Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua: 
A Report of the LASA Task Force on Human Rights 
and Academic Freedom 

(Part 1 of a 2-Part Report)

by 
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I. Introduction

The remote and relatively quiet, sparsely populated Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua was suddenly drawn into world attention in December 1981, when the Nicaraguan government moved thousands of indigenous people, mainly Miskitos, from their villages on the Río Coco, the border with Honduras. At that time, many Indians fled to refugee camps in Honduras. Some joined guerrilla groups that then returned to fight in Nicaragua. This forced relocation was followed by charges from the U.S. government and others of massive human rights violations, even genocide. Subsequent studies by impartial human rights groups—the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Americas Watch—have shown that the more extreme claims were exaggerations, although serious human rights abuses did occur. These organizations criticized the Sandinistas and made a series of recommendations, most of which have now been implemented. The Nicaraguan government responded that the abusers were usually punished, were not part of a general policy or pattern, and, while the resettlements inflicted hardship on the population, they were done in response to a perceived threat to national integrity.

The resettlement marked a radical escalation of a conflict that had been brewing in the region. This conflict grew into a three-year period of warfare between the Sandinista government and two indigenous groups, MISURA and MISURASATA. From time to time, both received support from the U.S. government’s "covert" war on Nicaragua.

In late 1984, some movement began toward a settlement of this conflict that led to a set of negotiations between MISURASATA and the government. At the outset of these negotiations, in December 1984, the government named a national autonomy commission for the Atlantic Coast. Later, in May 1985, partly as a product of the negotiations, steps were taken to negotiate and maintain a cease fire with Indian insurgents. During this period of relative peace, the government also began a process to assist a return to the Río Coco for those people who had been relocated from there earlier.

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state sovereignty are principles recognized by other states. The rights of subnational ethnic groups, be they tribal or otherwise, must now be negotiated in this asymmetric atmosphere.

In the second half of the twentieth century, indigenous and ethnic groups have begun to voice their responses to these historical injustices. Regional, national, and international groups have formed and there is now greater awareness of the condition of the Indians of the Americas. Where indigenous and ethnic groups have formed organizations to defend their interests, some legal guarantees have been obtained. In many cases, though, legal guarantees have proved untrustworthy, as in the case of the many broken treaties with Indians in the U.S. Often the legislative solution to indigenous problems simply seals the fate of a group already severely persecuted, such as the Mapuches of Chile. Sometimes, indigenous groups achieve de facto autonomy because of their remoteness from the central government and their determination to defend themselves, as in the case of the Kuna of Panama. But the usual state of affairs is one in which the state has the upper hand and shows no sign of relinquishing its advantage.

A question for indigenous peoples that is of particular relevance to the autonomy process in Nicaragua is self-determination. While there is no universally accepted definition of autonomy or self-determination, the demand for autonomy and the debates that accompany it usually signal a moment of tension between the state and the ethnic groups. It has erupted in many multi-ethnic nations and the results hardly ever benefit indigenous peoples.

This issue has come to the fore among international indigenous-rights organizations. The World Council of Indigenous People (WCOIP), a nongovernmental organization with U.N. affiliation, asserts the strongest claim of indigenous rights. It states that "every indigenous people has the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they may freely determine their political, economic, social, religious, and cultural development according to the principles established in this declaration." This right means that "each nation-state within which indigenous peoples are located must recognize the population, territory, and the institutions proper to each people." More specifically, the WCOIP claims for indigenous people "inalienable rights to traditional lands and to natural resources." The rights listed above reflect recent Indian activism and organization. However, these principles are not yet formally recognized by governments. For the WCOIP the desired status for groups such as the Atlantic Coast indigenous people is that of "nation." This term, preferred by MISURASATA, the original representative group, is defined by the WCOIP and includes the "capacity to initiate relations with other states."\(^1\)

In this report, autonomy refers to a specific, legal relationship with the Nicaraguan government, beyond ordinary citizenship, that recognizes the unique characteristics of the Miskito, Sumo, Rama, Creole, Garifona, and Mestizo populations of the Atlantic Coast. In the Nicaraguan case, the most serious autonomy problems have arisen over economic and political rights, specifically claims concerning land and local natural resources, and political power, that is, the right to unique types of representation in governing bodies with clearly defined powers and jurisdiction. Over time a general agreement has emerged concerning the "cultural" issues, i.e., respect for traditions, use of indigenous languages, and religious practice.

This historic, regional conflict must be viewed in the context of revolutionary changes in all of Nicaragua, as well as the resistance, both internal and external, to these changes. So, when MISURASATA raised these economic, political, and cultural challenges, framed as questions of "nationhood" and "sovereignty," the Nicaraguan government saw them as separatist in nature. Although all participants in the dialogue have also said that autonomy could be accomplished while recognizing the sovereignty of the Sandinista state, the fundamental tension remains.

Exacerbating this tension is the constant pressure from U.S.-financed contra insurgents, and a threat of external invasion. The role of the United States, and its geo-political perspective on the area, must figure in any analysis of events.

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The Study Team

Research was conducted in August 1985 by three members of the LASA Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom and one invited member. The Task Force members are Martin Diskin, anthropologist from M.I.T. (chairman), Thomas Bossert, Political Science, Sarah Lawrence College, and Stefano Varese, anthropologist, director of Popular Culture Agency of the Secretary of Public Education, Oaxaca, Mexico. We were joined by Salomón Nahmad, anthropologist, and former director of the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (Mexican Indian Institute). Diskin's expenses were covered by a grant from the M.I.T. Provost's Research Fund, Bossert received a Ford Foundation individual research grant, and Varese and Nahmad both were funded by CADAL (Centro Antropológico de Documentación de América Latina, Mexico City). A follow-up trip was made by Diskin in January 1986.

In Nicaragua, we were generously assisted by Laura Enríquez a member of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua, who has resided in Nicaragua for the past two and a half years. Two of us (Diskin and Bossert) had previously visited the Atlantic Coast and had been following events there and in Nicaragua in general. Diskin and Bossert had contacts who facilitated access to documents and interviews. Varese and Nahmad represented a wealth of study and practical experience in situations in Peru and Mexico concerning indigenous people and the state.

