
RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES

THE ROLE OF DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE AND EXTORTION IN PROMOTING MEXICAN MIGRATION Unexpected Consequences of a Drug War

Viridiana Rios Contreras
Harvard University

Abstract: Mexican immigration figures have reached their lowest point since 2000. Yet, even if as a whole the United States is receiving fewer Mexican migrants, the opposite is true for cities at the border. In this article, I present evidence to show that this sui generis migration pattern cannot be understood using traditional explanations of migration dynamics. Instead, Mexicans are migrating because of security issues, in fear of drug-related violence and extortion that has spiked since 2008. I provide the first estimate of this migration pattern, showing that 264,692 Mexicans have migrated in fear of organized crime activities. In doing so, I combine the literature on migration dynamics with that on violence and crime, pointing toward ways in which nonstate actors shape actions of state members.

Mexican immigration to the United States has diminished steadily since 2000 (MMP 2009). With figures dropping from an estimated 525 thousand Mexicans yearly leaving their country for the United States to fewer than 100 thousand, current migration figures are the lowest on record (Sheridan 2011; Cave 2011). Among the main reasons behind this trend are changes in Mexico's demographic profile (Terrazas, Papademetriou, and Rosenblum 2011), an increase in the number of Mexicans earning college degrees (Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007; Orrenius and Zavodny 2005), a constant increase in the costs associated with crossing the border (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003; Orrenius 2004, Cornelius and Lewis 2006;

MMP 2009), and the recession that the US economy has been facing since late 2007 (Papademetriou, Sumpston, and Terrazas 2011).

Even if the United States as a whole has experienced a decrease in the number of Mexican immigrants, the opposite seems to be true for US cities located at the border. Preliminary figures estimate that about 115,000 Mexicans have arrived in US border cities since 2006 (IDCM 2010; Rice 2011). El Paso, for example, grew by 50,000 inhabitants from 2009 to 2011, and at least 30,000 of those new inhabitants were Mexicans moving from Ciudad Juárez (Alvarado 2011).

To understand this phenomenon, I bring together the literature of migration dynamics (Massey and Taylor 2004) with studies of crime, security, and violence (Di Tella, Edwards, and Schargrotsky 2010). I claim that to fully understand the dynamics of migration from Mexico to the United States and within Mexico, we need to broaden our analysis of the factors that we normally analyze as part of traditional immigration literature, such as economic hardship, network analysis, or labor dynamics (Massey et al. 1998; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Massey and Taylor 2004).

As cumulative causation theory improved our understanding of migration patterns by pointing toward the importance of social ties in shaping individual decisions to relocate (Massey 1990)—a variable that had been overlooked by scholars from the new economics, neoclassical economics, and labor market theories (Todaro and Maruszko 1987; Harris and Torado 1970; Piore 1979)—this article argues that to complement the various competing theories that explain migration, academics should bring attention to how security environments affect relocation. In particular, I argue that drug-related violence and organized crime activities are affecting migration dynamics in Mexico. An important number of Mexicans are relocating to the United States, and to other cities within their country, to escape drug-related homicides and criminal activity that has spiked since 2008. In advancing this argument, I also speak to broader political science theories that have tried to assess the impact that nonstate actors have on shaping the decisions of state members in fundamental areas such as the allocation of human capital and resources within a polity.

I first present an overview of Mexico's security situation. A second section explores migration outflows at the border and within Mexico and shows why Mexicans living in border towns seem to be particularly inclined toward migrating. The third and fourth sections show my statistical results. I estimate that a total of 264,692 Mexicans have changed residency in direct response to drug-related homicides. A fifth section provides qualitative evidence of migration outflows.

MEXICO'S DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE

Fear has become part of our lives. . . . There's panic. We don't know when the shooting is going to break out.

Tijuana citizen, quoted in Marc Lacey, "Hospitals Now a Theater in Mexico's Drug War"

Mexico's homicide rates have increased every year since 2006 as a result of increases in territorial fights between drug cartels and changes in Mexico's security

policies (Dell 2011; Castillo, Mejia, and Restrepo 2012; Rios 2013b). From December 2006 to 2010, 34,550 killings were officially linked to organized crime, a dramatic increase from previous years (2000–2006), when only 8,901 killings were linked to organized crime (Rios and Shirk 2010). Most drug-related homicides concentrate at border cities, because the most profitable part of the drug-trafficking business chain occurs at US-Mexico crossing points (see figure 1). During the 2006–2010 period, the six Mexican states located at the US-Mexico border accounted for 47.81 percent of all drug-related murders despite containing just 17.62 percent of Mexico's population. Approximately 30.04 percent of all drug-related homicides occurred in 39 border municipalities, which represent less than 1 percent of the roughly 2,450 municipalities in Mexico and just 6.06 percent of the country's population.

Drug-related homicides within Mexico have not only increased but changed in nature. Different than in years prior to 2004, government authorities are increasingly targeted by traffickers (Freeman 2006). In border cities like Tijuana, at least 100 policemen died on duty every year from 2007 to 2009 (Guerrero 2009).¹ To put this in perspective, in the entire United States 133 police officers were killed in the line of duty in 2008. The same period saw the chief of police in Nuevo Laredo, south of Texas, lasting eight hours in the position before being assassinated by traffickers. Traffickers have also created new ways to spread fear among the population. Bodies are left in the streets with messages targeted at other citizens, politicians, or fellow criminals.

