PRESIDENT'S CORNER
By Helen I. Safa (University of Florida)

This is a difficult time to be involved in Latin American studies. Since our congress last fall at least four major initiatives of the Reagan administration in the Latin American field have been severely challenged by some of our members. Two have led to resolutions by the LASA Executive Council—the invasion of Grenada and the summary dismissal of Peter Bell as president of the Inter-American Foundation (the texts of these resolutions appear elsewhere in this issue of the Forum). The third initiative, the Kissinger Commission's report on Central America, is the subject of extensive commentary in this issue of the Forum. And, finally, the Administration's FY85 budget proposal eliminates all funding for Title VI area studies centers as well as the Fulbright-Hays exchange programs.

As a Caribbeanist, I was particularly distressed by the events in Grenada. All of us were appalled by the assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and members of his cabinet by a faction within his own party, the New Jewel Movement. The regime that replaced him, led by General Hudson Austin, lacked any legitimacy, even among the Grenadian people. Yet it did not seem to justify an invasion with such a massive show of force, including 6,000 American troops on a small island with a population of about 100,000. Surely the threat of force or a blockade would have been sufficient to secure the withdrawal of the American medical students and even the collapse of so fragile and discredited a regime. While the invasion was apparently welcomed by the people of Grenada and other neighboring islands of the eastern Caribbean, it raises the spectre of growing militarization in a region that traditionally has eschewed the use of force and abided by a British tradition of parliamentary democracy. The United States does not help restore faith in the democratic process by such a massive show of force.

The firing of Peter Bell also demonstrated a lack of commitment to democratic pluralism. The Inter-American Foundation has been a strong supporter of human rights and grass-roots development efforts in Latin America. Its activities have been under attack, not only by right-wing groups in Latin America, but also by conservative forces in the United States such as the Heritage Foundation, which conducted an extensive investigation of the IAF in 1981 but could find no evidence of wrongdoing. The autonomy of the IAF had been respected by every U.S. president, including Republicans such as Nixon and Ford, until Reagan. All four Reagan appointees to the Board of Directors of the IAF voted for Bell's dismissal, leaving the Democratic representatives in the minority. Unless a successor to Bell can be found who enjoys bipartisan support and who has a like reputation for integrity and achievement, the future of the IAF is in serious jeopardy and LASA and the people of Latin America will lose a staunch friend and ally. Elsewhere in this issue of the Forum, Alejandro Portes (Johns Hopkins University) provides background and commentary on the IAF.

The Kissinger Commission's report on Central America recognizes the urgent need for economic reform in the area. It proposes to spend $8 billion on malnutrition, illiteracy, education, infant mortality, population control, and housing. Yet it couples economic reform with military support for existing nondemocratic governments, as in El Salvador and Guatemala. It continues to see the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the guerrilla movements in El Salvador and Guatemala as evidence of Soviet and Cuban intervention in the area rather than as indigenous efforts at political and economic change. If the defeat of the Sandinistas and Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas is Reagan's primary goal, then no amount of economic aid will ever benefit the mass of the Central American people, for it will entrench in power the elite groups most opposed to social change in the area.

Taken together, these four initiatives by the Reagan administration offer little hope to those of us committed to economic reform and democratic pluralism in Latin America. We should have learned in Vietnam that arms and money alone cannot undo years of corruption, neglect, and gross inequality. As an organization, LASA can only respond by calling attention to these issues and passing resolutions that may go unheeded. We can support alternatives to the Kissinger Commission report like those recommended by PACCA (Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America), which call for a reduction in U.S. military aid to the region and a greater emphasis on diplomatic initiatives. (A summary of the PACCA report, in which several of our LASA colleagues participated, is printed elsewhere in this issue.) But it is our responsibility to our members and colleagues in Latin America to continue searching for ways in which the principles of democratic self-determination and equitable economic development (both cited as guiding principles of the Kissinger

Contents

Second Report of Program Committee 2
Letters to the Editor 4
Concerning Grenada 8
The Inter-American Foundation 9
Concerning the Kissinger Commission Report 13
Human Rights in El Salvador and Nicaragua 24
Education in El Salvador and Nicaragua 28
In Memoriam—Angel Rama 30
Coming Meetings and Conferences 31
Announcements 32
Employment Opportunities 37
Commission) may reach all the people of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Turning for a moment to the internal affairs of the association, I am pleased to announce that the task forces are now fully staffed. Mark Rosenberg (Florida International University) has joined the newly created Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua. Ray Bonner of the New York Times and 1983 winner of the Media Task Force award for outstanding journalism has become an ex-officio member of the Task Force on the Media. And Michael C. Meyer (University of Arizona) has become a member of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with the Soviet Union.

The Program Committee for the 18 to 20 April 1985 XII International Congress in Albuquerque, New Mexico, is now complete with the addition of Joseph Tulchin (University of North Carolina), former editor of the Latin American Research Review. He will also coordinate the fundraising activities of the committee. (For more information, see the following Program Committee report.)

And as a final note on committee personnel, the Executive Council has accepted the resignation of Jorge Dominguez as of 29 September 1983.

If 1983 was the year of the Mexico City meeting, the association efforts this year are to produce the first membership directory since 1977. The Secretariat has purchased an IBM PC and is now in the process of creating a LASA database that can be used to produce a directory. In order to determine what would be the most useful format for this publication, I would like to hear from the membership concerning how it would like the directory to be structured, what kind of indices it would like to have, and what other items it would consider useful. Please address your comments to Executive Director Richard Sinkin, who is coordinating the project.

SECOND REPORT OF THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE,
XII LASA MEETING, ALBUQUERQUE
Christopher Mitchell, Chairman (New York University)

The Program Committee for the 1985 meeting in Albuquerque has reports, suggestions, and exhortations as follows.

Membership: The membership of the committee has been completed with the addition of Prof. Joseph S. Tulchin of the University of North Carolina. Prof. Tulchin, a historian, is already well known within the association as a result of his long and very valuable service to LARR. Prof. Tulchin’s address is: Prof. Joseph S. Tulchin. Department of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

Dr. Tulchin’s role on the committee will carry with it special responsibilities for fund raising to assist the participation of Latin American scholars in the Albuquerque meeting. This role was filled for the Mexico City meeting by Peter Smith, who had very notable success. The fact that the Program Committee undertakes fund raising for travel, however, does not imply that LASA will be able to fund all requested travel. Still less does it indicate that Dr. Tulchin should be called on to raise funds on an ad hoc or emergency basis, and he will not be administering funds at all. Rather, an orderly fund raising process will require the maximum of cooperation from the LASA membership. Proponents of panels or papers that may require travel assistance are urged to provide detailed and complete information by 15 April 1984 so that the Program Committee may coordinate funding efforts. Alternative sources (outside LASA) should also be vigorously pursued by panel proponents so that LASA’s limited resources will have the greatest effect.

Special Needs for Panel Organization: LASA members are strongly urged to frame their Albuquerque proposals as focused panels rather than as individual papers, which may not fit
together into logical panels or sessions. While we try to accommodate all proposed papers, the work of panel coordinators will be vital to the success of the meeting, both administratively and intellectually.

RESULTS OF RESOLUTIONS BALLOT
I. Resolution on U.S. Relations with Cuba
   Whereas the U.S. government has pursued a policy of hostility toward Cuba;
   Whereas the U.S. government is denying many U.S. citizens the right to travel to Cuba as tourists; and
   Whereas professional scholars must seek special clearance from the U.S. government if they wish to do research in Cuba;
   Therefore be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association urge the U.S. government to end its policy of hostility and to begin negotiations for the further normalization of relations between the two countries, including the lifting of obstacles to travel.
   Approve: 745
   Disapprove: 107

II. Resolution on Guatemala
   Whereas in the period since the last meeting of LASA the overall level of political and military repression has reached unprecedented heights in Guatemala, including a marked increase, in 1983, of repression directed against members of the academic community; and
   Whereas the U.S. government continues to provide military, economic, and symbolic support for the government of Guatemala;
   Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association urge the Guatemalan government to cease its violations of human rights and academic freedom;
   Be it further resolved that LASA urge the government of the United States to cease its support for the Guatemalan government, should that government not cease its violations of human rights immediately; and
   Be it further resolved that this resolution be forwarded to the president of the United States, the secretary of state, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, the chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the president of Guatemala, the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, and the Democratic Front against Repression (FDCR).
   Approve: 755
   Disapprove: 92

III. Resolution on Universities in El Salvador
   The Latin American Studies Association deplores the violation of academic freedom and human rights in higher education in El Salvador, evident in attacks against the National University and the Universidad Centroamericana.
   LASA therefore calls upon the government of El Salvador:  
   1) to return to the university the control of its own elected officials, allocating funds to restore the university buildings and equipment, and to pledge to support the autonomy of both universities and the restoration of academic freedom;
   2) to end all harassment of faculty, staff, and students, and to release all university personnel imprisoned without due cause;
   and
   3) to prosecute those responsible for acts of violence directed against the Universidad Centroamericana in recent weeks.
   Upon ratification by mail ballot, the resolution shall be sent to President Alvaro Magaña of El Salvador, Amb. Thomas Pickering, Secretary of State George Schultz, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Human Rights Commission.
   Approve: 792
   Disapprove: 58

IV. Resolution on U.S. Visa Policy
   Whereas the U.S. Department of State's actions regarding the entry of Latin American scholars, other professionals, and public figures has shown a pattern and practice of denial of visas; and
   Whereas such denials of visas deprive U.S. citizens and scholars of a free exchange of ideas;
   Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association urge the Department of State to cease denying visas to Latin American scholars, other professionals, and public figures for participation in educational activities.
   Approve: 793
   Disapprove: 62

V. Resolution on the Denial of Visas to Representatives of Nicaragua
   Whereas the U.S. Department of State has denied visas to representatives of the people of Nicaragua on several occasions; and
   Whereas these actions deny the rights of the academic community and of the people of the United States to a free exchange of information;
   Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association condemn these actions of the U.S. Department of State; and
   Be it further resolved that the Latin American Studies Association convey this resolution to the secretary of state and urge the Department of State to permit entry into the United States for representatives of the Nicaraguan government and people.
   Approve: 753
   Disapprove: 100

VI. Resolution on U.S. Aid to Anti-Sandinista Forces
   The members of the Latin American Studies Association deplore and condemn the so-called covert aid given by the government of the United States to the former National Guardsmen of the Somoza dictatorships and other anti-Sandinista forces who are attacking Nicaragua from Honduras and Costa Rica. U.S. aid to counterrevolutionary forces seeking to destabilize or overthrow the government of Nicaragua is illegal on several counts. Moreover, aid to forces formerly associated with the Somoza dictatorship means that the U.S. government is supporting known violators of human rights.
   Therefore, be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association urge the U.S. government to cease immediately its support for these activities and to accept immediately, in deed
as well as in word, the mediation of the Contadora Group of Latin American leaders with respect to the Central American situation.

Approve: 732
Disapprove: 114

VII. Chile Resolution
The Latin American Studies Association, the hemisphere’s largest organization of scholars specializing in the study of Latin America, deplors the violence perpetrated by the government of Chile’s Armed and Security Forces since May 1983, including the killing of a number of Chilean citizens peacefully demanding the reestablishment of democracy in Chile.

The Latin American Studies Association urges the government of Chile:
1) to release all individuals arrested for participating in strikes and political demonstrations; and
2) to respect the right to strike and the freedom of assembly.
This resolution shall be forwarded to the president of Chile; the ambassador of Chile to the United States; the secretary of state of the United States; the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and the chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Approve: 783
Disapprove: 62

VIII. Resolution on U.S. Military Aid to El Salvadoran Government
The revolutionary upheaval in El Salvador is primarily a response to decades of social inequity, undemocratic rule, and brutal repression of prior attempts at reform. Continued violations of human rights by the government of El Salvador and associated paramilitary groups have been well documented.

The Latin American Studies Association calls for an end to U.S. military aid to the Salvadoran government and calls upon the U.S. government to change its policy to one of full support for the initiatives of the Mexican government and the Contadora Group to bring about a negotiated settlement to the Salvadoran civil war.

Approve: 729
Disapprove: 111

IX. Resolution on the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill
Whereas immigration policy is one of the most critical aspects of United States relations with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean; and

Whereas the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1983 (Simpson-Mazzoli Bill) pending in Congress would drastically reverse the liberalization of U.S. immigration law achieved during the past twenty years; and

Whereas the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill would sharply curtail the ability of Central American refugees to apply for political asylum and deny them the right of appeal to the federal courts; and

Whereas the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill would place an arbitrary overall ceiling on the annual volume of immigration, thereby denying many present U.S. citizens and resident aliens the right to reunify their families; and

Whereas provisions of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill would permit U.S. employers to import “temporary” workers in a fashion reminiscent of the notorious Bracero Programs of the 1940s and 1950s; and

Whereas U.S. Latino associations, civil rights organizations, and church groups such as the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops, have expressed grave concern that the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation would subject Latinos to new forms of employment discrimination; therefore

Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Association call upon all members of Congress to vote “no” on the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill.

Upon ratification by mail ballot of the membership, notification of this resolution shall be sent to Senator Edward Kennedy; Representative Tip O’Neil, speaker of the house; and the Committee on the Judiciary.

Approve: 721
Disapprove: 103

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

To the Editor of the LASA Forum
I have read with interest the report of the ad hoc committee to investigate the publication of a CIA employment advertisement in the LASA Forum (Winter 1984). As may be evident to some readers of that report, I agree with the view that the publication of the ad was a mistake and disagree strongly with the view that I may have authorized its publication. The purpose of this letter, however, is not to attempt to reconstruct those events. It will serve LASA best to close that sad chapter. Instead, I wish to comment on the part of the ad hoc committee’s report entitled “probable contributing factors” because it is an unfair and inaccurate characterization of my conduct in the LASA presidency. I write this letter with great regret because, as will be evident in the paragraphs that follow, I have had the highest respect for the members of the ad hoc committee and other interested parties.

That section of the ad hoc committee report describes a closed approach to the conduct of the LASA presidency. Fortunately, readers of this publication ought to have at least some good reasons to be very skeptical of that description. To the best of my knowledge, I was the first LASA President to write a column in every issue of the LASA Newsletter (recently renamed Forum) on matters of Association and professional business and to invite the comments and participation of all. My conduct within the decision making structure of the Association was equally communicative and consultative. There is no space to detail all instances that would support this point; instead, I will focus only on some of the matters mentioned by the ad hoc committee that could have been verified by some of its members directly, or by some of the people they consulted and cite in the report, or by reading some of the things I have written in internal LASA memoranda, or published, or alas, by asking me (I was not shown a copy of the ad hoc committee report until it was published).

The ad hoc committee takes note of steps I took to “discipline” the Business Meeting over which I presided at
LASA's 1982 national meeting in Washington. The committee failed to mention why or how or with whose consent and participation this was done. The purpose of disciplining the Business Meeting was to enable its majority to work its will effectively and to provide its minority with a protection of its rights. That was done by applying parliamentary procedures, as the LASA By-Laws require. The Business Meeting agenda was explicitly modified to insert opportunities for members to question officers or the Association and to make brief speeches without the need of making a motion and without impairing any previous member rights. The meeting worked smoothly and effectively; it was conducted fairly. I was authorized to act in this manner by the Executive Council and assisted by Business Meeting Parliamentarian (and now ad hoc committee member) Arturo Valenzuela. One of the wisest steps of my presidency was to recommend to the Executive Council Valenzuela's appointment as Parliamentarian. His knowledge and good sense have served the Association well. I trust that he continues to share the belief that he impressed upon me that disciplining the Business Meeting to serve majority and minority rights—rather than to face the not infrequently characteristic LASA Business Meeting chaos—is a policy worth continuing.

The ad hoc committee quotes a part of one of my President's Corner articles describing LASA's public image as "a one-sided, partisan and ideological organization where "leftists" use the Business Meeting to put forth resolutions that reflect their views." The ad hoc committee failed to make clear that this part of my article reported on a perception among some of what LASA has been. The ad hoc committee failed to mention my own views, discussed later in that article, that chastised as well polemical diatribes from the "right" (LASA Newsletter 13, no. 2, Summer 1982, p. 3). The ad hoc committee goes on to suggest that my concern with pluralism in LASA may have dulled my political sensibilities, implying less responsiveness to the concerns of those who might be described as being on the "left" of the Association or at least highly critical of the U.S. Government.

Quite the contrary, the working of the Business Meeting over which I presided facilitated the expeditious approval of resolutions quite critical of U.S. Government policies. The purpose of a pluralistic conduct of the presidency is not to stifle one set of views but to allow many to blossom and contend. But it may be worthwhile to call attention to other steps that indicate that my political sensibilities were not dulled in the manner implied by the ad hoc committee. Let me refer only to easily verifiable items where I took steps in opposition to "the right" or, simply, to the Reagan Administration.

Prof. Angel Rama graciously thanked the Association, and me personally, for work, sadly unsuccessful, to oppose the U.S. Government’s decision to deport him from the United States under false charges (LASA Forum 14, no. 2, Summer 1983, p. 8). While I served as LASA Vice-President, I played a key role in protesting an unfair attack on the professional integrity of several Latinoamericanists in an article whose senior author had just become the Reagan Administration’s Latin American staffer for the National Security Council (Washington Quarterly 4, no. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 204-205). Within the Association, I played a central role in bringing scholars and others from Cuba to participate in LASA Meetings and to secure the first formal agreement between LASA and a Cuban institution responsible for academic exchanges. More indirectly, I supported and stimulated the Task Forces on Scholarly Relations with the USSR and Cuba, and on Academic Freedom and Human Rights, to expand the scope of their work. This was amply evident in many issues of this publication. Less polemically, but no less importantly, I took a number of active steps in opposition to Reagan Administration policies toward higher education in letters to members of Congress and other officials and in several of my President’s Corner columns. And the LASA Congress, as usual, remained an open opportunity for the expression of all views.

The ad hoc committee criticizes the "LASA Briefing Paper" that had been prepared to develop a LASA institutional memory on two grounds. First, they say it was incomplete. Second, they say President Helen Safa and Vice-President Wayne Cornelius, and perhaps others, had not received it. It is true that the Briefing Paper was incomplete; it is also true that no one had ever tried to compile such information before. This was a first, ongoing step to solve a problem. LASA Associate Director Ginger Miller had worked, characteristically, with effectiveness and enthusiasm to put together as much as we knew. It is important for the membership to realize that, when this effort began, we did not even know how many LASA Task Forces there were nor who were all their members; we were not even certain we had an up-to-date copy of the Constitution and By-Laws, as amended. I hope Safa and Cornelius complete this work. I hope future historians do not accuse them of "excessive proceduralism." I am sorry they had not received a copy. I am: sure that members will understand that it had not been my intention to engage in this work and, then, to keep it secret. Short of centralizing LASA decision making processes even more in presidential hands, I could not have solved the problem of mail nondelivery.

The ad hoc committee comments that the emphasis on codifying LASA rules and regulations may have blinded me by minutiae and caused me to lose sight of the "big picture." They quote Executive Director Richard Sinkin characterizing my work as "the procedure approach to things, rather than focusing on the content." I was privileged to serve with Sinkin during my term. His many contributions to LASA cannot be documented in a short space. LASA records show that we worked on the following things, among others: how to keep the Association solvent, worrying about budgets, including revenues and expenditures, auditing, dues structure, relations with current and past donors, and the generation of a LASA endowment fund; we worked on the reactivation of the LASA Task Forces, getting new members, new leaders, and new ideas; we worked on the redefinition of the relationship between LASA and LARR (surprisingly, that was an ill-defined and at times troubled relationship); we worked to back up the Mexico City Program Committee, under the extraordinarily able leadership of Robert Van Kemper and Mario Ojeda and to select sites for two future LASA Congresses; we sought to upgrade the LASA Newsletter, and were enormously fortunate to find such a talented person as Jack Lowry to take principal responsibility for its improvement; we worked to represent LASA professional
interests in Washington; and, yes, we also sought to institutionalize LASA and to develop effective procedures that would serve the Association well. I find these concerns with LASA publications, meetings, budgets, and other activities to be appropriate and comprehensive, encompassing both content and procedures. I was fortunate to be able to work with Sinkin in helping the Association serve member needs more effectively.

The ad hoc committee characterizes my decision making style as highly centralized and nonconsultative. Fortunately, the ad hoc committee cites my concern to maintain the participation of the Executive Council in the making of decisions, as was constitutionally mandated and appropriate. How was this done? LASA financial resources are very limited. The Council met twice and its Ways and Means Committee one more time during the eighteen months of my presidency. In addition, I decided to rely on frequent and varied written consultation with the Executive Council. An additional advantage of written correspondence in an organization such as LASA is that it facilitates both consulting a larger number of people and the keeping of a written record. If I did not write it, it was clear, I thought, that I had made no decision (and there is no written record of any involvement of mine with regard to the CIA ad).

