PRESIDENT’S CORNER
by Helen I. Safa (University of Florida)

In my last column, brief mention was made of the failure of the Reagan administration to reinstate funds for Title VI of the Higher Education Act and for the Fulbright program in its budget proposals for FY 1985. This is not the first time these vital programs have been under attack. Two years ago they were also threatened with a cut in funding, only to be restored with additional funding by Congress after considerable pressure was brought by the academic community, including LASA. This pressure needs to be mounted again.

What advantages do these programs have for Latin Americans in the United States? As a director of a Title VI national resource center at the University of Florida, I would like to address myself primarily to the importance of this program. There are now eleven major national resource centers on Latin America in the United States: the University of California at Berkeley and Stanford University; UCLA; University of Florida; University of Illinois and the University of Chicago; University of Kansas; University of New Mexico and New Mexico State University; University of Pittsburgh and Cornell University; University of Texas; Tulane University; University of Wisconsin; and Yale University. Florida International University and San Diego State University are undergraduate centers for Latin American study, and a new program for international business was funded last year.

These Title VI programs form the core of Latin American language and area studies programs in the United States. They attempt to achieve the two major national interest goals originally set out for these programs: to train high-quality students to an advanced level of language and area competency, and to produce a systematic body of knowledge on other countries to inform our educational system, the public, and the makers of our national policy.

Few would argue with the validity of these goals, particularly in these critical times when we confront serious challenges to our foreign policy in Latin America and other parts of the globe. The achievements of these Title VI centers have been commendable. They have trained a generation of scholars, in the U.S. as well as in Latin America, and have produced significant publications in the social sciences and humanities. The Title VI program has been plagued with severe problems, however, including lack of stable and adequate funding, disciplinary and geographic imbalances, little interest and funds for research and publications, and lack of long-range planning. In addition, the effectiveness of Title VI support has been eroded by inflation, by the brevity of the grant cycle, by shifting selection criteria based on policy swings within the Department of Education, and by periodic efforts to abolish the program.

Under the Reagan administration, there has been a marked tendency to tie international education programs to immediate concerns of national security, such as the 10,000 scholarships for Central America proposed by the Kissinger Commission. The commission wanted to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union, which has been providing fourteen times the number of scholarships to Central America as the United States in recent years. At the same time, however, long-standing educational exchange programs such as the Fulbright and the Inter-American Foundation fellowship programs are threatened with loss of funding.

There is increasing discussion of a national endowment for international studies, which could meet some of the shortcomings of Title VI noted above and consolidate all international programs under one roof. Such a body would parallel the National Science Foundation or the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities, or it might be appended to one of the existing governmental agencies such as the Smithsonian Institution. In the recent Lambert Report, commissioned by the Department of Defense and the American Association of Universities, it was recommended that such an endowment, in addition to annual appropriations from relevant agencies or directly from Congress, "be supported by a share of monies flowing back into the U.S. Treasury from foreign loan repayments or from sales of military and other equipment abroad." To encourage support from the private sector, the body should be eligible to receive some of the nonrepaireable profits held overseas by American business. These recommendations for funding parallel those of the report of the Advisory Board on International Education Programs in the Department of Education.

In my view, these recommendations represent a significant step in the right direction toward a more stable and rational long-range program for international education in the United States. The endowment could administer a variety of international educational programs now scattered among a variety of agencies and administer new programs such as the USIA...
linkage program between U.S. and Latin American universities, which has been well received in both the United States and Latin American academic communities. It might also streamline the educational exchanges under the Fulbright program, which are now subject to long delays as they pass through several governmental bodies in the U.S. and abroad for approval. The endowment should be kept quite distinct from the recently created National Endowment for Democracy, which is designed to facilitate exchanges between U.S. private sector groups, primarily business and labor, and "democratic groups abroad."

Since it aims to promote democratic pluralism abroad, perhaps a priority of the new National Endowment for Democracy should be a study of the destabilizing effects of the policies of the International Monetary Fund in Latin America. Certainly the violent riots that broke out in the Dominican Republic the week after Easter demonstrate the threat to democratic institutions stemming from IMF policies. Less than two weeks before, on the occasion of President Jorge Blanco’s visit to Washington, President Reagan had spoken in glowing terms of the country that "shines like a beacon from freedom loving people everywhere."

Yet Reagan failed to look beyond the façade of political democracy to the economic misery that has been plaguing the Dominican Republic for the past few years, brought on by a fall in export prices, rising prices for imports of petroleum and food, and a burgeoning government bureaucracy. A group of sixty prominent Dominican entrepreneurs sent an open letter to President Reagan warning of the dangers of political unrest in a country suffering from rapid inflation, cutbacks in government subsidies, and 40 percent unemployment. The sudden price increases imposed by the terms of the International Monetary Fund, to which the Dominican Republic had turned for help, were the straw that broke the camel's back—particularly since they included such basic items as milk, flour, and medicines. Under these conditions, it is unnecessary to place the blame on political agitators of the Left or Right. While political groups may have taken advantage of the situation and certainly labored hard against the terms of the IMF, they found fertile ground in an explosive and suffering populace.

Unfortunately, similar conditions are facing other Latin American countries, including Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Political control may be tighter in these countries than in the Dominican Republic, but any government must fear excessive reliance on force and censorship. The Dominican riots left over sixty persons dead and hundreds injured and resulted in the closing of two radio stations and a television station. These are ominous signs for a country committed to political and economic democracy. The IMF must find ways in which to design its policies to curb rather than reinforce the growing immiserization of the Latin American masses, or the violence in the Dominican Republic may grow into increasing political unrest there and in the rest of Latin America.

I would like to urge all members of LASA to write to the following, requesting continuing financial support for Title VI of the Higher Education Act:

Representative Paul Simon, chairman, House Subcommittee on Post-Secondary Education, House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515

Senator Lowell Weicker, chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510

LASA FORUM

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University of Texas

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PRELIMINARY SLATE ANNOUNCED FOR VICE-PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The following slate of candidates is hereby submitted to the LASA membership for the fall elections that will select a vice-president for the term of office from January 1985 through June 1986. At that time, the vice-president will assume the office of president for the 18 months from July 1986 through December 1987. In addition, the LASA membership must select three persons to join the Executive Council for a three-year term beginning in January 1986. The current council members whose terms are expiring are Cornelia Butler Flora, James M. Malloy, David Scott Palmer, and Saul Sosnowski. Remaining on the Executive Council are President Helen Safa, Vice-President Wayne Cornelius (who will become president on January 1, 1985), Carmen Diana Deere, Mario Ojeda, and Norman Whitten.

According to the LASA By-Laws, additional candidates for vice-president may be proposed by submitting a petition signed by at least 100 members in good standing. Members of the association may also propose additional candidates for the Executive Council by submitting a petition signed by at least 20 members in good standing.

Write-in petitions must be received in the Secretariat by September 15, 1984, to be included on the official ballot, which will be mailed shortly after the September 15 deadline.

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

Cole Blasier
Professor of Political Science and Research Professor of Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Education
Ph.D., Columbia University; Universities of Mexico and Chile
Professional and Administrative Experience
Publications
LASA Activities
Member of five-member committee that drafted Constitution and convened Constituent Assembly of LASA, 1966; founding committee of Latin American Research Review, 1967-1969; chair, LASA Nominating Committee, 1973; chair, LASA Task Force on U.S./U.S.S.R. Scholarly Relations, 1981-

Marysa Navarro
Professor of History, Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire
Education
Ph.D. (History), Columbia University, 1964
M.A. (History), Columbia University, 1960
B.A., Instituto José Battle y Ordoñez, Montevideo, Uruguay
Professional and Administrative Experience
Lecturer, Latin American History and Economics, Rutgers University, 1963-1964; Guest Lecturer in Latin American History, Stern College, Yeshiva University, 1964-1965; Associate Professor of History, Newark State College, Union, New Jersey, 1965-1967; Visiting Associate Professor of History, Long Island University, Brooklyn, New York, 1966-1967; Assistant Professor of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1968-1972; Associate Professor of History, Dartmouth College, 1972-1977; Visiting Associate Researcher in the Centro de Estudios de Población (CENEP), Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1977; member of the Advisory Screening Committee in Latin American Studies (Fulbright-Hays); member of the Editorial Board of Signs; member of the Ms Advisory Board on Research, Scholarship and Education; Vice-President of the New England Council for Latin American Studies (1980-1981); President, New England Council for Latin American Studies (1981-1982); member of the Advisory Committee of Women's Studies International: A Network and Resource Center (1982); member of CLACSO Seminar (1983-1984)
Publications
LASA Activities
Executive Committee alternate, 1980-1981; member and cochair of LASA Task Force on Women

FOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Julianne Burton
Associate Professor, Board of Studies in Literature, University of California, Santa Cruz
Education
Ph.D. (Romance Languages and Literatures), Yale University, 1972
M.Phil. (Romance Languages and Literatures), Yale University, 1970
B.A., Dennison University, 1967

Professional and Administrative Experience

Publications

LASA Activities

Georgette M. Dorn
Head of the Reading Room, Specialist in Hispanic Culture, and Curator of the Archive, Hispanic Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC

Education
Ph.D. (History), Georgetown University, 1981
M.A. (History), Boston College, 1961
B.S. (Political Science), Creighton University, 1959

Also attended the Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1953-1955

Professional and Administrative Experience
Latin American Specialist, Library of Congress, 1964-1969; Lecturer in history at Georgetown University, 1982-1985; President of the Inter-American Council of Washington, DC, 1975-1976; Contributing Editor, *Handbook of Latin American Studies*; member of Board of Directors of the San Martin Society; Assistant Editor, *The Americas: A Quarterly Review of Inter-American Cultural History*; Corresponding Editor, *Letras de Buenos Aires*; member of Board of Directors, First Latin American Book Fair of Washington, 1983; research conducted on social and cultural history with concentration on the Southern Cone and contemporary Latin American literature

Publications

LASA Activities
Inter-American Council LASA Liaison, Washington, DC, 1976-1977; Local Arrangements Committee of the 10th National Meeting of LASA, 1982

Susan E. Eckstein
Professor of Sociology, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts

Education
Ph.D. (Sociology), Columbia University, 1972
B.A. (Sociology), Beloit College, 1963

Professional and Administrative Experience
Associate Professor of Sociology, Boston University, 1976-1983; Assistant Professor of Sociology, Boston University, 1971-1976; Lecturer, Boston University, 1970-1971; Visiting Assistant Professor, University of California at Santa Barbara, 1974; Tutor, Social Relations Department, Harvard University, 1969; Honorary Research Fellow, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978-1979 and 1983-1984; Research Fellow, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, 1973-1977; Research Associate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1969-1970; researcher with Bureau of Social Science Research, Washington, DC, 1965; Committee on Membership, American Sociological Association, 1973; Dissertation Fellowship Screening Committee, Latin American and Caribbean Studies Program, Social Science Research Council, 1975-1976; Council member, New England Council on Latin American Studies, 1976-1978; Latin American Liaison Subcommittee, Americal Sociological Association, 1977-; chair, Nominations Committee, Political Economy of

Publications


LASA Activities

Member, LASA Nominating Committee, 1978-1979; Chair, LASA Nominating Committee, 1977-1978.

Robert V. Kemper

Professor of Anthropology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas

Education

Ph.D. (Anthropology), University of California at Berkeley, 1971

M.A. (Anthropology), University of California at Berkeley, 1969

A.B. (Social Sciences and History), University of California at Riverside, 1966

Professional and Administrative Experience


Publications


LASA Activities

Co-Chair, Joint Program and Local Arrangements Committee XI LASA International Congress, 1983.

William M. LeoGrande

Associate Professor of Political Science, The American University, Washington, DC

Education

Ph.D. (Political Science), The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1976

M.A. (Political Science), The Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1973

A.B. (Political Science and Psychology), Syracuse University, 1971

Professional and Administrative Experience

Assistant Professor, American University, 1978-1984; Professional Staff, Democratic Policy Committee, U.S. Senate, 1982-1983; Director of Political Science, School of Government and Public Administration, 1980-1982; Assistant Professor, Hamilton and Kirkland Colleges, Clinton, New York, 1976-1978; Editor, The Maxwell Review, Syracuse University, 1974-1975; Research Assistant, International Relations Program, Syracuse University, 1971-1972; consultant for National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission), House Committee on Appropriations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Publications


LASA Activities

Member, Task Force on Media; Editorial Board, Latin American Research Review.

Arturo Valenzuela

Professor of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

Education

Ph.D. (Comparative Politics), Columbia University, 1971

M.A. (Comparative Politics), Columbia University, 1967

B.A. (Political Science, Religion), Drew University, 1965

Professional and Administrative Experience

Associate Professor of Political Science, Duke University, 1976-1983; Assistant Professor, Duke University, 1972-1976;

Publications


LASA Activities

Parliamentarian, XI Annual LASA Meeting, Mexico City, 1983; Parliamentarian, X Annual LASA Meeting, Washington, DC, 1982; Member, LASA Nominating Committee, 1977

PROPOSED CHANGES IN BY-LAWS CONCERNING RESOLUTIONS AND MOTIONS AT LASA BUSINESS MEETINGS

The LASA Executive Council, at its meeting of March 22-23 in Austin, Texas, approved the following changes in the association's by-laws.

Article VI, Section 7 is amended as follows:

Substitute the following words: “Resolutions for consideration at the International Congress must be signed by at least five LASA members and received by the LASA Secretariat thirty days prior to the beginning of each Congress. All proposed resolutions shall be reviewed by a Subcommittee on Resolutions consisting of three members of the Executive Council, appointed by the president. This subcommittee may seek advisory opinions from the relevant LASA task forces as well as individual scholars with appropriate expertise, and may recommend revisions. The Subcommittee shall report its findings to the full Executive Council and recommend action to be taken. Resolutions to be referred to the Business Meeting must be approved by a two-thirds majority vote of both the Subcommittee on Resolutions and the Executive Council. The vote on a resolution in its final form at the business meeting shall be by secret ballot. A resolution approved by the business meeting shall be submitted to the full membership for a mail ballot along with the tabulation of the secret ballot.”

The original wording of Article VI, Section 7, is “Resolutions for consideration at the national meeting must be submitted in advance to the Executive Council and, if referred to the assembly and passed, must then go to a mail ballot before being reconsidered by the Executive Council. Resolutions on questions of academic freedom and human rights must first be referred to the Academic Freedom and Human Rights Task Force, which, after due study, will report its findings to the floor and recommend what actions, if any, should be taken.”

Vice-President Wayne Cornelius presented the proposal and President Helen Safa seconded the motion. The Executive Council vote on this proposed amendment was 5 in favor, 3 opposed, and 1 abstention.

Article VI, Section 8 is amended as follows.

The text of Article VI, Section 8 reads as follows: “At business meetings, motions other than those dealing with procedural matters will be accepted only when they address unforeseen new events that preclude the use of normal resolution procedures. Such motions must be signed by five LASA members and presented in writing to the Executive Council at least twenty-four hours before the business meeting. The EC shall consider all such motions and recommend to the assembly what actions, if any, might be taken.”

The following words are to be added after the present final sentence: “The vote on a motion in its final form shall be by secret ballot. The tabulation of such ballots shall be reported to the membership along with the text of any motions approved at the business meeting in the LASA Forum.”

The Executive Council vote on this proposed amendment was 8 in favor, none opposed, and 1 abstention.

Under the LASA Constitution, changes in the By-Laws proposed by the Executive Council “shall be considered ratified unless at least one hundred Members or Student Associates protest in writing to the Executive Director within ninety days of the distribution of the proposals. Any proposed amendments that have been so protested must be submitted to a mail ballot and shall be considered ratified if approved by a majority of the voting membership that responds within ninety days of the distribution of the ballot.”

PROTESTS MUST BE RECEIVED AT THE LASA SECRETARIAT BY SEPTEMBER 15, 1984.

GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING RESOLUTIONS TO BE PRESENTED AT LASA BUSINESS MEETINGS

Also at its March 22-23, 1984, meeting in Austin, Texas, the Executive Council approved the following guidelines for preparing resolutions to be presented for discussion at future business meetings of the association, beginning with the meeting to be held at the International Congress in Albuquerque in April 1985.

1. Resolutions should be limited to 100 words.

2. If additional supporting materials are provided by the proposers of a resolution, such materials (up to three pages) will be duplicated and distributed, along with the text of the proposed resolution, at the time of the business meeting. However, these supporting materials cannot be read during the business meeting. To allow sufficient time for reproduction, supporting materials should be received by the LASA Secretariat.
thirty days prior to the beginning of the International Congress.

3. Copies of resolutions approved by the business meeting assembly and subsequently by mail ballot of the LASA membership will be sent by the LASA Secretariat to the appropriate individuals and institutions, so it is not necessary to include a list of recipients in the text of the proposed resolution. The LASA Forum will publish the names of those receiving copies of approved resolutions.

4. Each resolution should deal with only one issue.

5. Each resolution should be a statement of general principle, which can be illustrated, if appropriate, by reference to specific cases, events, or circumstances.

6. Each proposed resolution must be signed by at least five LASA members, one of whom should be designated by the proposing group as its spokesperson and contact person, to facilitate communication with the Secretariat and the Executive Council’s Subcommittee on Resolutions. Complete office and home mailing addresses and telephone numbers for the spokesperson/contact person must be included with the draft resolution.

