COMING OF AGE?
Recent Scholarship on Brazilian Foreign Policy

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Brazilian foreign policy has never been a major point of interest among the non-Brazilian scholars who call themselves Brazilianists. Over a span of almost thirty years, the four edited collections of that epistemic community’s informal state of the art—Alfred Stepan’s Authoritarian Brazil (1973) and Democratizing Brazil (1989), and Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power’s Democratic Brazil (2000) and Democratic Brazil Revisited (2008)—have altogether one chapter on foreign relations. A small number of scholarly books have looked at the topic over the past forty years, mostly focusing on historical problems, overwhelmingly on aspects of the relationship with the United States. Ronald M. Schneider’s Brazil, Foreign

Policy of a Future World Power (1976) and Wayne A. Selcher’s Brazil’s Multilateral Relations (1978) and Brazil in the International System (1981) stand out as pathbreaking attempts to look broadly at the country’s foreign relations as if Brazil were a significant power or at least a “normal” state from the standpoint of mainstream foreign policy studies. Like some stretches of the Trans-Amazonian Highway, however, bushes and trees progressively invaded the path with years of neglect, a situation that only now appears to be changing. The major exception is Andrew Hurrell and Leticia Pinheiro’s 2006 collection Brazil in the World: Globalization and State Power, which reopened the path but whose broad coverage of issues, intriguingly, is ignored by the many works reviewed here.

While northern (colonial?) area studies remained largely indifferent, a very different scenario was playing out in Brazil itself, where historians and scholar-diplomats have long been engaged in the study of their country’s foreign relations. The Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional has been published without interruption since 1958 by the Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI). The University of Brasilia (UnB) introduced a graduate program in the history of Brazilian foreign policy in 1984, and for a long while the academic field was dominated by the works of UnB historians, in particular Amado Luís Cervo and Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira. There is also a strong tradition among senior Brazilian diplomats to produce and publish book-length studies about various aspects of their country’s foreign policy: for instance, and among a large number of other works, Fernando de Mello Barreto’s two-volume Sucessores do Barão (2001, 2006), Gelson Fonseca’s A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais (1998) and O interesse e a regra (2008), and perhaps especially Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães’s Quinhentos anos de periferia (1999) and Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes (2006). In addition, since 1979, the thesis requirement imposed on Brazilian diplomats for promotion has produced a steady flow of monographs from Brazil’s diplomatic academy, the Rio Branco Institute: 618 such theses had been defended by 2011, with several of them finding their way to publication through the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation. While the UnB historians and political scientists have arguably kept a dominant position to this day, smaller but very active nuclei have emerged around political scientists Monica Hirst and Maria Regina Soares de Lima at the Rio de Janeiro University Research Institute (IUPERJ) and the Catholic University of Rio (PUC-RJ), whose Institute of International Relations started publishing Contexto Internacional in 1985; at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Rio under Matías Spektor; and in the state of São Paulo at the University of Campinas and the Cath-

olic University of São Paulo, and particularly at the University of São Paulo (USP) and at the State University of São Paulo (UNESP), around José Guilhon de Albuquerque and Tullo Vigevani. The latter two universities have also been publishing Política Externa, “Brazil’s Foreign Affairs,” since 1992. Guilhon Albuquerque’s four-volume collection, Sessenta anos de política externa brasileira,4 testifies to a broad and deep interest in Brazil’s foreign relations but also to an expertise that remained largely in the hands of diplomats and historians, and to an essentially descriptive and historical approach. Of the four volumes’ fifty-five chapters, twenty-seven were written by diplomats and virtually all of them are strictly descriptive. The Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul also has an active team of researchers, with Paulo Visentini prominent among them, and now a brand-new journal in English, Austral: The Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations.