The ad hoc committee quotes Helen Safa to the effect that I rarely consulted her. Helen Safa was an excellent Vice-President, and I am sure will be so as President. I found especially helpful her responses to many consultations of her, where her views were typically given due deference. She was influential in such diverse matters as the composition of the Albuquerque Program Committee, policies on membership dues, or the handling of delicate personnel matters. The record of many of these consultations is in my files and, presumably, in hers as well. It was my policy to include her in as much as possible precisely to facilitate institutionalization from one presidency to the next. The only complaint I recall is that I had sent her too much, not too little.

Were my memoranda or letters little more than a fait accompli to be ratified by others? There were different types of memos or letters. Some, to be sure, simply followed through on matters the Executive Council had discussed, but that needed some further work before they could be approved. Others were explicitly designed to promote discussion. Let me cite only two examples. As Vice-President and President, I was doubly concerned with the insufficiency of LASA services to members and with the Association's serious financial problems. I wrote several memos and letters over the months on these subjects to promote Executive Council and Ways and Means Committee discussion, by mail and by phone, as well as during Council and Committee meetings. None of the initiatives I suggested were implemented without Council and Committee discussion. Indeed, a fair characterization of this process is that most of these initiatives were not approved by the Council or the Committee—hardly the result expected from tyrannical rule. The main disagreement was that I wanted LASA to increase services to members to a level comparable with what other professional organizations provide; the Council, in its wisdom, preferred to focus on doing better the narrower set of activities that LASA already performed. A second example is the composition of the Albuquerque Program Committee. Those discussions began in advance of the Ways and Means Committee meeting of the fall, 1982; continued during it; were followed by further correspondence; and culminated in the Executive Council's final decisions. The original "slate" for the Program Committee was greatly changed by the end thanks, precisely, to my use of extensive correspondence.

I mention these two examples, in part, because ad hoc committee chairman Wayne Cornelius could have easily verified them. He had served as LASA Treasurer, and thus had a special interest in my open-ended consultations on LASA services and finances. The memos and minutes are readily available from LASA files, or from his files or mine. As Treasurer, he was also a member of the Ways and Means Committee. He could have verified that the "slate" for the Albuquerque Program Committee to come out of a meeting in which he participated was very different from the final result. And he could have further verified that this was the result of my decision to pursue, and to take seriously, the consultation of the Council by mail and at a subsequent meeting. Wayne Cornelius has become a LASA legend in his own time. Even before becoming President, a richly deserved post, he had served the Association magnificently as chairman of the Houston Program Committee. That was the single most centralized Program—cum-Local Arrangements Committee in my recollection of LASA history. In part, such centralization was required to meet several serious organizational crises; in part, that centralization had the advantage of facilitating coordinated membership participation in program design. Similarly, as Treasurer, Cornelius contributed to the centralization of LASA budget formulation to enable the Association to have a financial instrument to assess its activities. Those budgets—prepared by Sinkin and the Secretariat—in turn allowed the Executive Council to participate more effectively and in an informed manner in making choices. To the extent that there was some centralization of some activities during my presidency, it was to facilitate more effective and wider participation over more important matters. I am grateful to Cornelius for teaching me this among many other valuable lessons.

The ad hoc committee is correct that there were "poor working relationships and breakdowns in communication within the Secretariat." That, undeniably, can be considered a "probably contributing factor" in the case of the failure to stop the ad's publication. LASA was fortunate to have three bright, energetic, hardworking people in the Secretariat. For complex reasons, relations among them deteriorated over time. Apart from the difficulties that emerged from the clashes of strong-willed and overworked individuals, there were also problems that arose in the relations of each of them to other units in the University of Texas. The Executive Council and I were aware of some personnel problems in the Secretariat for many months. The approach that the Council and I took to address these problems was to attempt to praise, and to reward to the extent possible, the three people who were working so hard and so well on behalf of the Association. These steps included budgetary actions, promotions, and statements of support for work well done; Jack Lowry's promotion to Editor of this publication was but one example of this Council policy. Because of the agreements stemming from the awarding of the Secretariat by
LASA to the University of Texas, the Council and I were restrained in efforts at mediating the increasing conflicts within the Secretariat. The problem, therefore, was precisely the opposite of that identified by the ad hoc committee. Far from the strong arm of the President confounding internal relations within the Secretariat, there was great restraint in order not to interfere excessively with the personnel procedures of the University of Texas, or the necessary management role that the Executive Director needed to have as a result of the bid agreement. The problems within the Secretariat were a tragedy before which the Council and I felt rather helpless.

The ad hoc committee states that the process of Executive Council agenda-building was closed. The committee is correct when it writes, “Following longstanding LASA practice, the agenda for that meeting had been developed by the incumbent President, in consultation with the Executive Director, and circulated in advance to Council members.” The ad hoc committee is, unfortunately, incorrect when it states that Council members were not asked to submit agenda items. The ad hoc committee is equally incorrect when it states that I adhered strictly to the prepared agenda, implying that I was either unwilling to accept new items, or insistent that everything was covered, or both. Had the ad hoc committee simply compared the agenda for the Austin Executive Council meeting (April 1983) with the minutes for that meeting, it would have found that certain agenda items were deliberately postponed to the future in order to make room for items that were not on the prepared agenda, such as a major discussion of possible LASA involvement in television programming. Any council member could help re-shape the agenda. I am delighted that the Executive Council has taken steps to ensure that its future meetings would not be limited only to discussions of items on the written agenda. That simply ratifies long standing practice. I hope that some future historian does not interpret this “new” Executive Council rule as evidence of “excessive proceduralism.”

The ad hoc committee failed to note as well a practice I used to delegate certain responsibilities to Executive Council members precisely to decentralize decision making. For example, Vice-President Helen Safa was asked to focus on the increasingly complex problem of how to think about, and how to organize and fund, LASA’s international relations. Treasurer Wayne Cornelius was asked to make proposals, eventually adopted, about the proper nature of LASA’s relations with Washington lobbying organizations.

The ad hoc committee appears to explain the nonfunctioning of the LASA Forum Editorial Board as a result of my allegedly excessively centralized decision making style. Fortunately, the committee mentions the decision to create that Board was taken by the Executive Council at my initiative; that Council member Cornelia Butler Flora was named to chair it; and that the Board was given as comprehensive a mandate as possible: “what kinds of things have gone and should continue to go into the Newsletter.” There was never any sense that the President should be consulted concerning what goes into the Newsletter/Forum. That precisely was the purpose of establishing the Board: I did not wish to function as an Editor or a one-man Board. The agenda and the minutes of Executive Council meetings show that I regularly docketed Newsletter items for discussion, and correspondence would show repeated efforts to urge Flora to use her considerable talents, energy, and imagination to activate the Board. Short of even more presidential centralization, I am at a loss to see how I could have forced others to consult among themselves.

In closing, let me say that I hope my friends think as well of my work as LASA President as I have thought of theirs. I valued greatly their collegiality as we worked together on behalf of LASA. I urge them to build on our efforts when we collaborated, and to feel proud of having served the Association with integrity and well.

Jorge Dominguez
Former President, LASA

To the Editor:

The Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate the Publication of a CIA Employment Advertisement in the LASA Forum has reviewed the response of former LASA President Jorge Dominguez to our report.

We believe that it is not in the interests of LASA nor in furtherance of its objectives to enter into a public debate over the merits of our report. We also believe that a detailed reply to Professor Dominguez’s letter would deflect attention from what we regard as the fundamental issue that our committee was charged with investigating: how the CIA employment ad was published.

Our report sought to explain this event, and not to evaluate in any comprehensive way Professor Dominguez’s tenure as LASA President. The report was not and is not intended as a blanket criticism of everything that was done during his presidency. We did not mean to imply that we attach no significance to Professor Dominguez’s valuable contributions toward putting the Association’s affairs in order.

We were charged with investigating a very unfortunate and damaging incident which occurred during the Dominguez presidency. Our clear mandate, as received from the LASA Executive Council as well as from the members participating in the Business Meeting in Mexico City, was not only to determine who was responsible for publication of the ad, but how it occurred. That was, of course, the purpose of the section of our report dealing with “Probable Contributing Factors. We believe that we have fulfilled our responsibility to the best of our ability and within the severe constraints of time available to us.

Wayne A. Cornelius, chair
Paul Doughty
Marysa Navarro
Arturo Valenzuela
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**STATEMENT ON GRENADA**

We, the following members of the Latin American Studies Association, condemn the invasion of the sovereign state of Grenada for the following reasons:

1) Although we do not condone the actions of the military council in Grenada, the invasion violated the charters of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States;

2) The invasion violates our stated goals of self-determination and freedom from outside intervention;

3) The reasons advanced as justification for the invasion—protection of American lives and restoration of democracy—are not sufficient to warrant the violation of the principle of nonintervention; and

4) The invasion makes the possibilities of negotiations and peace in the Caribbean Basin even more remote.

Therefore, we urge the immediate withdrawal of all United States troops from Grenada.

8 December 1983

Helen I. Safa, president (University of Florida)
Wayne A. Cornelius, vice-president (University of California-San Diego)
Alejandro Portes (Johns Hopkins University)
Cornelia Butler Flora (Kansas State University)
James Malloy (University of Pittsburgh)
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**INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS IN GRENADA**

The Reagan administration’s arguments purporting to justify the invasion of Grenada under international law must not be allowed to inveigle the American people into supporting this violent intervention into the domestic affairs of another independent state. Throughout the twentieth century, the U.S. government has routinely concocted evanescent threats to the lives and property of U.S. nationals as pretexts to justify armed interventions into sister American states. The transparency of these pretexts was just as obvious then as it is now. The Reagan administration has not established by means of clear and convincing evidence that there did in fact exist an immediate threat to the safety of U.S. citizens in Grenada. Even then, such a threat could have justified only a limited military operation along the lines of the Israeli raid at Entebbe for the sole purpose of evacuating the major concentration of U.S. nationals at the medical college.

Nor can the Reagan administration’s backup rationale of terminating the “chaotic conditions” allegedly then present in Grenada be properly invoked to justify the military invasion. Even when it actually exists, chronic disorder in a country does not permit neighboring states to intervene for the purpose of re-establishing minimum public security, let alone imposing a democratic form of government. Neighboring states do possess a right of individual or collective self defense (under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter) to preserve the integrity of their own borders from external attack originating from some unstable neighbor. But any other type of violent response on their part requires explicit authorization by the United Nations Security Council, or at a minimum, by the appropriate regional organization.

In this case the Organization of American States (OAS) was the only collective agency mandated by the regional community of states to maintain international peace and security for the Western Hemisphere in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Article 18 of the OAS Charter provides that no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Article 20 declares that the territory of a member state is inviolable and therefore may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. Finally, Article 21 reiterates the solemn obligation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter that American states will not have recourse to force except in cases of self-defense pursuant to existing treaties. In direct violation of these international obligations the Reagan administration has forthrightly admitted that it invaded Grenada for the illegitimate purpose of deposing the leftist military junta that had seized power after the coup against Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, and then installing a government more favorably disposed to the United States.

The members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) could not lawfully authorize the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Article 8 of its charter restricts OECS competence in such matters to situations amounting to an “external aggression” and then only in accordance with the right of individual or collective self defense recognized by U.N. Charter Article 51 and in accordance with the OAS Charter. Furthermore, OECS Article 8 requires unanimous agreement among member states before action can be taken, and that condition was never fulfilled here. There is no evidence that Grenada was either about to attack, or engaged in the infiltration of terrorists into, another Caribbean state. If such evidence had existed, the United States could have responded immediately under United Nations Charter Article 51 with measures necessary and proportionate to protect the victim.

If the OECS truly believed the new regime in Grenada created a serious threat to the future peace and stability of the region, the appropriate remedy would have been to bring the matter to the attention of the OAS. As the designated regional organization under Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter, the OAS possesses sufficient competence to act under circumstances not tantamount to an “external aggression” or “armed attack” upon a member state. For example, during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis the United States resorted to the OAS when the Kennedy administration realized it was not able to justify the “quarantine” of Cuba under United Nations Charter Article 51 because there existed no immediate threat of attack or aggression by Cuba. Unanimous OAS approval for the quarantine exercised a profound impact upon Khrushchev's
decision to remove the missiles. By comparison, following Teddy Roosevelt's antiquated "big stick" policy, the Reagan administration prefers the imposition of unilateral military solutions as a panacea for curing the endemic instability throughout the Caribbean and Central America. Historically, any United States foreign policy founded upon blatant violations of international law has proved to be counterproductive and ultimately self-defeating over the long haul.

Both the OAS and the United Nations charters unequivocally condemn the United States' invasion of Grenada as a gross violation of the most fundamental principles of international law. Just recently, 11 members of the United Nations Security Council and 108 members of the United Nations General Assembly, among them several staunch U.S. allies, have deplored this invasion for precisely these reasons. The U.S. government has suffered the most serious setback to its traditional role in upholding the integrity of the international legal order since President Johnson's strikingly similar invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. Even though Johnson subsequently obtained OAS approval for a military occupation, this invasion was followed in short order by Leonid Brezhnev's promulgation of a reincarnated version of the Johnson doctrine to justify the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of Afghanistan in 1979. In stark contrast to the Johnson administration, President Reagan has not even bothered to request the OAS to intervene in this matter for the limited purpose of organizing and supervising elections leading to the creation of a democratic government in Grenada. The total lack of such an OAS imprimatur will raise serious doubts concerning the international legitimacy of any successor government.

U.S. military action in egregious violation of international law sends a strong message to the entire international community that in the opinion of the U.S. government the traditional rules restricting the use of force no longer apply in settling the myriad of contemporary international disputes. When even the United States flouts international law, the only consequence can be an increasing degree of international violence, chaos, and anarchy. U.S. military forces are not up to the task of policing the entire globe. And as the War Powers Act proves, the American people would not permit them to do so anyway, despite the inclinations of the Reagan administration to the contrary.

International lawlessness in Grenada will return to haunt the future of American foreign policy around the world. Yet right now the Reagan administration seems to be planning an identical fate for the Sandinista government in Nicaragua under the subterfuge of reviving the moribund Central American Defense Council Pact, which is functionally similar to the OECS Charter. In order to forestall this immediate present danger, Congress must enact a Central American equivalent to the Clark Amendment for Angola, which would expressly prohibit the expenditure of any governmental funds in support of overt or covert military or paramilitary operations in the Western Hemisphere without explicit congressional authorization. Otherwise the Reagan administration will continue to provoke a broader war throughout Central America that can serve as a pretext for another round of illegal U.S. military intervention in the region.

Francis A. Boyle, University of Illinois-Champaign
Abram Chayes, Harvard Law School
Isaak Dore, St. Louis University
Richard Falk, Princeton University
Martin Feinrider, Nova Law Center
C. Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Harvard Law School
J. David Fine, Loyola University
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THE INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION: ITS IMPACT ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA
by Alejandro Portes and Lauren Benton

(Editor's Note: On 5 December 1984, the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Foundation in Washington, DC, asked for and received the resignation of the foundation's president, Mr. Peter Bell. The following article was written by Alejandro Portes, professor of sociology and until recently a member of the LASA Executive Council, and Lauren Benton, a graduate student in anthropology. Both are at The Johns Hopkins University.)

Since last December, there have been numerous press reports about the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) and the firing of its president, Peter Bell. Despite the exclusive dedication of this agency to social development projects in Latin America, many Latin Americanists are unfamiliar with its existence or the significance of these recent events. This is due, in part, to the small size of the foundation, its recentness, and the low-key manner of its operation. It is worth reviewing the history of this agency because, although a pigmy within the federal bureaucracy, it represents a qualitatively distinct approach to the philosophy and practice of foreign aid. This approach, which has gained increasing legitimacy in Latin America and support within the academic community in the United States, is seriously threatened by the firing of Mr. Bell.

A number of members of Congress and senators have issued statements expressing concern about the future of the Inter-American Foundation in the wake of Bell's departure. Such attention, bestowed on an agency with a staff of 65 and an annual budget that never exceeded 27 million dollars, may appear incongruous if it were not for the qualitative importance of its policies. To understand them, one must trace the course of the IAF since its creation by Congress in 1969.

The IAF differs from other development organizations in its unorthodox approach to social action projects and its unusual degree of autonomy. The idea of forming a semiautonomous development agency came from several members of the House who perceived that the program implemented by AID under the Alliance for Progress had not succeeded in significantly changing the lives of the poor in Latin America. A large portion of funding for development inevitably went to support
bureaucracies rather than the intended beneficiaries. Under the leadership of Dante Fascell (D-Florida) and Bradford Morse (R-Massachusetts), the House approved the creation of an organization capable of responding directly to the needs of the poor and able to bypass red tape and high administrative costs.

A fundamental requirement for the success of this initiative was that it should be insulated from the ebb and flow of political currents. Congress sought to ensure the autonomy of the new organization by awarding it semiprivate status and secure funding. The Board of Directors was to be composed of four members drawn from the private sector and three from government agencies. Funding would come from Congress and from the Social Progress Trust Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank, and it would not be subject to the various restrictions and limitations that normally apply to government-to-government programs and their implementation.

Congress specified that the organization was intended to support “self-help efforts” in Latin America and the Caribbean and encourage greater participation of the people in the development process. It was generally recognized that the IAF would be charting new territory and that its efforts would therefore be largely experimental. Although the foundation was granted considerable leeway to work with or through other public and private development organizations, its mandate was to foster development through “people-to-people,” rather than “government-to-government” relations.

The early staff of the Inter-American Foundation was drawn primarily from the Peace Corps, churches, and private foundations. The first board adhered closely to the guidelines established in the mandate. The objectives it outlined for the foundation were to broaden popular participation, ameliorate social conflicts, and further the cause of an equitable distribution of wealth, goods, and services in Latin America and the Caribbean. Rather than establish field offices to design and administer its own programs, the IAF opted for working out of its suburban Washington headquarters and distributing funds in response to the initiatives of local groups. The first president of the IAF was William Dyal, a Protestant minister and, at the time of his appointment, a Peace Corps officer. Dyal played a decisive role in leading the foundation through its first years and helping it overcome early difficulties and suspicions.

After awarding only three grants in its first year, the IAF expanded its grant-giving activities rapidly. After 1973, the foundation awarded an average of 100 to 120 grants each year. By 1983, it had made 1,600 grants for a total of 170 million dollars in over 25 countries. Most of the foundation’s grants have gone to support self-help development schemes, such as rural cooperatives, small businesses, and neighborhood housing projects. Other grants helped organize groups providing services to the poor, such as credit societies, technical-training programs, and legal-aid organizations. An early bias toward funding rural projects has recently begun to change. Although 48 percent of funding in 1982 was still being used to assist rural development, 22 percent was also awarded to education projects, with 8 percent each going to urban enterprises and community services.

A shift in orientation during the last years of the Dyal presidency, consolidated under Bell, resulted in the allocation of about 10 percent of the foundation’s budget (13 percent in 1982) to support research into development problems. At present, the IAF sponsors both doctoral dissertation and master’s fellowship programs that allow a small number of U.S. students to conduct field research on issues of poverty and social change in Latin America. Another recent program sponsors select Latin American scholars nominated by research institutions in the area to conduct graduate studies in the United States. More important, perhaps, the IAF has assisted a number of independent research centers in Latin America and the Caribbean. Many of these institutions survive precariously under regimes wary of critical evaluations and eager to shift attention away from social issues. The IAF has joined development agencies and charitable groups from other Western countries in the effort to keep these centers alive. Even in this endeavor, the foundation adhered to its policy of issuing grants for particular projects relating to the condition of the poor, rather than providing unconditional institutional support.

Such efforts helped establish a solid reputation for the IAF among grass-roots organizations and intellectuals in Latin America. Many of these same groups had initially believed that the foundation was intended to serve as a vehicle for exerting political pressure or that it was linked to U.S. intelligence operations. The growing prestige of the agency was further enhanced by the appointment of Peter Bell as president in 1980. Bell had served as a Ford Foundation representative in Latin America and was highly respected for his knowledge of the region.

The good will fostered by the IAF is one measure of its achievements. Another is the degree to which it has succeeded in fulfilling its mandate to aid those groups left out of traditional development programs. The foundation has been able to channel a large proportion of its total funds directly to its grantees. Administrative costs have never exceeded 15 percent of the budget. The average size of grants has remained small; over half were for amounts of under 50 thousand dollars. In many cases, small awards have meant the difference between success and failure for self-help projects affecting hundreds of families. Faced with these facts and figures, most experts agree that the IAF is one of the most cost-effective operations in the development-aid field.