7. Each proposed resolution should be typewritten, double-spaced, on a separate sheet of paper.

8. The Subcommittee on Resolutions (consisting of three members of the LASA Executive Council) will study each proposed resolution. The Subcommittee may revise, reformulate, and in some instances, combine duplicative proposed resolutions, in consultation with the proposers of each resolution.

9. The procedure for proposing a motion, as contrasted with a resolution, to be presented at an LASA business meeting cannot be substituted for the resolutions procedure, unless the circumstances prompting a motion are those specified in the LASA By-Laws (Article VI, Section 8): “At business meetings, motions other than those dealing with procedural matters will be accepted only when they address unforeseen new events that preclude the use of normal resolutions procedures. Such motions must be signed by five LASA members and presented in writing to the Executive Council at least 24 hours before the business meeting.” Under the proposed amendments to the By-Laws, draft resolutions must reach the Secretariat 30 days prior to the beginning of each International Congress. Therefore, proposed motions must deal with “unforeseen new events” that occur during the 30-day period preceding the International Congress.

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of the above guidelines and of the proposed changes in the resolutions procedure for business meetings is to streamline that procedure, improve the quality and clarity of proposed resolutions that reach the floor, and allow more time both for substantive discussion of the resolutions and for the conduct of other kinds of association business at the business meeting, as mandated by LASA’s Constitution.

At most business meetings held during the past decade, there has been little or no time available for such important matters as reports on the financial condition and prospects of the association, LASA-sponsored publications (LARR, Forum), decisions of the Executive Council, activities of LASA task forces, relationships with other scholarly organizations, and other matters bearing on the state of the association and of the profession. Under the existing procedure, much valuable time that might be devoted to such matters is, instead, expended in the editing of proposed resolutions in response to amendments from the floor, many of which deal with ambiguities and expository problems in draft resolutions that could have been eliminated through a more careful and orderly review and consultation process prior to the beginning of the international congress.

Moreover, the recent practice for handling proposed resolutions has been seriously disruptive to the functioning of the LASA Executive Council, which must meet at the time of each International Congress to deal with a wide range of association business, in addition to considering numerous proposed resolutions for possible referral to the business meeting (as mandated by the by-laws). Consultations with the proposers and with the relevant LASA task forces (the Task Force on Academic Freedom and Human Rights, and others) concerning revisions or consolidations of draft proposals, as well as the final retyping and bulk reproduction of the resolutions for distribution at the business meeting, must be accomplished under extreme time pressure. Consultations are often impeded by difficulties in communicating with all the relevant parties and by the press of other urgent business.

Not surprisingly, the results of these frenetic exercises are often disappointing. Poorly crafted resolutions have been criticized repeatedly by the membership—both during business meetings and subsequently in the mail ballots—as well as by the recipients of such resolutions. In short, neither the Executive Council nor the task force members with whom the Council consults on proposed resolutions can do their jobs well under these circumstances.

The Executive Council believes that there is a better way. It will require individuals and groups wishing to propose resolutions to do their work at least a month prior to each international congress, rather than after arrival at the congress. There will have to be more consultation by mail and telephone, both among the proposers and between the proposers and the LASA officers who are responsible for processing resolutions.

We believe that these inconveniences represent a relatively small price to pay for the considerable improvement in the quality, professionalism, and external credibility of LASA-approved resolutions that should result from the proposed changes.

The Council does not wish to discourage the submission or discussion of proposed resolutions. Nor does it wish to limit consideration of urgent, “unforeseen new events” or issues that may arise in the weeks immediately preceding an international congress. The motions procedure (as prescribed in Article VI, Section 8 of the By-Laws) will remain operative and available to all individuals and groups wishing to bring such urgent matters to the attention of the business meeting. Also, both draft resolutions and motions can be amended through floor discussion, as in previous years. Hopefully, the number of such amendments can be reduced through the more extended review process that we have proposed.

Members should keep in mind the difference between a
motion and a resolution. Under the LASA By-Laws, a motion represents only the sense of the assembly at the business meeting. An approved motion is an advisory opinion to the Executive Council. It is not submitted for approval to the entire LASA membership by mail ballot, as is required for all resolutions approved at the business meeting. Obviously, an approved resolution represents a more formal and authoritative statement of the association's position on an issue than a motion. Thus the resolutions procedure should be used to address issues of major import to the membership, except when time constraints do not permit a resolution to be introduced.

Another significant change in LASA procedures for handling resolutions and motions at the business meeting, which the Council has proposed, will require a secret (i.e., written) ballot on the final version of each resolution or motion. Resolutions or motions can still be amended during floor debate by a show of hands, unless some member requests a secret ballot (as is his or her right under Robert's Rules of Order).

The change of procedure on final votes is in response to strong, sustained criticism by LASA members over the last decade who have felt intimidated from expressing dissenting views on resolutions and motions presented at the business meetings, because of the absence of a secret ballot. The Executive Council believes that freedom of expression in the conduct of the association's business will be maximized by the proposed shift to a secret ballot. We also believe that this change will increase membership participation in the business meetings.

While the use of written ballots is more cumbersome than voice votes or shows of hands, the Secretariat has been charged with developing a rapid, efficient system for tabulating the ballots. Discussion of other proposed resolutions or motions can proceed while the tabulation is being done, and the results can be announced by the presiding officer before any further votes are taken.

REMARKS BY JOHN J. JOHNSON

The following remarks were made by John J. Johnson upon his acceptance of the LASA Kalman Silvert President's Prize in Mexico City at the XI International LASA Convention. Peter H. Smith (MIT), LASA past president, chaired the prize committee, which also included LASA past presidents William Glade (University of Texas at Austin) and Carmelo Mesa-Lago (University of Pittsburgh), and ex-officio LARR editor Gilbert Merx.

When Peter Smith invited me to say a few words on this occasion, a most flattering and satisfying one, I assure you, he suggested that I might address my remarks to any one of several possible topics. From his list of suggestions, I have chosen to speak on what I consider to have been major developments in the field of Latin American history, what remains for the future, and, having covered those areas, I propose to go beyond Peter's suggestions and note a couple of areas that I feel have been overdone.

I would not want to launch upon those topics without first saying that, from a strictly personal point of view, what has been most satisfying to me has been the opportunity that I have had of sharing in the training of a truly outstanding group of men and women who are making names for themselves in universities and public and private agencies across the country.

I constantly remind myself that nearly all persons who have enjoyed their careers as much as I have have accumulated heavy indebtedness along the way. My special debts are owed to Maurine, who has been 100 percent supportive at all stages in my work, and to Stanford University and the University of New Mexico for providing me with near ideal opportunities for pursuing my intellectual interests.

Most recently much of my professional satisfaction has come from having a voice in running the Hispanic American Historical Review. The Review has proved an excellent vehicle for trying to pump some new ideas into the discipline, to say nothing of helping to keep me abreast of developments in the field. I think it fair to say that when the Review is turned over to a new editorial staff in 1985, it will bear a University of New Mexico imprint.

It may be difficult for some of you to appreciate that, when I entered the field as an assistant professor at Stanford University in 1946, there were not in the United States a half dozen established Latin Americanists in either anthropology, geography, or literature, and that there were even fewer in political science, economics, and sociology.

Personnel in the bureaucracies in Washington was equally thin, although the State Department had Miron Burgin, and there was not a better scholar of modern Latin America in the United States than Miron. And the Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress was about to name the highly imaginative, self-assured Howard Cine.

In the academic world, only history, with such recognized names as Bolton, Haring, Lanning, Leonard, Munro, Perkins, Scholes, Robertson, Tannenbaum, and Whitaker, seemed to have the resources from which quick expansion might occur. That, at least, is what we novice historians believed. What is more significant, the stars were concentrated in only four or five institutions, most especially at Berkeley, which, in addition to an outstanding history department, had Lesley Bryd Simpson and Arturo Torres Rio Seco in literature, Stanford Mosk in economics, and Carl Sauer in geography.

Historians of Latin America in the United States enjoyed the luxury of having their own journal in the form of the HAHR, then and now the premier journal in the field. They thus could publish more or less at the rate they chose. Percy Alvin Martin, my predecessor at Stanford, for example, contributed 22 articles, notes, and reviews to the HAHR during its first 22 years, including among these seven full-fledged articles. Those days are, I fear, gone forever. Today we must always have in mind the need to spread the wealth.

History textbooks were truly abominable. They were generally impossibly dull. They were storehouses of fact, or what passed for facts. To say that they distorted history, were ethnocentric, or that they were weak on analysis would be gross understatements. The colonial era was written from an imperial point of view. The individual countries of the modern era were discussed with little, if any, reference to their neighbors or the region as a whole. One would never have suspected that the republics might be struggling with problems common to all. One had to read
between the lines to discover that not everyone in Latin America was a native American peasant, that there were already huge and rapidly growing commercial and industrial cities, or that not every chief executive in the area was a man on horseback.

What is equally significant, despite the thinness of personnel and miserable textbooks and few monographs on the modern period suitable for supplementary reading—the contributions of Frank Tannenbaum (I remember well that his *Peace by Revolution* was the first book on modern Latin America that truly excited my interest) and Arthur P. Whitaker being the most notable exceptions—United States institutions were turning out more professional Latin Americanists than were the institutions of any other country or pair of countries.

Now, *what has occurred since 1946* that has brought Latin American history to the advanced state that it now enjoys; to make Latin America an ever more challenging and meaningful field of study?

There have been, in fact, several positive developments. I would not, in these very abbreviated comments, wish to rank any one of them over any other, and I will, consequently, note them in random order.

First off, the field has expanded in the United States to the point where good to excellent training is available in a fair number of institutions, well scattered throughout the lower 48. Second, United States dominance as a training center has been seriously challenged as Mexico, Great Britain, and France have turned, and are turning, out an impressive number of sophisticated young scholars. And other countries are not too far behind—a fact that is all the more remarkable considering the unfortunate political, economic, and intellectual conditions under which Latin American scholars have been compelled to work. This division of training has been, I believe, a very favorable development.

Third, another critically important development has been the growth, quantitatively and qualitatively, in those disciplines to which historians must resort when they move beyond descriptive history. The day has passed when historians can sit in archives, obtain data, and report it without reference to the methodological and theoretical findings of related disciplines. Regrettably, some still try.

If circumstances were somewhat different, and if time permitted, I would suggest that, at this point, we should pause to toast Fidel, but there would be nothing original in such a suggestion. I first came across such a proposal in a Conference on Latin American History annual report written by Hugh Hammill in the early fall of 1961. I remember the instance quite well because it aroused the ire of Samuel Flagg Bemis, professor of diplomatic history at Yale and, at the time, president of the American Historical Association. He wrote me that were I, as chairman of the conference, planning such a toast, he would be compelled to withdraw his membership in the organization. I assured him that young Professor Hammill was just having his kicks. Professor Bemis stayed on and even sat at the head table during the annual luncheon, not next to Hugh, however.

Castro's contributions to the field have oft been noted; not so, I fear, others who deserve much credit. I think of the directors and boards of our more imaginative foundations, especially the Ford Foundation, for the opportunities they gave a generation of outstanding students to spend enough time abroad to acquire a reasonable acquaintance with the cultures of the various republics and to make what we hope will be lifelong intellectual contacts, to say nothing of, on occasion, meeting future spouses. And more recently the Tinker and Mellon foundations have come forward to take up considerable of the slack created by other foundations whose directors have chosen to chase the headlines coming out of Africa and the Middle and Far East. And the Fulbright program and the National Endowment for the Humanities have proved invaluable in these days of deficit budgets. I think, too, of those dedicated individuals who have made very important contributions to the field by keeping track of the flood of publications that began appearing after the mid-60s. What I am saying is that today's historians live in a far more complex and demanding intellectual world than when I entered the field.

Certainly one of the major favorable developments has been the increasing willingness of historians to take on local history, an area in which our Mexican colleagues have truly excelled. The development of quantitative history has been another of our major developments. If, however, I may be forgiven for harboring such a thought, I wish that those who engage in statistical measurements, present company excepted of course, would pay more attention than they sometimes appear to in their use of the king's English. As managing editor of the *HAHR*, I periodically receive a communication from my great and good friend Irving Leonard, chiding me for publishing tables and graphs the contents of which often could be made clearer by resorting to lucid writing. And I must confess that I sometimes agree with him.

When I came to the field, the largest single homogeneous group of historians was, for various reasons (availability of documentation, transportation, health considerations, and so forth) made up of those researching and writing about the areas, including Mexico, that figured most prominently in hemispheric relations. Intellectual interests in this New World are now much more dispersed. Mexicanists, however, clearly remain the largest single group. This is at once good and not so good. What is good is that members of the group are today interested primarily in internal issues of the nation and are leaving to the economists and political scientists binational problems. What is not so good is that political scientists and economists too often do not take the trouble to inform themselves of what historians have already discovered, or so it seems to me. Ideas that appear freshly innovative are frequently not so new to those familiar with the annals of history. As historians know well, societies have been around quite a long time and the evidence indicating that they have never been insensitive to their problems is abundant. Nonhistorians, thus, on occasion, are caught fighting their way through open doors. Another good aspect is that by zeroing in on Mexico's internal history, historians have opted for the most intellectually challenging area that the nation has to offer.

What remains to be done? Again, in no particular order.

I have been disappointed that the history profession has not taken more warmly than it has to oral history, particularly
because in our field, the records are often dangerously incomplete and those that exist are too often either biased or strictly polemical, but also because the potential for oral history is so very great. I need not elaborate on that point. I am also concerned that comparative history has not found a friendlier reception than it has. It has been, I suspect, the victim of our tenure system, a system that forces scholars to rush into print, thus denying them the time necessary to do analytical studies of the kind required for solid comparative studies. I would also like to see our colleagues take legal history more seriously. Where better than the debates of and the laws that ensue from those debates and the subsequent interpretation of those laws can one discover the concerns and flaws of a society. The importance of criminal law, as understood in Latin American societies, has been largely ignored to date, but, thankfully, has recently begun to attract attention.

I believe, too, that we have been unnecessarily and unrealistically tardy in turning to the history of art, architecture, music, psychology, science, and technology. I have tried, since becoming managing editor of the HAHHR, to identify scholars who might write for us in the fields just mentioned, but those of you who follow the Review are aware of how I have failed that mission. Not until the August 1983 issue of the Review did we carry a single article in any one of those areas. Much to our surprise, we have not received a single complaint about the article in the August 1983 issue that psychoanalyzed Haya de la Torre. And I would like to put in a word in favor of biography. In no field of history, I feel, can the analytical and writing skills of a historian be put to a stiffer test. I have often wished that I possessed those skills—I discovered that I was largely devoid of them when I did my study of Bolivar.

I believe that my remarks suggest nothing more than that I would like to see the profession finally break out of the political, economic, and social syndrome. I worry that the quality of book reviewing has not improved over the past half century. And I am not quite certain why that has been the case, but I do have some thoughts on the matter. The first is that our journals have opted for breadth rather than depth. The HAHHR, for example, in a recent issue ran reviews of 30 books, the reviews averaging one and one-fifth pages in length. The question is, are we producing 120 books a year that truly deserve reviews? Should we as scholars favor reviewing fewer books but at greater length than in the past? As I see it, our book review sections fail of their responsibility, perhaps, because publishers in Latin America, Western Europe and Eastern Europe do not provide us with their publications. And in the case of the HAHHR, at least, it is not because we do not keep after them. The third possible reason is that reviewers often lack the knowledge or the courage truly to analyze a volume.

I realize that very few of us are of the Secretary James Watt variety of humankind. We do not like confrontation, especially when friends are involved, but that being the case, it does not make for constructive reviewing. I wish that our reviewers would take a few lessons from our British and French, and occasional Latin American, colleagues who strike me as generally having the courage of their convictions. I recall that when in England during the summer of 1981, I asked a certain Oxford scholar why he repeatedly declined our invitations to review, his reply was to the effect that were he to review for a United States journal and say what he honestly thought of some publication, it could cost a young scholar his or her position. Deep down I could not help but agree with him; critical judgments deserve priority over polite ones. I am becoming convinced that we should either do away with reviews or insist that they be done in a way that has meaning to the seriously interested. Given our tradition, I have no real expectation that my thoughts about reviews will find an early acceptance.

Now, with your permission, I would like to indicate some of the aspects of the historical profession, as practiced in the United States, that bother me.

The first is, as I have suggested earlier, that the quality of composition has not improved and, in fact, probably has deteriorated during the past one-third century; and that is a pity. To the extent that we do not accurately express what we have in mind when we put pen to paper, or fingers to word processors, we do our data and analytical skills and the discipline a disservice. I wish that our instructors and dissertation directors would hold their students to rigorous standards in the use of the English language, which, when properly used, lends itself to such splendid expositions. I wish, too, that dissertation directors would teach mechanics, including footnoting and bibliography. Nothing that I have said about good English usage should be taken to suggest that I consider myself another Nevin, Trevelyan, or Tuchman. I know full well that I have not always succeeded in making myself clear, because reviewers of my books often have read into my remarks assertions quite different than I intended.

Closely related to the above is my concern with the failure of historians to popularize history in the sense of making it attractive to the average informed reader. I wish, too, that there were more members of the profession than we have to date, capable of arguing a point sufficiently well that they need not feel compelled to wear their ideological labels on their sleeves. I think that it is safe to say that all serious historians today borrow from across the ideological spectrum. I further maintain that if a point is well and clearly presented, the informed will recognize from what direction the author is coming. I wish that we could discard the term "intellectual history." I hold that those who pass themselves off as intellectual historians are no more intellectual than the rest of us. And certainly they are, as a group, no better craftsmen.