Since the middle of the 1990s, the field has exploded in Brazil, with international relations specialties cropping up in several major universities. Significant new institutional additions include the Department of International Relations of the Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC-Minas); the Programa Santiago Dantas, jointly run by the UNESP, the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), and the Catholic University of São Paulo; the Institute of International Relations (IRI) at the University of São Paulo, the Center for Strategic Relations (NERINT) at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul; and the Rio-based Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), which does not have a formal university affiliation. The establishment in 2005 of the Brazilian Association of International Relations (ABRI) made official the remarkable growth of the academic study of international relations in the country. This explosion of interest was paralleled in scholarly production, with the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Contexto Internacional, and Política Externa joined in 1998 by the digital Revista Cena Internacional; the Meridiano 47 bulletin in 2000, published at the UnB; and Conjun- tura Internacional in 2004, published by the PUC-Minas group. General surveys, textbooks, and specialized monographs have multiplied, including whole series such as those published by CEBRI, by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRS), which now has twelve titles; and jointly by the University of Brasília’s IBRI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG). In addition, university-based research centers publish regular reviews of Brazilian foreign and defense policy (e.g., the Grupo de Estudos da Defesa e Segurança Internacional of the Center for Latin American Studies at the UNESP), periodic commentaries in the country’s leading newspapers, and a number of quality blogs that feed a dense and lively national conversation on foreign affairs.

Since the end of the Cold War and the stabilization of its economy in the mid-1990s, and just as Brazil appeared to suddenly emerge on the global scene, scientific production on the country’s foreign policy has also increased, particularly in Brazil but also in Europe, while North America has lagged behind. This is reflected in the size and origin of the sample of books reviewed here, which includes a massive (2 volumes, 741 pages, 33 chapters, 45 authors), bilingual (En-

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glish and French) general survey of Brazil’s contemporary foreign policy written mostly by Brazilians (Denis Rolland and Antônio Carlos Lessa); a short edited volume on Brazil’s new partnerships with India and South Africa by Brazilian researchers (Lima and Hirst); scholarly monographs on Brazil’s foreign policy since the end of the military regime, with Sean W. Burges—a Canadian now at Australian National University—devoting his book mostly to the Cardoso presidency, and Tullo Vigeveni and Gabriel Cepaluni, both Brazilians, covering the whole New Republic; the presentation and comparative analysis of two surveys, made almost ten years apart, on the views of Brazil’s foreign policy establishment on their country’s place in the world, by a Brazilian scholar associated with CEBRI (Amaury de Souza); a historical overview of Brazil’s relations with the United States, by a British historian (Joseph Smith); a slight survey of Brazilian history as background for the country’s current rise to prominence, by one of the fathers of Brazilian studies in the United States (Riordan Roett); and an impressionistic and very personal presentation of the “new” Brazil and its growing assertiveness, by a longtime correspondent of the New York Times in Brazil (Larry Rohter).

This review essay is divided in two parts. The first explores the way in which the works covered here frame Brazil’s emergence as a world power, and the second examines the reorientations and mechanics of the country’s policy that have accompanied that emergence. A short conclusion addresses the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the works reviewed and brings the discussion back to the state of current scholarship on Brazilian foreign policy, in Brazil and beyond.

BRAZIL’S RISE

At least since Stefan Zweig’s famous work The Land of the Future (1941), Brazil has been painted as a gentle giant of limitless potential whose promising destiny was denied or frustrated by the weight of culture, history, corrupt governments, heartless elites, foreign powers, or the complex workings of a perverse world capitalist system. Even dependentista readings of the country’s development, however, had to give a prominent place to domestic elites and state policies to reconcile the country’s poor social and economic performance with the enormous resources and undeniable institutional capabilities that it possessed, at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. Unsurprisingly in that context, most of the works reviewed here consider at length the domestic obstacles that had—or remain—to be conquered for the country’s destiny to at last play itself out.

Riordan Roett’s concise essay conforms most precisely to this script. In 175 pages organized into eight short chapters, he retraces the country’s five-century march “from colony to BRIC,” to the Vargas era, the military’s “Revolution,” the awkward transition to democracy ultimately “completed” by Fernando Henrique