Two related problems, however, have plagued the foundation since its beginning. The first is that staff members have not always obtained adequate information about the feasibility of particular projects or their likely local repercussions. Given the organization’s lack of permanent field representatives in the different countries, itinerant staff members became responsible for conducting research into the background and orientations of prospective grantees. In the early years in particular, isolation from the local academic communities deprived the IAF of a valuable source of counsel. The lack of national advisory boards meant that funding decisions were often made without systematic local consultation. Despite the commitment and expertise of field representatives, it was inevitable that important information would be overlooked. One such oversight led the foundation to fund a politically sensitive project on racial discrimination in Brazil that ultimately resulted in the organization’s expulsion from that country.
A second shortcoming was that initially too few resources were set aside for the evaluation of projects and for research on the foundation’s activities. Critics of the IAF suggested that it had not learned from experience or had not been prepared to share the results of those experiences with other agencies. In its own defense, the agency noted the trade-off that existed between extensive internal monitoring and low administrative costs. Nevertheless, the foundation took additional steps to satisfy its critics, particularly with the creation of a research and planning division shortly after Bell became president.

Reagan supporters have placed much less emphasis on these organizational shortcomings than on ideological objections. A report issued in November 1981 by the Heritage Foundation, a right-wing think-tank aiding the transition to the new administration, charged that the foundation had been supporting left-wing groups in Latin America and the Caribbean. The report cited the IAF’s support for cooperatives and worker-managed enterprises as evidence of the IAF’s “anti-market” philosophy. The report also argued that the IAF’s directors had been mistaken in assuming that the poor were capable of leading development projects. It suggested that the IAF “should acquire a new economic and political philosophy” and concluded, somewhat ominously, that senior staff and board members should “share the same philosophy.”

That statement foreshadowed the adoption by the Reagan administration of what was indeed its only available strategy for gaining control over this agency. The White House had already called for the resignations of its top administrative staff earlier in 1981, only to be informed by members of Congress that the administration had no direct jurisdiction over the IAF. At that time, two positions on its board were already open and two were due to fall vacant within the year. The White House nominated Victor Blanco, a California businessman whose apparent qualifications were limited to militant support of Republican candidates, as the new chairman of the board. Strong bipartisan support for Bell in Congress prevented the newly appointed board from taking any action until its meeting last December, during the congressional recess. By a vote of 4-2, perfectly split along partisan lines, the board then demanded Bell’s resignation.

As noted above, the removal of Peter Bell has drawn sharp criticism in Congress. Congressman Robert Garcia (D-New York) has charged that the administration was employing “the same tactic used against the Civil Rights Commission” to politicize an organization intended to serve an apolitical function. Other critics, including insiders like George Cabot Lodge, a former member of the IAF’s Advisory Committee who resigned over the incident, emphasized the likely harmful effects to the United States’ image in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Bell himself stated in his testimony before the House in September 1983, it had taken a long time to convince Latin American and Caribbean groups that the foundation was in fact insulated from short-term changes in U.S. policy. His removal from the presidency, whether or not it is followed by further changes like those recommended by the Heritage Foundation, may prove sufficient to discredit the foundation’s hard-won reputation of independence.

The Inter-American Foundation was an intelligent initiative. In a context dominated by top-heavy bureaucracies, it represented a new and agile style of foreign aid. For embattled Latin American scholars and researchers, it became both a crucial source of support and a symbol that someone in Washington was attentive to their needs and aspirations. Ironically, just as the few independent Argentine research centers attempt to staff positions in the newly elected government, the head of the only U.S. official agency with the vision to support them in their time of need has been forced out of office.

A set of short-term and long-term issues now confront both Congress and the Board of Directors of the IAF. Supporters of the foundation’s current staff and policies promise a congressional investigation into Bell’s forced resignation. Meanwhile, the board will probably attempt to impose new policies on a staff that is still loyal to IAF’s traditional goals. At issue in the long-run is the interpretation of the foundation’s mandate and whether the changes will contradict the intentions of Congress. The only certainty appears to be that the organization one congressman called “the jewel of United States development programs” is unlikely to emerge unscathed.

(Editor’s Note: The following letter was forwarded to Mr. Victor Blanco, chairman of the Board of Directors, Inter-American Foundation, on 13 December 1983 by the undersigned.

We, the undersigned members of the Executive Council of the Latin American Studies Association, express our concern about the recent removal of the president of the Inter-American Foundation, Peter Bell. His unwarranted firing raises several major issues:

1) The effectiveness of the IAF depends on its stature as an apolitical organization, one that is free of partisan political considerations in its decision making. The actions of the board in the case of Mr. Bell appear to be exclusively partisan.

2) The IAF was established by Congress in a bi-partisan effort to create a grassroots development agency that would reach beyond governmental agencies and touch the lives of the truly poor in Latin America. The integrity and autonomy from short-term policy considerations of the IAF was one of the principal mandates of the Congress. The summary removal of Mr. Bell violates the spirit of the congressional mandate.

3) The IAF funding of research on development issues has allowed a significant number of scholars to work at the grassroots level in Latin America. This could be accomplished only because of the nonpartisan nature of the sponsoring institution. The firing of Mr. Bell may compromise this important scholarship.

For these reasons, the following members of the Executive Council urge the Board of Directors to reconsider this unfortunate and potentially damaging decision. The future of the IAF depends on adhering to the principles established by the Congress in order to maintain an effective, nonpartisan development organization.

Helen L. Safa, president (University of Florida)
Wayne A. Cornelius, vice-president (University of California-San Diego)
Cornelia Butler Flora (Kansas State University)
James Malloy (University of Pittsburgh)
Carmen Diana Deere (University of Massachusetts)
David Scott Palmer (Foreign Service Institute)
Saúl Sosnowski (University of Maryland)
Norman Whitten (University of Illinois)
(Note: Copies of this letter were also sent to Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, Senators Robert Kasten, Nancy Kassebaum, Pete Wilson, Charles Mathias, Charles Percy, and Edward Kennedy; and Congressmen Robert Smith, Robert Michel, Michael Barnes, Dante Fascell, Jack Kemp, Henry González, Robert Garcia, Jake Pickle, and C. W. Bill Young.

(Editor's Note: LASA President Helen Safa and Vice-President Wayne Cornelius wrote letters to key congressional leaders protesting the summary dismissal of IAF President Peter Bell. The following letter is a response from Congressman Michael Barnes [D-Maryland], chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.)

I appreciate your thoughtful and caring letter on the Inter-American Foundation.

This problem has caused me a great deal of anguish, but I'm not sure how much we can do. We have been fighting for three years to avoid precisely this event, but we finally lost. It is true that the law contains statements of objectives for the Foundation that any fair minded person knows are being violated, but the more important fact is that the same law gives the President the authority to appoint the Board and the Board the power to appoint the President. The criteria and procedures to be employed are essentially left to the integrity of the actors, and these guys are bad actors. A willful and driven White House can destroy organizations like this if it is determined enough, and that is what is happening.

My colleague, Congressman Dante Fascell, and I are exploring every possibility we can think of to influence the selection of the new President and protect what is left of the integrity of the Foundation. Our basic weaknesses are, first, that the Foundation has no political clout behind it, and, second, that the only real power we have is to abolish the Foundation or cut off its funds if it is being misused, an outcome which would not particularly trouble the Administration.

Within those rather confining parameters, we are doing the best we can. We are announcing further hearings, and drafting possible amendments to the law. We appreciate your support, and we'll keep on fighting.

Sincerely,

Michael D. Barnes, chairman, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
Congress of the United States

REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION prepared by Prof. Alexander Wilde (Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame)

What Is Happening at the Foundation?

1) The removal of Peter Bell was an ideologically and politically motivated act. It was the first major decision of the Board of Directors in the foundation's thirteen-year history that was taken along strictly partisan lines, and, in effect, ended the foundation's nonpolitical, nonpartisan tradition.

2) Peter Bell's ouster is part of a longer-term effort by the radical Right to gain control of the foundation and impose its ideology on the foundation's activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. That effort began in earnest with a study undertaken by the Heritage Foundation in mid-1981. The concluding chapter of that study provides the blueprint for taking over the IAF now being followed by the administration and the board. The effort accelerated following the appointment in December 1981 of Victor Blanco, a right-wing Cuban-American businessman from Los Angeles, to the chairmanship of the foundation's board. From the outset of his tenure, Blanco made his intentions (and his lack of scruples in pursuing them) clear. With Peter Bell's removal, the way has been opened for other important changes in personnel and for major redirections of program activity.

3) Even in the short period since Peter Bell's departure, it has become clear that the kinds of program changes likely to be promoted by the board will include the reactivation of foundation grant-making in El Salvador in support of short-term U.S. policy there; the termination of grant assistance in Nicaragua except for support to groups in active opposition to the Sandinista government; curtailment of projects in support of social and economic research and legal assistance; and the funding of groups throughout Latin America and the Caribbean associated with the American Institute of Free Labor Development. Sizeable reductions in the IAF's fellowship programs are also to be expected.

What Are the Crucial Issues Facing the IAF?

1) Will the foundation's independence of short-term U.S. foreign policy be compromised? Indications are that the foundation's activities will be increasingly aligned with the Reagan administration's foreign policy objectives on Central America and elsewhere in the region. There is also the prospect that the foundation will be used to promote groups on the far right in Latin America and the Caribbean.

2) Will political and ideological considerations become part of the grant decision process?

3) Will the recruitment and assignment of foundation staff continue to be based on professional criteria or will personnel decisions be influenced by political and ideological considerations?

4) Will the foundation's publications maintain their intellectual integrity or be used to promote particular economic and social ideologies?

5) Will the foundation be able to maintain its bipartisan support in this country?

What Legislative Action Would Be Useful?

1) A hearing should seek to obtain commitments from IAF board members testifying that the procedures for selecting the new president will be open and honest; that high professional criteria will guide the choice; that political beliefs will not be taken into account; and most importantly, that the president will be named only by unanimous vote of the board (as was the case in the selection of Peter Bell and his predecessor, Bill Dyal).

2) Members of Congress should make it clear that they will be closely monitoring the actions of the foundation's board and that any violations of the foundation's institutional integrity or introduction of political considerations into its decision processes will be the subject of further hearings.

3) Congress should seek to identify legislative alternatives
that would further remove the foundation from partisan politics. Among the possibilities (none of which are fully satisfactory) are expanding the board membership, making board membership explicitly bipartisan, and setting some professional qualifications for the appointment of board members. Ideally, Congress might be able to find a way to reconstitute the foundation as a private 501(c)(3) organization.

4) Congress must express and demonstrate its willingness to deauthorize the foundation (i.e., end its existence) if there are no effective ways of maintaining its autonomy and integrity.

THE KISSINGER REPORT: VISIONS OF HISTORY THROUGH ALICE’S LOOKING GLASS
by E. Bradford Burns (Department of History, UCLA)

(Editor’s note: E. Bradford Burns is a professor of history at the University of California at Los Angeles. He recently participated in a workshop at the University of Southern California that analyzed the Kissinger Report [see the rapporteur’s summary published in this issue].)

For most people, the past is an impression: vague, amorphous, often confused. Everyone talks about the past; few study it. Among the population at large, that cavalier treatment of Clio is understandable, if lamentable. Among high government officials, such treatment is not only inexcusable but dangerous. The Kissinger Report on Central America mistreats history. It offers a vision of the region’s past as fanciful as though viewed through Alice’s looking glass. Fantasy has replaced fact; rationalization supplants reality.

In a search for the causes of the present isthmian crises, the Kissinger Report misses by three centuries the real origins of Central America’s political, economic, and social problems. Resurrecting the Black Legend, it confuses the peculiar history of an isolated and neglected Central America during the long colonial period with the broad trends notable in the more dynamic and commercially active areas of colonial Latin America. Central America constituted an unusual exception in the Latin American colonial experience. Iberian institutions rested lightly on a region never well integrated into the Spanish trading system. The plantation export system was the exception in colonial Central America, not the rule.

While the Spanish colonial system provided no Eden for the Indians or ladinos, its consequences for them were minimal in comparison with the deculturization, wholesale loss of land, and the forced labor that characterized their lot in the late nineteenth century. The Kissinger Report insists that the overextended estates of the few, the landless rural workers, monoculture, and export dependency resulted from Central America’s colonial past, while a more historically satisfactory explanation traces them to the region’s rapid incorporation into the capitalist marketplace of the North Atlantic nations during the last decades of the nineteenth century. However, the commission’s interpretation is meant to do more than advocate a historical perspective. It complements the report’s recommendations.

To blame the Spanish colonial system rather than the realities of nineteenth-century capitalism and the type of modernization and export-oriented economies selected by the Central American elites simplifies the task of the Kissinger Commission as well as enhances its recommendations. Those recommendations support, probably even strengthen, the export sector of the Central American economy with massive investments, loans, and aid. Thus, the Kissinger Report recommends buttressing those very institutions inherited from the nineteenth century that cause and deepen the current crises. This misinterpretation of the past constitutes the fatal flaw in the commission’s recommendations for the future. The doctor prescribes medicine that will compound, not cure, the ailment.

A second major historical error arises from the commission’s failure to learn from the experience of the Alliance for Progress. The report alternately praises and castigates the alliance. Yet, it concludes, “The Alliance for Progress was a major force for modernization and development.” The historical record simply does not substantiate that claim.

Launched in 1961 largely as a response to the appeal throughout Latin America of the Cuban Revolution, the alliance professed noble goals: economic development, democracy, and social justice. It failed despite the expenditure of billions of dollars. The traditional oligarchy clearly showed that it had no intention of freely volunteering to give away or sell its lands, to tax itself more heavily or to share power with a broader base of the population. A decade after the alliance’s creation, there were more military dictatorships and less evidence of democracy than at any time in recent memory. In a ten-year span, military rule replaced thirteen constitutional governments. The United States lavishly supported the Latin American military. More than two-thirds of the alliance funds went to military dictators or to military-controlled civilian governments, despite the intention that funds would be used to buttress democracy.

Economically, the area’s condition was more precarious in 1971 than it was in 1961. The rate of growth per capita over the decade averaged a pitiful 1.8 percent, lower than in the years before the alliance and lower than the 2.5 percent target of the alliance. Senator Frank Church, then chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, voiced the dismay of many. “We thought we were seeding the resurgence of democratic governments; instead, we have seen a relentless slide toward militarism. We thought we could remodel Latin societies, but the reforms we prescribed have largely eluded us,” he said.

Defying the lessons of history, the Kissinger Report
recommends aid, trade, investments, and military training as a major contribution to the solution of Central America’s crises. In short, it would have the U.S. policy of the 1980s repeat the experiences of the 1960s. The report never reveals why policies that failed two decades ago would work today. Here, though, Henry Kissinger’s boast of offering a bipartisan report rings true. A Democratic administration concocted the ideas in 1961, and a Republican administration has warmed them up in order to re-serve them in 1984.

As might be expected, the report dwells at some length on Nicaragua. It repeats old myths about the Nicaraguan past, while adding a few eye-popping historical interpretations of its own. In one of the very few references to the many, frequent, and occasionally prolonged interventions of the United States in Central America, the report insists that the United States intervened in Nicaragua in 1909 to restore stability. No basis in fact exists for this interpretation, although it serves to illustrate the old observation that the conqueror rewrites history to suit his own ends. In point of fact, Nicaragua under the long Liberal rule of José Santos Zelaya (1893-1909) enjoyed the first period of real stability, economic growth, and modernization in its history. In truth, U.S. intervention was much more closely related to Zelaya’s abrasive nationalism, his cavalier treatment of U.S. investors, and his flirtation with the Germans, English, and Japanese in an effort to interest them in building a canal across Nicaragua. To credit Luis Somoza with political “pluralism and freedom” constitutes a historical generosity or a mental gymnastics that exits the reader’s lust for footnotes.

The report reserves its most abusive and inflammatory language for Nicaragua. It threatens that if Nicaragua does not conform to U.S. demands, force will be used: “Nicaragua must be aware that force remains an ultimate recourse.” Does it do so because Nicaragua exposes another of the report’s major contradictions? Chapter V, “Human Development,” stands as one of the noblest parts of the report. Denouncing “widespread” hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, poor health, and wretched housing, it calls for an energetic campaign to eliminate or at least to reduce these social scandals. While expressing great hope, the report suggests one remedy: the expenditure of vast sums of money. Here, as throughout, the report fails to come to grips with the fundamental reality that only basic institutional changes, not aid, can eliminate the harsh economic and social realities that haunt the majority of the population. Under present conditions, an inflow of funds will benefit those who control the present institutions, widening still farther the yawning gap between the privileged few and the impoverished majority. Further, the report refuses to recognize that Nicaragua has made impressive efforts to improve the social and economic conditions for the majority of its population, precisely because it has made the requisite and essential institutional reforms. Playing the ostrich, the report denies this Nicaraguan experience despite the fact that it is by now a historic reality.

In Nicaragua between 1979 and 1983, literacy jumped from 50 to 90 percent; the number of schools doubled; the number of public libraries quintupled; 40 percent of the population was in school; and all education from prekindergarten through graduate studies was free. The number of health centers has multiplied from 26 to 99; infant mortality has fallen by 50 percent; diphtheria, measles, and polio, until a few years ago major cripplers of children, have disappeared; life expectancy has increased from 55.2 to 57.6 years.

In 1983, the World Health Organization cited Nicaragua as a model country for its advances in health care. Between July 1979 and July 1982, corn production rose 10 percent; bean, 45 percent; and rice, 50 percent. The consumption of these three basics of the Nicaraguan diet climbed 33, 40, and 30 percent, respectively. Nicaragua came closer to self-sufficiency in food than any of the other Central American nations. Based on figures for infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy, the Overseas Development Council in Washington, DC, calculated that, between 1978 and 1983, Nicaragua made the most impressive gains of all the Latin American nations in the Physical Quality of Life Index: a jump of 16 points from 53 to 69. Such a leap is possible only if health and educational services are widely distributed throughout the population of the country.

These statistics and achievements contrast sharply with the harsh realities of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. The report repeatedly praises Honduras as a struggling democracy. Yet, while Honduras arms itself, militarily intervenes in El Salvador, and supports the incursions of counterrevolutionaries into Nicaragua, the grim social statistics from that nation reveal that its population is literally starving to death. Fully 50 percent of Honduran children die before their fifth birthday. Containing a fifth of the nation’s population, the eight poorest departments count on the service of only 28 physicians. Every index from Honduras screams social collapse. None of the social improvements enjoyed by the majority of Nicaraguans for the past four years finds even a remote echo in the Honduran experience. Nonetheless, the report treats Nicaragua as an outcast, when, perhaps, it should be emulated as an example. The report never addresses its basic contradiction of encouraging “human development” as a major goal while vehemently denouncing the nation that has done the most to achieve that goal in the past four years.

The report’s discussion of the economic crises, past and present, is weak but also deceptive. It slights the major economic causes of the convulsions of the early 1930s. They resulted primarily from the vulnerability of the plantation export economies and the refusal of the elites, buttressed by the military, to alter the discredited institutions accentuating that vulnerability. Their loyalty to inflexible institutions that benefited the few and burdened the many already had become well-established political and economic realities on the isthmus. The report lays the blame for the contemporary economic crises on the population increase, falling world prices for agricultural exports, and the high cost of oil. While these factors contribute to the economic problems, they are not the origin of them. Again, the report avoids coming to terms with the basic historical causes of economic distress: an emphasis on the export sector, a reliance on two or three primary exports, a dependency that takes most economic decision-making out of the hands of the Central Americans themselves, and the strength of iniquitous institutions, foremost of which are those affecting land and labor use.

The report fails to confront the historical reality that, while
there has been periodic growth, economic development has
never occurred. With all its emphasis on the need for
investment, the report neglects to mention that the economies
historically have been drained by excessive profit remittances
abroad, high foreign interest rates, and the expatriation of
profits and funds by the elites and the middle class.

With a glance at the past, the report laments the United
States' neglect of Central America and hopes to rectify that
error. That ambition may cause all Central Americans to quake.
If the members of the Kissinger Commission have no historical
memories, the Central Americans all too vividly recall that
"neglect" has meant repeated and lengthy interventions, direct
and indirect, in their affairs. After all, the United States
governed Nicaragua directly from 1909 to 1933 and indirectly
through the Somoza dynasty and the Guardia Nacional from
1933 to 1979, or for seventy of the eighty-four years of the
twentieth century. That lengthy attention hardly denotes
neglect. The report does not explain why during that long
involvement the United States encouraged neither democracy
nor development. No historian has accurately counted the
number of times the U.S. Marines have landed in Central
America, the U.S. Navy has bombarded Central American
ports, or the CIA has manipulated local politics. Neglect has
not characterized U.S. behavior toward Central America in the
twentieth century, although one might conclude that the
members of the Kissinger Commission have neglected to read
Central American history.