Furthermore, criminal organizations have diversified their activities, getting into alternative illegal businesses, and expanded their areas of operation (Diaz Cayeros et al. 2011; Coscia and Rios 2012; Rios 2013a). Extortion is perhaps the most widespread of these new criminal ventures. Criminals initially used extortion to target illegal businesses such as prostitution rings and casinos, industries in which the probability of being denounced to the police by the owner was exceedingly low. However, the extortion of businesses soon extended into the legal sphere and became traffickers' most accessible means of quickly acquiring cash. It has deeply affected business dynamics. High protection fees and intimidation have forced businesses into bankruptcy and have pushed some businessman to take radical action such as creating violent organizations for self-defense.

UNEXPECTED MIGRATION OUTFLOWS IN MEXICO

From 2006 to 2010, some Mexican cities started depopulating unexpectedly. As a result, the usual general predictors of population trends, which have previously been quite successful in predicting the yearly population in Mexican counties (Partida Bush 2008), are producing higher than normal prediction errors.²

1. Tijuana is a border town located south of San Diego, California. During 2008, it saw 614 drug-related homicides, a rate of about 43.72 per 100,000 inhabitants, more than non-drug-related homicides, which caused only 20.46 casualties per 100,000.

2. Mexican authorities have developed quite sophisticated methodologies to predict migration trends due to the important role that population flows, particularly migration to the United States, play in determining demand for public services.

Unexpected migration outflows have been particularly prominent in areas located on the US-Mexico border, probably because acquiring US residency is relatively easy there (table 1). While Mexican border cities tended to lose inhabitants unexpectedly (an average of 35,255), counties not on the border tended to gain inhabitants (an average of 1,297.86). The tendency is less strong when considering all border counties (independently of whether or not they are urban or rural), yet even here an average about 8,103.63 people left unexpectedly.

When considering all Mexican cities, among those experiencing the largest unexpected population outflows are important border cities. Juárez lost 150.36 thousand inhabitants, about 11 percent of its population, between 2006 and 2010. Other cities with high violence levels have lost population during the same period, like Tijuana (6 percent), Reynosa (9 percent), and Matamoros (4 percent) (Partida Bush 2008; INEGI 2010).³ Cities like Práxedes G. Guerrero, Mier, and Guadalupe have faced unexpected outflows of more than 25 percent of their whole population (Partida Bush 2008; INEGI 2010).

It is impossible to know where these people relocated, but preliminary figures agree that at least half of them moved to the United States (IDMC 2010; Rice 2011). Particularly, for middle- and upper-class Mexicans living on the border, migration to the United States feels like the natural choice when a change of residency is being planned. For many of them it is just like moving from one neighborhood to another within the same city, or, as one citizen described it, "moving to the American side of the city." Inhabitants commonly refer to border cities using their Mexican or American names almost interchangeably. As the mayor of Laredo said, "We are inhabitants of Laredos," referring to Laredo, Texas, and Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas; "The border does not divide our policies or families."⁴

Other Mexicans have surely relocated within Mexico. Indeed, some cities, particularly Acapulco, Chimalhuacán, and Tlajomulco have experienced unexpected migration inflows. Tlajomulco, for example, grew about 30 percent more than population predictions had accounted for; Juárez (Nuevo León) and Bahía de Banderas also grew by more than 18 percent from 2006 to 2010.

In the following section I present empirical evidence linking Mexican migration outflows to drug-related violence and organized crime activities.

EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS

As my main specification I used a linear regression model whose dependent variable is the number of Mexicans within a county that unexpectedly left that county from 2006 to 2010, or what I call unexpected migration outflows. The unit of analysis is the county. There are a total of approximately 2.5 thousand observations, one observation per county. All figures were scaled to represent rates per 100,000 inhabitants. To measure unexpected migration outflows I subtract popula-

3. Reynosa is a Mexican border city located south of Texas with drug-related homicide rates of about 26.18 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010.

4. Ramón Garza Barrios, mayor of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, interviewed in June 2009 at Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico.




Figure 1 Errors in official population predictions from 2005 to 2010. Each point represents one of the 2,450 Mexican municipalities. The y axis measures the population (per 100,000 county inhabitants) that was incorrectly predicted from 2005 to 2010; the x axis does the same for the period 2000–2005. Positive [negative] numbers refer to municipalities where predictions calculated more [less] population than actual.

tion predictions for 2010 (calculated using variables measured in 2005 to predict the number of people that would be living in a particular county in 2010; Partida Bush 2008) minus real population figures (according to the 2010 census; INEGI 2010).⁵

This research project was made possible because of mistakes made by Mexico's National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Población, CONAPO). Every year, CONAPO predicts county-level population figures considering demographic and economic variables. Given how important migration outflows to the United States are as predictors of population figures, CONAPO uses very sophisticated methods to predict the total number of Mexicans that will change their residency to the United States.⁶ The predictions take into account economic conditions in both Mexico and the United States, surveys, polls, previous census figures, and panel studies. Every five years, when a census is conducted in Mexico, CONAPO predictions can then be checked for accuracy. The predictions are normally quite good. However, as figure 1 shows, official predictions in 2010 were particularly

5. Only positive cases were considered (i.e., migration outflows) because the goal of this article is to identify variables that are correlated with people leaving their counties, not with people arriving to new counties. Decisions over exiting a county (outflow) and picking a new one (entry) may not necessarily follow the same logic. The former is the only concern of this article. Models considering positive and negative values (also called "migration flows") were calculated as alternative specifications and provided similar (although weaker) results than those presented here.