5. The acronym BRIC stands for “Brazil, Russia, India and China” and was coined by Jim O’Neill when he was head of economic research at Goldman Sachs, in a paper that has since become famous. Jim O’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” Goldman-Sachs Global Economics Papers No. 66, Goldman Sachs, New York, 2001.
Cardoso, and finally Brazil’s emergence as a “crafty superpower” under Lula. Cardoso is the key player here, with a series of “decisions” taken from 1994 on that put Brazil on track to becoming a great power. Roett’s book was clearly written for a policy audience largely ignorant of Brazil but intrigued by its sudden visibility and looking for insights into the country’s foreign policy outlook. Though systematic, it is not clear that it satisfies those needs. The book is extremely light on historical or statistical data; schematic and superficial in its analyses; and oblivious of current scholarly discussions and debates on Brazil’s economy, social policy, political system, or international relations. In particular, it completely ignores Brazilian scholarship and keeps the discussion strictly within the—very narrow—bounds of existing discussions in the mainstream Anglo-American media and think-tank establishment: aside from Goldman Sachs’s famous report on the BRIC countries, the narrative is based on articles from the Economist, the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Newsweek, while not a single Brazilian paper is even mentioned. When more substance is needed, the text relies on the latest edition of standard college textbooks on Brazil—Roett’s own in particular. Insofar as policy insights are concerned, the paternalism of Roett’s analysis of the limitations of Brazil’s rise is cringe inducing, for instance, when he quotes approvingly an article from the Economist that states blankly, “World domination . . . will not come to a place where 45 percent of the heads of poor families have less than a year’s schooling” (114), or when he points out, “Lula will need to understand that an increase in Brazil’s profile entails responsible global conduct” (148). The patronizing tone of such comments looks hardly justified in a book that readily accepts the military regime’s self-description of its dictatorship as a revolutionary experiment, or in which one “learns,” against existing evidence, that Brazil has made significant progress on poverty but not on inequality (2), that Japan was “rising” in the 1990s (5), or that Hugo Chávez’s Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestro América was “based on the EU model” (163n2). Even from the standpoint of the Washington audience that Roett appears to be writing for, one wonders how useful it is to understand Brazil’s position in the 2008 Honduran crisis, or in the current debate on Iran’s nuclear program, as signs that the country may not be “prepared for a global role” (146). Maturity, unfortunately, has never been much of a condition for the exercise of power in the world, and one would have expected deeper insights and less judgmental decrees from one of the world’s best-known Brazilianists. The book remains instructive: its hardly bearable lightness and the fact that Brookings published it testify to the continuing lack of serious interest in Brazilian affairs in Washington’s policy circles.

Larry Rohter’s attempt to explain the new Brazil to America stands on firmer ground and engages the country in a much more meaningful way. This is to be expected from the author, who was correspondent for the New York Times in Brazil for fourteen years (1977–1982 and 1999–2008) and, as such, is a well-connected, well-informed, and hugely influential interpreter of its social, economic, and political dynamics. Much of the book is devoted to a portrait of the country’s society and culture and of the extent to which these have changed over the past forty years. Rohter’s focus then moves to the economy, with an engaging overview of the country’s industrial sector but especially of its huge riches and potential in
agriculture, resources, and now energy. While the author considers that Brazil is on the rise, as the title makes clear, his analysis shows that for him what underlies the process is its domestic transformation. It is thus without surprise that a single chapter at the end of the book (“Becoming a ‘Serious Country’”) is devoted to Brazil’s foreign relations.

Rohter’s critical tone is at times bracing. He doesn’t shy from attacking the country’s sacred cows and dirty secrets or its elites’ insecurities, from the myth of racial democracy—admittedly a dead horse, if the reader will forgive the mixed metaphors—and the nationalists’ paranoia about the Amazon to the generalized use of servants by the middle class, which only massive social and economic inequalities makes possible, as well as what he sees as a national “inferiority complex” (6). At the same time, his critiques would be more compelling if his story were not marred by a peculiar theory of cultural and historical determinism, a casual attitude toward intellectual property, and sometimes glaring mistakes of fact.