In Nicaragua, our work was facilitated by the Centro de Investigación y Documentación de la Costa Atlántica (CIDCA), a semi-autonomous government agency. Its director, Galio Gurdian, kindly assisted our access to documents and people connected to the autonomy process. We made our own arrangements, utilized our own contacts, and paid for all our transportation and other expenses. Only considerations of timing and schedules constrained our travel and interviews. We feel confident that we were able to observe an adequate variety of situations and speak to people with a wide diversity of views.

The group visited Managua and the two major regions of the Atlantic Coast: Zelaya Norte (and surrounding communities), where most Miskito and Sumo communities are; and Zelaya Sur (Bluefields), the major concentration of the Creole community [see map]. We interviewed a wide range of participants in the autonomy process: civilian and military government representatives; independent Miskito, Sumo, and Creole leaders, Moravian church officials; and many community members. We also conducted interviews with members of organizations openly in conflict with the Sandinista government (MISURASATA and ASLA) and with some of their North American advisors at the Indian Law Resource Center in Washington and at Cultural Survival in Cambridge, Massachusetts. To assess the official United States view of this matter, we interviewed a political officer at the U.S. embassy in Managua (see appended list of interviewees).

The report that follows first presents a brief history of the complex nature of ethnic-state relations on the Atlantic Coast, highlighting the roles of the Nicaraguan state and foreign actors as well as the internal distinctiveness of the different indigenous and ethnic groups (Section II). Section III discusses the impact of the revolution and the events leading to the relocation of the indigenous population to resettlement camps. In Section IV we review the emergence of the insurgency and the changes in Nicaraguan government policies. Section V deals with the Nicaraguan autonomy proposal and the beginning of negotiations with opponents of the government as a reply to the specific conflicts of the previous five years. In the two following sections we examine first (section VI) the internal process, i.e., the autonomy consulta, noncombatant indigenous groups, and the current military situation. Then, in section VII we discuss the "return to the river," including some observations in "snapshot" form from our trip through Zelaya Norte. Zelaya Sur is discussed in section VIII. In the concluding section (IX), we offer an evaluation of the present moment and some guidelines for the future.

II. A Brief History of the Atlantic Coast

The Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, separated from the Pacific side of the country by significant geographic barriers, has been shaped by its own special cultural, economic, and political forces. Constituting more than half the national territory, with only about 10 percent of the national population, the coast is a place of cultural diversity that has looked toward the Caribbean and the English-speaking world more than toward the national seat of government and the Hispanic heritage of the Pacific side. Relations between these two Nicaraguas have always suffered from a lack of mutual comprehension. A brief examination of this history will help show its distinctiveness as well as the origin of some of the present problems.

Much of the history of the Atlantic Coast may be seen as an effort, first by competing colonial powers, then by foreign commercial interests, and, finally, by the Nicaraguan state, to exercise control over the people who live there. Usually, these efforts were unsuccessful. Before the Spanish Conquest, the Pacific side of Nicaragua was the southern frontier of Mesoamerica, a region of powerful civilizations that extended from Central Mexico to Nicaragua. These civilizations, organized into states, were eventually conquered by the Spanish through a combination of military and political means, often aided by the combined effects of extreme cruelty and the introduction of new diseases. Once the indigenous leadership was removed, the Spanish administration could capitalize on the still existing state structures. These structures were then used to channel tributes and labor to Spanish rather than
indigenous purposes.

The Atlantic Coast, a region extending from contemporary Belize to Panama, was a very different physical and cultural environment from that of the Pacific part of the region and presented different problems to the Spanish conquerors. Reflecting influences from Caribbean and Andean culture, its population lived in a more dispersed fashion. Using the resources of the humid tropical forests, the river banks, and the maritime resources of the coastal littoral, the population lived by farming, fishing, and hunting. Unlike the hierarchical societies of Mesoamerica, their political organization never reached the level of large states or chiefdoms and most of the residents were not subject to any form of indigenous central control. Further, the hot, rainy climate and the virtual impenetrability of the region overland proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the Spanish method of dominating the highland communities of Mesoamerica. As a result, the Spanish conquerors had no real interest in assimilating this region into their imperial plan.

It was because of emergent British expansionism in the Caribbean that the Atlantic Coast acquired strategic importance. During the long period from the early seventeenth through the late nineteenth centuries, patterns were created that persist to the present. British buccaneers, raiding the Caribbean coasts of the Spanish Main, directly challenged Spanish hegemony, and the Atlantic Coast became a boundary zone between the British sphere of influence in the Caribbean, with Jamaica as its seat, and the Spanish interests, whose centers were in Guatemala City and Mexico City. The British, however, like the Spanish, were not interested in colonizing the Atlantic Coast so much as establishing a presence there through coastal trading contacts.

The first people the British met were the Miskitos, who lived mainly on the coastal littoral and who were adept in maritime activities. Quickly, a mutually convenient relationship was established. British privateers could count on refitting and provisioning themselves with fresh water, meat, fruit, and crews. In exchange, they provided the Miskitos with muskets and other trade goods. Thus, the British were able to extend their effective maritime control in the Caribbean while the Miskitos began to dominate the other groups in the area, principally the Sumos.

What is now the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua was largely the home territory of the Sumo people at the moment of European contact. But the alliance with the British permitted the Miskitos (then called Sambo-Miskitu) to expand at the expense of the Sumos. The Miskitos became the brokers in the commerce of Sumo slaves. Through their superior force of arms, they also became the military conquerors of their neighbors in the region.

In the seventeenth century escaped and shipwrecked African slaves freely intermixed with the indigenous inhabitants of the coast. Through subsequent migration from English-speaking islands, the group now known as Creoles achieved significance, particularly in the southern part of the coast, in and around Bluefields, which became the administrative center of the coast.