I wish, too, that historians in particular would not be as myopic as some of them have been. The histories of the individual countries of Latin America vary so greatly that to understand the workings of a single country does not qualify anyone, whether Latin American or Anglo-American, to speak for Latin America as a whole. A very dangerous undertaking in the best of circumstances.

I wish that history department faculties had the fortitude to make promotions and tenure decisions about their colleagues. Very few departments, I fear, possess such fortitude. Most prefer to put the burden on directors and editors of the various presses and scholarly journals. If a colleague's manuscript is accepted for publication, that is ordinarily enough for his or her department to recommend promotion or tenure, as the case may be. If a manuscript is rejected the author may well be put on
hold. The point is that in the first instance the manuscript may have been accepted for reasons quite aside from scholarly content and in the second case the manuscript may have been turned down simply because it was too scholarly to find a market. The ability to market a product should not be the basis for such important decisions as promotion and tenure. It is time that faculties assume their responsibilities and stop passing the buck to directors and editors whose criteria may be, and often are, different from what those of history faculties should be.

Finally, I would like participants in sessions held at annual meetings to learn to stick to the time allotted them so that the audiences have an opportunity to make their feelings known or to seek answers to questions that interest them. A good question period is a very satisfying experience. That observation is an open invitation for me to sit down and I accordingly do so. Thank you.

The following section of the LASA Forum contains articles and opinion pieces submitted by readers and others. The views expressed in them are solely those of the authors; the Latin American Studies Association does not endorse, approve, or censor them.

The recent upheavals in Chile are the subject of the following articles. The first is an interview with General Augusto Pinochet, president of Chile. The next, by economist Ramón Daubón of the Inter-American Foundation, explores the roots of the economic crisis. Arturo Valenzuela, a political scientist at Duke University, analyzes the current political situation and prospects for the future.

PINOCCHET ON CHILE

Editor’s Note: General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, president of Chile and commander-in-chief of its armed forces, recently granted an interview to Newsweek’s United Nations Bureau chief, Patricia J. Sethi—his first exclusive, on-the-record interview with the United States press in ten years. Below, Sethi details her impressions of the 68-year-old military leader and concludes with the complete text of the 90-minute session. The LASA Forum would like to thank Ms. Sethi and Newsweek for the right to publish the interview.

My interview with General Pinochet was scheduled for 8 a.m. on March 5, 1984, at La Moneda, the elegant Spanish-style presidential palace in the heart of downtown Santiago. I arrived with Diego Goldberg, my photographer, a few minutes ahead of the appointed time to work out security procedures. We walked into the presidential chamber at 8:15 after being greeted by a score of military aides en route.

The decor of Pinochet’s office is Spanish provincial: heavy deep-blue drapes with fringes and sashes; intricately carved wood tables and straight-backed chairs with velvet covers; lush oriental carpets over the parquet floor. Portraits of famous figures from Chile’s past, set in extravagant gold-leaf frames, adorn the walls. The president’s huge carved wooden desk was neat and uncluttered with a few papers stacked in the center; a large tapestry hangs right behind it with the words “Por la razón o la fuerza” (“By Reason or By Force”) woven through it.

The president greeted me with a flourish bordering on gallantry when I entered, extending his hand, then bowing low in traditional Spanish greeting; he complimented me on my “elegant dress.” He had shed his military uniform for a dark blue suit, blue shirt with red tie, white socks and black shoes. His mannerisms and gestures were full of old-world charm. The entire scene was out of another era: the traditional furniture; the old-fashioned formality of the greeting and gestures; and, once we started talking, the old-world responses to questions dealing with issues of the 1980s.

Twenty minutes into the interview he stopped abruptly, glanced at his gold wristwatch, then informed me that the interview was being terminated. He had an important meeting scheduled with the junta, he said; besides, he added, I had enough for my story. I was horrified; we were just warming up and I had not yet asked the crucial questions. I protested vigorously, arguing that I had not taken a 12-hour plane ride down to Santiago for a 20-minute encounter. Besides, I reminded him that this was his first major statement to the U.S. public in ten years and the U.S. public certainly deserved better. If he could not speak to me at this time, I told him, I would wait until his meeting with the junta had concluded.

My protest worked. Pinochet relented. He dismissed the military aide who had entered to remind the president about the pending meeting; Pinochet told him that we were not to be disturbed for the next hour. As if on cue, a gold-plated telephone sitting in a velvet box at the president’s elbow began ringing. Pinochet ignored it completely, despite the fact that the ringing continued for several minutes (intelligent guesswork suggests that the junta members were probably trying to remind him of their scheduled meeting). We talked for a total of 90 minutes.

The president appeared to be relaxed throughout the interview. In fact, he appeared upbeat and optimistic at times, especially when discussing his future. “I have everything going for me,” he informed me. He struck me as sincere in his beliefs—whether they are valid or not. He has a crusader’s zeal about him; he genuinely believes he is Chile’s savior, leading the fight for Christianity and spiritualism, on the one hand, and against Marxism and materialism on the other. Moreover, he told me, he has God on his side. The view is cut-and-dried: it reveals the black and white perspective of a military mind. But his responses to my questions suggest that this was not a politician talking; the answers emanated for the most part from the gut. They were too precise, too direct, too blunt. Politicians don’t usually talk that way. The only time he bordered on the eloquent was when he discussed his relationship with the military and his personal links with his fellow army officers. He became edgy when I persisted in asking about the Walter Rauff case; his temper showed through when I raised the question about corruption in his family. But he did not refuse to answer a single question, not even the tough ones.
Pinochet is an extremely volatile personality, as evidenced by two particular incidents that occurred in the course of our meeting. Initially, when I raised the issue of U.S.-Chilean relations, he rhapsodized about how good they were, how close they were, how they could never be better. Then I asked him to comment on U.S. Ambassador James Theberge’s recent remarks to the Chilean press that Pinochet’s government was not moving fast enough down the road to democracy, and it obviously touched a nerve. What followed was a tirade against the United States—in complete contrast to what the president had said only two minutes before.

That same volatility showed through at the end when Diego Goldberg tried to pose the president under a portrait of Bernardo O’Higgins in an anteroom. The portrait of O’Higgins depicts the general standing tall in full military regalia with one hand resting on the back of a chair. Diego tried to duplicate the scene with Pinochet posing under the portrait with his arm on a chair. Hardly had Diego set the scene when the president shouted out: “Nunca, nunca.” He picked up the chair with both hands and flung it across the room with such force that it hit the wall and toppled over. No one moved; Diego appeared to be in a state of shock. The president quickly recovered, posed for another fifteen minutes without the chair, then gallantly bid me farewell with another low bow. He also presented me with an autographed copy of his book _The Crucial Day_. When translated from the Spanish, the words read “For Señora Patricia, from the author, Augusto Pinochet.”

_Sethi:_ What do you think caused the strife that we witnessed in Chile over a six-month period last year? At that stage, many observers argued that your government was doomed and that you would be squeezed out. You survived. Why were you able to ride out the storm?

_Pinochet:_ The difficulties arising from the world recession created a restlessness here, since they significantly affected the economic situation and expectations of my people. The opposition used these difficulties politically, attributing them exclusively to the government. Their purpose, quite obviously, was to create a climate of agitation, of social and trade-union effervescence in order to destabilize the government. But they were mistaken. The majority of the Chilean people understood that demagogy, violence, and political maneuver were not the path to resolving the economic crisis. Besides, such behavior made most Chileans recall the days of the Allende government when there was an attempt to construct a Communist society in Chile as there is in Cuba. We in the government responded calmly even while carrying out public order. The people of Chile in turn responded with their characteristic good sense. And we rode out the crisis together.

_Sethi:_ Some U.S. observers, however, argue that it was really your control of the military through promotions and raises that was the secret to your success in defusing the crisis last year.

_Pinochet:_ I am tired of these unfair accusations made against me and my government primarily because we are a military government. Let me tell you that I was formed as a military man. I am a military man. I have been a military man for more than fifty years. I have eaten my meals with my fellow army officers. I have lived with them. I have been with them on all campaigns. I rose through the ranks like all of them, and a sense of loyalty has resulted from me to them and from them to me. I do not have to buy them; they are part of me and I am part of them. The decision taken on September 11, 1973 [the coup that toppled Allende] was not mine alone. It was a united military decision. As for the secret to my survival, it is not a secret. I am a man fighting for a just cause: the fight between Christianity and spiritualism on one hand and Marxism and materialism on the other. And as a God-fearing man, I get my strength from God.

_Sethi:_ Have we then seen the last of the unrest in Chile or will there be more eruptions after the summer season is over? The opposition is planning a general strike and rallies for later this month. Do you think that will come to naught?

_Pinochet:_ Everything that occurs must be taken seriously but I know that behind such a strategy of protest is a minority group that does not reflect popular support. And behind that group is the Communist party. During the year some sporadic agitation might occur in an attempt by the opposition to create a fictitious climate of instability. But they will be engineered by forces that are directly or indirectly at the service of Soviet imperialism, which will never forgive us for the defeat inflicted in 1973 by Chilean people and the armed forces on their purpose of world domination. The possibility always exists of extreme sectors trying to create conflicts with which they justify the money they are receiving from abroad. But the best guarantee against these groups is the attitude of the majority of the citizens, who are traditional enemies of violence and terrorism and who truly want order, justice, and liberty. I want to stress here that I do not only operate through the military. The majority of the Chilean people are with me.

_Sethi:_ When you first came into power you said that one of your primary goals was to eradicate communism in Chile. It would appear that you have not achieved that goal, since you blame much of the country’s unrest on the Communists.

_Pinochet:_ The Communist party works most effectively in developing countries, in poor and underdeveloped societies. Communism appeals to the idealism of the youth. Thus we have to work on two fronts: alleviate economic misery and at the same time point out to our youth the insidious nature of communism. This is not a dictatorship here: this is not a Nazi or Fascist society where you order the youth how to think. We in the government have tried to do things with full liberty, we want to give our youth full freedom within which they can determine what Marxism is all about. Maybe we have given our youth too much freedom, maybe we should have been more tough. But our goal has not been reached because the Communists work in our youth and our explanation to our youth about Marxism is a long process.

_Sethi:_ What is the current state of relations between the U.S. and Chile?

_Pinochet:_ The bilateral relations between Chile and the United States are normal; it is a fluid relationship and one of mutual understanding. There is much exchange on the academic, intellectual level. Official delegations also visit: in the next few weeks we expect a contingent of important state department officials to consult on strengthening bilateral relations. In the economic arena, there exist important commercial exchange
and financial and credit assistance. The government in Washington has also adopted a more objective attitude concerning the human rights situation in Chile when it rejected as discriminatory certain United Nations resolutions that were adverse to Chile. In general, I would say that except for some misunderstanding about Chile in certain sectors of U.S. public opinion, relations are very good.

Sethi: But sources out of Washington have indicated that the U.S. administration is “encouraging” Chile’s military leaders to liberalize faster and move more quickly along the road to democracy. In fact, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, James Theberge, indicated only a few days ago that the political process appears to be stagnating at this time. What is your response?

Pinochet: I don’t like it when an ambassador gets involved in the internal affairs of a country. Even if he comes from a country as powerful as the United States. They don’t have to tell us what we should do. We have always had problems with the United States, before independence, during independence, and after independence. They have tried on many occasions to impose their opinions on Chile. I could list several such historical cases: the Galapagos Islands, the famous case of the ship Baltimore, when we almost went to war with the U.S. Chile is a sovereign country; it is not a colony. We may be a small country but we are a proud country. We don’t like anyone, even the powerful United States, telling us how to run our lives. We will never accept it. Besides, what is this sickness for democracy? I do not understand it. I believe in democracy but I also believe that within democracy are the germs for the destruction of democracy because the Marxists know perfectly well how to use the elements of democracy and the freedom it offers to destroy democracy. At the rate we are going, we will all end up being Marxist countries. I would recommend to everyone a book by Jean François Revel entitled The End of Democracies, about how democracies fall victim to totalitarianism.

Sethi: But you yourself talk about returning Chile to democracy at some stage in the future?

Pinochet: Of course I believe in democracy. The democratic system is the best way—of that I am convinced. I am a better democrat than those who call themselves democrats. Because the democracy I speak of is a protected democracy—not a license that will be used by totalitarian groups to destroy it, much the way they attempted to do so in Chile a decade ago.

Sethi: Does this mean that protected democracy will not permit the existence of any left-wing parties?

Pinochet: The Chilean Communist party is pro-Soviet and has totalitarian objectives contrary to democracy and liberty. All antidemocratic parties must be excluded from political life because they work against the institutional order of the republic. Our past experience will not be repeated again. We have the responsibility to keep watch for the democratic system and to achieve that, it is essential to adopt a defined position contrary to totalitarianism. The Communists, Fascists, and any other group with totalitarian ideas represent democracy’s death. Political parties do not exist legally today but in the next few months I might go to the people to ask them to decide on the fate of the parties. The government will then make available fundamental political laws relating to the functioning of a national Congress, political parties, and the electoral system.

Sethi: What happens in 1989 when your term expires? Will President Pinochet be a candidate again?

Pinochet: The constitution allows that possibility. But it will be the sovereign people of Chile who will have to decide whether I will be president after 1989. At this moment I am strong, my position is strong. I have everything going for me. Five more years down the road things could be different. So it is too soon to think about 1989.

Sethi: Obviously, the liberalization process in Argentina must have an impact on Chile, given the proximity of the two countries.

Pinochet: Every country has its own reality. Chile’s situation is different from Argentina’s; our histories are also different. To try to identify them just because of their geographical proximity is as mistaken as trying to compare the United States and Canada.

Sethi: But as a military man yourself, aren’t you concerned about a repeat performance in Chile as you watch the Argentine government dealing with its military officers?

Pinochet: Actually, I am feeling very calm about the new government in Argentina because most of the problems we have had with that country are being resolved by the new administration.

Sethi: Like your current truce with Argentina over the Beagle Channel. What is the next stage in the negotiating process?

Pinochet: We are attempting to resolve the conflict peacefully and even now active negotiations between the two parties are taking place in Rome. I cannot go into much detail, given the delicate nature of the negotiations, but let me say that we have entered the concluding stage. The peaceful resolution of this conflict should set an example for the rest of the continent.

Sethi: Some observers say that the case of the four left-wing “guerrillas” seeking asylum in the residence of the papal nuncio in Santiago could cause a serious rift between the church and the state in Chile. Do you plan to give the four safe passage out of the country as the church and the Vatican are requesting?

Pinochet: It would be very easy for me to give them safe conduct because of the respect this government has for the Vatican. But this is not a religious matter; this is a legal issue. It is a matter of justice, and justice is for the courts to decide. I do not want to harm the pope; I do not want to offend the pope. But if we allow these four terrorists to go free—terrorists who we knew were involved in the murder of the military governor of Santiago and two other officers—what will the military and what would the people of Chile say? Asylum is given for political reasons—not to criminals. The issue must be decided legally.

Sethi: International pressure appears to be mounting for the extradition of the notorious Nazi war criminal Walter Rauff. Will you permit him to go to Germany to stand trial?

Pinochet: We have a tradition in Chile that principles have to be respected, and the case of Rauff was decided in 1963 by the Supreme Court. The highest court in the land decided that Rauff could stay. I couldn’t care less for Rauff as a person. I don’t know him at all. I regret that he committed so many crimes, as the Israelis and the Germans say. But that was a long time ago. I cannot do anything about it once the courts have decided. Of course, if entirely new evidence, totally different
from the evidence presented to the Supreme Court in 1963, were presented, the situation would have to be reviewed again. But the evidence would have to be totally new and different.

* Sethi: What about a review of the case under Article 24 of your constitution, which allows you to expel an undesirable?

* Pinochet: Now you have moved from position A to position B—extradition is quite different from expulsion, which is an internal matter. The point is that Rauff has done nothing in Chile that would make him an undesirable. He has broken no laws. He is old. He lives in Chile, alone, in his private jail: the jail of conscience.

* Sethi: Activist groups around the world suggest that it would be good for Chile’s international image to let a Nazi war criminal out.

* Pinochet: Where were all these groups during the Frei government, during the Allende government? Why are they concerned with Chile’s image only now? Is it because this is a military government? This is one more way of hitting at my government by suggesting that military governments harbor Nazi war criminals. You tell those groups that the case has been resolved by the courts.

* Sethi: The tales of torture and disappearance with regard to Chile are legion. Amnesty International, U.N. reports on human rights abuse, the State Department’s annual human rights reports, even the Chilean Vicaria reports, state that there is abuse in Chile. Can all these reports be fabrications?