The major historical "howler" of the report concerns not
Central America but Mexico. In a masterstroke of historical
revisionism, the report states that the United States welcomed
the Mexican Revolution as an "approved" indigenous revolution
(as opposed to the unapproved, foreign-inspired and dominated
revolutions of Guatemala, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua).
Latin American history texts indicate the form that welcome
took: the U.S. Navy bombarded and occupied Veracruz, while
blockading the ports on the Gulf of Mexico; the U.S. Army
invaded Mexico; Washington brought every diplomatic pressure
possible to bear on Mexico; the U.S. press, public, and
government throughout the 1920s and well into the 1930s
complained bitterly, loudly, and frequently that the Bolsheviks
dominated the Mexican Revolution. They viewed Mexico as
nothing less than an outpost of Soviet Communism in the New
World. Once again, the report distorts historical fact for
political expediency.

Alice's looking glass does not provide an acceptable vision of
Central American reality, past or present. Clearly, the
Kissinger Report did not draw on history in order to reach its
consclusions and recommendations. Rather, it shaped history to
fit them. If the report's recommendations are adopted, their
failure to heed history's lessons will cause the United States to
repeat the past with all its errors. The Kissinger Report will alert
all historians of the Latin American past to the monumental
educational task confronting them.

THE KISSINGER COMMISSION REPORT: UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
by Ann L. Craig (Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego)

The report of the National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America (the Kissinger Commission report) is being
used to legitimize and build Congressional support for the
Reagan administration's military and economic assistance
proposals for Central America. This carefully crafted document
is intended to confine the national debate about Central
American policy within a narrow national security framework.
In order to influence this debate, scholars must be prepared to
engage in a constructive discussion of the fundamental
assumptions of the report—especially its assumptions about the
nature of the "crises" in the region—before addressing the
specific policy recommendations deriving from them.

The Kissinger Commission's report contains a series of
assumptions about the nature of the economic, political, and
security crises in Central America, and about the kinds of
public policies that can help resolve them. This essay
summarizes, and briefly critiques, the most fundamental
premises of the report. These and other assumptions in the
report can be debated on theoretical, empirical, and historical
grounds; other essays appearing in this issue of the Forum
begin that necessary task.

The Economic Crisis

The commission defines the economic crisis in Latin
America as primarily a crisis of growth. The 1960s and early
1970s are portrayed as a period of positive economic change in
Central America, characterized by high aggregate growth rates
and expansion led by the private sector. However, this growth
was not sustained long enough to satisfy rising expectations.
Declining growth was precipitated by the international economic
recession (including rising interest rates and petroleum price
increases, weak demand, and lower prices for exports),
intragional tensions, economic management problems, and
excessive foreign debt. This analysis is vitally important to the
commission's long-term policy recommendations.

Nowhere does the report argue that the pattern of economic
growth, investment, or trade during this period was necessarily
self-limiting. The report does state that the benefits of this
pattern of growth were inequitably distributed. But it concludes
that it was primarily expectations frustrated by the failure to
grow fast enough that produced grievances, which, in turn,
became fertile ground for those "who wished to exploit the
crisis for their own advantage" (p. 25). It therefore undertakes
no structural analysis of the region's economic problems, nor
any extensive proposals for reform.

The commission's policy recommendations for the economic
crisis reflect a deep faith in trade-led aggregate economic
growth centered on the private sector. It strongly supports
stabilization measures to maintain debt service, rebuild damaged
infrastructure, and increase productive capacity. The specific
prescription is to provide large sums of assistance to ease the
burden of debt repayment, followed by loans, guarantees, and
investments to facilitate imports and exports, to encourage
domestic savings and investment, to support the private sector,
to encourage regional economic integration, and (at the bottom of the list) to assist producer cooperatives.

These recommendations are based on more specific economic assumptions of which the following three are the most important: international economic and financial conditions will continue to improve (a necessary precondition for trade-led growth); increasing proportions of public sector expenditures should go to support the private sector; new financial resources are best allocated to investment rather than consumption.

No economic or social performance conditions are attached to the commission's recommendations. Nor does the report propose strong incentives for U.S. investors to redirect their investments to the region. Nor are adequate assurances given that U.S. trade barriers would be lowered for exports from the region.

Several observations can be made about the commission's economic policy recommendations and their potential consequences. First, by making the private sector engaged in international trade the principal early beneficiary of economic assistance, the U.S. government risks strengthening the hand of those who resist reform and contributing further to capital flight from the region. Second, despite the professed objective of increasing aggregate economic growth in Central America, the commission's "ambitious but realistic target" is to recapture 1980 per capita income levels by 1990. Third, while the diagnosis and prescription are region-wide, the principal beneficiaries of the economic assistance will be El Salvador and Honduras. The main institution proposed to coordinate development assistance, the Central American Development Organization (CADO), would be a regional economic organization composed of private sector and government representatives from those countries in the region that demonstrate their commitment to democracy by periodically holding "competitive" elections. Finally, while the report refers frequently to the need for indigenous solutions to economic (and security) problems, the recommendations most likely to be funded would continue to underscore U.S. predominance. For example, only one-fourth of U.S. assistance would be channeled through CADO; the remainder would continue to take the form of bilateral aid.

The Political Crisis

The commission explicitly defines the political challenge in Central America as a crisis of governmental legitimacy, meaning disagreement about who should rule and how governments should be selected and organized. This presumes that the central political conflict in the region revolves around ascension to power and not the uses of public office; around electoral procedures and not ideologies. According to the commission, this political crisis is rooted in the Spanish colonial heritage of authoritarianism, from which the Latin American republics can emerge only gradually. This misrepresents Central American history and absolves both United States policy and Central American elites from major responsibility for the political conflict.

The prescription flowing from the commission's diagnosis of Central America's political crisis is familiar. The U.S. government is urged to provide support for democracy in the region. The operational definition of democracy in the report is popular participation in free elections involving competing political parties, elections that are not subject to "outside" pressure (from Marxist-Leninist governments or revolutionary groups). The definition is also extended at various points to include free and democratic trade unions, strong judicial systems, freedom of expression, and respect for human rights. Countries in which the political process does not meet these standards would be denied direct U.S. economic assistance as well as membership in regional development organizations. By employing a procedural definition of the crisis, and selectively applying its own standard for democracy, the commission is able to contend that "democracy" is on the rise everywhere in Central America—except Nicaragua.

The Security Crisis

The real political crisis that the commission perceives becomes apparent in the final section of the report, dealing with security problems. The most fundamental and pervasive premises of the report are those relating to United States national security interests in the region. These are the key assumptions intended to justify U.S. involvement in the economic and political crises outlined above. They explain the report's focus on El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the concentration of its assistance recommendations on the former. The treatment of issues of humanitarian relief (refugees) and human rights violations must also be regarded as a consequence of the commission's formulation of the security issues at stake in the region.

The first of the commission's security assumptions is that U.S. national security interests are not threatened by authentic, indigenous social reforms (or revolutions), nor by the legitimate social, economic, or political grievances of Latin Americans on which such revolutions may be based. In the limiting language of the report, however, these indigenous revolutions remain purely hypothetical. Marxist-Leninist insurgencies are equated in the report with externally supported guerrilla insurgencies, which do pose security threats to the United States. "External involvement" is taken to include a wide range of activities including providing political advice or sanctuary for insurgents, training them and providing ammunition for them.

In the commission's view (see pp. 86-88 of the report), it is the "external involvement" of revolutionary groups or governments espousing foreign ideologies that makes the current conflicts in Central America fundamentally different from "authentic" social revolutions. ("Indeed, if wretched conditions were themselves enough to create such insurgencies, we would see them in many more countries of the world.") The commission argues that the current conflicts in Central America are occurring because external actors have taken advantage of preconditions for indigenous revolution and turned social conflicts over these problems to their own purpose and advantage. The involvement of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua transforms indigenous conflicts into an attempt to impose totalitarianism. ("The insurgents, if they win, will create a totalitarian regime in the image of their sponsors' ideology and their own.") Finally, such revolutions "develop their own momentum, independent of the conditions on which they feed." Therefore, and this is critical for the commission's
recommendations, "once an insurgency is fully under way, and once the lines of external support are in place, it has a momentum which reforms alone cannot stop. Unchecked, the insurgents can destroy faster than the reformers can build."

From this most basic premise about the security implications of authentic vs. externally supported revolutions, two further assumptions follow: one about U.S. national security, another about the security of Central American governments. The first of these is that the survival of the Nicaraguan regime poses long-term, land-based, strategic threat to the United States. The commission anticipates that the threat could take a variety of forms. Nicaragua is a potential military ally and base for Cuba and the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere in the event of a bipolar conventional war. Short of that, Nicaragua could endanger critical military and trade sea lanes passing through the Caribbean. The commission is also concerned that planning for this unlikely eventuality would require the United States to fortify its southern land border, redeploying military resources away from other theaters of conflict.

The commission concludes that the most proximate security danger that the Nicaraguan revolutionary government poses is to its neighbors in the region. Nicaragua is regarded as an agent for externally supported social revolutions in Central America. Then, having defined the conflict in El Salvador as such a revolution, the commission concludes (implicitly) that neither power sharing nor stalemate is an acceptable outcome for the conflict in El Salvador.

By defining the long-term security threat as externally supported revolutionary governments that would inevitably become Cuba-Soviet military allies in Central America, the commission’s policy recommendations necessarily turn on eliminating this potential military capability at its roots. By misrepresenting the U.S.-Soviet agreement that concluded the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the commission eliminates the option of a negotiated settlement to prevent the installation of a Cuban or Soviet military presence in the region. And by defining all armed attempts to address political and economic grievances as necessarily externally supported, the commission opts to eliminate the conflict rather than the grievances themselves.

Under the commission’s recommended approach to dealing with the security crisis, El Salvador would receive massive infusions of direct foreign assistance, and Nicaragua would remain the target of continuing international political and economic pressure. While the commission extends its support to the Contadora negotiations process, its assumptions directly contradict the working premises of the Contadora Group. Furthermore, the promise of massive assistance from the United States reduces the incentives to engage in a negotiated settlement and reasserts U.S. hegemony in the region.

Although the commission advocates regional solutions to the security crisis, it makes no specific recommendations to this end. Nowhere does the report mention the administration’s apparent policy of developing a permanent regional military training capability in Honduras, nor the massive joint troop maneuvers based there, which reportedly will continue indefinitely.

Conclusion

For Latin Americanists, the working assumptions of the Kissinger Commission are hauntingly familiar. Only the extended treatment of the debt issue, and the relatively reduced emphasis on social reform, distinguish these proposals from the Alliance for Progress. The report does not forge creative responses to the region’s problems. It is a throwback to old policies and to fundamentally mistaken assumptions that will do little to improve the welfare of impoverished Central Americans, or to advance the legitimate long-term interests of the United States in the region. By increasing U.S. military commitments and U.S.-financed flows of arms into the region, the commission’s recommendations, if implemented, might lead only to a dramatic regional escalation of the war. Given the security risks it identifies, this is a possibility the commission was prepared to contemplate. (“In this case, we can expect negotiations to succeed only if those we seek to persuade have a clear understanding that there are circumstances in which the use of force, by the United States or by others, could become necessary as a last resort”, p. 107.) To avoid this possibility, effective opposition to the commission’s report must propose a politically viable, narrowed, alternative statement of U.S. security interests in the region.

THE KISSINGER REPORT: A FIRST APPRAISAL
Notes from a Workshop at the University of Southern California (15-16 January 1984)
Prepared by Richard Stahler-Sholk (University of California-Berkeley)

(Editor’s note: The following is excerpted from the rapporteur’s summary of a workshop held on 15-16 January 1984 at the University of Southern California to evaluate the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, the "Kissinger Report.” Twenty-one specialists on Latin America and U.S. foreign policy from a variety of disciplines and political perspectives analyzed the report in off-the-record sessions. For more information or a full transcript of the report, please contact Prof. Abraham F. Loventhal, School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0043, who chaired the meeting.)

Introduction

From the outset of its discussions, the USC group recognized that the Kissinger Report—released in an election year, at a time of mounting public and congressional concern over current U.S. policy in Central America—is inevitably a political document. Therefore, in addition to reviewing the report’s recommendations, workshop participants also discussed the context in which the report was written and its likely impact on U.S. policy.

The Kissinger Commission was organized by the Reagan administration ostensibly as a bipartisan examination of
administration policy in Central America. The administration clearly hoped that the bipartisan character of the Kissinger Commission—like the administration’s previous commissions on social security and the MX missile—would lend sufficient credibility to its conclusions to overcome dissent, or at least to provide some breathing space for a continuation of current policy. Workshop participants felt, however, that rather than ending debate, the Kissinger Report should be viewed as a starting point for public reexamination of U.S. policy in Central America.

Participants generally believed that the Report of the Kissinger Commission would not significantly expand bipartisan support for U.S. policy in Central America. Unlike the two previous “bipartisan commissions” used by the Reagan Administration, the Kissinger Commission was composed of people with little or no expertise in the field and maintained only limited liaison with Congress. The commission’s fact-finding efforts, in terms both of travel in the region and of consultation with area specialists, were less than thorough. Workshop participants who received questionnaires from the commission, for example, found that major issues raised in the questionnaires were not addressed in the Kissinger Report. The inadequacy of the commission’s review of evidence is reflected in the fact that the report professes ignorance as to whether the U.S. government is supporting the contras in Honduras. Historians participating in the workshop were dismayed by the selective rewriting of Central American history in the report. Overall, perhaps the most striking feature of the report is its vagueness. By fuzzing over tough policy dilemmas, the report overstates the degree of policy consensus—yet even with this technique, most of the commission members felt constrained to add individual interpretations or clarifications of the crucial points, and several dissented on major issues.

The main conclusions of the Kissinger Report are that leftist insurgencies in Central America represent a grave threat to U.S. national security, and that U.S. military assistance in the region should be substantially increased. The report also recommends (in language reminiscent of the Alliance for Progress) a massive infusion of economic aid; however, the figures proposed are so large, and the purposes so imprecisely specified, that this recommendation has little chance of passing Congress. The report refers to possible diplomatic solutions, but only in passing. The political use of the report—which is at least as important as its content—will probably be to rationalize protracted U.S. military involvement in Central America.

Workshop participants saw two different reports within the Kissinger Report. Although part of the document touches on such issues as human rights, redistribution of income, the Contadora process, debt, etc., the thrust of the report is contained in what one workshop participant called “the paragraphs marked ‘K’”: paragraphs that emphasize military challenges and responses. The likely impact of the report within Central America will be to signal the revolutionary movements that the United States has no intention of pursuing meaningful negotiations; to undermine the Contadora negotiating process; and to signal to the recipients of U.S. military aid that they can count on continued backing even without progress toward social reforms, as long as they keep alive the specter of a Cuban-Soviet threat.

Economic Policy

The Kissinger Report’s economic recommendations are based on an overly optimistic set of assumptions. With regard to factors external to the Central American economies, the report assumes: 1) that interest rates will not rise sharply; 2) that half of Central America’s interest payments on the foreign debt will be voluntarily rolled over by international financial institutions; 3) that this rollover can be accomplished by means of the policies recommended in the report; 4) that the world economy and Central American exports will recover; 5) that private and non-U.S. international financial sources will be available for new financing; and 6) that the international financial system will successfully accommodate the Latin American super debt.

On the internal side, the report assumes: 1) that Central America’s armed conflicts will quickly end; 2) that there will be no more destruction of infrastructure; 3) that the governments of Central America will have no problem stabilizing fiscal and monetary policies in the future; and 4) that capital flight will be stemmed.

These assumptions lead to some basic inconsistencies in the Kissinger Report. For example, the assumption that the insurgency (with the associated capital flight and destruction of infrastructure) will end suggests a military solution to the region’s economic crisis. This dovetails with the overall argument of the report that the insurgency can be defeated if external supplies are cut off and U.S. military involvement is increased. Stability is seen as a prerequisite to socioeconomic development; yet stability is narrowly viewed in the Kissinger Report in terms of military defeat of Central America’s revolutionary movements. The paradox is that escalating military conflict works against socioeconomic development.

A second overall inconsistency in the report stems from the assumption that there will be little or no economic growth in the region, coupled with the recognition that redistribution is essential. Redistribution without growth suggests an absolute drop in upper income levels. Yet the report fails to address the difficult question of how to change power structures in such a way as to allow meaningful socioeconomic reforms.

A third basic inconsistency built into the economic section of the report is reflected in the absence of apparent links between the report’s economic, social welfare, and aid proposals. While a number of particular proposals in each of these sections have merit, these parts of the report are not designed to be mutually reinforcing. For example, the proposal for $8 billion in U.S. aid over the 1985-1990 period is not linked to discussion of economic development strategies. Workshop participants agreed that the issue of structural reform cannot be isolated from the question of Central America’s needs for external financing.

A fourth basic inconsistency in the report revolves around the apparent failure of the Kissinger Commission squarely to face policy tradeoffs. For example, the report refers to U.S. economic, political, and security policies in the region as a “seamless web.” Yet the question of whether U.S. military aid should be made conditional upon progress toward human rights and socioeconomic reforms, for example, is ambiguously answered in the report. Compounding the ambiguity are the footnote appended to the report by Dr. Kissinger and two other commission members, and the White House’s preemptive
announcement of the administration’s intention to ignore any such recommendation of conditionality.

Bearing in mind these basic inconsistencies, workshop participants assessed the economic policies proposed in the Kissinger Report with regard to aid, trade, finance, and investment.

The most striking economic proposal is the report’s call for $8 billion in economic aid to Central America for the five-year period beginning in 1985. Workshop participants found this proposal not only unrealistic in the context of U.S. domestic politics, but also vague in its design.

The report does not even specify, for example, how much of this aid is to take the form of grants and how much will take the form of loans. A more fundamental flaw in the aid proposal is that it misunderstands the special nature of Central America’s economic crisis. The Kissinger Report incorrectly implies that Central America’s economic problems are simply a part of the general Latin American debt problem. The report overstates the impact of the world recession, relative to Central American regional problems. To a much larger degree than Mexico and other Latin American debtor countries, the Central American debt is financed by the multilateral development banks. Declining terms of trade have had a major impact on the primary product-exporting Central American area. Coffee export earnings have been particularly affected in the years since the temporary increase caused by the 1975 Brazilian frost. Other particular aspects of the Central American economic crisis include Costa Rica’s special adjustment problems, and the costs of war (reflected in the fact that El Salvador and Nicaragua have registered much larger drops in real per capita income in recent years than have other countries in the area).

Because it misunderstands the nature of the problem, the report’s aid solution is inappropriate. The report improperly suggests that balance-of-payments support can be automatically translated into economic development. The report’s recommendations are reminiscent of the underlying premise of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), namely, that the external availability of foreign exchange is the principal determinant of economic viability. The idea of using massive amounts of aid to help Central America make interest payments on foreign debts and to compensate for declining terms of trade, rather than directly addressing the debt and trade problems, smacks of robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The report’s aid proposal separates the issues of balance of payments support and economic development from the problems of structural reform. For example, there is scant discussion of agrarian reform and the critical need to increase production of foodstuffs in Central America. The report does not discuss whether and how U.S. aid might be used to help Central American governments provide compensation for expropriation that is carried out as part of the process of agrarian reform.

The Kissinger Report does not specify precisely the mix of economic and security assistance proposed. It is unclear how much of the proposed $8 billion would be military-related. More importantly, the report does not consider how massive infusions of military aid (the figure of $400 million for 1984-85 is mentioned) will affect the economies of Central America, given the limited absorptive capacity of those economies. The experience of South Vietnam suggests that massive military aid will contribute to inflation, bloated imports, and a host of socially distorting effects. One economist argues that giving economic and military aid to Central America, rather than being complementary, is analogous to applying leeches and giving transfusions at the same time; the more aid for counterinsurgency, the more economic aid will be required. Another participant pointed out that significant progress could be made toward development simply by cutting off the flow of funds from Miami to right-wing death squads in El Salvador.

The report’s proposal for channeling a portion of the aid package through a new Central American Development Organization (CADO) is problematical. The Kissinger Commission’s suggested criteria for participation in CADO are open to subjective interpretation. Under U.S. leadership, CADO would surely exclude Nicaragua, thus detracting from the regional character of the proposed development strategy. The security orientation of the proposed aid package is reinforced by the caveat that specifically notes that the United States would not be bound by CADO or any other performance criteria in determining bilateral U.S. aid policy. Workshop participants were divided on the question of whether the Kissinger Report attached human rights or other conditions to the aid proposals—perhaps reflecting the ambiguous language of the report.