Spanish-British commercial competition created other changes. Materials from the region, such as precious woods for shipbuilding and dyestuffs, were acquiring foreign demand. The local populations slowly began to reorient their productive activities in response to this demand. Culturally, the region experienced influences different from the Spanish-dominated zone. Initially, at least, Catholicism did not penetrate to any significant degree. Nor was the Spanish language implanted as it was in the rest of Mesoamerica. Spanish patterns of rural administration with its attendant bureaucracy never developed either. The Atlantic Coast remained a frontier region through most of its history.

In the nineteenth century, external influences continued to shape the region. Since the 1840s, when the first German-speaking Moravian missionaries entered, the Moravian church, a small Protestant sect, quickly became the most significant religion on the coast. The Moravian presence created changes in patterns of dress and community organization. Moravian schools and seminaries were established to create and train an indigenous Moravian clergy composed of Miskitos and Creoles. As a result, today virtually every Miskito village has its resident pastor. The Moravian Church has few levels of hierarchy and functions in a rather decentralized way. It supports village unity and stresses family integrity, hard work, and self-reliance. Moravian services often take on the aspect of community assemblies where public problems are aired. While the Moravian Church established an early and continuing dominance, the Catholic and Anglican churches have also become important institutions.

Spanish-British commercial and military competition was generally harmful to the people of the Coast. First, since the primary goal of each was to extend its overseas empire rather than to colonize, there was never a concern for the welfare of the indigenous population. Second, it set up a tension for the coastal populations that pitted them


against the Pacific-based "Spaniards" that has left a legacy of suspicion and lack of understanding that continues to fuel the present problem.

In the early nineteenth century, an American presence arrived on the scene. Expanding United States interests looked toward Central America as a fertile area for investment. The period after independence from Spain was chaotic with weak, short-lived governments, and failed efforts at national consolidation. The expanding industrial capacity of the United States, fueled by notions of U.S. power embedded in the Monroe Doctrine and the idea of "manifest destiny," made this the epoch of a series of flamboyant actions that established the United States as the dominant economic power in Central America. Soon a wave of adventurers and investors discovered that what could not be accomplished through outright bribery and force and their own mercenary forces would in time be supported by the economic and military power of the United States, eventually punctuated by the frequent invasions of the Marines.

As U.S. influence grew in the region, the British prepared their withdrawal with a series of treaties and agreements. The 1860 Treaty of Managua granted Nicaragua sovereignty over all its territory, including the Atlantic Coast. It also recognized the Rey Mosco, a Miskito monarch created by the British, and stated that he was to be under the sovereignty of Nicaragua. In 1894, the "reincorporation" of the Mosquitia (the Atlantic Coast) was finally completed. At this time the Atlantic Coast became a department (state) of Nicaragua, called Zelaya, after the liberal president of the time. In 1905 the British relinquished their last claims to the Coast with the Harrison-Altamirano Treaty. This treaty abrogated the provisions concerning recognition of the Miskito monarchy and granted certain concessions on behalf of the Miskito people such as respect for Indian land titles, special tax exemptions, and grazing rights.4

These diplomatic arrangements, over a sixty-year period, gave priority to the international competition for influence rather than the well-being of the coastal people. For example, at about 1850 a particularly thorny question was the Anglo-United States competition for a trans-Isthmian route between the Caribbean and the Pacific. In this context tension of the issues of Nicaraguan and Miskito relations emerged. As Nicaragua was acquiring recognition of its territorial sovereignty, the British affirmed the independence of the Mosquitia and its king as a way of denying rights to the competing interests of the United States. Significantly (in view of the present conflicts), the U.S. State Department, in 1895, challenged the British view.

It will be observed that from the beginning of the conflicts, which at times were serious, this Government [the U.S.] has steadily recognized the paramount sovereignty of Nicaragua over the entire reservation [Atlantic Coast], yielding to no pretensions inconsistent with that sovereignty. . . . At no time during the last forty or fifty years has the so-called native Indian government in the strip been real. On the contrary, it has been an alien government administered according to alien methods. Although Americans and American interests have for some time predominated in the strip, this government, while intervening in proper cases for their protection, has consistently disavowed any right of its own or of its citizens to govern or participate in its political affairs. Whatever right of self-government the Indians enjoyed under the treaty concluded between Great Britain and Nicaragua was to be exercised by themselves and not by aliens in their name. That treaty contemplated the eventual surrender by the Indians of their right to govern themselves and other inhabitants of the strip, and their 'incorporation into the Republic of Nicaragua on the same footing as other citizens of the Republic.'

Concerning coastal self-determination, in 1856 the U.S. had the following opinion:

The President can not himself admit as true, and therefore, cannot under any possible circumstances, advise the Republic of Nicaragua to admit that the Mosquito Indians are a state or a government any more than a band of Maroons in the island of Jamaica are a state or government.5

The period of United States domination began somewhat before the departure of the English and continued until shortly before the 1979 Sandinista triumph. British commercial interests were still represented as were those of Europeans and Japanese. Atlantic Coast production responded to foreign demand. The Bragman's Bluff Lumber Company cut and exported mahogany. The tropical pine forests were denuded, clear-cut for their resin by the Nicaraguan Long Leaf Pine Lumber Company (NIPCO) and the Atlantic Chemical Company (ATCHEMCO) among others. Clear-cutting of the tropical pine forests was the rule and these forests were not replaced by replanting. Pine resin extraction continues

5. The first two quotes are from the Report of the Secretary of State (W.Q. Gresham) to President Grover Cleveland, January 2, 1895, p. 3. In Senate Executive Documents, 3rd session, 53rd Congress, 1894-95, Vol. 1, Executive Document #20. The third quote is from Secretary of State W. L. Marcy's report on the Bay Islands and Mosquito Territory, Senate Executive Document #74, 58th Congress, 2nd session, July 26, 1856. We gratefully acknowledge Dr. Philippe Bourgeois for the above references.
today and a modest reforestation program is being implemented to ensure the continuation of this industry.