* Pinochet: There is a well-mounted campaign against Chile and its government, organized and orchestrated by international Marxism, that projects Chile as a primary violator of human rights. Look at which countries accuse us at the U.N.—Cuba, Algeria, the Soviet Union and its satellites. Are these the kind of countries that can afford to point the accusing finger at us when these countries do not know the meaning of liberty? Can they afford to throw the first stone? There is the politics of the double standard at the U.N., where, out of 158 countries, Chile, Guatemala, and El Salvador alone are singled out for human rights abuses. As for Amnesty International, I agree that they at least study abuse in the vast majority of countries in the world. But in the case of Chile, they have never recognized the circumstances under which this government came to power and the ensuing battle between the anti-Communist forces and the terrorists of the Left. Amnesty International also doesn’t recognize the improvement in the situation in Chile since. With regard to the Vicaria of Solidarity in Chile, there is a Dr. Manuel Almeida who was primarily responsible for verification of tortures for the Vicaria. He is now in jail because he called for a Marxist revolution against my government. Can such a person’s word be trusted?

In Chile we have an independent judiciary, and we are proud of it. If there were torture in Chile, it would have to be sanctioned by this power. If anyone is tortured, he has the right to go to the court to seek justice against the wrongdoers. You are free to go to the tribunal if you wish to verify cases of torture. You will not find any.

* Sethi: Mr. President, has there ever been a time you have said to yourself, “I’m tired of all this pressure: the church, the opposition, international groups, other governments. I wish I could just retire from public life, go and settle down in a small villa by the beach, and live out the rest of my life in peace.”?

* Pinochet: I am an independent man. But I am also a military man and I have a tradition to follow. I am here because my people ask me to stay. Go on, they say, please, don’t leave us. I wasn’t looking for this job. Destiny gave it to me. I have a responsibility and a duty to fulfill on behalf of the military and the people of Chile and I have to fulfill it with honor and pride. I have to sacrifice myself for this privilege. I don’t misuse power for my personal gain or for myself. I don’t socialize, I don’t go to parties, I am a teetotaler. I wake at 5 in the morning, I am at the office by 7 and I work until after 10 at night. And I will continue to do it until the end. I am a man of principle. I have never waivered on my principles. I am anti-Communist, I am anti-Marxist, and I will never compromise on that. All politicians want to be president. I never wanted to be president. But I am.

* Sethi: Some sectors of the Chilean press have been reporting that your family, especially your son-in-law and daughter, are using your position as president for their own personal gain. How to you respond?

* Pinochet: This is part of the left wing’s campaign against me. It is so low that I don’t even want to credit it with a reply. How do you answer infamy? My daughter has worked to gain independence from me. I could have given her a job but she wanted to be independent. Now that she is successful in her own right, she is being attacked. This is a free country. The press is free to write and I am free to respond or not to respond to such low-class slurs. I choose to ignore them.

* Sethi: What is your criterion for permitting Chilean exiles to return? Is it a blanket policy or a selective one? For example, why did you allow moderate leftist Luis Maira in but kept out Sergio Bitar? And Jose Salaquett, the lawyer and president of Amnesty International, was only allowed in for ten days?

* Pinochet: The exile issue is difficult to understand for those who have not known civil war or lived in a climate of ideological confrontation. Last year, the government believed that enough time had elapsed for those persons who more than a decade ago were trying to destroy themselves and the country. So we decided to let some exiles back on a selective basis, which required the study of each particular case. The government, however, is still not willing to permit the return of the terrorist who will try again to create a state of violence. So far the Ministry of the Interior has managed to reduce the number of persons whose return to the country was denied from 9,000 to some 4,500.

* Sethi: Many critics argue that Chile’s economy has been virtually destroyed by the conservative economics of the Chicago boys. Now that Chile is under the gun with regard to its economy, do you envisage any changes in economic policy?

* Pinochet: Chile is currently suffering from the same negative effects of a world recession as is most of the developing world. Added to that we have the drop in the price of copper, a drop in our export market, and a sluggish economy accompanied by unemployment, my main worry. After the Marxist government of Allende, we were effecting an 8 percent growth rate, which means Chile is capable of repeating that performance if conditions are good. We plan to return to the same levels of growth without renouncing our accepted principles of an open market. A free market: economy. Alongside, however, the
government will encourage the construction of roads and housing, and we will develop programs for the unemployed. But I think we are now recuperating from the worst moment. We will pull through and, most important, we will repay our external debts.

THE CHILEAN EXPERIMENT IN MONETARISM: ANATOMY OF A FAILURE
by Ramón Daubón

Introduction
In 1976 the government of Chile initiated an experiment in applied monetarism that drew the attention of the world. After the previous experiment with democratic Marxism had ended with the military pronunciamiento of September 11, 1973, a diametrically opposed free-market alternative began to offer spectacular results. By 1981 there was widespread talk of a "Chilean Miracle."

Innovations in credit mechanisms and a steady inflow of U.S. dollars had brought quality consumer durables to within reach of the middle classes and often below. Santiago's streets were clogged with new cars, and color television sets adorned the living rooms of many a modest home in its working-class districts. American financial publications extolled the Chilean modelo económico's success in increasing incomes while holding down inflation, and urged the United States to learn from the experience. Somehow, everything seemed possible at the time.

Two years later, the economy was in the midst of a recession the likes of which had not been seen since the 1930s. What precisely was the Chilean monetarist model, and what went wrong with it?

The Monetarist Model
This longest-running—and possibly most orthodox—of the world's monetarist experiments replaced in stages the interventionist import-substituting model of traditional Latin American mold that had come before it. It is not clear whether the military had an economic program in mind when it assumed power, beyond the reversal of the policies of the previous government. Still, the junta dismantled the prevailing complex system of price controls early, in favor of the free flow of market forces.

Inflation, though, which had assumed crisis proportions under the previous government, continued high. Convinced that the deformities introduced under a statist regime with massive subsidies and price rigidities would condemn to failure any attempt at reactivation, the government announced in April 1975 a drastic curtailment of public demand dubbed "the shock treatment." Per capita industrial value-added fell 27 percent between 1974 and 1975 as a result of this contraction of aggregate demand, but the impact on reducing inflation was also quickly felt. The planned recession was a success, and the program of reconstruction could begin. That program, and the team of University of Chicago-trained economic advisers who proposed it, would pass on to Chilean popular history, respectively, as El Modelo and Los Chicago Boys.

In essence, the program proposed a mixture of orthodox monetarist policy prescriptions such as restricted growth of the money supply, with the less-rigorously defined precepts of supply-side economics. In the context of a small undeveloped economy such as Chile, however, and with a concomitantly large foreign sector, the modelo required specific adaptations.

The underlying reliance on private sector initiative remained undiminished in the Chilean model, and the government enacted a series of measures to create an effective transfer of resources to the private entrepreneurial sector. First among these was the transfer of state enterprises nationalized or created under the previous regime. The most viable among these were rapidly absorbed by the private bidders, while the rest were either liquidated or transferred to their workers as empresas de autogestión.

Next, a broadly revised labor legislation in effect diluted the bargaining power of labor organization beyond the level of the firm. It was to be expected that the reduced bargaining power of labor would reduce real wages over time, executing a functional redistribution of income among factors of production from the owners of labor (who are expected to consume) to the owners of capital (who are expected to invest).

Third, the privatization of the country's social security system made available a major source of domestic saving. The fierce competition to be expected among rival pension-fund managing firms was to insure maximum managerial efficiency and optimal investment allocations in the quest for the highest rate of return on investec capital.

Finally, very large sources of foreign capital were to be made available by the direct integration of Chile's private sector into the world financial markets. But this measure had broader implications. The 1970s had witnessed a worldwide transfer of financial wealth toward the oil-exporting economies, most of which were ill-equipped at the time to absorb these massive amounts of hard currencies without serious inflationary and structural disruptions. Much of the wealth thus found its way into the credit accounts of large Western banks. To the latter, though, these bulging accounts represented liabilities, and thus a strong incentive to increase lendings.

In Chile, meanwhile, the receptivity of the private sector to increased foreign borrowing depended on assurances of foreign-exchange stability. Chilean banks would be willing to borrow dollars in the international markets, to the extent required for the desired reactivation and for domestic investments in Chilean pesos, only if the return convertibility into dollars was assured. This would require pegging the peso to the dollar, in effect tying Chile to the dollar economy. This implied that adjustments in economic disequilibria would have to be made not through changes in the exchange rate, but through real changes in the economy. The monetary artifice of exchange-rate fluctuations would not be available with Chile on a dollar standard. Real factor costs would have to drop to compensate for differences in relative factor costs and to rectify unfavorable trade flows. Implicit in all this, of course, was the downward flexibility of real wages and the unrestricted movement of capital and products in and out of Chile.
The logic of market forces dictated that, if internal inflation in Chile were to rise above the general rise in dollar prices, the resulting increase in the cheaper imports would depress internal demand and, in the resulting slowdown of economic activity, bring inflation into line. A responsible monetary policy that carefully monitored growth in the money supply, though, as well as the depressed state of the Chilean economy after the “shock treatment,” almost insured that internal inflation rates could be reduced below international levels. Once that was achieved, and the peso-dollar parity was fixed, internal rates of return in Chile would exceed international ones and capital would flow into the country unrestricted by controls and impelled by the natural forces of the market. True self-sustaining growth would then occur.

The Implementation

The carefully devised plan required close monitoring of the situation during the years prior to its implementation. The government selectively eliminated import restrictions after 1976, and by 1979 practically all Chilean imports were only subject to a uniform 10 percent entry duty. To deal with the widespread inflationary expectations built up over the years, themselves a powerful self-fulfilling inflationary force, a series of revaluations of the peso were executed between 1976 and 1979. These coincided with years of good international dollar prices for Chilean copper, and were accompanied by an aggressive promotion of “nontraditional” exports in which Chile was felt to possess a comparative advantage (items such as fresh fruits and vegetables for the countarseasonal northern hemisphere markets, fishmeal, seaweeds, lumber, and pulp and paper products). Thus aided by falling import prices, inflation approached 15 percent by 1979.

In June of that year, after considering the healthy upward trend in production, the lowered inflation, and a favorable international financial situation, the government took the plunge. It executed a substantial precautionary devaluation to create a safety margin, and formally tied Chile to the dollar.

The Consumer Boom

The greatest single misjudgment on the part of the designers of the modelo seems to have been the serious underestimation of the Chileans’ capacity to consume. Held back by years of import restriction under the previous regime, and by years of recession under the present one, consumption levels experienced impressive increases after the recovery that began in 1976. This was especially pronounced in the areas of consumer durables.

As import duties fell and the peso was revalued from 1976 to 1979, consumer imports became increasingly cheaper. The fixing of the exchange rate in 1979 offered Chilean banks an attractive incentive to further promote consumer lending. The restrictive monetary policy had resulted in comparatively high interest rates, and the unleashing of consumer demand for intermediate-term credit drove rates even higher. The guaranteed convertibility allowed Chilean bankers to borrow dollars abroad at international rates and lend them as pesos to Chilean consumers at rates considerably higher. As international dollar inflation rates dipped below Chilean internal rates in 1980 and 1981, prices of imports fell further, relative to domestic prices.

Expenditure in the 13 main consumer items grew twelvefold in real terms between 1970 and 1981. Merchandise imports more than quadrupled between 1975 and 1981.

As the very active financial markets drove real annual interest rates to 40 percent and above by 1981, consumer demand remained unaffected. Pent-up demand and credit availability were apparently sufficient motivation to consumers still accustomed to three-digit inflation, and to whom a fixed monthly peso obligation over time remained a guarantee of a good buy, regardless of the interest.

Exports had continued to rise through this period, but the phenomenal rise in imports reduced a balance-of-trade surplus of US$70 million in 1975 to a US$2.598 million deficit in 1981. Meanwhile, the unrestricted competition from relatively cheap imports began having serious effects on Chilean production and employment. Manufacturing operations began converting into less labor-absorbing import operations, and plant layoffs began to increase. These were probably concentrated more at the low end: skills levels, and were to some extent absorbed by the government’s emergency public employment program (Programa del Empleo Mínimo), which had been created as a subsistence safety net in anticipation of frictional spurs of unemployment. That the consumer boom continued unabated into 1982 seems to indicate that the bulk of its beneficiaries were basically higher up in the income scale and were probably not affected by the decline in domestic production to the same extent until 1982.

Meanwhile, private bank borrowing to finance the import boom was rapidly increasing the foreign debt. The latter’s private-sector component almost doubled every year between 1978 and 1981. As the uneasiness of international banks over the debt picture of developing countries began to grow in 1982, the possibilities for sharply rising foreign productive investment in Chile began to worsen.

Profits had concentrated in the financial services and trade sectors, and for a while in the construction sector, aided by the availability of long-term financing. The so-called smokestack industries had been adversely affected all along by the foreign competition. Much of their assets had become involved in financial operations of the “paper industries,” about which the government publicly complained.

These paper conglomerates had arisen from amidst already solid economic ventures, which had been in a solvent enough position to benefit from the government’s privatization drive, acquiring public enterprises in liquidation at bargain rates. These real assets had then served to fortify their financial position and had allowed them to opt into the massive pool of private financial resources that became available with the privatization of the social security system. Having real assets to back them, and the necessary complementary financial arms (finance and insurance institutions) at their disposal, these grupos económicos capitalized on the opportunity. By 1981 the two largest among them controlled three fourths of the social security funds transferred from the state system. All of the pension management firms belonged to a small number of grupos, which controlled over 70 percent of the assets of the private financial system.
The Unraveling

While it lasted, then, the 1976-1981 boom relied on consumer demand as its motor, cheap imports as its fuel, and easily available dollars as its lubricant. The unsuspected capacity of consumers for indebtedness carried the system far beyond what it could bear. The profit possibilities in financing this consumer demand diverted domestic and foreign resources as well as attention away from productive investment. The latter had been made uncompetitive in many—but by no means in all—lines of activity by the fixed exchange rate, which had made the free flow of foreign financial capital possible in the first place.

The potential for paper profits ultimately overextended the capacity of the grupos, and the growing trend of bankruptcies in the less-productive lines of economic activity eventually caught up with them. Real assets that guaranteed paper assets were called in, and the chain of financial interdependencies in the grupos broke at its weakest point. This was the conflicting interest between the smokestack enterprises, which urged abandonment of the fixed dollar exchange as the only means to compete and survive, and the paper enterprises, which depended on that fixed exchange rate for their ability to maintain their dollar debts, and hence their survival. But the two were so closely intertwined in the grupos that the increasing failures of the first were pulling down the foundations on which the second were built.

The system was thus untenable in the long run. As bankruptcies and unemployment grew, the assets of the grupos collapsed, loans became uncollectible, and the necessary external flow of dollars became questionable. The May 1981 bankruptcy of a large sugar refinery in Valparaiso sent shudders through the system. By early 1982 the pressure from industrialists and agriculturalists to devalue the peso became intense, and the government finally gave in. Between June and August of that year, it devalued the peso by 55 percent. The resulting crisis in the financial system was such that the government was forced to intervene in the banking system in September to guarantee its solvency before foreign lenders.

But by then the crisis had spread. By the beginning of 1983, GDP had fallen over 14 percent, unemployment was pushing 30 percent, and inflation was back to 25-30 percent. The experiment thus ended.

THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE PINOCHET REGIME
by Arturo Valenzuela

On March 27, 1984, after a lull for the summer months, opponents of the military government of President Augusto Pinochet of Chile renewed their massive national protests. Children were kept from schools, stores closed early or failed to open, and the transportation system came to a standstill. In the evening, citizens from all walks of life banged pots and filled the city of four million with a rhythmic, metallic sound. In an effort to intimidate protesters and control the increasingly militant demonstrations in lower-middle and working-class neighborhoods, the government resorted once again to emergency measures, muzzleing the press, imposing a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and mobilizing thousands of troops.

The monthly protests in Chile had begun almost a year earlier, on May 11, 1983, when labor leaders called on the population to bang pots as an expression of dissatisfaction with military rule. To their surprise, the response was overwhelming. It marked the first time in nearly ten years that large sectors of the Chilean people lost their fear of the authorities and openly demonstrated their opposition. As such, the protest signaled a historic change in the fortunés of the Chilean dictatorship. Within months, as the government unsuccessfully attempted to quell discontent by arresting leaders, censoring publications, banning meetings, and resorting to an extraordinary show of force, open political activity once again became the hallmark of a country that had been known for its ubiquitous parties, whose presence had extended to most organizations and institutions of society. The cardinal objective of the military government, to "purify" Chile of partics, groups, and ideologies and bring about a new "patriotic" citizen, had met with resounding failure. Even worse, from the point of view of the authorities, the very same political parties and the very same leaders whom the military had hoped to relegate to the dustbin of history had once again reemerged on center stage.

What happened to a military regime that as recently as 1981 was claiming broad national support? Are the prospects good for either an overthrow of the military regime or an early and peaceful transition back to democracy? These questions cannot be considered in the abstract. An assessment of the viability and future of any regime depends on our understanding of the principal characteristics of that regime. Thus, the first part of this essay will briefly characterize the most important features of the military regime that took power on September 11, 1973. This characterization involves two dimensions: a description of the nature of governmental authority, and a description of the fundamental policy thrusts of the government, that is, the regime's broader political economy.

Authoritarian Rule in Chile

In describing government authority in Chile it is easier to begin by indicating what it is not. The Chilean regime is not Fascist. The military governors have strongly resisted the entreaties of some of their civilian supporters that a large, nationalist, civic-military movement be created to mobilize the masses in support of the government. Nor have the authorities sought to appeal to working- and middle-class elements through populist economic and social policies.