6. Predictions are based on the algorithms developed by Bean and colleagues (2001) and Corona and Tuirán (2006) using Mexican and US Census figures (1950–2005), the Current Population Survey (1990–2005), and the American Community Survey (2002–2005). For more details on the specification see Partida Bush (2008).

inaccurate. The graph shows each county according to the size of the population that was incorrectly predicted for two periods, from 2000 to 2005 and from 2005 to 2010. Positive (or negative) numbers refer to municipalities where predictions calculated more (or less) population than actual. While in 2005 most of the observations are close to zero, meaning predictions were accurate; the dispersion of the 2010 figures is much larger. In 2005, official statistics failed to predict the migration of 866 thousand Mexicans, in 2010 they failed by 2,394 thousand, an error 176 percent higher.

In my main specification, I compare CONAPO predictions for 2010 to census figures in 2010 to capture population outflows that could not be predicted even while accounting for changes in economic or demographic conditions in Mexico and the United States. The level of analysis is the municipality. I called my dependent variable *unexpected outflows* and defined it as the number of individuals (per 100,000 inhabitants) that CONAPO predicted would live in a municipality and yet the census showed were not there. Unexpected outflows are larger when CONAPO predicted more people will be living in a county than the census captured.

In every specification, I added a control to account for other unmeasurable factors driving possible errors in CONAPO's prediction. I created a proxy variable for *expected CONAPO errors* by measuring the error that CONAPO made in its previous predictions. I used the estimation errors that CONAPO made in the second-to-last census year (INEGI 2005) because I expect 2010 municipalities to be more similar to what they were in 2005 than to any more distant census year. The logic behind this proxy is to control for counties that have proven to be difficult to estimate for CONAPO. Some counties may have inherent characteristics that make their population figures more variable and thus highly susceptible to incorrect estimation.

As my independent variables, I used measures of three of the most common types of organized crime violence in Mexico: homicides linked to drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping. These variables quantified as the total incidence of these crimes per county, per 100,000 inhabitants, for years between censuses (i.e., 2006 to 2009). Drug-related homicide figures come from Mexico's National Security Council (2011), an institution that counts the number of homicides related to activities of criminal organizations and provides monthly figures per county from December 2006 until December 2010.⁷ Kidnapping and extortion figures were obtained from state-level Mexican offices of the general attorney (INEGI 2009).

To control for social and economic factors that may have generated unexpected economic conditions within Mexico (which could have changed migration patterns more than CONAPO could have predicted) I added two sets of controls: employment and education figures. Academic research indicates that these two variables are among the most important drivers of migration (Massey et al. 1998). Particularly, research shows that a higher number of college graduates is an important deterrent of migration to the United States and an enhancer of migration

7. Mexican authorities follow strict procedures to identify whether a homicide is related to organized crime according to the characteristics of the event as well as intelligence reports. For more information, refer to Rios and Shirk (2010).

within Mexico from rural to urban areas (MMP 2009). Higher levels of employment normally translate to less migration (Tuirán, Partida, and Avila 2000a, 2000b).

A common dummy for each of the thirty-nine Mexican counties located right at the border was added. The intention is to capture, in a very indirect way, the ease of migration decisions. The assumption is that any factor increasing migration willingness among Mexicans will have an increased effect on border counties, where migration costs are lower with respect to the rest of the country. An alternative specification also added a common dummy for each of the five border states.

Finally, as part of robustness tests, extra controls and specifications were tested. An alternative specification adds figures of general homicides not related to organized crime as assessed by INEGI (2009) to account for the effects that other forms of violence may have had in driving migration. State-fixed effects (thirty-two, one per Mexican state) were also added.⁸

General descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables are presented in table 1.

PRINCIPAL RESULTS

The results, given in table 2, strongly support my hypothesis. Migration outflows are higher in places with higher drug-related violence and crime, even accounting for factors such as employment and human capital. Several models were specified.

Model 1 presents results without controlling for non-drug-related homicides, while models 2 and 3 control for them. Controlling for non-drug-related homicides does not change the results but improves the fit of the models. Drug-related violence is strongly linked to migration outflows, independent of the general homicide rate in a county. Furthermore, in every specification the coefficients of drug-related homicides are larger than those of general homicides, which confirms my hypothesis that Mexicans are making the decision to migrate based on organized crime activities rather than on general security concerns. The reason why drug-related homicides are better predictors of migration outflows than general homicides may be that drug-related homicides are a newer phenomenon, not an important cause of homicides before 2004 (Rios and Shirk 2010), and leave a longer-lasting impression in the communities because of their particularly violent features. Unlike general homicides, the victims of drug-related homicides are tortured and beheaded and their bodies are dumped in the streets, hanged from pedestrian bridges, or displayed publicly next to messages directed to rival trafficking organizations.

Model 3 adds fixed effects per states to capture changes happening at the state level that may have influenced migration dynamics. For example, we should expect citizens living in states with publicly well-regarded justice systems to be less affected by drug-related violence even if the number of homicides is the same

8. I tested for weighted coefficients based on the inverse of their squared residuals. The use of weights did not change coefficients or standard errors meaningfully.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics

Dependent variable	Independent variables							
	Unexpected outflows	Drug-related homicides	Extortion	Kidnapping	Employment	College degrees	General homicides	Previous estimation error
Minimum	0	0	0	0	1,604.00	0	102	-20,760.00
Standard deviation	3,543.05	95.32	1.234	1.645	23,415.41	3,725.82	126,578.1	1,526.76
Mean	1,217.00	29.08	0.116	0.175	67,030.00	3,581.27	42,079.62	-1,560.00
Max	62,149.00	1,552.25	36.64	34.18	658,998.00	36,643.32	182,088	4,928.00

Note: All figures were standardized as rates per 100,000 inhabitants at the municipal level. The level of analysis is the municipality. Unexpected outflows are the number residents (per 100,000 inhabitants) of a municipality that Mexican population offices predicted would live in a community and yet census authorities failed to capture.