The Neptune Gold Mine Company and the Rosario and Light Mine Company extracted gold and silver to be refined elsewhere. United Fruit cultivated bananas until a plant disease made production unprofitable. And in a particularly poignant episode, the ocean turtles that the Miskito were so skilled in obtaining became increasingly destined to satisfy a European demand for turtle oil and shell. The Green and Hawksbill turtles are now almost extinct as a result. Further, as the Miskito fishermen became more deeply embroiled in cash production, their diet suffered.6

As in previous waves of foreign economic attention, the wealth provided by the region left no lasting traces in infrastructure or welfare. The technology, management, and knowledge were all imported and the profits exported. Along with the memories of the company commissaries where Scotch whiskey could be bought, lie the rusted hulks of heavy machinery manufactured in Ohio and Pennsylvania. What did last, however, was the orientation toward markets in the U.S. rather than with the other coast of Nicaragua.

The central government permitted this long period of resource exploitation for several reasons. During this time, Nicaraguan sovereignty was systematically challenged by United States force all over the country. Numerous invasions and occupations by U.S. Marines led, in 1932, to the installation of the Somoza dynasty, which lasted until 1979. Indeed, the thin pretexts that were used to justify U.S. invasions served to legitimize U.S. interests on the coast and in other parts of the country. The Somoza regime was "underwriting" of U.S. interests on the Atlantic Coast so long as there was no direct economic conflict with the several family businesses that included the fishing fleet of Bluefields.

The question of the autonomy of the Miskito or other ethnic groups was moot during this time. Many people on the coast remember it as a time of noninterference; some even view it as the "golden age" in which foreign companies brought luxury goods for those who had access to friends in management or to the commissaries. It was certainly not a golden age for the miners, however, many of whom were Indians who worked under abominable conditions until disease or accidental death ended their careers. Nor was it so for the banana workers who were left unemployed with the sudden termination of banana production. For many Miskitos in their Río Coco subsistence communities, the presence of commercial lumbering operations nearby meant sporadic though growing participation in a wage economy that undermined self-sufficiency.7 It was accompanied by the developing

system of merchant intermediaries whereby people had to sell their crops cheaply and buy necessities at high cost.

Increased commercial opportunity during the two decades prior to the Sandinista victory attracted more "Españoles" to the coast and with them an enlarged presence of the National Guard, especially in the vicinity of the mines. This migration of mestizos, i.e., non-Indian, Spanish-speaking peasants, was the result of the expansion of cotton and cattle production on the Pacific side, which drove many peasants off their land.

For the Creole population of southern Zelaya (Bluefields) there was a considerable amount of freedom to trade freely beyond the national limits. With a fishing industry that sold to Honduras, Costa Rica, Colombia, and the United States directly, usually for dollars, Bluefields was in effect a free port. Much of the population there had international experience through migrant relatives, many in the United States, or through work as seamen. The inshore low-technology fishermen as well as the offshore lobstermen could find international markets with little or no regulation.

On the Atlantic Coast during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s this sporadic economic development occurred in the absence of state attention. The Atlantic Coast was more isolated from the more brutal aspects of the Somoza regime, but it was part of an international commercial system that continued its status as an enclave economy, subject to a boom and bust cycle. The splendid isolation of the Atlantic Coast was an example of malign neglect, especially during the long "bust" period since the 1950s. Its isolation made it an ideal place from which to launch troops for the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.

Even under Somoza, though, some movement toward indigenous organization was allowed. During the 1970s an indigenous organization, ALPROMISU, was created to represent the Miskito and Sumo people. A small organization based in a few towns, ALPROMISU had a modest potential to raise largely economic and social demands. In the Somocista environment it could hardly engage in more energetic lobbying. It did make it clear, though, that the people of the Atlantic Coast felt they could make legitimate claims on the Nicaraguan state. Issues such as schooling, health, and economic demands were on the agenda.

Up to the time of the Sandinista Revolution, the coast had remained relatively isolated from the rest of national territory. The influences that penetrated the region were generally exploitative business enterprises that created little domestic economic structure and were permitted to operate virtually at their own discretion. Politically, the coast depended on Managua but economically its fate was determined outside of the country. When the Sandinistas came to power in July, 1979, however, it quickly became


7. Ibid.; Helms, Asang.
clear that coastal people had many aspirations and plans for their region and were waiting for the opportune moment to voice them.

III. Revolution Comes to the Atlantic Coast

On the Pacific side of Nicaragua, the Sandinista triumph brought a general wave of optimism along with the notion that revolution meant turning the social system of privilege on its head. Under the new "logic of the majority," benefits were to go to the most dispossessed groups first. The rural poor of the Pacific side were obvious recipients of this revolutionary logic. Compensation for past exploitation meant that the Sandinista state would channel resources such as land, health services, literacy, and education to those who had never had them. The notion that spreading Sandinismo to the entire nation was an absolute good seemed obvious to the broad base of supporters of the Sandinista government.

The coastal population, with its long history of social and economic distance from the Nicaraguan state, did not embrace this new logic. The insurrection that toppled Somoza, so costly in human terms on the Pacific side, was not felt the same way on the coast. There has been no major fighting on the coast and few of the revolutionary organizations had established any presence there prior to the 1979 triumph. Coastal natives who joined the insurrection fought on the Pacific Coast. The lack of an insurrectionary experience meant that the emerging Sandinista state had not established the support and confidence of the people in the region.8

To overcome the historic and insurrectionary isolation of the coast, the Sandinista government dedicated itself to "incorporate" the coast into the new national development process. One of the top commanders of the FSLN (Sandinist Front for National Liberation), William Ramírez, himself a coastal native, took charge of this process. This effort was intended both to overcome the perceived neglect of the Somoza era as well as to build a base of support for the revolution in an area that had not experienced the insurrection.