It is also a serious mistake to characterize the Chilean regime as corporatist or functionalist. Half-hearted attempts to create a progovernment labor movement failed for lack of government support. No steps were taken to create mechanisms of representation through intermediate bodies such as gremios or business and professional associations. Indeed, rather than relying on corporative bodies for representation and control, the government has distanced these ties and, what is more, has deliberately sought to break the power and influence of organized functionalist groups. Under Pinochet, the Chilean
state has acquired extraordinary autonomy from societal forces, even those directly responsible for bringing the regime into being. Once-powerful gremios, such as the truckers and the medical association, have had little say in the formulation and implementation of policies that affect their fundamental interests. Today, many of their members have openly identified with the opposition, and the truckers have formally backed the labor coalition responsible for calling the protests. Most professional associations and many business associations have elected officers identified with the opposition. Whatever corporatist tendencies existed in Chilean politics (and they were not very significant) have been dealt a severe blow by the openly antistatist and anticorporatist social and economic policies of the military regime. Ironically, these free-market policies were carried out by Chicago-trained economists with close ties to the gremialista group of the Catholic University. But, it is a misreading of contemporary Chilean history to equate that "gremialismo" with corporatism.

While the regime is not Fascist or corporatist, it is also not correct to say that it is purely a military government. Some of the most important figures of the regime have been civilians, though most had not played prominent political roles before the coup. While many military officers have occupied top government positions, with the exception of Pinochet himself and the members of the junta, few have been allowed to occupy positions of public prominence at the national level for extended periods of time. And military officers in government serve the government, not the military. They are subject to directives from their immediate government, civilian or military, and are not subject to the directives of their superiors in the military. In fact, the discipline in the Chilean military is such that they rarely discuss government policy questions with their counterparts in the military—either formally or informally. There are no forums at the highest levels of the armed forces where nonmilitary policy issues are debated in order to influence the government. Unlike other Latin American cases of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule, in Pinochet's Chile there is a strict separation between the military institution and the government it supports. The dictatorship is of the armed forces but not by the armed forces.

It is this reality that has given Pinochet so much power, and so much autonomy. As commander-in-chief of the army, a highly disciplined and hierarchical organization, he has vast authority over important institutional decisions, including promotion. At the same time, as head of state, while relying on the armed forces for support, he is not constrained by the military in presiding over the government. With the adoption of the 1980 constitution, Pinochet could claim that his power derived directly from popular consent as enshrined in fundamental law. According to the constitution (the legitimacy of which is questioned by the opposition but not by the military and much of the Right), Pinochet's term extends until 1989, with a proviso that the junta can renew it for another eight years.

It is important, however, to add a qualifier to the above discussion. One should not exaggerate the degree of personal rule in Chile. Pinochet presides over a complex state, constituted by many institutions and organs, most with long trajectories. Ministries in many ways have a great deal of autonomy on most matters within their jurisdiction so that the personal impact of the dictator on the day-to-day life and operation of state agencies is not very significant. The junta, though considerably weaker than the executive, is still the locus of legislative power, and Pinochet must come to terms with its prerogatives in making important decisions. The complexity of the historical Chilean state reduces arbitrary power, and the average citizen relates to his or her government for the mundane things of everyday life in largely the same way as before the advent of military rule. This contributes to the sense of routine "normality" that often characterizes authoritarian regimes and, paradoxically, helps to defuse opposition to the dictator.

Clearly, however, on major policy issues Pinochet is the key actor of the system. Nowhere can this be appreciated more than in his decision to give free reign and continuous support to the economic planners of the Chicago school.

The Political Economy of Authoritarianism in Chile

It is these free-market policies that have defined the political economy of the Chilean regime, the second element in our regime characterization. Three reasons can be given for Pinochet's choice of the Chicago boys as the key economic and social planners of the regime, despite the well-known proclivity of military men for statistics and nationalist economic policies. In the first place the Chicago boys, while recommended by anti-Communist elements on the Right, did not have a history of political activism and identification with the much-maligned political parties. They were independent technocrats with no strong ties to any particular constituency or interest group and served very much at the pleasure of the president. (They eventually formed their own pressure groups within the state bureaucracy and came to be identified with the power of newly emerging financial conglomerates that benefited from their policies, and served as high-paying employers once the technocrats left public service.) This helped to insulate Pinochet from the political demands of the large, organized business organizations—increasing his own autonomy and room for maneuver. In the second place, the Chicago boys promised economic recovery and well-being with dazzling technocratic explanations, which Pinochet himself marveled at, and to which military officers increasingly oriented toward high technology weaponry and management systems could relate. Third and most important, the Chicago boys promised not only economic development, but economic development that would engender profound social and political ramifications. Their anticollectivist antistatist orientation fit in well with the antipolitics posture of the military. But the promise of development and modernization through private initiative went a step further: it held out the possibility that broad-scale transformations in society and policy would make completely obsolete the appeal of groups, parties, and ideologies of the old order.

For a time, the availability of vast quantities of imported consumer goods fueled by unprecedented foreign borrowing provided the illusion that economic formulas were indeed working, and were having the desired political effects. This reinforced the political standing of the Chicago boys and Pinochet's commitment to their policies of economic liberalism and privatization of welfare, pension funds, and health care. A
veritable orgy of consumption of imported goods seemed to turn people from all stations away from a preoccupation with some of the more unsavory qualities of the regime, although unemployment remained at record levels and domestic business and domestic agriculture continued to be buffeted by foreign competition.

It is very doubtful that increased well-being would have led to fundamental changes in Chile’s political landscape and partisan attachment to historical parties and organizations. But whether or not this would have taken place soon became a moot point, as Chile’s economy collapsed. The free-market policies led to a weakening of domestic industry while the enormous flow of foreign funds served to support imports, or were channeled by large conglomerates (encouraged by the government) into speculative activities or the conglomerates’ own failing companies. Investment under the military government remained far below historical levels.

The collapse of several banks in November 1981 marked the beginning of the end of the Chilean “miracle.” In 1982 the GNP fell over 14 percent, as compared to an average decline of 1 percent for the rest of Latin America. During 1983 and the first few months of 1984 the economy remained essentially stagnant, with unemployment well over 25 percent. Like many other Latin American countries, Chile’s recovery is severely constrained by the massive foreign debt and the austerity measures imposed by IMF agreements. The Chicago boys have seen their star fade with the Chilean economy, while conglomerate leaders have been jailed as the authorities seek scapegoats for the economic failure.

In sum, by the time of the first national protest, the economic model of the regime had suffered a severe setback. This aggravated the widespread discontent over the regime’s authoritarian practices. Most organized groups in Chile, with the exception of the military itself, openly demanded either a fundamental change of direction or the overthrow of the regime.

The Prospects for Regime Change

While it is not totally inconceivable that Pinochet might resign from office in the face of majority opposition to his presidency, it is highly unlikely that he will do so. All indications are that he conceives of his role as a sacred mission, if not a calling from heaven. (See the extraordinary interview that Patricia Sethi conducted with Pinochet, published in full in this issue of the LASA Forum.) The Argentine precedent, with prospects of arrest and trial for government actions and human rights violations, are undoubtedly very disturbing to him. If Pinochet is to leave his post before the end of his term, he will have to be forcefully removed from office. This would entail a successful popular uprising (which in turn would mean a collapse or defeat of the armed forces) or a military coup. Given the characteristics of the Chilean regime and of Chilean society, both options are highly problematic.

At this juncture in Chilean history a popular uprising capable of defeating the armed forces or forcing the disintegration of the military is out of the question. The Chilean military does not consist of a personal national guard riddled with patronage and corruption. It is a highly professional, disciplined, and cohesive institution with substantial military might.

At the same time, the protests are, today, a far cry from an insurrectionary movement. They are largely peaceful, though massive, demonstrations, lasting for circumscribed periods of time. The day after the monthly protests, most Chileans return to their daily chores and await the call for next month’s protest. The attempt by the copper workers to institute a general strike with its potential for crippling the country failed completely in 1983. With unemployment hovering close to 30 percent, there is great reluctance on the part of those with jobs to take undue risks.

The protest movement has become more militant with the passing of time. Paradoxically, this may have diminished its overall effectiveness, rather than increased it. This is the case because large sectors of the lower-middle and middle classes, which constitute a large percentage of the population in Chile, fear unrest and violence more than they oppose the government. Unless the protests become more militant, government forces can easily control them. If they become more militant, they will lose the necessary support of the middle sectors. Bombing incidents carried out by the extreme Left (or government security forces?) help to strengthen the government rather than undermine it.

Opposition leaders in Chile have no illusion that they will be able to defeat the regime militarily. They consequently have oriented their efforts at convincing the military services that the regime is no longer viable. Disorder and mass protests do undermine Pinochet’s credibility and the government’s slogan that “Chile Advances in Peace and Order.” Massive protests could eventually convince military officers that their own credibility as well as that of the government is at stake unless they remove Pinochet and initiate a transition process. That stage has not been reached.

Indeed, a strong argument can be made that militant protests only reinforce the military’s determination not to violate its own legality. The constitution it is sworn to uphold is its constitution, and the government, its government. They fear that a violation of that legality would only lead to political unrest or a hostile government that would undermine its institutional integrity. Military officers are intensely anti-Communist and worry that the pendulum could swing sharply to the left and threaten not only their considerable privileges but their own personal security and that of their families. Ironically, according to this interpretation, Pinochet may become more vulnerable to a military coup once the government is under less pressure, and military officers believe that the regime is in a position to engineer a transition that gives them guarantees. And, indeed, he may be more vulnerable to removal by his fellow officers over comparatively trivial matters, such as disgust over mounting evidence of personal and family corruption, than over broad policy disagreements, or the actions of opposition forces.

In addition to the reluctance of the military to remove Pinochet while the regime is under duress, two other factors give Pinochet some breathing room. In the first place, while opposition elements have come a long way in one year, they still face substantial roadblocks to developing a coherent and concerted antiregime force. Individual parties are still in disarray. This is particularly true of the Socialist party, which
continues to be deeply divided, with some elements siding with the Communist party and holding to the thesis that an insurrectionary strategy for overthrowing the regime should not be discarded. Other elements draw on the historical commitments of the Chilean Socialist party to democratic institutions and procedures, allying with the Christian Democrats in the Democratic Alliance. The alliance finds itself buffeted by the Communists and their allies on the Left, and elements of the Right that would like it to structure a transition to their liking.

The polarization of Chilean politics remains a serious obstacle to national dialogue, despite considerable progress in mending the wounds of the past. This cannot but help the regime, which argues that partisan conflict would once again plunge Chile into chaos if Pinochet were removed from office.

Second, the Right and much of the business community, for all their protestations against the Chicago boys and their contempt for Pinochet, fear the consequences of a democratic government dominated by the Christian Democrats with strong leftist influence. They are intent on structuring a transition that favors their interests and, at this point, it appears that they don’t see a way of doing it without Pinochet. They have, however, placed great pressure on a reluctant Pinochet to consider accelerating the transition process.

In fact, in an effort to stem the growing tide of opposition, Pinochet was prevailed upon by his advisers to appoint Sergio Onofre Jarpa, one of the founders of the conservative National party, to the post of minister of the interior in August of 1983. This was the first time that a major cabinet post was held by a prominent political figure. Jarpa took the job with the intention of salvaging the regime by engineering a partial opening, including the legalization of all parties (except Marxist parties) and moving up the timetable for congressional elections.

While Pinochet had balked at giving Jarpa broad authority, holding up until April 1983 the final removal of the remnants of the Chicago boys from cabinet positions, it is apparent that Jarpa has garnered for the government at least temporary support from elements on the Right and the business community who had become strongly disaffected. With a closing of ranks around the government on the Right, and continued policy disagreements in opposition circles, the incentive for military officers to return to the barracks by casting aside the 1980 constitution and their own commander-in-chief, is significantly diminished.

Ironically, by relying on the traditional Right to help save the regime, Pinochet is seriously cutting back on his autonomy and prerogatives, which in turn might make him more vulnerable to removal at a later date. Even if he survives in office, he will be forced to take into account much more than in the past the pressures of constituency groups associated with the government.

Support from the business community and the Right will also be contingent in the long run on the performance of the Chilean economy, which may turn out to be the Achilles’ heel of the Jarpa initiative. The new economic team, representing domestic business, will be hard pressed to reactivate the economy, given the colossal foreign debt situation. The business community and the bulk of the middle class, though tired of authoritarian rule, are basically interested in a resolution of their serious economic difficulties. Unless the government can reactivate the economy, the military may decide that its long-run interests are best served by not continuing to be identified so closely with economic failure.

Authoritarian regimes by definition are arbitrary and highly unstable. Domestic and international developments have added to the pressures on the Chilean regime, which has limited its own extrication strategy by locking itself into the lengthy transition envisioned by the 1980 constitution. It is likely that the pressures will increase further and that the Pinochet government will be hard pressed to serve out its term. However, predictions of an early demise of the Pinochet government, which filled the pages of the international press last year as the Chilean protests increased in intensity, proved to be premature. The prospects for regime transition need to take into account the nature of the Chilean regime, and a complex of forces that make an early return to democracy a difficult process.

Editor’s Note: The recent transition to democratic government in Argentina is the subject of the following three essays. All three authors—David Rock of the University of California at Santa Barbara, Carlos Waisman of the University of California at San Diego, and Monica Peralta Ramos of the Argentine Embassy in Washington, DC—participated in a recent conference on the topic of Argentina’s new government held at the University of California at San Diego in the spring of 1984.

ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS AND ISSUES
by David Rock

In ending an eight-year military dictatorship, the recent election of Raúl Alfonsín and the return of Radical party government raise hopes of recovery from a calamitous decade in Argentine history. Since taking power in 1976 the military regime put to death between 10,000 and 20,000 alleged opponents and rebels. It arbitrarily imprisoned and tortured many thousands more. Having triumphed in its war on “subversion” by 1978, the regime came close to provoking war with Chile, a conflict that could well have ignited a general South American conflagration. In April 1982 the junta committed itself to what it assumed was the less risky adventure of occupying the Falkland Islands; its fate here was crushing defeat by Britain.

The military junta waged economic warfare on many of its own people, provoking thousands into flight abroad for refuge. Between 1976 and 1983 the wage share of national income fell to its lowest level ever; the depression in manufacturing was also unprecedented in depth and duration. The junta failed to curb inflation, which has usually remained above a 100 percent annual rate since 1974; by late 1983 inflation had again leapt
almost beyond control and was estimated at around 430 percent. Since early 1981 the Argentine peso has depreciated at a speed reminiscent of the Confederate dollar during the American Civil War. In 1983 the public-sector deficit climbed to around 15 percent of gross domestic product. Outside Argentina the best-known of the junta’s legacies is a foreign debt calculated at $43 billion in early 1984—the third highest in the world, and, after Venezuela’s, the second largest per capita debt. The return to constitutional government in late 1983 was the fourth such transition in the previous twenty-five years. If Alfonsin can complete his scheduled four-year term, he will be the first elected president to do so since Perón in the late 1940s. The new government undoubtedly enjoys certain advantages over its predecessors. Unlike the previous Radical administration, under Arturo Illia in 1963-1966, which came to power with only a quarter of the popular vote, Alfonsin gained a popular plurality. He achieved the unprecedented feat of trouncing the Peronists in an open election. In 1983 the Radicals gained control of Congress and most of the provinces. Compared with Peronism in 1973, Alfonsin’s party backing is more homogeneous, less susceptible to swift internal disunity and breakup. The election of 1983 revealed a different kind of electorate from ten years before. Expectations from government seemed lower, the fear of renewed political failure and the return of the military much greater. As grim revelations concerning the fate of the desaparecidos from the late 1970s continue, Alfonsin is the beneficiary of a wave of hostility and recrimination against members of the past military government. Nevertheless, the new regime has an extremely delicate task before it, and is already facing some critical choices and pressures. Among the issues, the foreign debt is the most basic and formidable. One doubts that Argentina could simply default on the debt, however attractive in principle default may seem in Buenos Aires at the moment. Default would probably provoke an international commercial and financial embargo. In paralyzing much of the economy, an embargo would be likely to induce a shattering depression, and through depression precipitate uncontrollable political breakdown. Yet, Argentina must at least renegotiate the foreign debt. It simply cannot meet its obligations in the way they are currently structured, with a large part of the debt maturing during the next two or three years. The terms of renegotiation will play a major role in the evolution and fate of the new constitutional government. The more stringent the terms of the debt, the more exposed the government will be to internal pressures, and the more necessarily desperate its methods of controlling and resisting opposition will become. Even going on the assumption of substantially more favorable terms being negotiated, the debt will remain an insuperable constraint on government policies and programs. Servicing the debt will require large trade balances, and the need for trade surpluses will oblige the government to pursue the following basic program.

1. Increase commodity exports to a maximum; shift internal terms of trade in favor of farm producers as an incentive to increase production; deploy whatever investment resources are available toward the farm sector; restrict domestic consumption of exportables.

2. Minimize imports to increase the positive trade balance; limit manufacturers’ access to imported goods or raw materials; by applying these curbs, restrict manufacturers’ ability to create new jobs; by limiting imports, also curb consumption and living standards.

Here lies the government’s chief immediate dilemma. To meet the foreign debt, it must maintain austerity. It cannot avoid inflicting a recessionary policy on the urban economy. Yet, this necessity runs directly against its public commitment to reflation and growth. How will it surmount the contradiction?