Rohter’s analysis gives much emphasis to cultural determinants, and he repeatedly associates current attitudes and practices with colonial legacies. Brazil’s ethos is attributed to a “unique mix of European, African and Indigenous” cultures (41) and the “autonomist” mentality of Northeast politicians traced to the sixteenth-century *capitania* system (13). The corruption that plagues today’s government practices has its roots in Tomé de Souza’s mid-1500s “bureaucratic retinue” (16), and many of Brazil’s destructive environmental practices trace their origin to Portugal’s own disastrous environmental record (14). In his analysis of everyday cultural practices, from the *jogo de cintura*, *malandragem*, and the *jeitinho* to *você sabe com quem esta falando*, Rohter’s discussion (34–43) is derivative of Roberto DaMatta’s rich and subtle analysis.6 When he is on his own, Rohter’s ultimate thinness on the cultural issues he gives so much weight to becomes especially glaring, for instance when he uses the demeaning term *macumba* to designate some Afro-Brazilian religions (45), or when he conflates the Afro-Brazilian hero Zumbi with the Palmares *quilombo* where he died (69). The fact that he misses the negative connotation of *povão* when he applies it to Lula (252) is another window into his skewed and surprisingly superficial reading of Brazilian society.

Rohter’s treatment of economic and political matters is tighter. Still, the fact that he misses the country’s rapid deindustrialization since 1990—speaking instead, against all evidence, of its “booming industry” (157)—and that he presents its hyperinflation episode of the 1990s as more severe than Weimar’s or Zimbabwe’s (141) also raises doubts about his grasp of those issues. In the end, his chapter on foreign policy is probably the best of the whole book, with a ruthless deconstruction of the tensions between domestic policies and external stands (“talking Left abroad and acting right at home,” 233), of the vanity of its submarine acquisition plan and of the country’s aggressive campaign to get a seat at the UN Security Council as the “triumph of ambition and ideology over common sense.” Still,

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6. Compare Rohter’s treatment with chapter 7 in Roberto DaMatta, *O que faz o brasil, Brasil?* (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1984). While Rohter mentions DaMatta en passant, and norms in journalism do differ, as an academic publisher, Palgrave Macmillan could perhaps have been more careful before giving its imprimatur to such cavalier intellectual borrowing.
though it provides a good antidote to the starry-eyed tone of much media coverage of Brazil’s growing international influence, this chapter offers little detailed analysis of an emergence in world affairs that is a central component of the country’s rise.

Antônio Carlos Lessa and Denis Rolland’s massive two-volume collection intends precisely to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of Brazilian foreign policy in all its dimensions. With thirty-three chapters (twenty of them in French) by a large and diverse group of authors, several original documents (in English), and a statistical section, the product looks commensurate with the ambition. Its chapters cover the country’s security and defense policies; its trade; environmental and even futebol diplomacy; Brazil’s engagement in global multilateral institutions; the weight of presidential diplomacy under Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; and relations with the United States, China, India, France, the European Union, and Africa, as well as Argentina, Mercosul (Mercado Comum do Sul) as a bloc, and Latin America more broadly. Unfortunately, as a result of significant overlap between chapters, poor organization of the various contributions, very light use of both statistical and documentary empirical data, sometimes shoddy translation from Portuguese to English, and editorial leniency toward weaker contributions, the result is a bit disappointing, especially the first volume. Nonetheless, the collection is a valuable addition to any Latin American research library, given the quality of a number of the chapters, the sheer range of issues covered, and the fact that the book includes several contributions in English by influential Brazilian foreign policy specialists—such as Amado Luis Cervo and Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini—whose published work is almost all in Portuguese.

While eclectic overall, the collection is dominated by three overlapping themes: Brazil’s growing influence in the world as a whole and its emergence as an influential player on all the continents—except perhaps in Asia—and in almost every major global institution; the essentially benign and overdue nature of the country’s rise, framed almost invariably as an assertion of autonomy rather than power; and finally, the diversification of the country’s foreign relations, mostly away from the United States and toward South America and especially other emerging powers in Africa and Asia.