The proposed Central American Development Organization is not unlike CIAP in that it presupposes the notion of development radiating out bilaterally from the United States; the hub of CADO is clearly the United States. Yet the Kissinger Report does not examine the problems raised by this approach under the Alliance for Progress. Rather than recommending a program of people-to-people aid, which has proved to be effective in the Inter-American Foundation’s approach, the Kissinger Report fails to specify how aid under CADO would be disbursed.

Regarding the trade proposals contained in the report, workshop participants agreed that these proposals added little to the existing Caribbean Basin Initiative. Even Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, the sole economist on the Kissinger Commission, lamented the “timidity” of the trade proposals in his dissenting footnote. One workshop participant speculated that the commission’s reluctance to endorse new trade preferences reflected political caution. Others argued that meaningful trade proposals would have to involve commodity price stabilization arrangements, a revision of the U.S. sugar quota system, and a regional approach to development that would allow the reactivation of Central America trade. Although such an approach might have domestic economic (and political) costs in the United States, participants pointed out that these costs were minor compared to the grave national security threat that the Kissinger Report sought to portray.

In reviewing the report’s discussion of Central America’s financial problems, workshop participants observed that the report largely overlooked the role of U.S. domestic economic policy, which is the single most important instrument for addressing those problems. One participant pointed out that the United States government is currently financing one-half of its
huge deficit with the entry of foreign capital—a policy that will surely complicate efforts to reduce interest rates.

Regarding investment, workshop participants were skeptical about the likelihood of stimulating more private investment in the region through such policies as increasing insurance provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The report’s proposals for rebuilding infrastructure in the region are inadequate, and heavily military in practical application. Only an end to the insurgency in the region can bring the kind of stability necessary to renew investment in Central America. There are several conceivable ways in which the insurgency can end; yet the Kissinger Report focuses predominantly on its military defeat. The economic section of the report as a whole hinges on the security argument that is at its core, and many workshop participants found that security argument unconvincing.

Workshop participants outlined six policies that would represent a positive alternative to the economic policies proposed in the Kissinger Report. First, instead of a massive aid program, more could be accomplished with less money if the aid were used to set up a Central American fund to capture regional savings. Second, aid should be targeted for production of wage goods and for self-help development projects without military application. Third, effort should be concentrated on increasing Central America’s export possibilities. The United States could shift its pattern of imports in favor of Central America, expanding the provisions of the CBI. Newly industrialized countries in Asia that will be phased out of the United States’ Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 1985 under existing sunset legislation could be particularly encouraged to take advantage of liberalized CBI trade opportunities. Fourth, economic development strategies should be explicitly linked to social change and particularly agrarian reform. Fifth, military deescalation is essential. Sixth, the United States should encourage a reactivation of regional trade, which would require that Nicaragua not be excluded from the development plans for Central America. Gert Rosenthal, economist at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), has estimated that only about $70 million would be required to revive the Central America Common Market and reivate regional trade. Rather than focusing on the United States as the economic axis on which the region turns, a more effective development strategy would emphasize the reintegration of Central American economic activity.

Issues Ignored or Dodged in the Report

The Kissinger Report is in some ways a useful starting point for discussion of U.S. policy in Central America. The report catalogues economic, political, and security issues in such a way that, if the report had an index, almost anyone interested in Central America would find an entry for her or his particular area of concern. Yet the report greatly oversimplifies the Central American crisis by omitting inconvenient facts and skirting the toughest policy dilemmas.

The historical section of the report is seriously flawed, as has been noted above. Because the long history of U.S. intervention in Central America has been sanitized in the report, the document misinterprets the authentic nationalism and even anti-U.S. sentiments that are often associated with revolutionary movements in the region. The report omits mention of the region’s historical efforts toward unification and the U.S. role in exploiting intraregional conflict. Since the historical section skips over the emergence and development of “mass organizations” and popular front movements throughout the 1970s, the report fails to appreciate the fundamentally indigenous quality of Central American revolutionary movements. These omissions and selective interpretations shape the underlying premises of the report.

The policy questions that the report avoids (some by explicit disclaimer, others implicitly) can be divided into two categories: 1) What is the nature of U.S. interests in Central America?, and 2) How can U.S. policies further policy objectives?

The Kissinger Report defines U.S. interests primarily in security terms, arguing that Central America poses a major threat to the national security interests of the United States. For the most part, workshop participants tended to agree that U.S. economic stakes in the area were minimal, and to differ with the report’s conclusions about the extent of the threat to U.S. security interests. More fundamentally, however, workshop participants agreed that the Kissinger Report failed to adequately specify the nature and limits of U.S. security interests in Central America—thus weakening the underlying logic of the report.

For example, the report is unclear as to whether U.S. security is threatened by the ideology per se of revolutionary movements and regimes in Central America, or by their potential military alignment with the Soviet Union. The Kissinger Report asserts the importance of preserving the “moral authority” of the United States in Central America, without clarifying how this relates to U.S. interests. This ambiguity leaves open the important question of whether the United States can live with independent radical-nationalist governments in Central America.

Are Marxist regimes automatically a threat, or is the threat limited to Soviet installation of military bases or major offensive weapons?

Many workshop participants felt that nationalist and even anti-U.S. movements in Central America should be given an alternative to being pro-Soviet. Some argued that the historical enmity of the United States toward progressive forces in the region has made them inevitably anti-U.S., but that the United States can deal with (and perhaps even act to moderate) Marxist-Leninist regimes—as with parts of Eastern Europe, the Eurocommunist movement, Surinam, Angola, Portugal, Sudan, Somalia, Guinea, etc. In the workshop’s public session, one questioner suggested that such regimes tend to “come of age,” becoming less hostile toward the United States and distancing themselves from the Soviet Union, as in the case of China. A few participants argued that the strategic importance of Caribbean sea lanes and Central America’s proximity to the United States make the region special and in a special case. Others countered that Central America’s geographical proximity is a factor that is not only not new, but also probably less relevant than previously, given today’s technology; and that in any case, the security argument hinged on an implausible scenario involving a Cuban/Soviet conventional military attack in Central America. Although workshop participants disagreed among themselves
as to precisely how U.S. security interests out to be defined, they agreed that the Kissinger Report failed to address these questions.

The Kissinger Report is also vague on the broad question of how proposed policy instruments are expected to further U.S. objectives. For example, this logical connection is missing for three important issues: human rights conditioning, aid to the contras in Honduras, and economic development strategies for the region. Perhaps this imprecision—essential for the thin consensus achieved by the Kissinger Report—is at the root of the dissenting footnotes at the end of the report.

In examining the unexamined connections between means and ends on these three points, workshop participants found the problems to be more complicated than the Kissinger Report suggests. First, how can military support for the contras lead to negotiations to reduce the potential security threat on the Nicaraguan border? The report’s description of the somocistas as “democratic” forces obscures a real contradiction between U.S. policy goals and instruments. Workshop participants rejected the idea of U.S. support for the contras. Second, how can unconditional military aid bring progress toward necessary social and political reforms in El Salvador? Again, the Kissinger Report’s reference to a “humane anti-guerrilla strategy” (page 96) obscures this contradiction. Third, how can the Kissinger Report’s economic proposals, stressing balance-of-payments support that might be more appropriate for Mexico, further the goal of economic development in Central America? Economic assistance must be tied to structural reforms—however inconvenient this may be for the security forces and economic elites of Central America—if the root causes of poverty and instability are to be addressed.

The Kissinger Report dodges the contradiction inherent in pursuing a negotiated settlement and a military victory at the same time. While mentioning negotiations and the Contadora Group in a cautiously favorable light, the report emphasizes security concerns and calls for a massive increase in U.S. military aid. The reactivation of the Central American Defense Council (CONDECA), promoted by the Reagan administration, is not discussed in the report. The short-term solutions proposed in the Kissinger Report call for more of the same—which sends the wrong signals for creating the necessary conditions for long-term solutions. Many workshop participants felt that the Kissinger Commission’s failure to address these tradeoffs reflected either naivete or cynicism.

On a number of other specific issues, the Kissinger Report dodges difficult problems. For example, the report calls for elimination of the death squads in El Salvador—a point on which everyone can agree—without addressing the fact that the death squads are only a symptom of the more general social disease. In its preoccupation with El Salvador and Nicaragua, the report skips over what is in some ways the more complex problem of how to deal with Guatemala, Honduras is described in the report simply as a democracy, with no discussion of the threat to democratic institutions posed by the encroaching power of General Gustavo Alvarez and the military (bolstered by increasing levels of U.S. military aid). The larger problem of how to reform the armed forces of the region is inadequately addressed in the report.

Although the Kissinger Report mentions the potential role of the Contadora Group in a negotiated settlement, it does not seriously explore this alternative. By proposing a solution that revolves around massive new aid flows, precisely at a time when Mexico and Venezuela are in no position to be major contributors, the report tends to undercut the Contadora process. By prejudging the sincerity of Nicaragua’s commitment to negotiations, by rejecting the idea of power-sharing formulas, and by endorsing increased aid for counterinsurgency, the report undermines the possibility of negotiations. If the Kissinger Commission were really seeking an alternative to either abandoning Central America or sending in the Marines, the report should have considered more fully what might be the best option: putting the Contadora Group at the center of a process of negotiations to find a nonmilitary solution to the crisis in Central America.

**CHANGING COURSE: BLUEPRINT FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

(Editor’s note: The following is a draft of the executive summary of a report being issued by the Central America Resource Center located in Austin, Texas. The center is a nonprofit private institution created to meet the national need for more systematic access to information about Central America. Copies of the final report may be obtained for $5.00 plus $.75 postage from the Resource Center, P. O. Box 2327, Austin, TX 78710, (512)476-9841.)

**Introduction**

The United States is headed toward direct involvement in an unnecessary war in Central America. Today, the U.S. has some 15,000 troops in Central America and the Caribbean, warships patrolling off the coasts of Nicaragua, and a complex of military bases under construction in Honduras. The CIA is funding and directing guerrilla attacks on Nicaragua. The United States is arming and training the military in El Salvador and Honduras. U.S. officials have even sought to pressure Costa Rica, the sole demilitarized democracy in the region, to begin a military buildup. The administration has committed itself to a regime in El Salvador that faces increasing popular resistance. The possibility of direct U.S. intervention to save that government from defeat grows as other options are narrowed.

To counter growing congressional and public opposition to the covert war against Nicaragua and the escalating military commitment to the government of El Salvador, President Reagan appointed the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The so-called Kissinger Commission was designed to create a broad consensus by treating events in Central America as threats to U.S. national security.

As this report suggests, no consensus on intervention in Central America is possible. Moreover, to designate Central America as a national security crisis can only worsen a bad policy, creating a false premise that will lead to a disproportionate
response. To serve the interests of the United States, the course of U.S. policy in Central America must change. This report presents an alternative blueprint, based upon careful delineation of U.S. interests and a sense of proportion about the events in Central America.

I. The Need for a New Policy

Current policy distorts U.S. interests in Central America. National security has been invoked, cloaking events in the region under the mantle of global East-West competition. Policymaking responsibility has been shifted from State Department professionals and experts to "crisis managers," strategists generally uninformed about the region in question and prone to see solutions in military terms.

The resulting failure is self-evident. Current policy has helped push Central America farther from peace and stability and closer to regionized war. It has produced an alarming escalation of U.S. military and financial commitments, quite out of proportion to the interests at stake. It has already created political division within the United States itself. Finally, U.S. credibility has suffered, both in the hemisphere and in Europe, where our allies oppose the course of U.S. policy.

The policy has failed because it is built upon false premises. It places a Cold War context upon social revolutions long in the making, indeed, long expected. A sensible policy must come to terms with the causes and implications of these revolutions.

The revolutions and civil wars in Central America have indigenous roots. They are not products of a Soviet-Cuban conspiracy. The aid provided by Cuba to postrevolutionary Nicaragua and to El Salvadoran rebels has not been a major factor in the struggles. Indeed, aid from Western governments, political parties, and religious organizations surpasses that provided by the Cubans and the Soviets.

Successful revolutions in Central America need not threaten U.S. national security. The United States already trades with and aids a range of communist and socialist governments. Some, like China, are seen as virtual allies against the U.S.S.R. Neither revolution nor socialism inevitably result in Soviet domination. In Central America, any postrevolutionary regime will require external assistance. Western Europe, the United States, and Latin American oil exporters are necessarily the preferred sources of that aid. A sensible U.S. policy would be to assist postrevolutionary governments, not force reliance on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The United States needs to change its course in Central America. A clear definition of U.S. interests provides the basis for a new course. The invocation of a national security crisis cannot be allowed to distort the manner in which those interests are considered.

II. The Interests of the United States

The most serious hemispheric threat to U.S. economic well-being derives from the debt crisis, not from the upheaval in Central America. Unprecedented debts afflict the major countries of the hemisphere—Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru—producing domestic austerity and social unrest. Possible default threatens major U.S. banks, if not the international monetary system itself. Yet this real threat to our economic security receives but a fraction of the attention devoted to Central America.

The United States has security concerns in Central America. These are less military than political and economic concerns. The overwhelming military power of the United States ensures against any military threat. Needless to say, the United States does not want hostile bases in this hemisphere, nor regimes that thrive on anti-American postures. These security objectives are best ensured by controlling what has become an almost Pavlovian response to revolution. Revolutionary nationalism is a dynamic force in world politics. In this hemisphere, economic disparity and political repression have made revolutionary upheaval likely, if not inevitable, in several countries. A mature understanding of our security requires that we come to terms with historical movements and forces, and not seek to counter them through military intervention.

The United States has an interest in peace. Peace is the precondition to development and to stability. War is not only costly in lives and resources, it undermines democratic institutions by reinforcing the military. In Central America war generates large numbers of refugees, some of whom end up in the United States.

Increasing militarization of the region has the same effect as war, even if the fighting does not spread. The U.S. interest is to lower the level of violence in Central America, to impede the regionalization of internal upheavals, and to decrease the level of resources used on military expenditure.

The United States has an interest in human rights and democracy. Support for basic human rights and democratic institutions is what the United States should represent in the world. In Central America, this support serves other concerns as well. Revolutions arise not simply from poverty, but from economic injustice and political repression that suffocate reform. Fostering equitable development and democratic institutions serves U.S. security concerns, and helps to create domestic support for U.S. policy. Moreover, it is the only way to guarantee long-term stability and peace.

Promotion of human rights and democracy requires more than creating elections to mask a regime in El Salvador that is dependent upon a state security apparatus to terrorize the population. Democratic institutions can be undermined as much by burlesquing them as by ignoring them.

U.S. policy requires substantial domestic support and international credibility in order to succeed. The current Central American policy has gained neither. In fact, the most important Latin American nations have expressed serious misgivings about the growing U.S. military buildup in Honduras and El Salvador, and about the ongoing undeclared war against Nicaragua. At home, important congressional leaders, reflecting the views of their most vocal constituents, have promised that the president will face stiff opposition to requests for more military aid to El Salvador and more funds for the CIA's war against Nicaragua. Public opposition will grow as the costs and the risks of the current policy become clearer.

In Central America, a different course can be charted. Confidence in our own economic and military strength enable us to elaborate a policy that is accepting of change, that reflects the best of our values, and that serves U.S. interests.
III. Recommendations: Changing Course

A Program for Peace

The final report details more than twenty recommendations to implement a new course in Central America. In this summary we outline the key steps that follow from pursuit of U.S. interests in the region.

1. Regional Demilitarization

The United States should take immediate initiatives to halt the regionalization of the conflict in Central America. The United States should withdraw its troops from Honduras, and its ships from the coasts of Nicaragua. The United States should place its full support behind the Contadora process, seeking to end all outside military involvement in the region.

2. Nicaragua

The United States should terminate all support for counter-revolutionary forces based in Honduras and Costa Rica. The attempt to isolate Nicaragua politically and economically should be ended. The covert support of terrorists is unworthy of the United States, and violates both U.S. laws and interests. The United States should work with the governments of Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica to develop a humane resettlement plan for those recruited to fight the covert war.

The United States should then engage the Nicaraguan government in a process aimed at restoring full relations. The Contadora Group has offered its auspices for such discussions; Nicaragua has proposed that bilateral discussions might be more suitable. Commitment to either would be an appropriate response to Nicaraguan initiatives that suggest that negotiations can settle all outstanding questions.

3. El Salvador

The United States should place its weight behind a negotiated solution in El Salvador, one that will limit the violence and destruction suffered by the people of that country. No negotiated solution is possible without a process of power-sharing, which ends the violence and moves toward full, democratic elections. Again, the Contadora nations offer collective auspices for working toward this end.

Progress toward this objective requires that the United States distance itself from the current regime. Military aid should be halted. Economic aid should be conditioned on movement toward a negotiated settlement. The FDR-FMLN's legitimate, political status should be recognized by the U.S. government, as it is by many of our allies.

A successful negotiated solution would lessen the destruction in El Salvador and diminish the danger of regional upheaval. It would also give the United States great credibility in Europe and in the hemisphere. If efforts to negotiate were unsuccessful, the United States would not be tied to an illegitimate regime whose existence depends on external U.S. aid and internal death squads.

4. Honduras

The current military buildup in Honduras should be reversed. The United States should support democratic institutions and citizen organizations in Honduras, in the hope that democracy can be encouraged. A large and powerful military in Honduras will preclude that possibility and undermine positive economic or social reform.

5. Guatemala

The United States should maintain a firm arms embargo on the regime, which is a consistent and gross violator of human rights. Aid to Mexico, dispensed through official and private organizations, can help to alleviate the conditions of the thousands of refugees who have fled from the violence in Guatemala. It can also help Mexico manage a growing economic and social burden.

6. Costa Rica

Costa Rica is an established democracy, blessed with no military establishment, and faced with economic bankruptcy. U.S. support is both needed and essential. The Costa Ricans should be encouraged in their policy of neutrality in Central America. They should be granted U.S. economic assistance to alleviate their external debt, and to help restructure their economy.

7. Cuba

For twenty-five years, successive administrations have sought first to overthrow and then to isolate the Castro regime. To this day, Cuba is the target of a continuing economic embargo.

It is time to recognize the Castro government. Isolation will not undermine it; intervention would be illegal and endanger our own security. Steps must be taken to reassert the natural influence of the United States on this country, located ninety miles off our coast. An end to the U.S. embargo will lead to a resumption of normal diplomatic and trade relations. Increased trade can begin the reintegration of Cuba into hemispheric relations. Ultimately, Cuba could become a partner in Caribbean Basin development.

The reduction in Cuban dependence on aid and trade from the U.S.S.R. may well decrease Soviet influence. It could enable the United States to regain a positive note on the island. In any case, it could not produce worse results than the current policy, which sustains embittered relations without apparent end.

A Program for Development

1. Peace is a prerequisite to development in the region. Without peace, development assistance will be used to subsidize the fighting. Capital flight and physical destruction will drain the countries of their resources.

2. Traditionally, in Central America and the Caribbean, development has promoted the interests of a small elite, on the assumption that growth would aid the majority. The result, when successful, has been economic growth without social development, increasing the disparity between rich and poor. A new program for development must reverse this priority.

3. Aid

Assistance to the region should adhere to guidelines designed to induce equitable development. Aid to corrupt governments can serve to exacerbate inequalities and fuel tensions, countering our interests. Underlying principles would include:

a. Support for democratic institutions. This would include government-to-government assistance to favor those countries with policies in place that narrow the gulf between rich and poor. Direct assistance should also be given to institutions that represent the poor—farmers' unions, cooperatives, women's
organizations, labor organizations, community groups.

b. Promotion of regional cooperation. Economic assistance should encourage regional projects. Attempts to exclude countries from regional development planning will only impede progress in the region.

c. Encouragement of collective planning and implementation. Regional planning and cooperation should bring other donor countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela, and recipient countries into the planning process.

d. Promotion of economic diversity. Assistance should seek to reduce external dependence on food and energy imports and to diversify exports of the countries involved.

4. Trade

a. U.S. trade policy should be liberalized toward the region, but liberalization should be linked to equitable development strategies and adequate protection for U.S. workers.

b. Trade policy must respond to the dependency many countries in the region have on one or two commodity exports, and the havoc wreaked by the fluctuating prices in those commodities. The United States should consider creating limited commodity arrangements to provide protection against this fluctuation.

5. Debt

The debt problem in the hemisphere is part of a global debt crisis. To respond, the United States should work internationally, through the IMF and other international institutions, to develop a long-term plan for renegotiation of the outstanding debt. Without such efforts, aid may simply be subordinated to debt repayments, negating any possibility of development.