In November 1979, in an effort to initiate this new policy, FSLN leader Daniel Ortega attended a meeting in Puerto Cabezas, the principal community of northern Zelaya. At that meeting it became clear that, while some government presence was welcome, the Miskito leadership of ALPROMISU was not willing to become assimilated into the emerging Sandinista mass organizations such as the ATC (Farm Workers Association). Instead, they asked for their own indigenous organization to represent the people of the coast. On the spot, MISURASATA (Miskito, Sumo, Rama, Sandinista, Working Together) was formed. MISURASATA was declared a "mass organization" of similar status to the ATC and given representation on the Council of State, at the time a deliberative, but not the sole legislative, national body.

While three indigenous groups were mentioned in the name of the organization, the leadership continued to be overwhelmingly Miskito. In northern Zelaya the Miskitos were clearly the most politically sophisticated and energetic in defense of community interests. The Sumo, Rama, and Garifona communities were quite small with about 8,000, 800, and 1,500 people, respectively, and had few politically experienced leaders. Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, Hazel Lau, all Miskitos, were the emergent leaders of MISURATA. They were simultaneously active in the literacy crusade. Indeed, it was one of their political goals that the literacy instruction be done in Miskito and English as well as Spanish. Many of the present activists, pro- or anti-government, began as members of MISURASATA and literacy workers.

The Creoles of Bluefields had community goals that were somewhat different than those of the indigenous communities and never became a significant voice in MISURASATA, choosing instead to pursue their interests in other forms. In addition, there was no organized group that represented the large and growing mestizo community. They lived scattered throughout the region as small farmers, miners, merchants, and bureaucrats and represent 65 percent (172,046) of the coastal population.9

With Miskito dominance of the mass organization, it is no wonder that the impression gained by most outside observers was that the Miskitos were the only important group in the region. But, while speaking on behalf of all coastal people, the Miskito could not represent all the divergent ethnic interests of the coast. The Sandinistas, burdened as they were with their Pacific-oriented view, had difficulty understanding this multiethnic panorama. Nor did they really appreciate the basic historical coastal agenda composed of demands for land rights and cultural considerations.

The Sandinistas seemed of two minds concerning the coastal situation. On the one hand, there was a certain suspicion and resentment because of low coastal participation in the anti-Somoza insurrection. Some feared that the absence of an insurrection of the Atlantic Coast meant the population was open to counter-revolutionary sentiment. On the other hand, there was almost missionary fervor in the commitment that the Sandinista policies of revolutionary reorganization would generate agreement even without the insurrectionary experience. This was coupled


with a willingness to serve the coastal population but with
the Sandinista tools developed for the Pacific "majorities." The
first of these efforts was the National Literacy Crusade.

In 1980, when the literacy campaign got under way on the
coast, MISURASATA insisted that it be done in Miskito and English. Although it also represented the Sumo and Rama people, MISURASATA made no major
effort to include these languages in the campaign. The Literacy Crusade provided a context of heightened
communication between the newly emerged indigenous
leadership and the communities, resulting in
MISURASATA's quickly acquiring strength. Indigenous
demands were formed and pressed on the new government.
Among these demands were road construction (especially
the completion of an all-weather road between Managua
and Puerto Cabezas), health centers, basic grain storage
centers, agricultural assistance in the development of crops
suitable for the zone such as cacao, the continuation of the
literacy campaign in native language, and bilingual
education for children. These demands were similar to
those of the mass organizations of the Pacific side and were
consistent with Sandinista development goals and policy for
the whole nation.

The government formed a new agency, INNICA, to
respond to and coordinate the heightened level of
communication with the coast. Its major leaders were
Sandinistas from the Pacific side, and there were offices in
Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields. In 1982, CIDCA (Centro
de Investigación y Documentación de la Costa Atlántica)
was created to engage in research on the coast and to
generate the information necessary to help the government
make decisions.

MISURASATA pressed for special treatment based on
an emerging sense of indigenous rights. The most
prominent and problematic of these rights was the
recognition of indigenous land ownership. This demand—
often expressed in terms of "self-determination," "sovereignty," and "nationhood"—seemed to challenge
the programs and objectives of the Sandinista government.
Against a background of the growing CIA-supported contra
forces just across the border in Honduras, the government
worried that MISURASATA could become the vehicle for
a separatist movement, or worse, the base for
antigovernment insurgency.

The Land Issue

Up to 1979, most of the indigenous coastal people had
exercised de facto control over the lands they used for
subsistence activities. Ocean and riverine resources were
freely used by all and forest products were generally used
as needed for house and canoe construction. Access to
forests, however, was limited periodically, first by the
foreign lumber companies and later by Somoza's forestry
agency. Subsistence agriculture involved an alternation
between cultivation and fallow cycles. Any community
member could have the use of any unused plot. A plot was
considered used even if it was not under cultivation at the
time; that is, the cultivator could maintain the right to use
the land after its fallow period ended. Land was not titled
in the conventional sense but was available to any
community member. The low population density and the
abundance of land meant little conflict over land rights
among community members or between communities.
Even with a steady migration of mestizo peasants toward
the Atlantic Coast, there seemed to be land enough for
everyone.

But once MISURASATA was formed and recognized, it
supported the absolute recognition of coastal land rights as
the single most important problem to be resolved. In late
1980 the government agreed that MISURASATA should
undertake the necessary background study to produce the
nineteenth-century land titles on which its land claims were
based. These titles were referred to in the treaties at the
time of "reincorporation." An American indigenist
organization, Cultural Survival, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, gave a grant of $8,000 to MISURASATA
for this study.