Brazilian foreign policy is generally framed here as a problem of international “insertion” whose rationale derives from the requirements of the country’s development (Visentini and André Luiz Reis da Silva, vol. 1). Those requirements, in the new century, impose a strategy of deeper engagement and of differentiation, as Brazil’s economy becomes more open and globalized, as the relative weight of the country’s traditional partners declines, and as new regional and global players gain ground. These changes also call for significant rearrangements of the institutional architecture of global governance, in which those new players, Brazil prominent among them, must have a greater weight, in the name of efficiency but also of “reciprocity” (Cervo, Hervé Théry, Visentini and Reis da Silva, Vigevani and Cepaluni, and Lessa, all in vol. 1). Fault lines among these analyses lie in their distinct assessments of the degree of continuity between the Cardoso
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(1995–2003) and the Lula administrations (2003–2011) and of the soundness and relative success of their strategies. Some see a continuous “quest for autonomy” whose specifics vary along with changes in the country’s environment (Vigevani and Cepaluni), whereas others (Cervo; Visentini and Reis da Silva) consider that Cardoso’s bet on a closer relationship with the United States and his embrace of neoliberal globalization were simply misguided and inconsistent with the country’s interests. For them, Lula’s much more aggressive turn to the South and his more progressive stances represent a welcome break from his predecessor’s more open attitude to traditional Western powers. This generally positive assessment of Lula’s policy is challenged in a whole section devoted to “critical interpretations” (1:199–283). Paulo Roberto de Almeida—Itamaraty’s foremost “detached intellectual”—proposes a sharp, if slightly sloppy, assessment of Lula’s diplomacy, arguing in particular that the latter’s efforts have failed to build a tighter South American community around Mercosul; to expand alliances in the global South; or to leverage the whole to gain influence and status, particularly at the United Nations (1:249–259). Argemiro Procópio takes a much shriller stand, linking the country’s foreign policy to its deep domestic inequities, to denounce what he calls the “legend” of Lula’s diplomacy (1:261–282).

The second volume collects much more narrowly focused chapters organized around the Western Hemisphere; Europe; Brazil’s southern diplomacy; the country’s economic “insertion”; and new areas of diplomacy, including sports, culture, and the environment. The discussion of the relationship with Argentina and of South American integration (Carlos Eduardo Vidigal; and Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros and Maria Isabel Meunier Ferraz, vol. 2) provides the substance that was lacking in Almeida’s argument and confirms his pessimistic stance. Daniel van Eeuwen’s systematic overview of Brazil–United States relations is comprehensive, if devoid of novelty, except in his clever characterization of the relationship as hovering between “conflictual bipolarity” and “cordial rivalry,” both—especially the latter—useful ways to capture the ambiguity that has dominated the relationship between the two giants, especially since Lula’s election in 2002. The three chapters on economic insertion (Renato Baumann; Carlos Quenan and Daniela Ordóñez; and Enrique Ventura) are possibly the best of the whole collection, with very measured and well-documented assessments of an evolution whose management confronts lots of uncertainty and quite a few risks.

DIVERSIFICATION OF BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY

Since at least the beginning of the twenty-first century, Brazil’s relationship with the United States has been the central preoccupation of its foreign policy, and the importance of the current policy shift lies precisely in the extent to which new partnerships and rivalries displace the United States from that position. Joseph Smith’s compact but comprehensive tome provides the reader with a clear, system-