6. U.S. Economy

a. Any U.S. assistance policy toward the region must be accompanied by domestic programs to assist U.S. workers displaced by the flight of capital or jobs abroad.

b. Similarly, concrete steps must be taken to guarantee basic rights to immigrant workers. Development and peace in Central America would do most to limit the influx of refugees. Steps must be taken to limit the use of this vast, nonunionized, exploitable labor force as an instrument to drive down wages or to break unions in the United States.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA

by Jan L. Flora (Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, Kansas State University)

(Editors' note: The author has made numerous trips to Nicaragua since June 1980. He visited El Salvador and Nicaragua in January 1984 with the FACHRES-CA group [Faculty for Human Rights in El Salvador and Central America], whose purpose was to examine education, particularly higher education, in the two countries, and in particular to seek the reopening of the campus of the University of El Salvador, and to learn about the human rights situation in these countries. In El Salvador the group had interviews with Archbishop Rivera y Damas, President Magaña, representatives of nongovernmental and government human rights organizations, U.S. embassy officials, leaders of the University of El Salvador and the Jesuit Central American University [UCA], two presidential candidates, and others. The group also visited six refugee camps and two political prisons. In Nicaragua, they talked with the government and opposition human rights organizations, editors of the opposition and pro-government newspapers, Minister of Agriculture Comandante Jaime Wheelock, U.S. Ambassador Quainton, and various educational leaders of both universities and of the Education Ministry, including Minister of Education Carlos Túnerman. The group spoke with church representatives [Miskito and Protestant], visited a prison farm, and talked with business leaders. The Graduate School at Kansas State University provided partial funding for the trip.)

Contrasts between El Salvador and Nicaragua

El Salvador and Nicaragua are two Central American countries with histories of extreme social inequalities, long military-oligarchical rule, and suppression of human rights. Recently, the two countries have experienced significant levels of organized political violence. Both countries face increasingly troubling insurgencies, and both governments have limited political and civil rights in the name of fighting that insurgency. The governments of the two countries have quite different goals. Since much concern has been expressed about the human rights records of both governments, and since the Salvadoran government is embraced by the United States government and the Nicaraguan government is opposed by it, I thought it useful to attempt as objective a comparison of the human rights situation in the two countries as possible, although the pitfalls in doing so are considerable.

In the interest of limiting the scope of this article, I will use the more narrow definition of human rights as political and civil rights rather than also including social and economic rights. The socioeconomic context within which one can examine this more narrow vision of human rights is quite different in the two countries and should be touched upon. Nicaragua has experienced a successful armed insurrection and has a government that is committed to the redistribution of power and wealth from a defeated military-oligarchical clique to the poor majority, while dominant elements in the ruling group in El Salvador are committed to either maintaining the power of the oligarchymilitary group, or to mild reform that would defuse the guerrilla movement and bring some redistribution of wealth, without a major transformation in social, political, and economic relations.

In the period since the beginning of major armed conflict in the two societies in the late 1970s, both countries have experienced similar declines in total gross domestic product—a result of the destruction of war and of the world economic recession, which has had depression consequences in Central America. However, beginning in 1979, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua initiated a series of economic and social changes that have brought about a significant redistribution of a shrunken economic pie among the most needy elements in the population. Provision of education, health services, land redistribution and rent reductions, and subsidization and
rationing of staple food items have all benefited the poor majority. Only in the case of land reform can El Salvador be said to have made any progress; in all other areas mentioned above, the situation for at least the lower 50 percent of the Salvadoran population has deteriorated. This is both because the civil war in El Salvador has been more prolonged than it was in Nicaragua (and shows no signs of approaching a resolution) and because the Salvadoran government is at best ambivalent about instituting even mild reforms.

The current insurrections that afflict the two countries are quite different from one another. That in El Salvador is deeply rooted in the country's social conditions. The guerrilla groups, affiliated with one another in the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN), control a substantial number of county-seat towns in the northern and eastern parts of the country. The opposition armed groups in Nicaragua (commonly called the contras) control no county seats in Nicaragua and essentially depend on sanctuary in Honduras (and to a degree in Costa Rica) for their continued existence. The different character of the insurgent groups has implications for their violation or respect for human rights, which will be discussed later.

**Political Human Rights**

It is the nongovernmental human rights organizations in both countries that seek to document the violations of basic political and civil rights, largely through the depositions presented by families and friends of those who are imprisoned, disappeared, or tortured. We will examine the human rights records of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Magaña government and its immediate military predecessors in El Salvador through data presented by nongovernmental human rights organizations.

1. Government violations of personal security and right to life

War itself is a violation of basic human rights. However, in the case of El Salvador, civilian political deaths not directly associated with the war probably exceed the number of deaths from military confrontation, according to a spokesman from Tutela Legal (Legal Protection), the human rights organization of the Catholic Archdiocese of San Salvador.

Tutela Legal, the most reliable collector of statistics on human rights violations in the country,\(^2\) indicates that the 1983 level of civilian deaths attributable to right wing death squads is similar to 1982 levels. In the first eleven months of 1983, 4,638 civilians were assassinated and an additional 514 are considered to have definitely disappeared.\(^3\) Hence, an estimated 5,152 persons are presumed to have been killed for political reasons at the hands of the right wing in that eleven-month period. In contrast to U.S. government claims, this differs little from the 5,399 who were determined by Tutela Legal to have died in 1982\(^4\) (1982 does represent a significant drop from 1981).

Attribution of such deaths and disappearances to death squads is based on the clothing worn by abductors, their ability to operate in daylight, often with clear complicity of authorities (such as being allowed through government checkpoints), and disfigurement and cutting off of thumbs and fingers to avoid ready identification of bodies. If such characteristics are absent, the deaths and abductions are not counted as being politically related. Most observers with whom we spoke—church-related persons, intellectuals, and international press—indicated they had no doubt that the death squads are intimately linked to the military and security forces. A post factum indicator that this is so is that 80 percent of these disappeared persons who subsequently appeared in jail were captured by persons dressed in civilian clothes, according to Tutela Legal.

Our interviews with political prisoners in the Mariona men's political prison near San Salvador indicated grave violations of their human rights upon their arrest. Nearly all were detained incommunicado for several days for questioning and torture. The prisoners took a survey of the current population (432 persons) and found that, generally, they were blindfolded with their thumbs tied together during much of that period (370 persons). Routine forms of torture included beatings (398) and being deprived of food for 3 to 12 days (418). Nearly one-third (129) had electric shock applied to them. A small minority had their heads covered so they nearly smothered (22), or were hung by their hands, feet, or neck (26). According to one informant in the women's political prison in Ilopango, most of the 55 women prisoners had been raped, two by the men in an entire barracks. One of these is now pregnant and was severely affected psychologically.

None of the prisoners we talked to had been brought to trial or even had specific charges brought against them. We spoke to a group of 11 trade union leaders who have been held in prison since August 1980 without being brought to trial. Their crime was having organized a work stoppage in the hydroelectric plant in which they worked. Because of the threat to defense lawyers who defend political prisoners, they face the problem of finding a Salvadoran lawyer willing to represent them.

We can be quite sure that at least as many deaths, incidents of torture, and disappearances documented by Tutela Legal have occurred. The figures may be a serious underestimation, for many people may fear to report the death or disappearance of their loved ones and no human rights organization has an office outside San Salvador.

It is more difficult to assess the extent of violation of human rights by the government in Nicaragua. There is much controversy about the veracity of figures presented by the nongovernmental human rights organization, the Permanent Committee on Human Rights (CPDH), for it has close ties with the business-class opposition. The Sandinistas perceive it simply as a tool of the political opposition. We were told by the head of the Nicaraguan penitentiary system that whenever he gets a communication from the CPDH, he tosses it in the wastebasket.

Because of that controversy, I carefully examined the data presented to us by the CPDH. They presented month-by-month totals of government human rights violations for the year 1983, and gave us brief written descriptions of specific cases for November and December.\(^5\) In a minority of cases of torture, disappearances, and killing by authorities in an encounter, the cases appeared not to be political, and were therefore similar to such actions that, lamentably, occur in the prison systems or in law enforcement in many countries. Such incidents occur because of decentralized control rather than from a policy of torture or other violation of human rights. Americas Watch, which has sent delegations to Nicaragua, concludes, "There
have been a few documented instances of torture, but it is not a routine practice.  

In more than half of the cases of disappearances cited by the CPDH in November and December, the individuals had been released within the month. It is likely that a number of the remainder were released at a later date. Thus, the 209 annual disappearances include anyone who is reported by relatives as having disappeared—regardless of whether they reappear and whether they were political cases or not. Tutela Legal in El Salvador attempts to separate political from nonpolitical disappearances and deaths, and subsequently, when the individual is located in jail or released or the body is found, that person is eliminated from the disappeared category. Americas Watch determined a total of 10 persons in Nicaragua disappeared in 1981 and remained disappeared. There were no permanent disappearances for the first half of 1982. With the heating up of the conflict with the contras, it is probable that the number of disappeared persons in 1982 and 1983 has increased, particularly on the east coast, where the Sandinistas have great difficulty determining which Miskitos are friendly and which may be associated with the contras. 

Immediately upon coming to power, the Sandinistas abolished the death penalty and established the maximum sentence at 30 years. While there have been instances of civilians being killed by authorities when not yet in their custody, there are no documented cases of anyone being killed by the authorities while imprisoned. The government's unwillingness to investigate the CPDH's allegations of disappearances and occasional deaths in prison leaves such allegations unresolved.

The legal and judicial systems of both countries have succumbed to temptations to limit human rights under the pressure of insurgency and/or external military threat. In El Salvador, Decree 507, passed in December 1980, has been officially interpreted as allowing for the detention of persons up to 180 days without formal charges (in fact, political prisoners are held indefinitely without formal charges being made known to them) and detention for 15 days without notification of the courts (or anyone). In Nicaragua, certain guarantees extended to detained persons under the Statute of the Rights and Guarantees of the Nicaraguan People, promulgated after the revolution, were suspended under the military emergency declared in March 1982 when the contras increased their sabotage activities. Security prisoners may be detained incognito and without being informed of the charges against them for ten, and in special cases, up to thirty, days. This provision helps explain a number of the disappearances and subsequent release of persons who were never charged with a crime that have been indicated by the CPDH. While the Nicaraguan government appears not to have systematically used this provision to torture detainees as has the Salvadoran government, the provision is an invitation to such action, and is therefore disturbing.

The most serious violations of human rights by the Nicaraguan government have been with respect to the Miskito Indians. The failure to recognize fully the mistrust that the Miskitos have for any Spanish-speaking Nicaraguans resulted initially in the arrest of the principal Miskito leaders, in violation of the sanctuary of the Moravian church, and in the arrest of Miskitos when no other solution to a disagreement with them was visible to the government. In December 1981, 130 Miskitos were convicted of security violations under improper judicial procedures. Subsequently, the government human rights commission saw that the cases were reviewed; most of the Miskitos were released outright or had their sentences reduced. At about the same time, because of military conflict along the Honduran border, the Nicaraguan military saw the necessity of moving Miskito villagers back from the Rio Coco. Some 8,500 persons were evacuated and settled in five refugee camps. While probably necessary militarily, this has not contributed to improved relations.

Recently, the Sandinistas have admitted many of their mistakes. In December 1983, the Nicaraguan government declared an amnesty for all Nicaraguan citizens of Miskito origin who had "committed crimes against public order and security," whether in jail or inside or outside the country. Some 400 Miskito prisoners were released. Only 21 persons from the east coast (non-Miskitos) remained in jail for such crimes at the time of our visit in January. Even with the help of Moravian ministers from other countries, very little success had been achieved in encouraging Nicaraguan Miskitos to return from Honduras and Costa Rica.

2. Political Rights

Both countries have engaged in violations of the political rights of their citizens. The extent and method have differed considerably.

In both countries there exist problems for labor unions. Our group met in San Salvador with the secretary general of a pro-U.S. peasant union. His union has been active in implementing the agrarian reform law. Because of death squad threats against the secretary general, the National Police have provided two body guards with whom he travels constantly and who stood watch over our furtive meeting in a hotel room. One hundred twenty of his union members have been killed in the last four years, including his predecessor and the general secretaries of three provincial branches of the union.

In Nicaragua, the right to strike has been abrogated since the declaration of economic emergency in October 1981. The CPDH reports suggest that there was harassment of leaders of the Nicaraguan Workers Federation (CTN), a centrist labor union, in November 1983, particularly those who worked for the national bus company. Their lives were not in danger, however. Overall, Nicaragua has experienced a major expansion in labor organization since the fall of Somoza.

In El Salvador, among legal political parties, the Christian Democrats have been most seriously repressed. Some 35 Christian Democratic mayors have been murdered, nine in 1982; one was killed in a guerrilla attack. Since the establishment of a de facto coalition government following the 1982 elections, persecution of Christian Democrats has eased, but by no means has it stopped. While in San Salvador in January, we arranged a meeting with political party leaders, but the Christian Democrats did not attend. We were unable to determine how freely they were able to campaign for the 25 March elections. The armed opposition has been responsible for a handful of killings of right wing politicians; in February 1984, a leader of the PAISA party was gunned down, apparently by the guerrillas.
Nicaragua's treatment of opposition political parties has been much less severe, although opposition public rallies have been de facto proscribed; in 1981, leaders of the principal non-Somocista political party, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), went into exile. Nicaragua is currently preparing for national elections, which have recently been moved up to November 1984. A major question is whether opposition parties will have equal access to state-owned television.

Freedom of the press has been restricted in both countries. In El Salvador, this has been done through death squads; in Nicaragua through prior censorship. In El Salvador, opposition newspapers were closed in 1980 and 1981; one editor was hacked to death; another went into exile after several attempts on his life. "Freedom of expression has been suspended in El Salvador and the surviving newspapers—which are extremely right-wing—are subject to censorship." In Nicaragua, La Prensa, the opposition newspaper, continues to operate, but prior censorship established in March 1982 has rendered it rather bland. An easing of the severity of censorship in December 1983 has made it somewhat more interesting. Nicaraguans receive a greater diversity of information through their newspapers than do Salvadorans.

3. Human rights violations by the armed opposition

In El Salvador, since May 1982, Tutela Legal has kept figures on civilians killed by guerrillas outside combat. There was an increase of such documented killings from 40 in the last eight months of 1982 to 67 in the first eleven months of 1983. Archbishop Rivera y Damas (interview, San Salvador, January 1984) condemned the violence of both the left and the right, but observed that whereas the violence of the left is often punished, rightist violence occurs with impunity. He also indicated that since guerrillas violence occurs almost exclusively in the countryside, while official and death squad violence is more urban than rural, guerrilla violence against civilians is somewhat more underestimated than is rightist violence. The Salvadoran military does not take prisoners. The FMLN, aside from a brief lisp in mid-1983 when captured soldiers were executed, turns captured enlisted soldiers over to the International Red Cross. While at least 80 percent of the nearly 40,000 politically motivated deaths occurring since 1979 are attributed to the right wing death squads and security forces, no member of the armed forces and security organizations has been convicted of such activity.

The most severe violations of human rights in Nicaragua occur at the hands of the CIA-supported guerrillas. The Nicaraguan government tabulated that aside from military casualties, 346 civilians were killed by the contras in 1983, and 514 peasants disappeared.11

Conclusions

The dynamic behind official violation of human rights in Nicaragua and El Salvador is quite different. The Nicaraguan government claims political pluralism as one of its three tenets, but the Sandinistas also believe that the revolution was made for the poor majority of Nicaraguans. Attempts to relate these two sometimes contradictory tenets has led to some human rights restrictions. The U.S.-supported military pressure and sabotage against Nicaragua and the real fear on the part of many Nicaraguans and their government of a possible full-scale invasion from Honduran territory, provide an excuse, and in some cases a justification, for restrictions on rights initially guaranteed the Nicaraguan people following the triumph of the revolution. A recurrent pattern of action by the Sandinista government has been the violation of certain political and civil rights, and later the backing off from that position when opposition to it developed. Since the last months of 1983, the Nicaraguan government has shown a tendency to reconcile with the church hierarchy and with the political opposition in general. Amnesties for Miskitos and peasants fighting with the contras have been declared. Well defined plans for elections have been made.

The Salvadoran government is moved by a very different dynamic; its authority derives mainly from the practice of terror. This seems the only explanation for the continuing enormous rate of political murders and disappearances by its security forces. By now, those forces should be running out of politically initiate persons to kill. They keep killing, however, to maintain the terror.14

Notes


2. Americas Watch and the ACLU state that "Tutela Legal exhibits as high a degree of professionalism in this work as we have seen elsewhere, an accomplishment that is all the more remarkable in the dangerous circumstances in which it conducts its work." (Report on Human Rights in El Salvador. Third Supplement. Americas Watch Committee and the ACLU, 19 July 1983, p. 77).


7. Ibid., p. 31.


OBSERVATIONS ON SALVADORAN AND NICARAGUAN EDUCATION
by Charles L. Stansifer (University of Kansas)

(Editors' note: From 4 to 14 January 1984, a group of twenty academic and religious leaders belonging to the Faculty Committee for Human Rights in El Salvador and Central America (FACHRES-CA) visited El Salvador and Nicaragua. The group's purpose was threefold: to investigate education in general and the condition of university professors and students in particular; to explore the state of human rights among the general citizenry; and to study current political circumstances that might affect human rights, especially in the university community.)

In El Salvador the FACHRES-CA group visited several refugee camps, two model prisons, the campus of the private Universidad Centroamericana, and a number of government officials, including President Alvaro Magaña. The group interviewed representatives of the various political parties contending in the March 1984 presidential elections, international journalists, private business spokesmen, and administrators of the Universidad Nacional de El Salvador. Considerable time was spent with the government human rights commission, Tutela Legal (the legal aid agency operating out of the archdiocesan), and religious personnel, including Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas. The United States Embassy staff provided a briefing on economic, political, and military matters. Some members of the group also visited the National Library, the National Museum, the Ministry of Education, and other cultural institutions.

Education in general in El Salvador is at a standstill. With the government's attention riveted on the civil war, the budget for education has been allowed to wither. Many rural schools are closed, and many that are open have no libraries or equipment; as long as the war lasts, they have no hope of improvement. The teachers' union has been shattered by assassination, disappearances, transfers, and intimidation, leaving teachers and students demoralized. Occasionally, there is a breath of hope as in the case of the Museo Nacional, which recently opened new exhibits in celebration of its 100th anniversary, but the overall educational picture is grim and despairing.

At the university level the situation could hardly be worse. The main campus of the Universidad Nacional de El Salvador has been closed since June 1980, when it was overrun and looted by government troops. Repeated efforts to negotiate a reopening, the latest in mid-1983, have failed, primarily because the government views the university campus as a center of subversive activity. Shots fired from the university campus in June 1980 provided the justification for government intervention in the first place. President Magaña stated that the election campaign of March 1984 was not a propitious time to discuss reopening the university and that he doubted that the period following the elections would be any better.

In the meantime, the university continues to function in interim fashion. The budget for 1984 is approximately 25 percent of the 1980 level. Approximately 1400 professors (mostly part-time) of the 2,000 in 1980 remain on the payroll and instruct over 20,000 students. Professors offer classes in makeshift facilities, such as rented private houses, offices, and warehouses, scattered throughout San Salvador. Library materials and laboratory equipment, needless to say, are grossly inadequate. Professors are forced to assess special fees to keep supplies and equipment at a bare minimum, with resulting hardship on the poorest students and their families.

Worse still, the university functions in a climate of fear and intimidation. The day before the FACHRES-CA group arrived, a law student, Filomena Claros de Majano, was captured. Although we mentioned her case to President Magaña, there was no word of her whereabouts when we left five days later. In the period from 30 September to 30 November 1983, four professors were killed and five kidnapped. On 11 November 1983, in a raid on the Economics Department, nine persons were captured and one 68-year-old worker "jumped" from a third story window and died two days later. Security forces took the department's duplicating equipment, accusing the economics department of using it to print subversive literature, and have not returned it.

The most insidious form of intimidation has been anonymous newspaper advertisements accusing university members of subversion. A 6 October 1983 article in El Diario de Hoy accuses much of the administration and others in the university of belonging to specific guerrilla and other outlawed organizations. The names of the accusers do not appear. The newspaper refused to publish denials, even though these advertisements serve as death threats.

The Jesuit-run Universidad Centroamericana de Símon Cañas (UCA), in contrast, operates in an atmosphere approaching normality. Although security forces have raided the apartments of Jesuit instructors as recently as November 1983, classes continue on campus. President Magaña ominously indicated, however, that he was under pressure to close UCA too. UCA, with approximately 6,000 students, is the largest private university in El Salvador. Dozens more private universities have opened in recent years to try to satisfy the obvious hunger of Salvadoran youth for education (or at least certification), but the universal disadvantage is the high cost, which functions to exclude the poorest students. Also, the Ministry of Education, which serves as an accrediting agency, has obviously exercised little quality control over the new, private universities.