Table 2 Empirical results: Drug-related crime and immigration outflows

Dependent variable	Model 1 Outflows	Model 2 Outflows	Model 3 Outflows
Drug-related homicides	5.424* (2.325)	5.386* (2.331)	6.349* (2.64)
Extortion	12.416* (5.771)	12.215* (6.445)	13.031* (6.091)
Kidnapping	-1.636 (1.75)	-1.533 (1.677)	-2.188 (3.519)
Employment	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.021** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.008)
College degrees	-0.086*** (0.024)	-0.119*** (0.025)	-0.116*** (0.025)
Border county	2395.069* (1123.92)	1480.1 (1057.79)	1188.7 (1087.7)
Non-drug-related homicides		0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)
Fixed effects?	NO	NO	YES
Error correction	0.709*** (0.105)	0.704*** (0.104)	0.771*** (0.116)
Constant	3929.08*** (614.76)	3905.97*** (613.901)	2445.99** (788.03)

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficients.

Model 3 is the preferred identification. The dependent variable is the number of Mexicans unexpectedly leaving their county (outflows) (INEGI 2010, Partida Bush 2008). * $p \geq .001$; ** $p \geq .050$; *** $p \geq .100$

as in states where citizens are less confident of their governments. My goal is to show that outflows are correlated with organized crime activities, which is why model 3 is considered the preferred specification.

Indeed, in all specifications, drug-related homicides are an important factor in Mexican migration outflows. In my preferred specification (model 3), drug-related homicides increased the number of Mexicans unexpectedly migrating out of their counties of residence by 220,291.⁹ Each one-point increase in the rate of drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is correlated with 6.34 Mexicans fleeing their county of residence. As an example, consider the case of Tijuana. In the period from 2007 to 2008, its drug-related homicide rate changed by 31.04 points (from 176 to 614 drug-related homicides in just one year). If the results of

9. To transform the coefficients of my preferred specifications into actual number of immigrants, I calculated the value of the dependent variable (unexpected migration outflows) for each observation, setting each independent variable to its mean and assuming that the maximum of drug-related homicides and extortions had happened. I did the same, assuming that zero drug-related homicides and extortions had happened, and found the difference of these two figures. The results were relative figures measuring the population per 100,000 inhabitants that, *ceteris paribus*, the model would have predicted to migrate out of a county due to drug-related homicides and extortion. Considering population, the numbers were then transformed into absolute figures.

the model hold, an average of 5,367 Mexicans left Tijuana just during 2008 fleeing from drug-related homicides.

Other organized crime activities, particularly extortion, also have had important effects on migration outflows. In the preferred specification, every additional case of extortion per 100,000 inhabitants increases unexpected migration outflows by 13.03 per 100,000 inhabitants. That accounts for a total of 44,401 Mexicans relocating to escape extortion. Tijuana has lost about 926 citizens because of extortion; other border cities Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, and Juárez lost 286, 334, and 221 individuals, respectively. Kidnappings were not significantly correlated with migration outflows. This result is quite robust among all models and is consistent with what we would expect given the particularities of the victims of this crime. Kidnappers pick their victims according to their wealth, not location. Because kidnapping victims are hunted, migration does not change their attractiveness as targets.

Considering the forms of criminal violence that were found significant for migration, a total of 264,692 Mexicans fled their counties fearing either drug-related homicides (approximately 220 thousand) or extortion (approximately 44 thousand).

Traditional economic explanations of migration outflows take the expected signs and are significant in all outflows specifications. An increase of one point in employment rates or in the number of college degrees per 100,000 inhabitants reduces migration outflows by 0.01 and 0.11 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively.

Finally, all variables introduced to correct for CONAPO's error were strongly significant. Indeed, it seems as though CONAPO faces greater inherent problems in measuring population outflows in some places than in others. In general, places where CONAPO's 2005 predictions were upward biased (i.e., CONAPO predicted more people than the 2005 census) had the same upward bias in 2010. The relationship is 1 to 0.77 in the preferred specification, meaning an error of 1 in 2005 figures is correlated with an error of 0.77 in 2010 figures.¹⁰

THE NEW DRIVER OF MEXICO'S IMMIGRATION OUTFLOWS: SECURITY ISSUES

I know that we came here illegally, but at least we can sleep in peace now.

—Citizen of Juárez relocated in El Paso, quoted in Mariel Torres,
“Running from Violence, Young Student Finds Cultural Barriers in Her New Country”

The effect of violence in determining migration outflows is a well-studied phenomenon within political science research on Africa and in other civil war con-

10. The fact that drug-related violence is a predictor of unexpected migration outflows is an even more robust finding if we consider that CONAPO's 2010 population predictions assumed that migration outflows from Mexico to the United States will remain at least as high as those measured in 2000, which we now know was the highest point of Mexico-US migration to date (MMP 2009). Given unexpectedly harsh economic conditions in the United States, particularly in 2007 and 2008, CONAPO's predictions should be upward biased. In other words, CONAPO assumed US labor markets will remain as appealing for Mexicans as they were in 2000, which clearly was not the case with the 2007 crisis. The fact that, even with CONAPO's upward estimation bias, migration figures were underestimated in border towns strongly reinforces my hypothesis that other, noneconomic variables are being factored when taking migration decisions.

texts (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989; Morrison 1993). Most of these studies emphasize the role of violence in generating unexpected migration outflows and refugees.

