institutions and that they are also not capable of meeting the financial costs of peacebuilding . Raul Benitez Manuat reminds us that the presence or absence of some Latin American countries in the mission might also split the region in two groups, the first one composed of the countries that commit troops to MINUSTAH and a second one of countries that are not in the mission, such as Cuba, Venezuela and Mexico (Benitez Manuat, 2006, p 34).

As for criticism, Ulery noticed in 2005 that there were still a lack of common regional standards and criteria that could guide Southern Cone countries troop commitment to UN missions (Ulery, 2005, p 57). The author believes that Southern Cone countries have different approaches when it comes to peacekeeping missions as well as competing goals related to regional leadership, in a sense that Chile and Argentina could not accept taking a secondary role while Brazil would lead the mission. In regards to Chile, according to Ulery, even if we identify that Chile has established a joint partnership with Argentina in terms of participating together in peacekeeping missions, in terms of regional cooperation, Chile is not yet fully integrated into Mercosur (Ulery, 2005, p 98).

Tokatlian adopts a critical position in regards to the participation of Southern Cone countries in Haiti by affirming that the decision to participate in MINUSTAH can't be interpreted as merely altruistic duty but as a pragmatic one. For the author, the departure of Aristide was caused by a *coup d'état* organized by the United States, therefore , MINUSTAH subsequent mandate opens a dangerous precedent in the region , a precedent that according to Tokatlian can be used against South American countries themselves (Tokatlian, 2005, p 41).

Finally, far from covering all the aspects that involve Southern Cone countries participation in MINUSTAH, I have tried here to bring to attention some issues related to these countries involvement in the mission and how this participation affects regional cooperation and their performance in the mission. In order to assess the effects and the interests and principles behind the participation, I have relied on both official and academic sources, in order to get the broadest possible perspective. My research is motivated by the perception that an increase in the participation of the countries of the South Cone in operations of peace must be followed by academic reflections and an interaction between the academy and the Armed Forces regarding the subject.

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