During five working days in Nicaragua, the FACHRES-CA group formally visited both the León and Managua campuses of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua, the campus of the Jesuit Universidad de Centroamérica, the offices of the Comisión de Derechos Humanos and the Comisión Permanente para la Promoción de Derechos Humanos en Nicaragua, one prison, and the offices of the newspapers Nuevo Diario and La Prensa. In addition, members of the group had audiences with three government ministers (Ernesto Cardenal, Culture; Jaime Wheelock Román, Agrarian Reform; and Carlos Tünnerman Bernheim, Education), and various other government, university, business, and religious leaders. United States Ambassador to Nicaragua Anthony Quanton also received the group. Although time was short for both visitors and visited, our Nicaraguan hosts obviously made every effort to accommodate our schedules and assist us in obtaining information.

In the field of education, there have been many problems in
the transitional period since 1979. Minister of Education Tünnerman emphasized three principal goals of the ministry: to amplify the educational system so as to make it accessible to all; to improve the quality of education; and to transform the educational system so as to make it conform to Nicaragua’s needs. Another goal, that of making the educational system one in which all Nicaraguans, parents as well as professional educators, participate, also emerged in our conversation.

There appears to be little dispute in Nicaragua about the success of the Nicaraguan government in the first and second goals. The highly successful literacy crusade of 1980 has substantially reduced Nicaragua’s literacy rate (officially to approximately 13 percent of the population over 10 years of age) and the vigorous follow-up campaign of adult education has consolidated most of the gains. Access to general education has also been amplified by a vigorous campaign by the Ministry of Culture to create new regional museums and local casas de cultura and in general to stimulate popular participation in theater and other art forms through the Centros Populares de Cultura. As for the quality of education, little statistical information is available that demonstrates improvement, but the FACHRES-CA group did not encounter claims that the quality of education in general had declined. There were complaints, however, that mobilization for the war effort and for other causes such as the coffee harvest disrupted the school routine.

There is also little dispute in Nicaragua over the increase in participation by the citizenry in general in the educational process. Minister Tünnerman handed members of the FACHRES-CA group a little bulletin entitled “Fines, objetivos y principios de la nueva educación,” which was published in 1983 by the Ministry of Education. This document, which spells out in detail the ministry’s goals as outlined above, was only authorized after an elaborate consultative process. A questionnaire that included 55 questions about education was distributed to the mass organizations, teachers’ unions, parents, private and religious interest groups, and when the results were compiled, a series of 15 meetings were held by the Consejo Nacional de Educación to analyze and refine the document. Finally, the Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional gave the document its approval. It seems safe to say that few countries in the world have gone through such an elaborate participatory process in defining their educational goals.

Nevertheless, the process has not been without problems. It is in the area of educational transformation, the third goal of the Ministry of Education, that most problems are encountered. Leaving aside university education for the moment, it is obvious that many parents and church groups in Nicaragua object to aspects of the new primary and secondary education, and in particular, to the pressures on children to conform to the prevailing Sandinista political beliefs. Ministry of Education officials admitted that, upon occasion, especially during the first two years following the Sandinista victory in 1979, peer pressure resulted in psychological and even physical intimidation of students. One explanation offered was that during the last years of the Somoza regime, the secondary schools and even some primary schools had been regularly disrupted by the political polarization taking place in the country. Somoza’s persecution of students greatly contributed to turning schools into a battleground. Once in power, the Sandinistas found that it was not easy to turn off the confrontational tradition that had developed in the last years of the dictatorship. In contrast, the 1983 school year, according to officials, was relatively free of harassment.

The FACHRES-CA group heard other objections about the educational process in Nicaragua today. Some individuals protested the pressures put on primary school children to participate in the Asociación Sandinista de Niños movement. Others objected to the goal of involving children in work brigades and regular work assignments. Others complained that religious schools, because of the economic situation and government policies, found it increasingly difficult to continue to function. Objections were also raised that teachers in secondary schools were under governmental pressure to use the classroom to promote only the Sandinista political philosophy.

Officials who responded to these concerns indicated that religion was offered even in the public schools. Minister Tünnerman also pointed out that the Nicaraguan government was subsidizing private religious schools, which, although required to conform to the national curriculum, were allowed to teach religion during regular school hours.

Both Dr. Mariano Fiallos of the León campus and Dr. Humberto López of the Managua campus of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua expressed their faith in the ability of their faculty members, despite shortage of equipment and books and despite war-related disruptions, to carry out their responsibilities. Dr. Fiallos expressed regret that the Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities (LASPAU), which had provided ten professors during the 1983 academic year, was not being continued in 1984. Visiting professors from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and some Latin American universities, however, would continue during the 1984 academic year. At the Managua campus of UNAN, the FACHRES-CA group met with the entire university council, including deans and representatives of the professors’ union and the campus workers. Individual representatives of the council expressed their solidarity with the international university community. Much of the discussion centered on a course in the history of the Sandinista movement that is required of all university students. It is an indication of the continuing revolutionary atmosphere of contemporary Nicaragua that such a course is required while, regrettably, many basic courses have had to be abandoned. For example, the School of Humanities has been closed down temporarily at the Managua campus of UNAN for lack of resources. The universities in Nicaragua, in short, are continuing to operate, but under severe economic restrictions.
IN MEMORIAM—ANGEL RAMA
by Saul Sosnowski

Los innumerables ecos que ha tenido la trágica noticia de la muerte de Angel Rama, quien, junto a Marta Traba, Manuel Scoza y Jorge Ibargüengoitia, viajaban a Bogotá para asistir a un congreso sobre literatura, palidecen ante la enormidad de esta pérdida y ante las múltiples contribuciones que ha legado a la cultura latinoamericana. Sus intereses por la literatura latinoamericana fueron siempre fieles a un alto concepto por el rigor académico y la difusión de todo conocimiento que pudiera contribuir a un acercamiento legítimo y honesto a la realidad de América Latina. La página rápida que preludia o daba cuenta de una nueva obra o de un suceso que merecía la atención de sus lectores, el estudio meticuloso de un poema y la mirada profundamente abarcadora de un autor, un movimiento literario o la proyección hacia el futuro de nuevos textos, eran parte de un vasto mosaico intelectual abierto siempre a nuevas expectativas y lineamientos.

Entre sus múltiples obras será difícil consignar algunas que no sean material de consulta obligatoria entre los estudiosos de la literatura latinoamericana. Desde hace años ya se han vuelto fundamentales los aportes que signara en Rubén Dario y el modernismo, La generación crítica (1939-1969), Los gaucho-políticos rioplatenses, Literatura y sociedad; se sumarán a ellos los ensayos recogidos en Transculturación narrativa en América Latina, La novela latinoamericana y el pósitomo Literatura y clase social.

El reconocimiento que han merecido estos aportes se está dejando oír a través de publicaciones que honrarán a Rama explorando algunas de las vetas que marcará para siempre. El Departamento de Español y Portugués de la Universidad de Maryland, al cual pertenecía como Profesor Titular de Literatura Latinoamericana, ha establecido el “Angel Rama Scholarship Fund” como primer homenaje. Las contribuciones pueden ser enviadas al Department of Spanish and Portuguese, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, attention: Saul Sosnowski, chairman. El departamento acaba de publicar una Bibliografía Sumaria, Angel Rama (1926-1983), de 32 páginas, que puede ser solicitada sin costo alguno a esta misma dirección.

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VII Simposio sobre Dialectología del Caribe Hispano
The Department of Modern Languages at Florida Interna-
tional University and the Department of Language and
Linguistics of Florida Atlantic University will sponsor the VII
Simposio Dialectología del Caribe Hispano, which will take
place on the FAU campus on 27-29 April 1984. This year’s
symposium will include in its geographical scope not only the
Spanish of Florida and the broadly defined Caribbean area, but
also the language of Caribbean Hispanics now living through-
out the United States and in other countries.

UCSD Workshop on U.S.-Mexico Regional Linkages
On 20-22 May 1984, the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at
the University of California at San Diego will host an
interdisciplinary conference on “Regional Aspects of U.S.-
Mexican Integration: Past, Present, and Future.” This research
workshop will explore the social and economic linkages that
exist between specific geopolitical regions of Mexico and regions
of the United States. The keynote address, on the evening of 20
May, will be by Luis González de El Colegio de Michoacán,
the distinguished Mexican historian whose work inspired a new
wave of scholarship in both Mexico and the United States
dealing with the history and contemporary development of
Mexico’s regions and small towns. Other sessions will include
“Water Resources: Mexicali and the U.S. Southwest”; “Cal-
ifornia Agribusiness in Michoacán”; “Technology Transfer
in the Bajío”; “Mixtec Migration from Oaxaca to Tijuana and
Southern California”; “Regional Impacts of Mexico’s Oil
Boom”; “The Impact of Puebla’s Automobile Industry on
Detroit”; and “Processes of Regional Development: A Summary
Assessment and a Research Agenda.” The conference proceed-
ings will be published by the UCSD Center. For further
information, please contact Dr. Ina Rosenthal-Urey, Center
for U.S.-Mexican Studies (Q-057), UCSD, La Jolla, CA
92093; (619)452-2111 or 452-4303.

University of Michigan Summer Institute
For the thirty-seventh consecutive year, the Survey Research
Center of the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan will hold a Summer Institute in Methods of Survey
Research in two four-week sessions from 25 June to 17 August
1984.

The institute is designed to meet some of the educational and
training needs of men and women engaged in business and
government research, and also to meet the needs of graduate
students and university instructors interested in the use of
survey research methods in the social sciences.

For further information, contact Dr. Duane F. Alwin,
director of the Summer Institute, Survey Research Center,
Institute for Social Research, P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor,
MI 48106; (313)764-6595.

1984 Summer School in Mexico
The University of Calgary is offering its tenth biannual Latin
American summer school in Guadalajara, Mexico, during the
summer of 1984. Courses to be offered include Education
and Development in Mexico; Geography of Mexico and Central
America; Health, Welfare, and Social Development in Mexico;
History of Mexico and Central America; Interdisciplinary Studies on Latin America; Mexico's Current Development Crisis; Latin American Social Systems; and Education, Development, and Underdevelopment in Latin America.

A moderate budget for the summer school should be in the neighborhood of $1500.00, including tuition, travel, room and board. For further information, contact Special Sessions Office, The University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, T2N 1N4, CANADA; (403)284-7208.

Language Study in Summer 1984

The Inter American Institute of Puerto Rico will offer Spanish in Puerto Rico and French in Guadeloupe during the summer of 1984. Courses are at the beginning, intermediate, and advanced levels, credit or noncredit, and on the following dates: 7-26 June; 27 June-17 July; 18 July-7 August; and 8-28 August. For additional information, contact Dr. Roland I. Perusse, IAI, Penthouse G, Condominium El Monte North, Hato Rey, PR 00918; (809)763-2409.

Conference General de Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina

With the participation, among others, of Dr. Giuseppe Alberigo (Bologna), Dr. Alfonso Alcalá (Mexico), Dr. José O. Beozzo (Sao Paulo), Dr. Leslie Bethell (London), Dr. Thomas Bruneau (Montreal), Dr. Paulino Castráveda (Seville), Dr. Pierre Chaunu (Paris), Dr. Ralph della Cava (New York), Dr. Rodolfo de Roux (Bogotá), Dr. Enrique Dussel (Mexico), Mtro. Eduardo Hoornaert (Recife), Dr. Jeffrey Klaiber (Lima), Dr. Juergen Pren (Hamburg), Dr. Pablo Richard (San José), and Dr. Samuel Silva Gutay (San Juan), the I Conference General de Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina will be held in Mexico City from 10-13 October 1984. The program will include round tables, seminars, and open conferences. Cost of registration is $50.00. Further information may be obtained from CEHILA, Apdo. Postal 11-671, 06100, Mexico, DF, MEXICO.

Society for Ethnomusicology Meeting

The Society for Ethnomusicology will hold its 29th annual meeting at the University of California in Los Angeles from 18-21 October 1984. The meeting’s theme will be “The Applications and Implications of the New Technologies.” For further information on the program and abstract forms, write Prof. Anthony Seeger, program chair, SEM, Archives of Traditional Music, Maxwell Hall 057, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405. For further information on local arrangements, write Prof. James Porter, SEM Local Arrangements chair, Folklore and Mythology Program, University of California-Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

North American Economics and Finance Association Meetings

NAEFA invites you to participate and present a paper, organize a session, participate as a discussant, or serve as a session chairperson at its 1984 Annual Meeting to be held jointly with the Allied Social Science Associations, 28-30 December 1984 in Dallas, Texas. All papers dealing with topics on economics, business economics, finance, public administration, and international relations concerning the North American and Caribbean countries will be considered. Both country studies or comparative studies are acceptable. Theoretical papers should deal with problems of interest for these countries.

The Second International Meeting of NAEFA will be held in Mexico City, 25-28 July 1984. For further information on either meeting, contact Edgar Ortiz, Apartado 20-504, Villa Obregón/San Angel, 01000 México, DF.

PCCLAS Meeting at California State-Los Angeles

The Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies will hold its thirtieth annual meeting 18-21 October 1984 at California State University in Los Angeles. The theme for this meeting will be “Latin America and the United States in the World Context.” Deadline for submission of papers and panel suggestions is 31 March, but papers submitted after that date will be accepted if there is space available.

Ideas for panels or papers should be sent to Prof. Timothy Harding, Latin American Studies Center, Library North B352, California State University-Los Angeles, 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90032.

VII Conference of Mexican and United States Historians

The VII Conference of Mexican and United States Historians will take place in Oaxaca, Mexico, 23-26 October 1985. The conference theme will be “The City, the Country, and the Border,” with an emphasis on the historical tensions among these elements as well as discrete treatment of each. Sessions will be organized along chronological, topical, and historiographical lines. Comparative history and contributions from scholars in related disciplines will be welcomed.

Those interested in participating should request further information and a paper registration form from either of the coordinators: Prof. Hugh M. Hamill, Jr., The Center for Latin American Studies, The University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06268 or Maestro Roberto Moreno de los Arcos, Instituto de Investigaciones Historicas, Torre Uno de Humanidades, Séptimo Piso, Ciudad Universitaria, Delegación Coyocacán, México, DF 04510.

Researcher Available

Prof. Warren Dean of New York University wishes to inform LASA members that Nancy Naro, whose Ph.D. in history is from Chicago and who has been teaching at PUC-Rio and at Universidade Federal Fluminense, is available to undertake library and archival research on behalf of scholars overseas. Write to her for rates and conditions at Av. Atlántica 3308/601, Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil.

USIA University Affiliation Program

Although the deadline for this year’s program proposals will have passed when you receive this issue of the Forum, the following information may be of interest to readers for 1985. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Information Agency has announced the 1984
program of support for institutional partnerships between U.S. and non-U.S. colleges and universities. This program has four broad goals: to promote mutual understanding; to strengthen the research and teaching abilities of U.S. and overseas institutions; to contribute to the academic excellence of the participating institutions; and to expand the number of institutions participating in international exchange programs.

Applications on behalf of the collaborating institutions are to be submitted by the U.S. partner. Partner institutions should be prepared to assign faculty for teaching, lecturing, or research; maintain said person(s) on salary; and receive visiting faculty from the partner institution. USIA grant funds are to be used to underwrite the travel costs of non-U.S. and U.S. participants and, where needed, provide salary supplements for U.S. or non-U.S. participants. Institutional overhead is not allowable. Projects supported by USIA should last a minimum of two years and a maximum of three years; the total request to USIA should not exceed $50,000 covering eligible expenses of both institutions for the two- or three-year period. All proposed activities must relate to the program goals stated above.

Eligible fields will be in the humanities, social sciences, communications, and education. The following criteria will be applied. Sound academic goals and selection of fields; academic expertise of participants;

Promise of a true mutuality of beneficial development and a clearly demonstrable relationship between the individual exchanges and the affiliation program’s goals;

Advancement of the mutual cultural and political understanding of the countries represented in the partnership through institutional development, such as strengthening of the international components of the curricula;

Emphasis on long-term exchanges (i.e., exchanges of three months or more);

Integration of faculty and administration (department, college, division, or school) in the planning of the proposed activities;

Demonstration of the likelihood that the partnership will continue after the conclusion of the USIA grant.

For detailed guidelines and instructions, write to the University Affiliation Program, U.S. Information Agency, 301 4th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547 or see the Federal Register vol. 48, no. 245, table of contents entry “United States Information Agency.”

Fulbright Competition Announced

The Council for International Exchange of Scholars has announced its annual Fulbright competition for university lecturing and postdoctoral research awards in Latin America and the Caribbean. Awards are offered in a variety of academic fields for periods of two to twelve months. Candidates must be U.S. citizens, should possess a doctorate or equivalent degree in their field, and have college or university teaching experience. Good to fluent Spanish or Portuguese is required for most awards, except those in the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean. Applications for all awards in Latin America and the Caribbean must be submitted by 15 June 1984. For further information contact Latin American Section, The Council for International Exchange of Scholars, Suite 300, 11 Dupont Circle, NW, Washington, DC 20036; (202)833-4955.

Billy Graham Center Archives

These archives concentrate on documenting Protestant nondenominational evangelization efforts from or in North America largely since the 1800s. Among the archives’ holdings on this significant aspect of Latin American history are the records of O. C. Ministries documenting their work in Latin America (1951-1983), the records of South America Mission (1921-1955), and the records of Latin America Mission (1948-1970). Also included are the personal papers of Charles Troutman, which include extensive material on Latin America Mission (1924-1979), oral history interviews with Ray Elliot, a missionary in Guatemala, as well as other collections or interviews with material on Latin America. These materials provide information not only on the missionary work with which they are primarily concerned but also on life and activities and historical and political developments in Latin America, and offer insight into Latin American cultures by those intimately involved with them.

Types of materials include minutes, reports, correspondence, oral history interviews, photographs, films, videotapes, slides, maps, and posters. Facilities are located at the Billy Graham Center on the campus of Wheaton College. The Reading Room is open to the public from 8:30 to 4:30 on weekdays and from 8:00-12:00 on Saturdays. Photocopying is also available. For further information, or to be placed on the mailing list to receive free semiannual checklists of newly processed collections, direct inquiries to BGC Archives, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL 60187 or call 312-260-5910.

Concerning the Archive at Sucre

The following letter was forwarded to us by Prof. David Brading of the Centre of Latin American Studies, Cambridge University, concerning the plight of the Archive at Sucre, Bolivia (the main deposit of colonial records in Bolivia). We publish it here for your information.

Dr. Gunnar Mendoza L., director
Archivo Nacional y Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia
Sucre, BOLIVIA
2 de noviembre de 1983

Conluego con placer a su carta de octubre 1983, en la cual Ud. me pide mis observaciones sobre mi experiencia en el ANB y sobre los problemas económicos que dificultan el mejoramiento de su infraestructura. He trabajado en el ANB en varias ocasiones desde mi primera visita en 1970-71, y últimamente he tenido la bendición (otorgada por el gobierno del gobierno) de pasar dos años y medio de residencia en Sucre, con el propósito de explorar los fondos del Archivo que versan sobre el siglo 19 y posteriores. De esta manera he podido ver de cerca la situación del Archivo, y de experimentar los servicios excepcionales que ofrece a los investigadores del pasado boliviano, a pesar de una falta crónica de un apoyo adecuado por parte de los organismos públicos del país.

Las condiciones de trabajo para los investigadores son de veras asombrosamente favorables en comparación con casi todos los demás repositarios de América Latina que conozco.
En ciertos aspectos esenciales, se puede decir que son únicas. Esta opinión—compartida por todos mis colegas que han realizado investigaciones en el ANB—se basa sobre todo en calidad de los índices analíticos, disponibles para buena parte de los fondos. Estos índices han sido realizados por el Director y un equipo enteramente entrenado por él, y permiten que el investigador tenga un conocimiento rápido, amplio y preciso del contenido de cada fondo. Sobresalen los dos fondos Coloniales Tierras e Indios y Minería y Mano de Obra Minera, bases esenciales para la renovación historiográfica que ha sido el objetivo constante del Archivo. Miles de documentos han sido re-leídos, resumidos y vertidos en fichas para su instantánea acceibilización. Los ficheros están en constante chequeo, corrección y amplificación. El trabajo es largo y arduo, ya que cada año nuevos fondos van incorporándose al proceso analítico, nuevos ficheros se ponen a la disposición del investigador, y el trabajo de corrección, ampliación y afinación se inicia, con cada vez mayores requerimientos de personal e infraestructura. Es esta sensación de estar participando, de alguna forma, en un labor archivístico que es a la vez una profundización historiográfica incesante, que hace que la investigación en el ANB sea, no solamente una actividad de consulta, sino un proceso de aprendizaje de las técnicas más refinadas del manejo de las fuentes primarias.