However, until now Mexican migration outflows had never been understood in these terms, probably because prior to the current explosion of drug-related violence in Mexico, economic rather than political or social concerns drove most migration decisions (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003; Fussel 2011; Papademetriou, Sumption, and Terrazas 2011).

This article has provided evidence supporting the idea that gaining a more complete understanding of migration outflows within Mexico and between Mexico and the United States requires one to account for the literature on organized crime violence. Recent spikes in drug-related violence within Mexico have changed migration dynamics, adding a whole new dimension that considers well-being and security issues as a fundamental part of migration decisions.¹¹

Before the current article, the total number of Mexicans migrating as a result of drug-related criminal activities had not yet been scientifically counted. Some tentative figures had been given of about 230,000 Mexicans moving out of violent cities, 115,000 of them to relocate in the United States (IDMC 2010). Yet many claim that this number may be underestimated as it does not account for Mexicans who leave on a temporary basis, checking in at US hotels for short periods of time “to rest from the constant violence” (Corchado 2009). Other accounts claim 120,000 is the figure only for Juárez (Alvarado 2011). Overall, the accuracy of these figures remains doubtful as none of these sources explain their methodology.

Based in my own estimates, I claim drug-related homicides from 2006 to 2010 yielded a total displacement figure of 220,291 and extortion yielded 44,401 displacements, for a total of 264,692 Mexican drug-violence refugees. This figure accounts for all relocations both within Mexico (from violent to nonviolent cities) and from Mexico to the United States. Some cities though, particularly the most violent ones, seem to carry most of the burden. According to my estimates, Juárez alone has lost 40,993 drug-violence refugees; about 15.48 percent of all displacements in Mexico happened in this city that has just 1.26 percent of Mexico’s total population.

Table 3 presents my estimates of the number of drug-related refugees for the top ten municipalities with the largest number of refugees in real and per capita terms. The cities with the largest burden during 2006–2010 are Juárez, Culiacán, and Tijuana with 40.99, 12.4, and 11.37 thousand inhabitants respectively leaving unexpectedly (representing 0.31, 0.16 and 0.8 per million of the total population of these cities, respectively). In relative terms, the cities with the largest drug-related migration outflows are Guadalupe, Mier, and General Treviño with 0.9 inhabitants per million leaving unexpectedly because of security concerns. Figure 2 maps the distribution of drug-violence refugees in Mexico.

My estimate of 264,692 Mexican refugees of violence matches what ethnographic, journalistic, and public opinion accounts have been describing as a

11. See Alvarado and Massey (2010) for a similar attempt using Latin American countries as the level of analysis, and Lindley (2010) for a good literature review on the topic.

Table 3 The top ten municipalities with the largest number of drug-related refugees, and the top ten municipalities with the largest number of drug-related refugees per million inhabitants.

Municipality	Refugees	Refugees per million inhabitants
Juárez	40,994	0.31
Culiacán	12,407	0.16
Tijuana	11,372	0.08
Chihuahua	9,024	0.12
Acapulco	4,785	0.07
Torreón	3,798	0.07
Guadalajara	3,720	0.02
Gómez Palacio	3,533	0.12
Mazatlán	3,477	0.09
Nogales	3,001	0.16
Guadalupe	924	0.99
Mier	622	0.93
General Treviño	137	0.90
Sáric	211	0.84
Guerrero	301	0.76
Matamoros	258	0.59
Doctor Coss	101	0.58
Arizpe	171	0.56
Guelatao de Juárez	29	0.55
Práxedes G. Guerrero	459	0.53




Figure 2 Geographic distribution of drug-violence refugees. This map shows the number of drug-violence refugees per municipality predicted by this paper. A darker area means more refugees. The four different shades were selected according to the distribution of refugees in four quartiles (1–12, 13–39, 40–141, and 141 and up).

massive Mexican exodus both within Mexico and from Mexico to the United States. Henry Cisneros, former mayor of San Antonio, Texas, classified Mexican migration outflows as the “largest since the 1920s” and acknowledged that “whole areas of San Antonio . . . are being transformed” (Sheridan 2011). Within Mexico, recent opinion polls have shown that out of all people interviewed, 17 percent had changed residency because of drug-related violence or to escape from criminal activities. This represents about 2 percent of the total migration outflows happening in the country, slightly above my own estimates.¹²

Perhaps the most telling case study of drug-violence migration outflows is that of Juárez, Chihuahua, and its US counterpart El Paso, Texas. The impacts of Mexican outflows have been felt strongly in El Paso, where housing, schooling, business associations, and many other spheres have changed significantly over the last two years to adapt to new migration patterns.

My results provide empirical evidence of the benefits that introducing variables related to crime and to the behavior of nonstate actors bring to our understanding of migration studies. Decisions to relocate cannot be grasped entirely by a focus on a monetary cost-benefit analysis or social capital. As I have shown, even the best estimates predicting migration outflows are subject to important errors unless we introduce as part of our independent variables information about the dynamics of crime and violence within territories. If CONAPO’s estimates were flawed in 2010, it was because Mexican demographers understated the effect that these variables have on migration dynamics.