The resulting document did not present evidence of land
titles as expected. Rather, it asserted the broadest possible
claims for indigenous rights to a significant portion of
Nicaragua's national territory. Several controversial
arguments were put forward. First, and most contentious,
is the statement that "the right of indigenous nations over
the territory of their communities is preferential to the
territorial rights of states" (pp.1-2). Similar to the claim
made by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, this
assertion is a direct challenge to nation-state sovereignty
and is not recognized by any existing state. The size of
the indigenous territory was to be determined by the concept
of "millenarian possession" in which residence on the land
since time immemorial was sufficient to affirm present
ownership. Furthermore, these rights extended indigenous
to the surface and subsoil, full rights to internal and
coastal waters, and the rights to adapt them, and
exclusive coastal economic zones. Thus, we indigenous
people may freely use the wealth and natural sources of the
land. In no case may a people be deprived of its means of
self-sufficiency" (p.6). Of the various treaties signed
between the Nicaraguan government and other powers
(British, American), none was seen as legitimately
abridging these rights. The study goes on to assert land
rights over 76.8 percent of the territory of the Atlantic
Coast, or one-third of the total territory of Nicaragua.10

In August, 1981, the government issued its own
conception of indigenous rights. Article Six of its

10. MISURASATA, "La tenencia de la tierra de las comunidades
indígenas y criolla de la costa atlántica." With supplement,
"Propuesta de la tenencia de la tierra de las comunidades indígenas y
criollas de la costa atlántica," no place, ms. 1981.
"Declaration of Principles" states that "the natural resources of our territory are the property of the Nicaraguan people. The Revolutionary State, representative of the popular will, is the only entity empowered to establish a rational and efficient system of utilization of said resources. The Revolutionary State recognizes the right of the indigenous people to receive a portion of the benefits to be derived from the exploitation of forest resources of the region. These benefits must be invested in programs of community and municipal development in accordance with national plans."

Article 5, dealing with land rights, said: "The Popular Sandinista Revolution will not only guarantee but also legalize the ownership of lands on which the people of the communities of the Atlantic Coast have traditionally lived and worked, organized either as communes or as cooperatives. Land titles will be granted to each community."

In these two articles, the state made it explicit that it would not relinquish its historical right to decide these questions of tenure and resource use and that it would treat indigenous communities the same as many other Nicaraguan communities. The implication was that the state had exclusive right to decide such questions and that there would be no unique status for indigenous groups. This was in effect a rejection of MISURASATA’S claim both to those rights as well as to its assertion of the sole power to decide them.

External Threat and Early Conflict

It was, however, U.S. policy that strongly influenced Sandinista fears of the special land demands. U.S. support for the now acknowledged "covert war" had already begun in late 1981 with CIA funding and Argentine advisors.

The bulk of the training camps for the contras were on the Honduran border near many indigenous communities. The contras, led by Somocista National Guardsmen, were preparing to infiltrate into Nicaragua and already had a well-developed propaganda apparatus on the Honduran side, the "15th of September" radio station. In this context, demands for land that amounted to most of the coast were viewed by the Sandinistas as a possible threat to national integrity.

From early 1981 the situation rapidly worsened as both sides contributed toward the heightening of the tension. In February 1981, shortly before the land study was to be presented, the Sandinistas arrested many Indian leaders for allegedly hostile activities. Most were held for a short time, but these arrests created suspicions among the indigenous groups that the Sandinistas would never accept a real Indian voice in national affairs.

The most inflammatory case of arrests occurred in February 1981 in Prinzapolka. Several Sandinista soldiers attempted to arrest a MISURASATA leader during the closing ceremony of the literacy campaign in a Moravian church. Instead of waiting for the ceremony to end, they entered, armed, to complete the arrest. A shootout ensued in which four Miskitos and four soldiers died. That event created a tone for Indian-government relations that has not yet been dissipated.

During this period the most dynamic leader of MISURASATA, Steadman Fagoth Muller, became an ardent critic of the government. He was jailed in February, 1981, and released in May on condition that he go abroad to study in a socialist country. He immediately left the country for Honduras and at once associated himself with the contras’ radio station "15th of September." From there he broadcast virulent attacks on the government and called for armed resistance to the Sandinistas. Using support from the contras, he was able to build a guerrilla force in Honduras that began attacking Miskito communities across the border in Nicaragua. The Sandinista response was to produce information showing that Fagoth had been an undercover agent for the Somoza regime during his university days.

While on the one hand Fagoth was active in a propaganda attack on the Sandinistas, testifying in Congress, lobbying in the U.S., and speaking frequently on the "15th of September" radio station from Honduras, he was also involved in frequent military actions, many of them classified as violations of human rights and the rules of war.

From mid-1981 through the end of the year, the situation heated up so rapidly that all hope was lost for resolution through dialogue. Near the end of the year the Sandinistas announced the discovery of a plot called "Red Christmas" designed to kill Sandinista workers on the coast and incite a general uprising. Citing the plot as evidence of imminent external threat to national integrity, the Sandinistas began a large-scale evacuation of villages on the upper Coco and the systematic destruction of houses and livestock there to deny support to the attacking forces. The evacuees, approximately 8,500, were taken to a new location, sixty kilometers to the south, called Tasba Pri ("Free Land"). This forced relocation saw people moving to Puerto Cabezas as well. Later, another center was opened in Sangilaya, north of Puerto Cabezas, that received resettled people from the surrounding communities. Some people, including many Sumos, were resettled in camps in the department of Jinotega. In addition, perhaps 15,000 people crossed the border into Honduras to live in refugee camps.

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13. Center for Research and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA), Trablil Nani: Historical Background and Current Situation on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua (Managua and New York, 1984.)
Human Rights Accusations

This time of resettlement and turmoil is what the government now calls the period of "errors." There has been official recognition of wrongdoing as well as published accounts of human rights abuses on the coast. Squeezed between a growing Indian militancy and a quickly eroding security position on the coast, the Sandinista solution was to try to establish greater control through the imposition of central power.

Some of the charges levied against the Sandinistas at that time go as far as to describe a war of extermination with massive human rights violations. Accusations focus on several incidents prior to the forced removals to Tasba Pri, the relocation itself, conditions in Tasba Pri, and finally, on the conduct of the Sandinistas in their military engagements with Indian guerrillas and with the civilian population.

Official Washington depicted the Atlantic Coast situation as a holocaust. In an address to the American people on May 9, 1984, President Reagan said of the Miskitos that "thousands have been slaughtered," that "they have been starved and abused," and that Tasba Pri and other relocation sites are "detention camps." In 1982 Secretary of State Alexander Haig waved a photograph of burning bodies as evidence of mass slaughter of Miskitos. It became particularly embarrassing to him with the revelation that the photograph had been originally published in Le Figaro during the insurrection showing victims of the slaughter of Somoza. The Reagan administration has continued a barrage of propaganda assertions that claim that Miskitos have been subject to genocide.