atic, and illuminating overview of the bilateral relationship, from the beginning of the 1800s to the end of the military regime, with a brief discussion of the transition to democracy, and a very short epilogue on what Lula’s 2002 election could imply. The book contains no historical revelation, and it is mostly written from the perspective of the United States. It relies mainly on US primary and secondary material, though secondary sources from Brazil are also referenced. Nonetheless, revisiting that history reminds one of the complexity of an evolution that has seen sharp convergence, as in Brazil’s vocal support for the Monroe Doctrine, but also much tenser moments, for instance when the military regime “secretly sought to develop nuclear weapons” (180). Such extreme moments, however, have proved exceptional, and while neither long-term alignment nor full confrontation have ever been in the cards, cooperation and a shared perception of overlapping strategic interests have made for a fluid and pragmatic, if scarcely ever warm, relationship. Perhaps more striking, however, is the persistence of some themes, in particular the constant ups and downs of US interest, with Smith’s evocation of the sudden “rediscovery” of Latin America on the eve of World War I (72) echoing contemporary complaints of US inconsistencies toward Brazil and Latin America more generally. Brazil’s unsuccessful quest for formal international recognition is another nagging continuity: to read that by the end of World War I, according to an American diplomat, “the securing of permanent status [on the League of Nations Council] soon became ‘the principal aspiration’ of Itamaraty” (86), and that Spanish-American nations proposed instead rotating seats (87), almost makes for too sharp a parallel with Brazil’s current inability to secure the region’s support in its quest to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni broaden the story to Brazil’s whole foreign policy, taking it from the José Sarney government at the end of the military regime to the middle of Lula’s second mandate. Their analysis is tightly organized around the proposition that Brazilian foreign policy should be understood as a continuous quest for autonomy whose complexion varies according to the “insertion strategies” (52) that successive governments adopt to bring it about. Brazil sought autonomy through distance, participation, and diversification. The first strategy—autonomy through distance—was characterized by defensive economic policies centered on import substitution industrialization and a general reluctance to engage the world. This period began in the 1930s and included the entire military period but for the brief rule of Castelo Branco. It ended with the neoliberal reforms of Fernando Collor de Mello, although the country’s economic and political tribulations prevented deployment of a new strategy of insertion until Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s election in 1994. Autonomy through participation, as Itamaraty’s Gelson Fonseca called Brazil’s proactive approach, would dominate the foreign policy outlook of the country until the end of the Cardoso administration. During that period, Brazil embraced the global liberal game and

its values (54), privatizing state enterprises and further opening up its economy, signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and trying to shape global governance by engaging dominant Western powers, especially the United States. The benefits of this engagement, however, failed to materialize, as Western powers refused to compromise on trade or to release their exclusive grip on global governance.

At the turn of the century, the international environment evolved quickly, and Brazil’s bet on developed countries lost its appeal. Russia found its footing; China, and soon Asia as a whole, fully developed into an alternative and much more dynamic pole of economic growth; and, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States increasingly flouted international institutions. This laid the ground for a strategy that broadened the range of Brazil’s foreign policy options and more directly challenged tired global governance structures dominated by Western powers. Vigevani and Cepaluni argue that such a strategy of autonomy through diversification has characterized Brazilian foreign policy since Lula’s election in 2002. Building on initiatives that had often started under Cardoso, and without breaking with rich countries, the new administration deepened its ties with so-called emerging economies and openly made the development of South-South linkages a central component of its foreign policy. Lula became an international star, and Brazilian activism—usually through effective coalition building, especially among developing countries—became a staple of international negotiations, in trade and beyond.

On this broad canvas, Vigevani and Cepaluni deploy a detailed analysis of two decades of Brazilian foreign policy, giving pride of place to the country’s relations with its South American neighbors, particularly Argentina; to Mercosul, which was a crucial plank of Brazil’s policy through much of the period; to trade issues that dominated its international agenda, notably those related to the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round as well as (ultimately unsuccessful) negotiations toward the Free Trade Area of the Americas; and to Brazil’s relationship with the United States, which has been the main point of reference in the country’s quest for autonomy. Their compelling and well-documented analysis fits very well with the “quest for autonomy” framework, which may be why their reading of the country’s foreign policy since World War II is quickly developing into the standard narrative for the period as a whole.

One of the most intriguing planks of Brazil’s diversification strategy is certainly the IBAS—for “India, Brasil, Africa do Sul”—initiative launched in 2003, which established a partnership among the previously little connected southern powers Brazil, India, and South Africa. Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst, longtime analysts of Brazilian foreign policy, propose a collection that looks at the determinants, meaning, potential, and scope of that partnership. The book is somewhat eclectic, with chapters on police oversight, security policy, information and communication technologies, and multilateral diplomacy. In addition, Lima and Hirst, in the introductory chapter, and Hirst alone, in the concluding one, propose conceptual analyses of the meaning and implications of these new players’ emergence in the world and of the role that middle-income countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and India play in South-South cooperation.
The introduction concisely outlines the peculiarities and potential of the endeavor, with Lima and Hirst showing how, in bringing together developing countries that are also democracies and regional powers, IBAS breaks from the Cold War “third worldism” of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. The limited economic interdependence among the three countries and their sometimes divergent outlooks are felt to be less important than the complementarity of their interests with regard to the redefinition of global governance, from the mechanics of the multilateral trade regime to the reform of the UN Security Council. The analysis finds great potential for cooperation in the similarity of the three countries’ quests for autonomy in the context of continuing vulnerabilities and internal contradictions, and in their complex relationships with their respective regions, characterized as ranging between indifference and “hegemonic predisposition” (17). Contributors lend support to that thesis in chapters on each country’s position in its respective “security complex” (Marco Cepik), on the limited convergence of their substantive positions on trade issues (Amâncio Jorge Silva Nunes de Oliveira), on the constraints that the remaining differences impose on potential alliances (Janina Onuki and Oliveira), and on the extent to which the growing presence of middle-income countries in the global aid regime is changing its political dynamics and even its nature (Hirst).