I have also contributed to our understanding of puzzles long researched by conflict scholars. In particular, the Mexican case provides tangible evidence of the precise ways in which nonstate actors (i.e., organized crime) affect the decisions taken by citizens and other actors within the state. I have presented robust quantitative evidence to show that violence generated by criminal organizations affects the location of human capital within a polity. My numbers show that academics researching the civilian burden of conflict (Wilson 1998; Cullen and Levitt 1999; Oliver and Shapiro 2006) were right to assert that violence has many and quite nuanced effects that still need to be studied, and that may benefit or hurt the state as a whole.

The influx of US immigrants generated by drug-related violence has had a positive effect on real estate markets in Texas. Housing prices, particularly in El Paso, have remained steady even in the face of the recession, largely because of the influx of Mexicans buying properties (Rice 2011). Completely new housing developments have started to pop up in McAllen and Brownsville, many of them specifically targeting Mexican markets, tastes, and needs. As a real estate developer in McAllen acknowledged, “The tendency is towards developing gated communities, close to border bridges, with larger kitchens, and more rooms because our customers have larger families and need to cross every day to Mexico to work”¹³

12. Parametría, “Mexico y sus desplazados,” http://www.parametria.com.mx/carta_parametrica.php?cp=4288.

13. In general, there is more inequality in US border cities and more gated, wealthy communities into which Mexican migrants like to settle with their accumulated wealth (Wong, Palloni, and Soldo 2007).

Mexicans have moved not alone but with their businesses, especially when their businesses were already targeted toward American consumers. Mexican restaurants, bars, and hair salons have closed their doors in Mexico and reopened in the United States. Relocating allows American clients who are increasingly fearful of crossing into Mexico because of violence to maintain their regular spending habits and, most important, allows Mexican businessmen to avoid paying extortion fees to traffickers. For example, it is estimated that as many as 700 businesses closed in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, in 2006 for this reason.¹⁴ Estimates for Juárez point to about 10,000 businesses closed between 2007 and 2010 (Torres 2011a).

The exodus of businesses can be tracked to some extent by the number of US “investor’s visas” (E1-E2) given to Mexican citizens during the last years. While from 2001 to 2005 only 7,603 visas were granted, from 2006 to 2010 the number increased to 31,066. Mexican businessmen have even started to organize themselves into self-support clubs. In El Paso, for example, a club named “La Red” (The Network) provides newcomers with advice on how to relocate their business successfully in the United States. As of 2011, La Red has almost 300 members, most of them enrolling just recently (Perez and Chávez 2011).

The school system may also be changing in important ways. There is no way to officially count the exact numbers of students transferring from Mexican schools to the El Paso School District, but some numbers provide evidence of Mexicans increasingly studying in the United States. The number of students enrolled in bilingual or limited-English-proficiency programs has increased by 1,330 students from 2007 to 2010, even as the total number of students enrolled in the school district has dropped from 45,049 in 2007 to 44,778 in 2010 (Martinez and Torres 2011).

These new Mexican immigrants are not only changing US border cities but also Mexican ones. The number of unoccupied dwellings in Mexican border cities is quite high and correlates strongly with rates of drug-related homicides. According to census figures, 26 percent of all dwellings in Juárez are unoccupied, 20 percent in Tijuana, and 19 percent in Mexicali. Other nonborder cities facing drug violence also have significantly low levels of occupancy: Chihuahua is 15 percent empty, and Monterrey, the second most important city in Mexico, faces the same situation with 11 percent of its houses vacant (Martínez, Alvarado, and Chávez 2011).¹⁵ Some claim that forced migration has affected smaller rural towns to the point of creating *de facto* ghost towns. Teachers, doctors, policemen, and pub-

14. This information was provided by Ramón Garza Barrios, mayor of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, interviewed in June 2009 at Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico. According to Garza, business relocation is not an easy task and fails most of the time. Businesses cannot remain profitable paying US salaries and following US regulations. The move itself is costly and the attractiveness of the business may be reduced by the change in location itself. What is considered a charming local restaurant in Juárez is perceived as a low-quality venue by El Paso residents, who are generally used to higher standards. Fulfilling legal requirements such as getting a social security number and passing the fire inspection is also difficult for relocated business.

15. A poll conducted at Juárez showed that only 6.95 percent of all dwellings were empty, totaling about 32,858 thousand residencies (Velázquez Vargas et al. 2010).

lic servants have left their communities without prior notice, fearing violence in communities of Tamaulipas, Michoacán, and Chihuahua.

Ciudad Mier, a border county located south of Texas, is quite impressive in this regard. My estimates account for a total displacement of about 431 individuals, a considerable number given that the city only counts 6,662 inhabitants. Most of the Mier migration happened in mid-2010 when Tony Tormenta, a Mexican drug trafficker, was assassinated.¹⁶ Mier inhabitants, fearing violence and retaliation from Tony Tormenta's allies, left the city immediately, creating a true state of emergency. The exodus of at least a hundred families was so abrupt that Mexican authorities had to install a refugee camp in a neighboring community (Guzman 2010). Refugee camps have also been created in Michoacán in response to traffickers' turf wars. In this southern Mexican state, forced unexpected migration has displaced at least 2.5 thousand Mexicans into refugee camps.¹⁷

When picking a place to relocate to, Mexicans have favored cities with larger markets and employment opportunities. Mexico City, for example, has become a quite attractive place for relocation. In the past, few businessmen wanted to move to Mexico City because of bureaucracy, the high cost of real estate, and lack of bank financing. Nonetheless, in 2010, about 6,500 businesses relocated to Mexico City from other states (MEPI et al. 2011).

CONCLUSION

Mexican immigration is changing in fascinating ways. Immigration figures have reached their lowest point since 2000. Better socioeconomic conditions in Mexico and economic hardship in the United States are among the main causes behind this trend. Yet even if as a whole the United States is receiving fewer Mexican migrants, the opposite is true for cities located at the border.