The harshest charges were made by Dr. Bernard Nietschmann, a professor of geography from the University of California at Berkeley, in testimony before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission of the OAS in October 1983. There he stated that in Miskito communities, the Sandinista government engaged in "arbitrary killings, arrests and interrogations; rapes; torture; continued forced relocations of village populations; destruction of villages; restriction and prohibition of freedom and travel; prohibition of village food production; restriction and denial of access to basic and necessary store foods; the complete absence of any medicine, health care or educational services in many Indian villages; the denial of religious freedom; and the looting of households and sacking of villages."

During this entire period though, the only responsible investigations of these charges were done by the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and Americas Watch. The IACHR report of November 29, 1983, considered a complaint lodged by MISURASATA that included charges of detentions, trials, imprisonments, disappearances, relocation, and several specific incidents involving Miskitos.

The IACHR investigated complaints put forward by MISURASATA concerning the events in San Carlos and Leimus in December 1981, the forced relocations, and illegal detentions. It found that "forces in opposition to the Nicaraguan Government crossed the Coco River from Honduras and occupied the town of San Carlos, on the bank of that river in December, 1981, where they ambushed, mutilated and killed six Nicaraguan soldiers." (p.129). The IAHRC also found that Nicaraguan Army forces "illegally killed a considerable number of Miskitos in Leimus in retaliation for the killings in San Carlos." (Ibid.). Americas Watch charges that 14 to 17 civilian prisoners were murdered in Leimus in December 1981 and seven Miskito youngsters were killed by government troops in Walpa Siksa. The government has punished those responsible for these crimes.

The IACHR expressed concern at irregularities and abuses of Miskitos concerning conditions of detention, lack of charges, and disappearances. With regard to the relocation it noted that, "despite the fact that the relocation and resettlement of the Miskitos in Tasba Pri was carried out in an atmosphere of fear and severe conflict, the Commission [IACHR] is not in a position to state that there was loss of life during the relocation, with which the Government had been initially accused." (Ibid.). The IACHR noted that "Hundreds of Miskitos have been arbitrarily detained without any formalities" and that trials of those arrested in late 1981 and early 1982 were "initially carried out without regard to the universally applicable norms of due process" (p. 130). It also recognized that as a result of the amnesty declared on December 1, 1983, almost all of the detained Miskitos were freed. The

17. Le Canard Enchaine, Paris, Feb. 24, 1982, exposed Haig’s misuse of a photo published in Le Figaro, Feb. 23, 1982. The original photo was made three years previously, during the Somoza regime.
IACHR received complaints of the disappearance of "nearly 70 Miskitos." While calling it a serious problem, it noted that some of those people may have fled to Honduras, some had been released and may have changed their names, making it difficult to account for them (Ibid.).

The OAS report recommends a pardon or amnesty for Miskitos; payment of compensation for economic losses; return to the Río Coco when the emergency ends; repatriation of Miskitos in Honduras; negotiations of fundamental issues such as respect for indigenous culture; and freedom of political participation. It supports the "study of a solution to the problem of the Indians' ancestral lands that would take into account both the aspirations of the Indians and the economic interests and territorial unity of the Republic" (p. 133).

It recognizes further, that while most of the Indians claims are just and valid, indeed agreed to by the government, international law "does not include the right to self-determination or political autonomy" (par. 1, p. 129).

In a separate and ongoing series of reports on human rights and the Miskitos, Americas Watch "made a special effort to inquire about the allegation of massacres, illegal detentions and torture of Miskitos during and preceding the relocation process. We found no evidence of widespread disappearances and... no specific information on the alleged torture and killing of Miskitos during the relocations." Americas Watch also found that while the relocation was consistent with prerogatives of countries under military threat, the relocation process itself should have been carried out with more notification, better transportation, and clearer compensation for losses of property.21

As the military conflict grew following the relocation, human rights observers investigated the charges of violations of the laws of war. Americas Watch judged both the Leimus incident in 1981 and one in Walpa Siksa in 1982 to be documented violations of the rules of war. Nevertheless, they concluded that there had been "a sharp decline in violations of the rules of war by the Nicaraguan government following 1982, though we have recorded abuses that took place as recently as a year ago (i.e. 1984)."22

As the conflict took on a more military tone, Indian insurgents violated human rights and the rules of war, as noted in the report cited above. On December 9, 1984, 19 unarmed members of the government security forces were murdered. Their bodies were found with their hands tied (p.42). Examples of summary execution of prisoners, torture, kidnapping of civilians, and armed attacks on civilian populations are attributed to combined MISURA-MISURASATA forces (pp. 43-50). Steadman Fagoth personally took credit for leading an attack on Sumubila, one of the Tasba Pri centers, on April 14, 1984. The MISURA forces, led by Fagoth fired rockets indiscriminately against houses and killed six civilians, including two children and one elderly woman. The only physician who serves the area along with his hospital administrator were kidnapped as well as 39 residents, 10 of whom returned later (pp. 50-51).

While our task force was in no position to make an independent study of the many charges and countercharges of human rights violations, we found no credible and responsible evidence to question the conclusions of the IAHRC and Americas Watch. The relocation was a regrettable policy that even the Sandinistas now call an error. It was, however, consistent with the rights of states to defend their national integrity and was carried out with minimal violations of the human rights of the Miskitos. It occurred in a context of violence during which the Sandinistas committed human rights violations. Most of these have been punished and there has been a marked reduction of them since that time, certainly fewer than the systematic violations committed by the contras and always less than the levels regularly reported by the governments of Guatemala against its indigenous population or by the government of El Salvador against its civilian population. Even during the worst moments of the Nicaraguan human rights record, in 1982, Americas Watch could say that "human rights are afforded far greater respect in Nicaragua than in the nearby states of El Salvador and Guatemala. As stated in our May [1982] report, the Nicaraguan government does not engage in a practice of torturing, murdering or abducting its citizens, practices that prevailed under the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle."23 There was certainly no policy of massive abuse or genocide.