Second, the new government has identified public-sector deficits as the principal cause of inflation, and like its military predecessors, it has adopted a plan of “privatization.” Behind privatization lies another potentially explosive political issue: much of the public sector is chronically inefficient; its chief purpose is simply to subsidize the unemployed. It seems very unlikely that private capital could be induced to assume such loss-making ventures. If the program of public-sector alienation were carried through, privatization would presumably become a euphemism for simple elimination. On the other hand, failure to act on the public sector would deprive the government of one of its chief weapons against inflation. Here, too, appears an almost insoluble dilemma: either the government must abandon its anti-inflationary program, or it must take steps likely to have another extremely damaging effect on employment.

These are two immediate, critical problems. In the longer term comes a third of similar significance. The general turmoil of recent years has obscured the declining incidence of a major structural barrier to economic growth in Argentina. Since the early 1970s, basically because of increased investment and technical advances, agricultural productivity has risen perceptibly. The prospect of growing agricultural export surpluses promises relief from the balance-of-payments crises that have constantly plagued urban industry since the late 1940s. It might be argued that, if it had no foreign debt, Argentina would enjoy more favorable preconditions than ever before for the pursuit of rapid industrialization. Industrial development in turn might be expected to yield more jobs, and leave employment less dependent on public sector spending; it could raise standards of living and overcome the deep-seated urban crisis that for more than a generation has lain at the root of political instability.

But, of course, industrial development offers no easy or painless transition to a society of superabundance. More likely, it would breed another spate of severe social dislocation. It would promote still greater industrial concentration alongside the destruction of much of the existing manufacturing sector. Capital-intensive industrial development could well enhance structural unemployment and induce growing rather than receding inequalities. Car a Radical government, drawing much of its popular support from beneficiaries of the status quo—petty manufacturers, state-employed or tertiary-salaried classes—handle the tensions of accelerating industrialism?

The basic issues facing Alfonsin are no different from those of his military predecessors. Their attempts to resolve them were either brutally authoritarian, or took the form of Bonapartist diversionary ploys. Alfonsin’s method is democratic negotiation and consensus. The danger is that democratic rules may be unable to restrain an outbreak of mass opposition
sparked by falling living standards. Ad hoc, multiclass opposition movements, stimulated either by recession or by "stagflation" and concomitant violent shifts in income distribution, have played a major part in modern Argentine politics. Such movements have provoked the downfall of one regime after another since the early 1950s. In early 1984 opposition already has an anchor among the trade unions, and numerous possible leaders among the Peronists.

Keenly aware of such dangers, the Alfonsin government has so far adopted three main tactics. First, it has taken a hard line toward banks and the international financial agencies on the foreign debt. Hints at default have enabled it to invoke nationalist sentiment to maintain popularity.

Second, the government has pledged to trim the military budget to finance an expansion of higher education—a measure that needs no justification in the light of recent Argentine history. Most popular among the Radicals' own core middle-class constituency, this measure carries the obvious potential for provoking military opposition. However, "defense" and education are merely different forms of public spending; if the government wished to expand education, it might well have to apply additional compensatory cuts in other areas of public spending to attack inflation. Thus, what one sector gains from education, another may lose through additional "privatization."

Third, the government has embarked on an effort to reform the trade unions by introducing more democratic procedures in the election of union officeholders. The measure amounts to an attack on Peronism, whose aim is to expand government influence among politically strategic sectors of the working class. Union reform, and a pledge to maintain a minimum wage linked to the cost of living, are central features of the government's projects for reform. By broadening its influence in the unions, the government hopes to restrain or forestall an outbreak of working-class dissent.

Efforts by non-Peronist governments to co-opt union and working-class support recur throughout post-1955 Argentine history; the last such attempt came under Galiteri in 1982. All failed, usually on account of rank-and-file opposition, which, like the cordobazo of 1969, sometimes flared into popular rebellion. At present, with the trade union legislation enshrined in Congress, there is perhaps little reason to believe that Alfonsin can achieve what others have not been able to achieve. But if the effort were to succeed, alfonsinismo would likely undergo a revolutionary metamorphosis in style, content, and structure. It would cease to be a horizontal association of the middle classes and become another of the multiple class "movements" that have played a major role in Latin American politics since the 1930s. The corollary of such movissementismo would be the decline of political pluralism and the emergence of neocorporatist forms. Under prevailing crisis conditions in Argentina—and more out of the necessity of survival than the personal predilections of political leaders—"national populism" may still prove the only possible alternative to dictatorship, and the only feasible form of democracy.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

by Carlos H. Waisman

The transition to democracy in Argentina is taking place under unfavorable conditions. In the first place, the country's economy is in a critical state. The economic legacy of the military regime is a combination of a very high level of indebtedness, hyperinflation, and stagnation. The policies of the regime were a reflection of its incoherence: trade liberalization and unrestrained spending, an explosive mix in a society with a noncompetitive manufacturing sector and a highly organized and mobilized working class. The Argentine debt, which stands at least at $44 billion, is the third-largest in Latin America, but it is the highest in relation to exports: the Argentine debt-service ratio (interest payments and nontrade short-term credit as a percentage of exports) is 133 percent, higher than that of either Brazil or Mexico. (American Express International Banking Corporation, New York Times, April 26, 1984.) Inflation is running at the three-digit level (a yearly average of over 400 percent in the first quarter of 1984), and the number of hours worked per worker in industry at the end of 1983 was only 80 percent of the figure for 1970. (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos [Argentina], Clarín [Buenos Aires], April 1, 1984.)

Second, the military regime was defeated in a war, but the similarities with democracies established after World War II in Europe or Japan end here. When the Alfonsin administration came to power, the institutional infrastructure of corporatism was largely intact: weak political parties, and strong corporate organizations (the armed forces, the unions, the church). Thus, after more than 50 years of political instability, military dictatorships, and populist-corporatist governments, liberal democratic traditions are weak in Argentina.

The policies of the new administration seem to focus on two major objectives. One is to expand Alfonsin's base of support, the other is to weaken the right-wing authoritarian opposition, which the new president has called the "union-military pact." In the election last year, the Radical party ticket got probably half of its support from the traditionally non-Radical electorate: segments of the working class and of the center-right. Most of the former was a protest vote, for Alfonsin was accurately perceived as a more resolute opponent of the military than the Peronist candidate; most of the latter was an anti-Peronist vote, provoked by electoral polarization.

The president is now trying to transform this tactical alignment into a more permanent coalition, and to give it an organizational form. This is the program behind the diffuse formula "third historical movement" (the two previous "historical movements" being traditional Radicalism and Peronism), whose constitution is Alfonsin's long-term objective. The nature of this "movement" is still unclear (an enlarged Radical party, a new party, a front?), but its ideology and expected social base are more definite. The ideology would combine
political liberalism and a moderately populist and nationalist economic policy, a different mix from the one prevailing in European Social Democratic parties. Observers in Argentina and abroad who have equated Alfonsin and his faction within the Radical party with Social Democracy do not realize that Mitterand-style economic “realism” is still politically unviable in Argentina. The targeted social base of this movement, however, resembles that of the Latin European parties: large segments of the working and middle classes, the latter including most of the intelligentsia.

The second objective is more clear: to disarticulate the authoritarian cluster, and contribute to the conversion of Peronism into a party committed to the maintenance of democratic institutions. This entails three tasks: subordinating the armed forces to the civilian authorities, democratizing the labor movement (currently controlled by a Peronist leadership whose predominant values are right-wing authoritarian), and developing a culture of democratic interaction with the “political” (nonunion) wing of Peronism.

The extent to which these objectives are attained will depend on how the new government manages the three central issues it faces: the payment of the debt, the relationship with the unions, and the relationship with the military. The transition to democracy will take place only if the Alfonsin administration prevents these issues from activating what can be called the destabilization mechanism. This mechanism would operate as follows.

a. The balance-of-payments crisis requires the implementation of severe stabilization policies, which lead to a serious recession.

b. This produces a high level of working-class mobilization, determined by both spontaneous discontent and the organizational and personal interests of the Peronist leadership, which is engaged in a fight for its survival; in order to maintain the control of their organizations, these leaders would bet again, as they did in previous democratic experiences, for destabilization.

c. This mobilization would trigger panic among the bourgeoisie and sectors of the middle class, and this would in turn lead to military intervention.

The deactivation of this mechanism would require minimally satisfactory outcomes in all three issues (the negotiations over debt repayment, the democratization of the labor movement, and the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control). Achieving this goal will not be easy, given the relation of power between the government and its foreign and domestic antagonists, and the close interrelationship among the issues.

As far as the first issue is concerned, the debt negotiation, the “antagonists” are the International Monetary Fund, the major lending banks, and the governments of the lending nations, the U.S. government in particular. The Alfonsin administration must thread a difficult path between two extreme and unacceptable options: an orthodox, IMF-style stabilization program, and a unilateral moratorium or the like. The first alternative would almost surely produce a high level of polarization; the second one would disrupt international trade and lead to an even more serious explosion. The IMF and the banks press for the orthodox option, whereas nationalist circles in Argentina (mainly among the Peronists, but also in the other parties, Radicals included) resolutely oppose any agreement with the fund, and espouse confrontational policies that would lead to default-like situations.

The government seems to be aware that, given the nature of the international economy, a recession is very likely, but it aims at reaching a compromise with the fund and the banks that would allow for gradual adjustments rather than a shock treatment, and for public works and import-substitution policies designed to cushion the recessive impact and lead to a faster recovery (which would not be a dramatic one in any case, given the debt-service ratio).

The IMF and the banks will only accept these unorthodox proposals if the United States and other governments do so. The Argentines are asking the Reagan administration to show that it pursues the global interests of democracy rather than the short-term interests of American capitalists. The issue is compoundd, for there are many other large debtors, and whatever concessions are granted to Argentina will have to be given to the other countries, some of which, democratic or authoritarian, are strategically more important to the United States than Argentina.

The argument, however, touches on the central weakness of U.S. policy toward Latin America: its almost exclusive concern with short-term goals. The assertion underlying the position of the Alfonsin administration is that, in the long run, American strategic interests are best served by legitimate, democratic regimes nonaligned with the Soviet Union (and preconditions for these regimes exist in several Latin American countries) rather than by “friendly” anti-Communist dictatorships.

Relationship with the unions is the second issue. Here the government must avoid two extremes: tactical accommodation with the existing leadership, and all-out war against it. The first option could be expedient in the short run, but it would leave one of the central pillars of corporatism intact. The second alternative, given the strength of the Peronists and the fact that a recession is almost inevitable, would lead to an early activation of the destabilizing mechanism described above. This second road was tried already, when the government sent Congress a bill mandating court-controlled elections in trade unions and establishing minority representation in union bodies. The bill was defeated in the Senate, where the government is in the minority.

Alfonsin is now trying a middle road, negotiation, in order to obtain more competitive union elections. Realistically, this is the best outcome the government can achieve. Over time, this could lead to a more pluralistic labor movement, in which nonmachine Peronists, the traditional Left, and Radicals would prevail over the right-wing Peronists. Time is, however, the obstacle. The recession is likely to hit soon, whereas this possible realignment would take several years.

Finally, the third issue is the relationship with the military. In this regard, the Alfonsin administration has no choices: it must move fast and eliminate the armed forces as an independent political actor, placing them firmly under civilian control. Only when the military are no more independent than, let us say, the Central Bank, will the destabilization mechanism be broken. Paradoxically, it is in this area, which was intractable for two generations, that the Alfonsin administration has the best chances for success. This is so because the military lost
LA INFLACION Y LA LUCHA ENTRE FRACCIONES EMPRESARIAS EN LA ARGENTINA (1976-1982)

by Monica Peralta Ramos

Uno de los rasgos distintivos de la historia argentina reciente ha sido la persistente y por momentos descontrolada inflación. Existe un fenómeno—poco o nada estudiado—que a nuestro entender es de fundamental importancia para comprender las alternativas de la inflación argentina. El mismo reside en el sistemático enfrentamiento entre fracciones empresariales y su recurrencia al ejercicio de prácticas especulativas como forma de hacer valer sus específicas reivindicaciones sectoriales.

Partimos de una definición de coyuntura como síntesis de relaciones de fuerza entre diversos actores sociales en un momento determinado en la historia de una sociedad. Por razones de espacio nuestro análisis solo se centrará en la relación de fuerzas entre las fracciones del gran capital agropecuario, industrial y financiero. Haremos pues abstracción de los distintos conflictos que sigan la coyuntura así como también de las alternativas de la coyuntura internacional que hicieron posible los fenómenos que detallaremos más abajo. En este contexto, la inflación expresará la lucha por la redistribución del ingreso entre diversos actores sociales, será pues el resultado de una determinante relación de fuerza. En lo que sigue intentaremos analizar esto último desde el punto de vista de las contradicciones existentes entre las grandes fracciones empresariales en el periodo 1976-1982.

A grandes rasgos podemos decir que desde 1960 en adelante los distintos gobiernos que se suceden (tanto cívicos como militares) comparten una misma estrategia de desarrollo. La misma se basará en dos grandes ejes: alta protección arancelaria e inversiones directas extranjeras en las ramas de la industria más capital intensivas. Estos ejes dan lugar a una sistemática intervención estatal en la economía a fin de estimular el desarrollo de estas ramas. A través de un tipo de cambio que subsidia sus importaciones y promociona sus exportaciones, de líneas especiales de crédito subsidiado, de alta protección arancelaria para sus productos y de bajos aranceles para sus importaciones, y a través de excenciones impositivas de todo tipo el Estado promoverá el desarrollo de estas ramas lideres. La contraparte de estas políticas en relación al sector agropecuario será el establecimiento de gravámenes especiales a las exportaciones de este sector, un tipo de cambio especial que actúa como un gravamen más, y un sistemático control de los precios internos. La conjunción de estas políticas tuvo por efecto provocar una traslación de ingresos del sector agropecuario hacia el industrial.

Tuvo además otros efectos. Este estilo de crecimiento tenderá a generar un crecimiento sobredimensionado de importaciones crecientemente sofisticadas. Diversos factores incidirán en este fenómeno: desde el comercio no regulado entre partes del complejo multinacional y la sobrefacturación hasta la incidencia a nivel local de la velocidad con que se renueva la tecnología en los centros. La sustitución de importaciones en estas condiciones generará pues crecientes importaciones de otro tipo que no se corresponderán con la evolución de las exportaciones agropecuarias, principal fuente de divisas del país. De ahí que este estilo de crecimiento se encontrará encerrado en una paradoja: toda expansión de la acumulación desembocará en una crisis del sector externo, con el consiguiente incremento del endeudamiento externo. La crisis del sector externo y la necesidad de encontrar divisas “fáciles” generarán las condiciones para que el sector agropecuario encuentre el poder económico y político necesario para presionar, y obtener,
un cambio circunstancial en las políticas que lo gravan.

Por lo mismo, esta estrategia de desarrollo acelerará los conflictos entre las principales fracciones empresarias en el ámbito industrial y agropecuario. Estos conflictos tendrán a expresarse en las alternativas de los precios relatives entre ambos sectores en cada coyuntura del ciclo económico, en el intermitente rebrote inflacionario que éstas producen, y en la endémica recurrencia a prácticas especulativas. El control monopolístico o oligopolístico de ramas estratégicas de la industria permitirá a esta fracción empresaria ejercer un impacto decisivo sobre la evolución de los precios del conjunto de la industria, y por esta vía, de la economía. Durante este período una forma típica de ejercer presión sobre los precios será la acumulación de stocks, el desahastecimiento, y el mercado negro.

La aceleración del conflicto entre estas fracciones empresarias se traducirá en el creciente accionar político a través de sus respectivos organismos corporativos, y en la consiguiente pérdida progresiva de legitimidad del modelo de desarrollo implementado desde los 60s. En estas circunstancias, uno de los principales objetivos que se planteará el golpe militar del 1976 será provocar un cambio en las reglas del juego económico a fin de modificar sustancialmente la relación de fuerza existente entre fracciones empresarias. Se plantearán entonces diversos objetivos: a) promover un desarrollo más “armónico” entre campo e industria, quitando poder económico y político a la industria y restituyéndoselo al sector agropecuario; b) estimular el desarrollo del poder económico y político del sector financiero privado; y c) incentivar nuevas formas de concentración del capital fusionando a las cúpulas empresarias de los diversos sectores productivos bajo la hegemonía del capital financiero privado, es decir, promover la formación de “grupos económicos.”

Desde un principio el gobierno definirá a la inflación como una lucha por la redistribución del ingreso y establecerá como uno de sus objetivos prioritarios el drástico control de la misma. Para ello, reducirá violentamente los salarios y desatará una represión sobre los sectores populares que lo marginará efectivamente del escenario político. Actos se guió todo el esfuerzo de la lucha antiinflacionaria se volcará sobre el sector industrial. Para ello comenzará por desmontar la compleja maquinaria de subsidios al sector industrial: se eliminarán los tipos de cambios especiales y las líneas de crédito subsidiado para la promoción y financiación de las exportaciones industriales. Al mismo tiempo, se liberalizarán los precios agropecuarios y se eliminará parte de los gravámenes a las exportaciones agropecuarias. En consecuencia, se mejorará inmediatamente la relación de precios interna del sector agropecuario.