Sean Burges’s book is at once more modest in scope than the aforementioned overviews of Brazil’s broader engagement in the world, and significantly more ambitious. While purporting to cover the whole post–Cold War period, it is largely a study of Brazilian foreign policy during the Cardoso administration, though the book includes a chapter on the first Lula presidency. Burges focuses essentially on the country’s relations with its South American neighbors, primarily Mercosul. It is probably the best treatment of that relatively short period currently available. Going beyond a simple, if detailed, discussion of that policy, Burges proposes a sophisticated interpretation of the type of regional leadership that Brazil has exerted during that period, which he calls “consensual hegemony” (building on neo-Gramscian political economy). Imposed on policy makers by Brazil’s lack of means to realize their regional leadership ambitions, but also by their inability to openly identify their country as a regional power, consensual hegemony works through the “teacher-student” dialectic first theorized by Antonio Gramsci (49). On the basis of extensive interviews with diplomats, the consultation of archival material, and a very thorough knowledge of the secondary literature, both in Brazil and outside, Burges examines the way in which that hegemony plays out in Brazilian ideas and discourses about Brazil itself and about the region, and in Brazil’s economic relations and security policy.

Burges’s project is extremely interesting because it addresses a question that keeps nagging students of global politics: why it is that, unlike Germany, South Africa, India, China, Egypt, and even Uganda and Rwanda, South America’s giant has never seriously tried to dominate its region, preferring to lead timidly and to hide behind weak and mildly constraining institutional arrangements. His answer, however, is extremely counterintuitive. Burges argues that Brazil has been exerting effective though “quiet” (12) regional leadership and in fact hegemony,
albeit without admitting it, even to itself, and especially without its neighbors’
even realizing it. To this reader at least, his demonstration falls short. The lack of
means for regional domination and above all the absence in Brazil of a felt need
for it, the constraints this imposes on Brazil’s abstract regional leadership ambi-
tions, and the timidity of its foreign policy establishment regarding the expres-
sion of those ambitions are all very well substantiated. Burges’s examination of
the often-limited success of Brazil’s initiatives and of the frequent resistance that
they meet from sometimes insignificant neighbors suggests, however, that Brazil
exerts no hegemony at all in the region. What regional cooperation Burges shows
to be happening, moreover, looks decidedly consensual. The story he tells, in the
end, reads like the tale of a country where foreign policy doesn’t matter much and
does not justify the investment that effective regional dominance would call for,
or the opprobrium that would come with overt claims of leadership.

The picture of hesitancy that one draws from Burges’s analysis could be dated
and may just have been the expression of a time of transition during which Bra-
zilian foreign policy was still finding its footing. This is certainly the picture that emerges from Amaury de Souza’s assessment of Brazil’s international agenda
though the eyes of Brazil’s “foreign policy community” (151). Souza’s book pres-
ents the results of an extensive survey done in 2008 under the aegis of the Centro
Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI), a private and independent think
tank based in Rio de Janeiro, and compares them to those of a previous one he had
done in 2001, also for CEBRI. Souza argues that the semistructured interviews
that were done with 100 specifically chosen individuals in 2001, and 150 in 2008,
enable him to draw an accurate portrait of the perceptions of the country’s role
and interests in the world that matter for its policy process. While such a sam-
ping method can be criticized, a review of the full list of participants—which is
included in the book—suggests to this reader that his study covers indeed most
of the people likely to engage in informed debates about the country’s foreign
policy.