In this article I have presented the first quantitative evidence available to show that the reason behind this migration pattern is not to be found in traditional explanations of migration dynamics. Mexicans are not crossing into the United States to get better-paid jobs or to run away from economic hardship; at least this is not the only reason. Instead, I argue that Mexicans are migrating out of fear of drug-related violence and extortion. This is particularly true in border counties, where Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have caused large increases in homicide rates and where migration to the United States entails relatively low costs.

Even when we control for variables fostering migration (i.e., employment, ed-

16. Alfredo Corchado, chief of Dallas Morning Bureau at Mexico City, interviewed in June 2010 at Mexico City, DF, Mexico.

17. Indeed, migration is not restricted to border communities but has also affected other highly violent counties within the country. Journalistic accounts have identified at least seventy counties where drug-related violence has had important consequences for migration outflows, particularly in the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Guerrero, Durango, Michoacán, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas (Zermeño 2011).

ucation, and economic conditions in both countries), drug-related violence and extortion correlate with migration figures. Each one-point increase in the rate of drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants correlates with 6.34 Mexicans fleeing their county of residency, and every case of extortion per 100,000 correlates with 13.03. These two forms of criminal violence account for a total of 264,692 Mexicans changing their county of residence as an unexpected consequence of Mexico's drug war.

The only way to stop the growth of migration outflows at the border is to increase safety within Mexican cities. A recent study measuring Juárez citizens' opinion with respect to moving away for security reasons found that 55 percent of the population would leave the city if they had the opportunity to do so (Torres 2011a). It is time for policy makers to realize that migration won't stop unless drug-related violence does first.

REFERENCES

- Alvarado, Ramón
2011 "Juárez Demographer Says 30,000 to 50,000 Persons Fled Juárez to the U.S. as a Result of Drug-War Violence since 2008." *Mexodus*, June 31. <http://mexodus.borderzine.com/>.
- Alvarado, Steven Elías, and Douglas S. Massey
2010 "Search of Peace: Structural Adjustment, Violence, and International Migration." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 630 (1): 137–161.
- Bean, Frank D., Rodolfo Corona, Rodolfo Tuirán, Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield, and Jennifer van Hook
2001 "Circular, Invisible, and Ambiguous Migrants: Components of Difference in Estimates of the Number of Unauthorized Mexican Migrants in the United States." *Demography* 38 (3): 411–422.
- Castillo, Juan Camilo, Daniel Mejía, and Pascual Restrepo
2012 "Illegal Drug Markets and Violence in Mexico: The Causes beyond Calderón." Manuscript. Universidad de los Andes.
- Cave, Damien
2011 "Better Lives for Mexicans Cut Allure of Going North." *New York Times*, July 6.
- Corchado, Alfredo
2009 "Effects of Mexico's Drug War Hit El Paso." *Dallas Morning News*, January 12.
- Cornelius, Wayne A., and Jessa M. Lewis, eds.
2006 *Impacts of Border Enforcement on Mexican Migration: The View from Sending Communities*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Corona, Rodolfo, and Rodolfo Tuirán
2006 "Magnitud aproximada de la emigración de mexicanos a Estados Unidos." Congreso Internacional de Migración: Alcances y límites de las políticas migratorias. Mexico City, October 6.
- Coscia, Michele, and Viridiana Rios
2012 "Knowing Where and How Criminal Organizations Operate Using Web Content." In *CIKM-12: Proceedings of the 21st ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management*, 1412–1421. New York: ACM.
- Cullen, Julie Berry, and Steven D. Levitt
1999 "Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81 (2): 159–169.
- Dell, Melissa
2011 "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War." Manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Díaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Beatriz Magaloni, Aila Matanock, and Vidal Romero
2011 "Living in Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence in Mexico." Paper presented at conference "Violence, Drugs and Governance: Mexi-

- can Security in Comparative Perspective," Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, October 3–4.
- Di Tella, Rafael, Sebastian Edwards, and Ernesto Scharfgrödsky
2010 *The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Freeman, Laurie
2006 *State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico; Unintended Consequences of the War on Drugs*. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America.
- Fussell, Elizabeth
2011 "Space, Time, and Volition: Dimensions of Migration Theory." In *Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration*, edited by Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor, 25–52. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Guzmán, Julio Manuel L.
2010 "Familias huyen tras muerte de Tony Tormenta." *El Universal*, November 9.
- Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro
1970 "Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis." *American Economic Review* 60 (1): 126–142.
- Ibarraran, Pablo, and Darren Lubotsky
2007 "Mexican Immigration and Self-Selection: New Evidence from the 2000 Mexican Census." In *Mexican Immigration to the United States*, edited by George J. Borjas, 159–192. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre)
2010 *Briefing Paper by the Norwegian Refugee Council's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre on Forced Displacement in Mexico Due to Drug Cartel Violence*. December. Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d2714522.html>.
- INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática)
2005 *Conteo nacional de población y vivienda*. INEGI, Consulta Interactiva de Datos.
2009 *Estadísticas judiciales en materia penal (1970–2009)*. INEGI, Consulta Interactiva de Datos.
2010 *Censo nacional de población y vivienda, 2010*. INEGI, Consulta Interactiva de Datos.
- Lacey, Marc
2008 "Hospitals Now a Theater in Mexico's Drug War." *New York Times*, December 4.
- Lindley, Anna
2010 "Leaving Mogadishu: Towards a Sociology of Conflict-Related Mobility." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 23 (1): 2–22.
- Martinez, Aaron, and Mariel Torres
2011a "El Paso School Districts Have No Idea How Many New Students Fled Juárez." *Borderzine, Reporting across Fronteras*, August 26. <http://mexodus.borderzine.com/>.
- Martínez, Jesús C., Ramón Alvarado, and Nicole Chávez
2011b "Violencia y anarquía obligan a miles de mexicanos de la clase media a reubicarse en los Estados Unidos y hacia otros lugares dentro de México." *Mexodus*, June 31. <http://mexodus.borderzine.com/>.
- Massey, Douglas S.
1990 "Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration." *Population Index* 56 (1): 3–26.
- Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor
1998 *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone
2003 *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Massey, Douglas S., and Kristin E. Espinosa
1997 "What's Driving Mexico–US Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis." *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (4): 939–999.
- Massey, Douglas S., and J. Edward Taylor
2004 "Back to the Future: Immigration Research, Immigration Policy, and Globalization in the Twenty-First Century." In *International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a*