Sin embargo, esto no detendrá el crecimiento de la inflación por lo que en marzo del 1977 el gobierno impondrá una tregua o control de precios por tres meses a las 200 empresas mayores del país, e iniciará un arduo proceso de negociaciones a fin de obtener su consenso respecto de la política oficial. Terminada la tregua, y en pleno rebrote inflacionario el gobierno implementará su reforma financiera. Esta consistirá en una descentralización de los depósitos bancarios, una liberalización de las tasas de interés y una ley de entidades financieras. Diversos serán los objetivos perseguidos por esta reforma, entre ellos cabe señalar que al encarecer notablemente el crédito interno se pretenderá provocar una masiva traslación de recursos hacia el sector financiero y obstaculizar la acumulación de stocks, el desahastecimiento y el mercado negro. Paralelamente con esta medida el gobierno bajará en forma discriminada y punitoria aranceles en aquellos sectores que no respetan las reglas del juego oficial y en noviembre del 1978 impondrá una reforma arancelaria cuyos plazos serán violados por el propio gobierno en su afán de castigar los excesos de precios. Haciendas de dicho año se establecerán pautas preannunciadas para la evolución del tipo de cambio ("tabilla") que dijeron por resultado una sobrevaluación del peso destinada a inundar el mercado interno con importaciones competitivas con la producción local, a fin imponer reducciones de precios en los artículos localmente producidos.

Ahora bien, ¿cuáles fueron los efectos de estas políticas? El crecimiento de las tasas de interés a nivel local fue tan considerable que las mismas tendieron a superar a las tasas de interés vigentes en los mercados financieros internacionales. Al mismo tiempo, el spread bancario local fue uno de los más altos posibles de encontrar en el mercado internacional. Al amparo de estos fenómenos se registró un masivo ingreso de préstamos financieros del exterior, una transferencia de recursos de los sectores productivos hacia el sector financiero, el desarrollo de una serie de prácticas especulativas en el mercado financiero llamadas popularmente “bicicletas,” y el consiguiente incremento del endeudamiento externo. Se produjo así una gran segmentación del mercado financiero. El mismo se dividió entre los bancos con acceso el mercado financiero internacional y local, y los bancos con acceso solamente al mercado financiero local. Los primeros se especializaron exclusivamente en clientes de bajo riesgo, los segundos en cambio al depender exclusivamente de los recursos obtenidos localmente, para competir con el primer grupo ofrecieron tasas de interés mayores y e especializaron en empresas de alto riesgo sin acceso al crédito externo. La garantía oficial sobre el total de los depósitos permitió no solo la expansión de este segundo grupo sino también la proliferación de lo que después fueron llamadas “prácticas irregulares.” Esta alta segmentación del mercado financiero local se dió conjuntamente con un alto grado de concentración por el lado de la oferta: 12 por ciento del total de las 209 instituciones financieras existentes en 1980 respondían por el 64 por ciento del total del crédito.

Desde el punto de vista del sector industrial, las consecuencias fueron múltiples. Por un lado, y desde una perspectiva global, se acentuó la recesión a un punto tal que la participación de la industria en el total de lo producido pasó de representar el 29 por ciento en el 1973-1975 a representar el 26 por ciento entre el 1978-1980. Por el otro lado, las políticas aplicadas produjeron una importante fragmentación del sector en dos grandes grupos: un grupo que nucleará a la mayoría de las ramas líderes en el periodo anterior al golpe, permanecerá altamente protegido. El mismo registrará importantes crecimientos del producto, de la productividad, del coeficiente de ganancias/ventas, y de las inversiones. Este grupo tendrá un fácil acceso al crédito externo. El otro grupo sometido crecientemente a la competencia de artículos importados, tendrá escaso o ningún acceso al crédito externo, registrará un
decrecimiento de la producción y del coeficiente ganancias/ventas, y registrará crecimientos de la productividad menores al grupo anterior. Para sobrevivir, este grupo adoptará diferentes tácticas según el tamaño de las empresas y el grado de acceso al crédito externo: desde transformarse en importadores y proveedores de servicios de los productos anteriormente producidos, reducir al mínimo sus operaciones esperando un cambio de política hasta fusionarse. De más está decir que las pequeñas y medianas empresas sufrirán enormemente las consecuencias de estas políticas y muchas desaparecerán de la escena.

Desde la perspectiva del sector agropecuario se puede decir que pasado el primer año de bonanza de precios, el mismo se verá crecientemente afectado: por un lado, por el incremento del costo financiero que trajo aparejado la reforma financiera; por el otro lado, la política de la tablita afectará seriamente a las exportaciones del sector. Amplios sectores también se verán perjudicados por factores climáticos y por la baja de los precios internacionales de algunos productos clave. La conjunción de estos fenómenos provocará el creciente endeudamiento y el consiguiente quebranto que arrasará con la pequeña y mediana empresa sin acceso al crédito externo.

Ahora bien, las mejores otorgadas al sector agropecuario entre el 1976 y el 1977 se tradujeron en un mejoramiento notable de sus precios que prácticamente se equipara con los industriales. Sin embargo, esta situación no perdurará entre el 1978 y el 1979: el crecimiento de los precios industriales superará en un 10 por ciento el crecimiento de los precios agropecuarios. Hacia 1980 este margen será de un 20 por ciento. Por lo demás dentro del sector industrial los precios variarán entre los distintos grupos mencionados: mientras ambos incrementen los precios en un nivel semejante hasta 1979, a partir de entonces el comportamiento de ambos grupos tenderá a divergir. Entre 1979 y 1980 el grupo competitivo lo incrementará en un 60 por ciento y el protegido en un 90 por ciento. La estampida de las tasas de interés acompañará de una persistente inflación. Los precios industriales nacionales crecerán más que los agropecuarios a lo largo del periodo y sólo en 1979 se harán sentir los efectos de la tablita sobre el comportamiento de precios del sector competitivo.

Por otra parte, la persistencia de un ritmo devaluatorio inferior al crecimiento de los precios locales sumado a la sustancial diferencia entre las tasas de interés internas y las internacionales harán cada vez más atractivo el ingreso de capitales y fomentarán el desarrollo de todo tipo de prácticas especulativas en el mercado financiero local. Este se transformará en el escenario privilegiado para la expresión de la pugna interempresaria y la consiguiente transferencia de ingresos entre sectores. El objetivo de promover la constitución de grupos económicos se logró ampliamente pero no por ello se atenuaron los conflictos existentes. Los mismos sin embargo adoptaron una nueva forma: la contradicción entre los grupos económicos con acceso al mercado financiero internacional y local y aquellos que solo tuvieron acceso al mercado local.

Desde el punto de vista del comportamiento político del empresariado se puede decir que el gobierno contó desde el principio con la adhesión explícita del conjunto de organizaciones empresarias que nucleaban al sector agropecuario y financiero y la reticencia y en ciertos casos oposición de los organismos corporativos de la industria. Sin embargo, esta situación no habría de durar mucho tiempo. En efecto, pronto se produce una fisura dentro del sector agropecuario y del industrial. La adhesión en un caso y la oposición en el otro no serán unánimes. Hacia 1980 el gobierno se encontrará progresivamente aislado. Solo un sector del empresariado industrial, agropecuario y financiero mantendrá su adhesión al cambio en las "reglas del juego." El resto, aprovechando la temperatura política de la coyuntura, presionará de distintos modos para hacer valer sus respectivas reivindicaciones sectoriales. Esto ocurre en circunstancias en que se inventa la pugna entre fracciones de las fuerzas armadas por imponer su propio candidato a la presidencia de la República. En el medio de la creciente inestabilidad y dudas respecto de la continuación de la política oficial sobreviene la intervención al Banco de Intercambio Regional (la principal institución financiera nacional) y a otros tres entidades financieras ubicadas también entre las más importantes del país. Esto produjo corridas de ahorradores que retiraron sus fondos de las instituciones consideradas menos sólidas y los volcaron en la banca oficial y extranjera mientras que otros se orientaron hacia la adquisición de divisas extranjeras. La amenaza de un "crack" financiero de gran magnitud provocó una actuación fuga de capitales. Para contrarrestar sus efectos, el gobierno saliente utilizará a las empresas oficiales para obtener masivamente créditos de corto plazo en el exterior. El resultado fue un incremento fabuloso del ya importante endeudamiento del sector oficial.

El gobierno de Viola (marzo-diciembre 1981) abre un periodo de intensa lucha entre sectores empresarios, y de aguda presión sobre el gobierno a fin de obtener cambios determinados en la política oficial. Frente a la fuga de capitales el gobierno optará por una sistemática devaluación del peso. Reestablecerá la dualidad en el mercado de cambios, incrementará las gravámenes a las exportaciones agropecuarias y designará una comisión especial (constituida por miembros del Ministerio de Hacienda y Finanzas, Agricultura e Industrias) a fin de evaluar los efectos de la reforma arancelaria y de hacer recomendaciones para el futuro. Al mismo tiempo, anunciará un plan de refinanciación de la deuda externa privada con el objeto de dar más aliento al sector empresario y reducir la amenaza de solvencia del sector financiero. Sin embargo, los bancos usaron las facilidades del redescuento otorgadas por el Banco Central para ayudar a sus mejores clientes. Y gran parte de las mismas fueron convertidas en el mercado negro de cambios. Terminada la "tablita," el mercado de cambios se transformará en el área donde proliferará la especulación. En junio el gobierno anunció un nuevo plan de refinanciación de la deuda provada llamado Bono. El mismo estará destinado a refinanciar el 50 por ciento de la deuda del sector industrial y el 40 por ciento de la deuda del sector agropecuario. Las disensiones entre el sector agropecuario, financiero e industrial explican que el mismo no se hiciese efectivo hasta noviembre del 1981. Como un síntoma más de las disensiones que caracterizan al periodo el Ministerio de Economía se dividirá en cinco ministerios, cada uno de los cuales responderá a una clientela económica específica. La inestabilidad política culminará con un nuevo golpe y en diciembre Viola será reemplazado por Galtieri. Las primeras
medidas adoptadas por el gobierno parecen indicar un retorno a la política económica del 1976. El panorama se complicará sin embargo con la guerra de las Malvinas y la posterior caída del gobierno de Galtieri. Sube entonces un nuevo general a la presidencia de la República y comienza un nuevo periodo signado por la convocatoria a elecciones democráticas en 1973 y la "contrarreforma financiera" del Dr. Cavallo en julio del 1982. La misma persiguió el objetivo de provocar una salida de capitales del sector financiero y orientarlos hacia la inversión productiva. Se estima que entre julio del 1982 y abril del 1983, un 43 por ciento de la deuda privada fue asumida por el Estado. Sin embargo, ello no impió el desarrollo de las actividades especulativas de todo tipo. Las mismas tuvieron por escenario tanto al mercado financiero como al mercado de cambios como así también el desahuecimiento acumulación de stocks y mercado negro de productos específicos. Paralelamente, y en la medida en que se avanza hacia la fecha de las elecciones, la hiperinflación estará a la orden del día.

CALLS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND PROPOSALS

The organizer of a workshop on "Techniques for Teaching Latin American Studies" to be presented during the 1985 LASA congress is seeking participants for that workshop. It will permit an exchange of ideas between participants and the audience on techniques for teaching Latin American (and Spanish and Portuguese language) studies in a variety of disciplines. Such techniques would include (but not be limited to) audiovisual resources, educational research, realia, art, field trips, study abroad, internships and cooperative education, interviews, local resources, computer-assisted instruction, and so forth. Participants will be asked to bring examples of their materials or techniques for brief demonstrations. No formal papers will be presented.

If interested, contact Dr. Jack Child, associate professor of Spanish and Latin American Studies, The American University, Washington, DC 20016; (202)686-2280, (202)363-1111.

Conference on Dimensions of Latin American and Caribbean Migration

Professors, students, independent scholars, community professionals, and others interested in Latin American, Caribbean, and U.S. Latino issues are invited to submit proposals to present papers or organize panels for the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Illinois Conference of Latin Americanists (ICLAS), which will focus on migration to, from, and within Latin America and the Caribbean. The meeting will take place at the University of Illinois at Chicago November 15-17, 1984.

Designed to deal with diverse causes, patterns, and consequences of immigration from social science, humanities, and other perspectives, the meeting should involve such general areas as migration and history, politics, art, popular culture, economics, law, health, psychology, religion, ethics, linguistics, and so forth. Topics could include Central American refugees; the latest developments in Mexico/U.S. migration policy; literature of migration and exile; comparative migration studies; Japanese, Chinese, or Indian immigration to Latin America, etc.

For further information, contact UIC ICLAS Meeting Committee, c/o Professor Otto Pikaar, director, Latin American Studies, 1401 University Hall, Box 4348, Chicago, IL 60680; (312)996-2445.

Midwest Political Science Association

Latin Americanists are invited to submit proposals for panels and/or papers for the April 1985 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. That meeting, to be held in Chicago, will feature a number of panels in the field of comparative politics.

Interested persons should write directly to the comparative politics section chair for that meeting, Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson, Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721; (317)743-1149.

McGANN PRIZE AWARDED

The Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies is pleased to announce the first award of the Thomas F. McGann Memorial prize in Latin American history to Prof. William H. Beezley (North Carolina State University) and Prof. Eric Van Young (University of California at San Diego).

Prof. Beezley's paper was entitled "Judas, Rabelais, and Abner Doubleday: Traditional vs. Modern Society in Porfírian Mexico." The citation for Prof. Beezley reads as follows.

"Professor William Beezley's paper demonstrates how the study of popular culture can be used to illuminate the chocaq between modernization and tradition in Porfírian Mexico. Beezley argues in a fresh and imaginative way that the Judas burning not only stereotyped traditional Porfírian society, but challenged directly the modernization impulse evidenced by the elite's adoption of American baseball. While traditional Mexican society found its inspiration in the liturgical calendar of the Middle Ages, the Porfírian elite sought to emulate the outer trappings of the Victorian age, but which did the revolutionaries embrace? Beezley sides with neither; the revolutionaries fought for leaders, not ideas."

Prof. Van Young's paper was entitled "Who Was That Masked Man Anyway?: Symbols and Popular Ideology in the Mexican Wars of Independence." The citation for Prof. Van Young reads as follows.

"Since the appearance of Luis González's masterful Pueblo en vilo, historians of the Mexican Revolution have grappled with vagaries of microhistory: Eric Van Young now carries this trend back to the wars of independence. Using primary evidence from the AGN and an impressive array of secondary sources, he analyzes competing interests during the conflict. His analysis of the role of the elites tells us little that we did not already know, but his venture into popular ideology drives home how cautious we must be in attributing a single set of motivations to the inherently complex struggle for Mexican independence from Spain."

The McGann prize, which carries a cash award of $50 and a certificate, was presented on February 25 at the 32nd annual RMCLAS meeting hosted by the University of Arizona. The prize honors the late Thomas F. McGann, a distinguished professor of Latin American history at the University of Texas at Austin, and former editor of the Latin American Research Review.

Friends of Prof. McGann donated funds for the prize. Individuals wishing to contribute to this prize may do so by sending their checks to the McGann Prize, New Mexico State University Foundation, c/o Center for Latin American Studies, Box 3JBR, Las Cruces, NM 88003.

GUATEMALA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION/USA

The Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA has announced a world campaign on behalf of the approximately 35,000 “disappeared” in Guatemala. For more information, please contact Sister Alice Zachmann, coordinator, Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA, P.O. Box 91, Cardinal Station, Washington, DC 20064.

WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, located in Washington, DC, seeks from individuals throughout the world outstanding project proposals representing diverse scholarly interests in the humanities and social sciences, and is hospitable to research that falls outside one of its existing geographical or thematic categories. Scholarship undertaken at the center transcends narrow specialities and includes a strong humanistic component. The center also encourages projects with theoretical, philosophical, or theological dimensions.

The center’s residential fellowships are awarded in one general program—History, Culture, and Society—and five more-focused programs—American Society and Politics, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Latin American Program, the International Security Studies Program, and the East Asia Program.

For academic participants, eligibility is limited to the postdoctoral level, and normally successful applicants have published one book beyond the Ph.D. dissertation; for participants from other backgrounds, equivalent maturity and professional achievement are expected. Fellows devote their full time to research and writing. The length of a fellowship can vary from four months to a year. Within certain limits, the center seeks to enable each fellow to meet his or her earned income during the preceding year. Deadline for receipt of applications is October 1, with decisions by mid-February. Appointments cannot begin before the following September.

For information and application materials, contact The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution Building, Room 331, Washington, DC 20560; (202) 357-2841.

BARRY SCHUMAN HEADS NEW DIVISION

Barry R. Schuman, former executive director of the Latin American Scholarship Program of American Universities (LASPAU), will be the first director of a newly created IIE unit, the Development Assistance Programs Division.

Development Assistance Programs will bring together a group of major education and training projects administered by the Institute of International Education that focus on the needs of the developing nations. Establishment of the new division will permit better coordination of activities related to development assistance. It will also facilitate IIE relations with the sponsors of these programs, which include the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and several foreign governments.

The new division under his direction will form a part of the Fellowship and Educational Services Department of the Institute of International Education, the largest U.S. higher educational exchange agency. Among the development assistance projects for which Mr. Schuman will be responsible are the Caribbean Basin Initiative Midcareer Training Fellowship Program and a World Bank-funded program administered on behalf of the Brazilian agricultural research organization, EMBRAPA.

Development-related projects managed by the division provide graduate, undergraduate, and technical education, practical training and internships to some 400 individuals each year. Many participants are midcareer civil servants, university teachers, and private-sector executives who are being trained for positions of greater responsibility in their home nations.