Souza’s detailed results and the comparison he draws between the two sur-
veys make for fascinating reading. Some of the new consensus areas he iden-
tifies are relatively obvious: Brazil’s rising influence in the world and the need
for an even deeper engagement; the central place of the United States, Argent-
ina, and China among Brazil’s geostrategic priorities; the falling importance of
Europe and Japan (a situation that would probably be even more severe today
than in 2008) and the increasing relevance of immediate neighbors like Bolivia,
Colombia, and Venezuela; and the critical importance of global warming, drug
trafficking, and trade protection in rich countries. The consensus on the need for
all countries, not just developed ones, to limit greenhouse-gas emissions is quite
startling given the limited support such a view finds among other emerging pow-
ers. In addition, given constant tensions with Argentina and little progress on
the regional integration front between the two surveys, the broad agreement on
the consolidation of Mercosul and in favor of stronger efforts to integrate trade,
energy, transportation, and communication networks throughout South America,
identified as a priority in both surveys, is perhaps even more surprising. How-
ever, the fact that there is a clear division (143) in the scope of such integration and strong disagreements on the direction to be given to Mercosul—between a fuller union and a simple free trade area—points in fact to the decay, “forte desgaste” (144), of the project. The strongest tensions within the foreign policy establishment revolve around economic and trade policy. A liberal faction confronts more autonomist coalitions for whom a regional project should be given greater importance, whether as a stepping-stone to a broader international insertion or as an end in itself, and “postliberals” for whom the country’s bet on global markets has been a failure. The most intriguing insights are probably found in chapter 7, which documents a broadly shared perception of lack of interest on the part of the public, of a Foreign Ministry largely isolated from interest groups, and of a Congress whose role is—and should be—limited to ratifying a policy defined by the executive branch. Elite perceptions, in other words, bear out Souza’s project, as the foreign policy game is shown to remain the preserve of the few, but policy makers’ responses also suggest that the game’s scope is strongly constrained by domestic debates about the directions of economic policy.

CONCLUSION

Most of the works reviewed here rely on the speeches, secondary literature, and mainstream media sources that are the bread and butter of “conjunctural” foreign policy analysis. Little new material is brought to bear, with the notable exceptions of Souza’s surveys; Oliveira and colleagues’ analysis in Lima and Hirst of the trade positions of Brazil, India, and South Africa; and Burges’s relatively extensive use of interviews and primary material. On the theoretical front, Burges’s “consensual hegemony,” Vigevani and Cepaluni’s typology of strategies of autonomy (through distance, participation, and diversification), and Lima and Hirst’s musings about the specificities of “emerging powers” and “middle-income countries” break the largely descriptive mold in which much recent scholarship on Brazilian foreign policy is caught, and try to engage broader conceptual debates. Burges’s political economy, from which a square consideration of domination is absent, makes, however, for a strangely emasculated neo-Gramscianism, and its internal consistency, as a result, looks a bit shaky. Lima and Hirst’s ponderings about the strange animals that emerging countries like Brazil represent read at times like muddling through, but to the extent that dominant theories of international relations provide few insights into the behavior of noncentral states, their tentativeness may be perfectly justified. Vigevani and Cepaluni, finally, have come up with a clever theory of Brazilian foreign policy, but it remains to be seen whether their insights can usefully be exported. Now, while still either overspecific or poorly specified, these theories of Brazilian foreign policy lay the groundwork for analytical frameworks that focus neither on large powers nor on Western middle powers, but instead on the peculiar behavior of those states like Brazil, India, and South Africa whose emergence is changing global politics in novel ways.

The books reviewed here show clearly that, along with Brazil’s emergence as
a significant player in world affairs, scholarship on its foreign policy is coming of age, mostly through the works and analyses of Brazil's own scholars. The next installment of any major collection on Brazil will need to include a chapter on its foreign policy written by a Brazilian or at the very least grounded in intimate knowledge of Brazilian writings. Even more than bad form, doing otherwise would be bad science.