Rodeados por un ambiente de organización y disciplina, por los labores constantes de equipo del ANB, los investigadores son colocados, atendidos, y aconsejados, mientras se vayan ubicando sobre sus pistas de preferencia. ea cual sea el fondo de su elección, el Director siempre estará a su lado para ofrecer la orientación que surge de su propio conocimiento personal de cada fondo. Y esto a pesar de estar ocupado paralelamente en la supervisión de la Biblioteca, que ofrece servicios al público sucreño y sobretodo a los Colegios, en las labores de difusión y entrenamiento archivista a nivel de todo el país y en el extranjero, y en sus propias tareas de investigación. Pues las instituciones bajo su cargo cumple con sus responsabilidades frente a la comunidad letrada de Bolivia entera, una eficacia que se reviste por pocos otros organismos en el país. Incluso con respecto a la población analfabeta el ANB tiene un rol imprescindible: los líderes de las comunicaciones indígenas llegan frecuentemente para pedir asesoramiento sobre sus títulos y linderos en conflicto, ya que los materiales que sirven para la investigación también ayudan a la población indígena a establecer los antecedentes jurídicos de sus propiedades comunales.

Lo impresionante es la capacidad del ANB de llevar a cabo tantas actividades simultáneas, y a ofrecer una atención única a las tareas de todas las investigaciones que se presentan, con un presupuesto no meramente nugatorio, sino en algunos ramos no-existentes. Sí, por ejemplo, que a veces no han habido fondos para cancelar las cuentas de luz y agua sólo en crédito y la reputación del Director y de la institución han logrado postergar un corte de servicios tan elementales. Las fichas, los ficheros, los empastados de guías, y mucho más se fabrican por el equipo con los materiales que estén a la mano. El techo del edificio es inseguro; y en noches de lluvia torrencial es necesario volver en horas de descanso para colocar plásticos para proteger los tomos valiosos de una destrucción segura. Los sótunos tienen espacio limitado para poder recibir los nuevos fondos y donaciones que llegan; los recursos de estantería no llegan a permitir su protección, ordenamiento y accesibilidad. Todo lo que se ha hecho a través de tantos años está en riesgo. Sólo la dedicación entera del Director y su equipo logran todavía evitar el desastre. Y esta dedicación no recibe siquiera una fracción de su remuneración verdadera: los sueldos ínfimos, de acuerdo con el arancel estatal, mantienen a todos en aprietos y hacen imposible la contratación de nuevo personal para enfrentar las tareas crecientes.

La situación del ANB, después de muchos años de depender casi enteramente de la ingeniosidad de su equipo, está ahora al borde del catástrofe. El reconocimiento de toda la comunidad científica se ha brindado para sus logros: sólo si este reconocimiento ahora se traduce en apoyo material, será posible que siga con sus labores al servicio de la investigación y de la cultura boliviana y mundial. Si el ANB recibe este apoyo—para que tenga materiales e infraestructura adecuada, para que pueda hacer las adquisiciones bibliográficas esenciales para que su personal pueda gozar de alguna seguridad económica, para que se pueda proceder a la construcción de un edificio especializado, nuevo y amplio—, sus antecedentes aseguran que la inversión sea óptimamente utilizada en provecho de sus objetivos y de sus patrocinadores.

Dr. Mendoza, en este año centenario del ANB, hago votos para que el trabajo de tantos años sea coronado, no solamente con la admiración y la gratitud de tantos colegas, sino además con el respaldo financiero que permita garantizar la disponibilidad de estos logros para muchos generaciones futuras.

Sin otro particular, le saluda muy atentamente,

Tristan Platt

Centro Dominicano de Organizaciones de Interés Social

Formed in February 1983, the Centro Dominicano de Organizaciones de Interés Social (CEDOIS) is a public service organization consisting of 20 nonprofit social service and development agencies. Its general objectives are to represent and promote the interests of nonprofit organizations and to offer technical and consulting services to member agencies. Director of the center, Manuel M. Ortega, has been in his position there since August 1983, before which he spent one and a half years in Chile.

Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales (CEPEI)

CEPEI is a newly created private organization whose principal purpose is to promote, organize, and carry out investigations, analysis, assessment, dissemination, and publication in the area of international studies in Peru. The program's director, Dr. Eduardo Ferrero Costa, is also a professor of international law at the Universidad Católica in Lima and has been visiting in the United States as a special guest of the U.S. Information Agency under their International Visitor Program.

1984 Tinker Visiting Professors Announced

In 1981 the Tinker Foundation completed its program of endowing Edward Larocque Tinker Visiting Professorships at U.S. universities. Below are listed the names of the scholars...
who will be in residence during 1984. Those interested in contacting the Tinker Professors should write to them directly at the institutions of their appointment.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Guillermo Arroyave, Guatemala—Food Research Institute, Human Biology Program, Spring 1984
José Carlos Sebe Bom Meily, Brazil—Department of History, Center for Latin American Studies, Spring 1984

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Jack Schechtman, Brazil—Department of Economics, Spring-Fall 1984

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Guillermo de la Peña, Mexico—Department of Anthropology, Spring 1984

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MADISON
Pier A. Mello, Mexico—Department of Physics, Spring 1984
José Pastore, Brazil—Industrial Relations Research Institute, Spring 1984
Paulo de Almeida Machado, Brazil—Department of Preventive Medicine, Spring 1984
Oscar Muñoz, Chile—Department of Economics, Fall 1984
Raúl Urrúa, Chile—Department of Sociology, Fall 1984

IIE Survey Reports 336,985 Foreign Students in U.S. in 1983 Academic Year

"The enormous increase of foreign students which the United States experienced during the seventies has reached at least a temporary plateau in the worldwide economic recession of the early eighties," according to Dr. Richard Krasno, president of the Institute of International Education (IIE), the largest U.S. higher education exchange agency. Dr. Krasno made this statement as he announced the results of the 1982-83 IIE census of foreign students at U.S. colleges and universities. This survey, published annually as "Open Doors," is conducted with financial assistance from the U.S. Information Agency.

The 1983 total of 336,985 foreign students represented a 3.3 percent increase over the 1982 figure. During the latter half of the seventies the rate of growth never fell below 10 percent and twice exceeded 16 percent, but has been decreasing since.

Dr. Krasno attributed the smaller increase largely to the worldwide economic recession, which has particularly affected the developing nations, where over 80 percent of foreign students originate. A recent IIE survey of changes in higher education's policies toward foreign students suggests that a second factor in the declining growth rate may be more stringent admissions requirements by American colleges and universities.

Actual declines in foreign student numbers that varied from 6 to 10 percent occurred in the Middle East, Central, and North America (Canada); increases above 3.3 percent occurred only in Asia, Europe, and South America (where the increase was accounted for almost entirely by one country, Venezuela). The Asian region, which includes several especially populous nations and relatively stronger economies, accounted for most actual foreign student growth.

Only 15 percent of foreign students indicated a U.S. source as their major source of funding. Of these, only two percent received primary support from the U.S. government. Engineering continued to be the leading field of study (23 percent); business and management were next with 18 percent, while science, mathematics, and computer studies together attracted 16 percent. California enrolled nearly one-sixth of all overseas students; two other Sunbelt states, Texas and Florida, were third and fourth. New York was second.

The IIE census of students from abroad is guided by the Interassociation Committee on Data Collection, and will be published as "Open Doors 1982-83." Those interested in the publication may contact Open Doors, Office of Communications, IIE, 809 U.N. Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

Ford Foundation News

The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) received a two-year grant of $220,000 from the Ford Foundation to continue a program of information gathering and advocacy on human rights and democratic reform in Latin America. Through extensive contacts in the region, publications, and conferences, WOLA provides information to policymakers, members of Congress, and the media. It also serves as an intermediary between these groups and Latin American religious, democratic, and human rights organizations.

Also receiving a grant from the Ford Foundation was the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (Costa Rica), for a survey of the programs of human rights organizations operating in Central America. This organization also received a grant for a conference of representatives of Central American human rights organizations.

James Ralston Scobie Collection

The University of California at San Diego's Central Library is close to completing the processing of the personal collection of James R. Scobie, eminent Latin American historian and member of UCSD's history department, whose untimely death saddened us all. His collection reflects his role as a pioneer in the development of the field of Latin American urban history, and is especially rich in archival and source materials on the development of the Argentine city. The over 2500 items include rare early censuses for Buenos Aires, excellent series of Argentine government publications which have had little distribution in this country, and extensive runs of early Argentine journals. If you have any questions about the collection, please contact Karen Lindvall, Latin American bibliographer, C-075R, UCSD, La Jolla, CA 92093.

Arizona State University Centennial Prize

In observance of the centennial year of Arizona State University, the Center for Latin American Studies is awarding a Centennial Prize for a book-length manuscript on any Latin American topic. The manuscript selected for the prize will be published through the center's publication program. Entries will be judged by an interdisciplinary committee and will be refereed by professionals in the discipline of the subject matter. The recipient will receive a $500 prize and a commemorative plaque. The award-winning book will be recognized as the recipient of the ASU Centennial Prize in all promotional and sales material.

Deadline for filing manuscripts is 15 September 1984.
Submissions should include the complete manuscript, including a table of contents, and a statement (not to exceed two double-spaced pages) that both describes the work and presents a statement of its importance in the field. The prize will be announced in December 1984.

Correspondence and manuscripts should be directed to Dr. David W. Foster, chair, Publications Committee, Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287; (602) 965-5127.

Hubert B. Herring Memorial Awards
The 1984 competition for the Hubert B. Herring Memorial Awards has been announced by the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies. Categories are best article or article-length manuscript; best book or book-length manuscript; best master's or senior thesis; best Ph.D. dissertation; best film or videotape. Awards will be announced at the PCCLAS meeting in October.

Entries should be submitted to the PCCLAS Awards chairperson, Prof. Jane S. Jaquete, Department of Political Science, Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA 90041. Deadline for submission is 15 June 1984.

Inter-American Dialogue Resumed
Impelled by the crisis in Central America and by other major problems in hemispheric relations, a group of fifty leading citizens from throughout the Americas decided to reconvene the Inter-American Dialogue from 18 to 20 March 1984. The decision to resume the dialogue was announced by its cochair, Sol M. Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States and presidential emissary to the Middle East, and Galo Plaza, former president of Ecuador and former secretary general of the Organization of American States.

After its meeting in March 1983, the dialogue issued a widely discussed report, The Americas at a Crossroads. The report made recommendations on the liquidity crisis in Latin America, on long-term economic development, on the promotion of democracy and human rights, and on a process for bringing about peace in Central America.

In announcing the resumption of the dialogue, Ambassador Linowitz stated, “There is a very strong sense throughout the hemisphere of the need to bring together again these leaders of diverse perspectives to discuss candidly and constructively recent developments that affect the future of inter-American relations.”

According to Ambassador Linowitz, “The issuance of the Kissinger Commission’s report has added to the sense of urgency among the members of the dialogue. In our report last spring, we urged that emphasis be put first and foremost on a process of negotiations toward peace in Central America. We strongly endorsed the Contadora initiative of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, and called upon the United States to offer the Contadora process its vigorous support. Whereas the dialogue argued that the Contadora negotiations should be central to U.S. policy in Central America, the Kissinger Commission treats them as peripheral.”

Ambassador Linowitz stated that last year’s dialogue report differed from the Kissinger Commission on other questions, such as the character of the security threat in the region, the value of negotiations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the wisdom of continued U.S. support for the Nicaraguan insurgents. He expressed agreement, however, with the thrust of the commission’s social and economic recommendations, especially if implemented as part of a peace settlement. He also indicated that members of the dialogue have emphasized the need to examine issues beyond Central America, including the debt situation and the financing of economic development, the process of democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone, and the prospects for reviving the inter-American system.

The Inter-American Dialogue was convened under the auspices of the Aspen Institute. The Latin American participants, who compose half the members of the dialogue, include former President Daniel Oduber of Costa Rica; former finance ministers Mário Henrique Simonsen of Brazil and Javier Silva Ruete of Peru; former foreign ministers Antonio Carrillo Flores of Mexico, Gabriel Valdés of Chile, and Oscar Camillon of Argentina; José Francisco Peña Gómez, the mayor of Santo Domingo; Augusto Ramírez Ocampo, the mayor of Bogotá; businessmen Oliver Clarke of Jamaica, Bernardo Quintana of Mexico, and Jorge Fontaine of Chile; Archbishop Marcos McGrath of Panama; Xabier Gorostiaga, director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research in Nicaragua; Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa; and Nicolás Arístides Barletta, former vice-president of the World Bank and presidential candidate in Panama. Participants from North America include former secretaries of state Cyrus Vance and Edmund Muskie; former secretaries of defense Elliot Richardson and Robert McNamara; former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones; business executives Ralph Pfeiffer of IBM and Ralph Davidson of Time, Incorporated; former governor of Michigan William G. Milliken; Hernán Padilla, the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, Maurice Ferro, the mayor of Miami; Joyce Miller, vice-president of the Amalgamated Textile and Clothing Workers Union; Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, president of the University of Notre Dame; Ivan Head, president of the International Development Research Centre in Canada; and Franklin Thomas, president of the Ford Foundation.

Participants in the Inter-American Dialogue assembled in Washington on 18 March and met through 20 March at the Aspen Institute’s Wye Plantation in Maryland. Financial support for the dialogue was provided by Aspen and several private foundations and corporations.

Peter D. Bell, of Washington, and Rodrigo Botero, of Colombia, served as vice-chairmen of the dialogue. Mr. Bell, a resident associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was until recently president of the Inter-American Foundation. Mr. Botero is a former minister of finance of Colombia and is currently publisher of Estrategia magazine in Bogotá. Staff work was directed by Abraham F. Lowenthal, professor of international relations at the University of Southern California.

For further information on the meeting, please contact the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1333 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Suite 1070, Washington, DC 20036.
PUBLICATIONS

Allegheny College and the Department of Urban Studies of the University of Akron wish to announce the creation of a new monograph series, *Latin American Issues: A Monograph Series on Latin American and Caribbean Affairs*. To be published four times a year, *Latin American Issues* will present original research on contemporary Latin America. Manuscripts representing all social science and humanities disciplines are welcomed. Authors are requested to submit two copies of their 60-100 page (double-spaced) manuscripts, together with two copies of an abstract of 100 words or less, to Dr. Giles Wayland-Smith, Department of Political Science, Allegheny College, Meadville, PA 16335.

The Centro de Investigaciones del Caribe y América Latina (CISCLA) at the Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico has begun the publication of the CISCLA Working Papers, to include papers delivered at a recent conference on “International Relations of the Contemporary Caribbean” held in April 1983. Requests for the papers should be sent to Dr. Jorge Heine, CISCLA director, Universidad Interamericana, San Germán, PR 00753.


These titles are available at a cost of $4.00 each from the Editor, Occasional Papers Series, LACC, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199. Submissions are subjected to “blind” review and may be forwarded to the editor at the above address.

Barbara Annis has been named editor of the independent, biweekly “Washington Letter on Latin America.” Ms. Annis lived in Guatemala from 1975 to 1980, reporting on developments in Central America for *Business Latin America*, and most recently was a freelance reporter in Washington for *Business International*. She succeeds Barbara Durr, who will continue as Washington correspondent for *Latin American Newsletters of London*. WLLA is published by Washington Business Information in association with *Latin American Newsletters*.

The Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales has introduced a monthly publication entitled “Mujer” that is designed to distribute information about women in several regions of Latin America. The publication contains articles by Latin American women and news clippings dealing with women and their roles and activities in numerous Latin American countries. Further information about the publication and subscription information may be obtained from Adriana Santa Cruz, coordinator, Unidad de Comunicación Alternativa de la Mujer, Casilla 16637, Correo 9, Santiago, CHILE.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

History/Comparative Politics at UM-St. Louis

A one-year visiting replacement position at the assistant professor level to teach Latin American history and comparative politics, beginning in the fall semester 1984, is available at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. This will be a joint appointment between the departments of history and political science. Teaching experience is preferred and salary will be competitive; however, the position is contingent on funding.

The position would be of special interest to a colonial Latin Americanist, as the university’s library has an extensive collection of primary source materials for research in that field. Complete resume and three letters of recommendation should be sent to Prof. James Neal Primm, History, and Prof. J. Martin Rochester, Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 8001 Natural Bridge Road, St. Louis, MO 63121. Deadline for receipt of applications is 1 June 1984. UMSL is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action employer.

Soviet-Latin American Studies

The University of Kansas College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, wishes to announce an appointment in Soviet-Latin American studies, contingent upon funding. The position would be at the assistant professor level, and would be from 15 August 1984 through 15 May 1985. This appointment will combine teaching and research; during the academic year, the appointee will teach a maximum of three courses (9 semester credit hours) of which at least one will be a team-taught interarea course. Concurrently, the appointee will pursue a research project in Soviet-Latin American affairs, resulting in a publishable work to be presented at a preliminary workshop in spring 1985.

Qualifications include proficiency in Russian and Spanish, ABD minimum, demonstrated competence in policy and international relations, and evidence of high quality research and teaching. (Preferred qualifications would be a Ph.D. or equivalent and area studies competence in both world areas.) Salary range: $16,000-$20,000. Applications should be sent by 15 April 1984 to William C. Fletcher, Soviet and East European Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045. The University of Kansas is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action employer.
Proposal for Special Events and Meetings

Please mail in time to be received by 15 April 1984 to
Prof. Christopher Mitchell
Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies
New York University
New York, NY 10003  USA

TYPE OR PRINT CLEARLY ALL INFORMATION:

Title of session: ____________________________

Sponsoring organization: ____________________________

Type of event:

☐ Breakfast  ☐ Reception (paid by sponsor)  ☐ Business meeting  ☐ Panel
☐ Luncheon  ☐ Cash (no-host) bar  ☐ Organizing Meeting  ☐ Board/Committee Meeting
☐ Dinner  ☐ Informal Discussion  ☐ Workshop

Is event open to all interested parties? ________________ Do you plan to charge a fee for admission? ________________

Provide a brief narrative description for possible publication:

Name and affiliation of chair: ____________________________

Name and affiliation of organizer (if different from chair): ____________________________

Preferred date and hour: ____________________________

List other groups whose simultaneous scheduling should be avoided:

Room set-up:  ☐ Theater (auditorium) with head table to seat ________ people
              ☐ Conference (up to 15 people)

Estimated attendance ________

Will food/beverages be served? ____________ If yes, give name, address, and phone number of the person to be billed:

Specify audiovisual equipment required:

☐ overhead  ☐ opaque  ☐ carousel slide  ☐ 8 mm
☐ electric pointer  ☐ tape recorder (playback only)  ☐ screen  ☐ 16 mm
☐ video (specify format very precisely)

Form completed by (include address and telephone number): ____________________________
PROPOSAL FOR ORGANIZED SESSION

A narrative description of not less than 75 nor more than 100 words is required for each organized session proposal. Three copies of this form are necessary. The reverse side is to be used for the list of participants. If you are proposing a paper, simply substitute “paper” for “organized session” in the line above. The completed proposal and the completed list of participants must be received by the Program Committee by the deadline—15 April 1984—to be considered for inclusion in the program of the 1985 LASA meeting in Albuquerque. Please provide all requested information—carefully, fully, legibly.

Mail, in time to be received by 15 April 1984 to:
Prof. Christopher Mitchell  
Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies  
New York University  
New York, NY 10003 USA

**TYPE OR PRINT CLEARLY ALL INFORMATION:**

**Title of Session:**

**Type of Session:**  Panel Session  Workshop  Breakfast/Lunch Discussion Group

**Organization sponsoring session, if any:**

**Description (75-100 words) of the session:**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organizer:</th>
<th>Co-Organizer (if any):</th>
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<td>Institution:</td>
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<td>Telephone (residence):</td>
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<td>LASA Membership Status of Organizer:</td>
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<td>Member: Yes  No  (circle one)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brief biographical sketch of Organizer:</td>
<td>Brief biographical sketch of Co-Organizer:</td>
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Title of Session: 

Sponsoring Organization (if any): 

**INSTRUCTIONS:** List participants in order of their appearance in the session. Use an additional sheet if absolutely necessary, but note that sessions are normally 2 hours in length. At least 20 minutes should be set aside for discussion at the close of the session, after all papers have been presented. Multiple-part sessions may be proposed, but require strong justification regarding the number of participants and the importance of the topic. All session organizers should attach a detailed schedule of the proposed session and a descriptive statement adequate to convey fully the organizer’s intentions to the Program Committee.

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<th>Participant:</th>
<th>Role in the Session:</th>
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