For more information, contact Barry R. Schuman, Institute of International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIALES REGIONALES

A new center of social scientific studies was created in 1983 by the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Temuco, Chile. This center is involved with the study and investigation of regional social, economic, and cultural problems. Anthropologists, ethnologists, linguists, and educators compose the center’s core staff, though other specialists serve as participating consultants. Staff members are currently conducting work on rural education, rural health, and various topics relating to the way of life and conditions, past and present, of the Mapuche Indians.

The Universidad Católica has been engaged in social and economic research in south-central Chile since the early 1970s and has organized periodically a national congress, the Semana Indígenista, to focus on Mapuche research problems. The fifth Semana Indígenista was held in October 1983, and was well attended by both national and international scholars.

For additional information, write to Dr. Teresa Durán, director, C.I.S.R.E., Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Sede Temuco, Temuco, CHILE.

DOCUMENTARIES AND FILMS AVAILABLE

The New Underground Railroad. A new video program distributed by the Indiana University Audio-Visual Center, produced by Kathy and Carl Hersh, focuses on church people in Madison, Wisconsin, struggling to decide whether to defy U.S. law by giving sanctuary to Salvadorans fleeing their
country. It also documents the story of a Salvadoran family and its clandestine journey to a U.S. destination on the “new underground railroad.” For more information, please contact Patricia C. Wetmore, director of field services, Audio-Visual Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.

In the Name of Democracy. A new 30-minute documentary that traces the events in El Salvador from the controversial U.S.-sponsored 1982 elections to the present, is available from Communications: El Salvador, 325 W. 38th Street, 3rd floor, New York, NY 10018; (212)947-9376.

TULANE UNIVERSITY ANNOUNCES PLANS

The Roger Thayer Stone Center for Latin American Studies at Tulane University announces a summer session in Mexico City to take place July 1 to August 11. This session is in conjunction with the Universidad Iberoamericana, and will consist of twelve courses on Latin American culture and language.

“The Social Context of Crisis in Central America,” a summer seminar in Costa Rica for faculty of southern U.S. colleges, will be held in conjunction with the Florida International University and the Central de Investigación y Adiestramiento Político-Administrativo.

The center has also received funding for conferences and film series throughout the South on Modern Central America. In addition, federal funding will support a new program combining undergraduate education and professional training in public health and tropical medicine. This program will include a spring 1985 conference on urbanization and health in the Third World and a summer field workshop on health and development in Guatemala and Colombia.

For further information on any of these programs, contact Richard Greenleaf, director, Center for Latin American Studies, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118.

NEW LEADERSHIP FOR WILSON CENTER LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars has announced that Richard M. Morse, currently William H. Bonsall Professor of History at Stanford University, has accepted appointment as program secretary of the center’s Latin American Program, beginning September 1, 1984. Professor Morse is well known for his studies of Brazil, his analyses of urban development in Latin America, and for his reflections on Latin American culture.

Having received his doctorate at Columbia University, Prof. Morse taught there for eight years, followed by three years at the University of Puerto Rico, where he also directed the Institute of Caribbean Studies. He then taught for sixteen years at Yale University before moving to Stanford in 1978. Among many other appointments in Latin America, he has served as Distinguished Lecturer at the University of Guayaquil (1975), El Colegio de México (1981), and at the University of Rio de Janeiro (1983). He served as Social Science Program advisor to the Ford Foundation in Brazil from 1973 to 1975, and has received a Guggenheim Fellowship as well as fellowships from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and the Stanford Humanities Center. In 1966 he chaired the constitutional committee that created LASA.

When he assumes the leadership of the Latin American Program at the Wilson Center, Richard Morse will inherit a program that, in the eight years of its existence, has sought to attract Latin American scholars from a wide range of disciplines and perspectives. The Latin American Program was established at the center by Abraham F. Lowenthal, who resigned after seven years to accept a professorship in international relations at the University of Southern California. Since that time, Louis W. Goodman has served as acting secretary, and will continue to do so until August 31, at which time he will become senior program associate with continuing responsibilities for social science.

UCSD ANNOUNCES 1984-85 VISITING RESEARCH FELLOWS

The Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, has awarded visiting research fellowships to 17 researchers from Mexico, the United States, Chile, and Germany for the 1984-85 academic year. Fellows will pursue individual research projects and participate in the weekly meetings of the center’s interdisciplinary Research Seminar on Mexico and U.S.-Mexican Relations, as well as present their work at research workshops and conferences held throughout the year at UCSD. Visiting fellows include researchers based at El Colegio de México, CEFNOMEX, UNAM, the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Universidad Iberoamericana, and the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones sobre Recursos Bioticos in Jalapa, Veracruz; several persons who recently occupied significant Mexican government positions; and two practicing lawyers or legal scholars.

Applications for fellowships for 1985-86 must be submitted by November 15, 1984. Both predoctoral and postdoctoral researchers are eligible, and applications from nonacademic specialists on Mexico are particularly sought. All fellowships are residential in character; fellows must spend three to twelve months in residence at the center. For further information, contact Graciela Platero, fellowships coordinator, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, UCSD, La Jolla, CA 92093; (619)452-4503.

TINKER POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS ANNOUNCED

Martha T. Muse, chair and president of the Tinker Foundation, has announced the winners of the foundation’s ninth annual Postdoctoral Fellowship competition. This fellowship provides scholars with the opportunity to conduct Ibero-American related research that will have significant theoretical or public policy implications. The competition is open to individuals who have completed their doctoral degrees no less than three years, but no more than ten years prior to the time of the application. Each one-year award carries an $18,000 stipend plus an additional $2,000 for research-related travel.
Last year, the foundation received over 300 inquiries about the program; the five successful candidates were selected from the thirty-four applicants who qualified for the 1984 competition. Those selected were David L. Clawson, University of New Orleans, "Agricultural Change and Stagnation in the Papaloapan River Basin, Mexico: A Reconciliation of Traditional Self-Reliant Strategies and Green Revolution Development;" Florence Elizabeth Mallon, University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Peasants and the National Question in Peru and Mexico, 1850-1900;" John Frederick Schwallier, Florida Atlantic University, "The Life and Times of Don Luis de Velasco, The Younger;" Richard W. Slatta, North Carolina State University, "Horsemens North and South: A Comparative History of Ranch Hands in the Americas;" and Steve J. Stern, University of Wisconsin-Madison, "Woman, Man, and Crime in Mexican Society, 1720-1850."

BUENOS AIRES AND RIO DE JANEIRO—CHRISTMAS 1984

From December 22 to January 5, there will be a study/travel group going to Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, plus two days at Iguazu Falls. Participants may receive 2 units of upper division academic credit. The cost is $1,575, which includes round trip airfare from Los Angeles, all hotels, and some meals. For more information, contact Prof. Merrill Antrim, 6247 Caminito Luisito, San Diego, CA 92111; (619) 565-7249.

COMING CONFERENCES

Centro Las Casas Meeting Scheduled

The Centro Las Casas is organizing a meeting for August 14-17, 1984, in Cuzco, Peru, on El estado y las regiones en los Andes, with the participation, among others, of Pablo Macera (Lima), Alberto Flores Galindo (Lima), Manuel Burga (Lima), José Blanes (La Paz, Bolivia), Xavier Albó (La Paz), Silvia Rivera (La Paz), Manuel Chiriboga (Quito, Ecuador), Danielle Demelas (Paris), and Jean-Paul Deller (Paris). Further information may be obtained from Centro Las Casas, Coloquio Estado y Regiones en los Andes, Apartado 477, Cuzco, PERU.

New Perspectives on Caribbean Studies

The Research Institute for the Study of Man, in cooperation with the City University of New York, is holding an international, multidisciplinary conference at Hunter College, New York City, August 28 to September 1, 1984. Prominent Caribbeanist scholars and policymakers from Caribbean Basin countries and North America will participate in the following sessions: Plantation Society and the Contemporary Caribbean; Stratification, Pluralism, and Sociopolitical Dynamics; Theoretical and Applied Issues in Social Organization; Nationalism, Independence, and Creative Florence; Political Economy and Sociopolitical Change; Public Health Indices of Development; Agriculture, Industry, and New Technologies; Political Economy of Caribbean Basin Integration; Caribbean Basin: Crisis, Reaction, and Response.

For further information, contact Research Institute for the Study of Man, 162 East 78th Street, New York, NY 10021.

Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers

From September 27 to 29, 1984, the Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers (CLAG) will hold its annual meeting at the University of Ottawa, Canada. The program includes panels on "Geopolitics in Central America and the Caribbean," "Amazon Development," "The Urban Informal Sector," "Rural Development," "Geographical Training and Dissemination," and "Energy Resource Development."

For further information contact Dr. Rolf Wesche, Department of Geography, University of Ottawa, 165 Waller Street, Ottawa Ontario KIN 6N5; (613) 231-2411, 231-2395, or 236-3307.

I Conferencia General de Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina

The I Conferencia General de Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina will be held in Mexico City October 10 to 13, 1984, with round tables in the mornings and seminars or workshops scheduled for the afternoons. Topics to be included are "Problemas y metodología de historia de la iglesia en América Latina;" "Historia latinoamericana de la iglesia;" "Historia reciente de la iglesia en América Latina;" "Historia de la iglesia, religiosidad y movimientos populares;" "Historia de las órdenes y congregaciones religiosas en América Latina;" "Historia del arte cristiano en América Latina;" "Álbum histórico-ecclesiástico y archivos de la historia de la iglesia en América Latina;" "Historia de la teología en América Latina;" "Expresión popular de historia de la iglesia en América Latina;" "Historia del Protestantismo en América Latina."

For further information, contact Comité Organizador, I Conferencia General de Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina, Apartado 11-673, 06100 México, D.F., MEXICO.

Annual Meeting of African Studies Association

The Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association will convene at the Los Angeles Hilton Hotel, in Los Angeles, California, October 25 to 28, 1984. Further information about the meeting and its program may be obtained from Dr. Carol B. Thompson, Department of Political Science, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0044.

Conference on Theory of Parody

An international conference on the "Theory of Parody" will be held at the Centre Culturel International de Ceresy-la-Salle, France, from July 27 to August 3, 1985. For information, contact Dr. Clive Thomson, Department of French Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada K7L 3N6.

INSTITUTIONAL NEWS

The University of California, San Diego announces the appointment of Prof. Paul W. Drake to the Institute of the Americas Chair in Inter-American Affairs, effective July 1, 1984. Prof. Drake, a historian who has directed the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at the University of Illinois since 1979, is the first holder of the Institute of the Americas Chair, established in 1983 through a gift from the
Gildred Foundation of San Diego. At UC-San Diego, Prof. Drake will be based in the Department of Political Science. He will be responsible for establishing a new, interdisciplinary Center for Latin American Studies at UCSD, which will cover all of contemporary Latin America and the Caribbean except Mexico. UCSD’s programs on Mexico and U.S.-Mexican relations will continue to be conducted by its Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies. At UCSD, comparative studies of Latin American development problems and strategies will be conducted jointly by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, the new center to be established by Prof. Drake, and the Institute of the Americas, headed by Dr. Joseph Grunwald.

The Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego has received new grants totalling more than $1 million for research, publications, and public service activities during the 1984-1987 period. The grants were awarded by the Ford, William and Flora Hewlett, Rockefeller, and Cowell foundations. The center, which opened in 1980, will utilize major portions of the new funding for six research and public education projects dealing with “Mexico-U.S. Development Strategies in a Competitive World,” “Development Strategies and Financial Institutions in Comparative Perspective: The Latin American and Asian Experiences,” “Urban and Rural Labor Markets in the U.S. and Mexico,” “Labor and Capital Mobility across the U.S.-Mexico Border,” “Labor Organization in Mexico and the United States,” “Immigrants’ Rights, Access to Basic Human Services, and Socio-Cultural Integration.”

Anthologies of papers and other publications resulting from numerous conferences and research workshops are being prepared for publication by the center. The first of these volumes, *Religión y política en México*, edited by Martín de la Rosa and Charles A. Reilly, will be published later this year by Siglo Veintiuno Editores. The center conducted 34 meetings of its interdisciplinary Research Seminar on Mexico and U.S.-Mexican Relations during the past year, featuring presentations of new research by its visiting research fellows and other guest speakers from throughout the United States and Mexico.

For further information on the center or its programs, contact Dr. Donald L. Wyman, public affairs director, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (Q-057), University of California-San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA.

Addendum to Spring LASA Forum

Prof. Jan L. Flora, author of “Human Rights in El Salvador and Nicaragua,” which appeared in the last issue of the *LSA Forum*, wrote the article in his capacity as a member of the LASA Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom.

Clarification of Minutes

In the Winter issue of the *LSA Forum*, Robert H. Trudeau is listed in the minutes of the Mexico City LASA Congress as having introduced several resolutions for consideration during the business meeting. Prof. Trudeau has asked that the following clarification be printed concerning the information presented in that article.

“I am listed in these minutes as having introduced several resolutions for consideration during the business meeting. This is technically correct, since LASA procedures require that resolutions be submitted in advance to the Task Force on Academic Freedom and Human Rights and that a member of that task force submit them to the business meeting. The minutes would be more accurate if they included the names of the original sponsors of the resolutions, who are the individuals who should receive the credit for giving the membership the opportunity to express their views on these issues. With the exception of the resolution concerning Guatemala, I was not involved in the authorship of any of the resolutions, but only in their transportation through the procedures.

Second, Professor Marianne Schmink of the University of Florida shared fully in the task force’s role in receiving and preparing the many resolutions. She was unable to present any of the resolutions to the membership during the business meeting and as a result, the minutes do not record nor acknowledge her contribution. Hopefully, this communication will correct that.”

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

The publications program of the Center for Inter-American and Border Studies at the University of Texas at El Paso has a varied publications list of working papers, border perspectives, monographs, special reports, and occasional papers. Recent working papers include “Education on the Mexican Railways,” “Nonpartisanship in El Paso: Discrimination against Border Hispanics,” “Seeking the Cause of Failure in English among Minorities,” and “The Economy of Mexico: 1984 and Beyond.”

Further information on the publications may be obtained from *Publications Program, Center for Inter-American and Border Studies, University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968-0605*.

SALALM, the Seminar on the Acquisition of Latin American Library Materials, announces the publication of *A Bibliography of Latin American Bibliographies* (Annual Report, 1982-1983), compiled by Lionel V. Lorona. This is number 10 in the SALALM Bibliography and Reference Series, and updates the Groppe Bibliography of Latin American Bibliographers and its supplements. Copies may be ordered from the SALALM Secretariat, Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. Cost is US$8 plus US$2 for postage and handling. Prepayment is requested.

Altamira Libros of Santiago, Chile, has announced that it will be offering Chilean publications for sale in the United States. Catalogues of book and journal titles may be obtained from Soledad Marchant S., manager, Altamira Libros, Huérfanos 669, Local 11, Galería de la Mereed, Santiago, CHILE.

The Central America Resource Center has announced the publication of the Spring 1984 edition of its *Directory of Central America Organizations*. The directory is a comprehensive
REVOLUTIONARY NICARAGUA: A CHECKLIST OF TITLES
Compiled by Gene Wiemers, Lionel Loroña, and Paula Corington

The authors of this bibliography were part of a group of librarians from U.S. research libraries who spent a week in Nicaragua in June 1983 on a working seminar on Nicaraguan librarianship organized under the Nicaraguan National Bibliography Project, with the cooperation of the Dirección General de Bibliotecas y Archivos, Ministry of Culture, and the Red de Bibliotecarios Universitarios de Nicaragua.

The seminar provided a first-hand look at the development of libraries in the revolutionary setting, and also provided an opportunity to select and acquire a number of recent Nicaraguan imprints that had been difficult to acquire through ordinary channels.

The following list represents the combined acquisitions of the New York Public Library, Vanderbilt University Library, and University of Minnesota Libraries-Twin Cities resulting from this trip. It is not an exhaustive list of publications that have appeared since the fall of Somoza, but it represents a reasonably complete picture of the publications of research interest that were available in Nicaragua at the time of the trip. The list reflects current trends in Nicaraguan publishing, including the intense interest in Nicaraguan literature and bibliography; extensive publishing in statistics, demography, agriculture, and politics; and the beginnings of serious analysis of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua.

The list has been checked for other holding libraries in the RLIN library cataloging database of the Research Libraries Group, with additional locations noted. Library locations are noted in standard abbreviations. The more common holding libraries include Yale (CtY), Stanford (CSt), the Bancroft Library at Berkeley (CU-BANC), Cornell (NIC), Library of Congress (DLC), Princeton (NJp), and Brigham Young (UPB), in addition to New York Public (NN), Minnesota (MNu), and Vanderbilt (TNJ). Scholars interested in using these materials should obtain them through regular interlibrary loan channels, since the lending policies of holding libraries may vary.

Microfilms of some of the materials listed here have been prepared by the Latin American Collection, Princeton University Library. These include:
Collection of pamphlets on election law, elections, and voting in Nicaragua, 1923-1930. Film M: 04690. 1 reel.
Complete information on these and other Latin American microfilms from Princeton may be obtained from Latin American Collection, Princeton University Library, P. O. Box 190, Princeton, NJ 08544.

This list is limited to Nicaraguan imprints acquired, although the trip provided opportunity to acquire Cuban, Soviet, and other Central American imprints as well.

BOOKS


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