- Global Market*, edited by Douglas S. Massey and J. Edward Taylor, 373–388. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MEPI and Tecnológico de Monterrey
 2011 “Relocate or Die: Mexican Entrepreneurs Migrate to the Interior Fleeing Violence, Insecurity.” *Mexodus*, June 31. <http://mexodus.borderzine.com/>.
- MMP (Mexican Migration Project)
 2009 *Selected Results*. New Jersey: Princeton University. <http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/results-en.aspx>.
- Morrison, Andrew R.
 1993 “Violence or Economics: What Drives Internal Migration in Guatemala?” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 41 (4): 817–831.
- Oliver, Melvin L., and Thomas M. Shapiro
 2006 *Black Wealth, White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*. New York: Routledge.
- Orrenius, Pia M.
 2004 “The Effects of U.S. Border Enforcement on the Crossing Behavior of Mexican Migrants.” In *Crossing the Border: Research from the Mexican Migration Project*, edited by Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey, 281–298. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Orrenius, Pia M., and Madeline Zavodny
 2005 “Self-Selection among Undocumented Immigrants from Mexico.” *Journal of Development Economics* 78 (1): 215–240.
- Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Madeleine Sumption, and Aaron Terrazas
 2011 *Migration and the Great Recession: The Transatlantic Experience*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Migration Policy Institute.
- Partida Bush, Virgilio
 2008 *Proyecciones de la población de México, de las entidades federativas, de los municipios y de las localidades 2005–2050*. Documento Metodológico. Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Población.
- Perez, Omar, and Nicole Chávez
 2011 “Juárez Businesses Fleeing Violence Open Doors North of the Border.” *Borderzine, Reporting across Fronteras*, June 31. <http://mexodus.borderzine.com/>.
- Piore, Michael J.
 1979 *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rice, Andrew
 2011 “Life on the Line.” *New York Times*, July 28.
- Rios, Viridiana
 2013a “Who Started the Mexican Drug War?: What Google Taught Us about the ‘Narcos.’” *Kennedy School Review* 13:18–22.
 2013b “Why Did Mexico Become So Violent? A Self-Reinforcing Violent Equilibrium Caused by Competition and Enforcement.” *Trends in Organized Crime* 16 (2): 138–155.
- Rios, Viridiana, and David Shirk
 2010 “Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis through 2010.” *Trans-Border Institute*. San Diego: University of San Diego.
- Sheridan, Mary Beth
 2011 “Drug War Sparks Exodus of Affluent Mexicans.” *Washington Post*, August 26.
- Terrazas, Aaron, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, and Marc R. Rosenblum
 2011 *Evolving Demographic and Human-Capital Trends in Mexico and Central America and Their Implications for Regional Migration*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Migration Policy Institute.
- Todaro, Michael P., and Lydia Maruszko
 1987 “Illegal Migration and U.S. Immigration Reform: A Conceptual Framework.” *Population and Development Review* 13 (1): 101–114.
- Torres, Mariel
 2011a “Businesses Flee Juárez as Customers Stop Knocking.” *Mexodus*, June 31. <http://mexodus.borderzine.com/>.

- 2011b "Running from Violence, Young Student Finds Cultural Barriers in Her New Country." *Borderzine, Reporting Across Fronteras*, August 19. <http://mexodus.borderzine.com/>.
- Tuirán, Rodolfo, Virgilio Partida, and José Luis Avila
- 2000a "Las causas de la migración hacia Estados Unidos." In *Migración México-Estados Unidos: Presente y futuro*, edited by Rodolfo Tuirán, 29–33. Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Población.
- 2000b "Crecimiento económico, libre comercio y migración." In *Migración México-Estados Unidos: Presente y futuro*, edited by Rodolfo Tuirán, 53–75. Mexico City: Consejo Nacional de Población.
- Velázquez Vargas, María del Socorro, Wilebaldo L. Martínez Toyos, and Nemecio Castillo Viveros
- 2010 *Viviendas deshabitadas: Efecto de la crisis económica, la violencia y la inseguridad en Ciudad Juárez 2010*. Mexico City: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez.
- Wilson, William Julius
- 1998 *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Vintage.
- Wong, Rebeca, Alberto Palloni, and Beth J. Soldo
- 2007 "Wealth in Middle and Old Age in Mexico: The Role of International Migration." *International Migration Review* 41 (1): 127–151.
- Zermeño, Jesica
- 2011 "Los desplazados." *Reforma*, July 24.
- Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo
- 1989 *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World*. New York: Oxford University Press.