IV. Changes in Sandinista Policy

The 1982-1984 period was a time of deepening military conflict with the strengthening insurgency of organized Miskito forces in the region. Since the insurgent Miskito made no secret of their links with the U.S.-sponsored contras and the advice and support of the CIA, the government regarded them as equal to the other contra enemies of the state and treated them accordingly. Against this background of increasing conflict and distrust from the local population, the government was faced with the challenge of implementing the revolution and overcoming its first failure there. This caused serious policy reconsiderations and taught the Sandinistas valuable lessons.

Through its efforts to gain local support after the relocation, the government acquired new understanding of the nature of ethnic minorities. Over these three years two important things occurred. First, the Tasba Pri effort saw the government invest heavily to promote development in a conventional sense. While it never succeeded as a model of development, Tasba Pri was nevertheless a qualified success. The bumper rice crops that were produced with the introduction of government provided supplies and technical assistance. The new health programs and new schools were seen by the people as benefits that, while not compensating for the uprooting, at least made the camps viable and productive communities that brought some obvious benefits to the inhabitants. Houses were made of materials superior to the traditional river homes, but they were placed uncomfortably close to each other. When the Sandinistas tried to offer greater security by issuing house titles, the result was threatening rather than reassuring. It implied distinctions among neighbors and a concept of ownership that were not part of traditional community life.

The other dynamic during this time was the armed opposition to the government. The Miskito insurgency that developed was qualitatively different than the contra war waged on the Pacific side. The contras were unable to gain shelter and support from the local population on the Pacific side. But the Miskito insurgents—in classic guerrilla fashion—were like "fish in water." The sparseness and dispersal of the population and the lack of strong infrastructure made it harder for the government to control territory, allowing the insurgents freer mobility and an ability sporadically to control towns and villages as well as to attack certain targets along the roads. The guerrillas were also able to destroy some productive installations, such as the sawmill at Sukapin, as well as health clinics. Government efforts to put down the insurgency, however, often reaped more distrust than military gain for the Sandinistas although, as we have noted, Americas Watch found few human rights abuses during that period. The imposition of government control over the communities simply raised government costs for supplying them with the food they were not growing. Government restrictions on the movement of villagers to their fields also engendered greater hostility.

The failure of the resettlement camps to gain active Miskito support for the Sandinistas, the partial success of the Indian guerrillas, and the growing perception that the U.S. government might be preparing an invasion, led to a rethinking of Sandinista policy. This meant choosing between the existing policy emphasized central political control along with military suppression of the insurgency, and an alternative, more political, solution which might remove the causes of local discontent—in particular the entire relocation—and negotiate military agreements to restore internal peace. This latter alternative would permit a return to a kind of normality while a negotiated solution was worked out. Militarily, it would enable the government to use its troops to engage the contras directly on the Pacific side of the country. An early harbinger of this change in policy was the general amnesty of December, 1983.

On the other side, the insurgents were experiencing internal conflicts and uncertainties about continuing the war. After Steadman Fagoth left Nicaragua for Honduras in 1981, he was soon followed by other MISURASATA leaders, including Brooklyn Rivera, and a flood of refugees who rejected resettlement or, in some cases, were coerced to cross the border. Recruiting from the refugees, the exiled leadership, with CIA funding and support, began building an insurgent fighting force called MISURA that was separate from, but allied to the central contra force, the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN), headed by Somoza National Guard officers.

In late 1982, however, a leadership conflict between Fagoth and Rivera led Rivera to leave Honduras for Costa Rica, where he allied himself with the ARDE (Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática) of Edén Pastora. Rivera kept the name of MISURASATA. Conflicts within MISURA continued because of the harsh and violent leadership of Fagoth, who was accused of killing those who disagreed with him and forcibly recruiting Miskitos to join him in Honduras. In 1984, Fagoth was expelled from Honduras for interference in the internal affairs of the country. His repeated public statements about his activities ran counter to the official Honduran position that denied that there were anti-Sandinista forces using Honduras as a sanctuary. The final straw was his threat to kill 23 Sandinista Army prisoners and for that he was expelled.

The U.S. role in assisting the contra war is now well known. What began as a "covert" war is now recognized as a U.S.-funded effort to overthrow the Sandinista government. The CIA has had a specific role in funding, supplying, and training all insurgent forces, including those of MISURA and MISURASATA. Consistent with their efforts to unite all opposition military forces, the U.S. has sought to strengthen the ties between the Miskito insurgents and the FDN. While Fagoth seemed quite willing to work closely with the FDN, other leaders, such as Brooklyn Rivera, resisted these efforts. The FDN had no policy that would respond to Miskito demands concerning land rights or autonomy and were unwilling to incorporate indigenous

24. Evidence for the beginnings of the change in Sandinista thinking comes from interviews with various government officials and local observers.


leaders into their command structure. The FDN, dominated by mestizos and ex-National Guards, were seen by some Miskito leaders (Fagoth and MISURA) as more sympathetic to their cause than the Sandinistas. But the evolving position of MISURASATA has recognized the FDN's lack of comprehension of indigenous problems and MISURASATA has expressed a preference to negotiate with the Sandinistas.  

U.S. influence receded when Congress refused to appropriate $14 million for the contras in April 1984. The lack of CIA funding probably reduced the effectiveness, unity, and morale of the Miskito insurgents. It was reported to us that the insurgent forces became increasingly dependent on logistical support from local communities, since supplies from Honduras and Costa Rica had declined. MISURASATA representatives also complained that the CIA was withholding support because it was not satisfied that the indigenous fighters took the overthrow of the Sandinista government as their highest priority. Thus, by mid-1984, the disorganization within the insurgent groups, the evidence of systematic atrocities committed by the contras, the precipitous decline in CIA funding, all suggested a context in which some Miskitos were willing to consider negotiations with the Sandinista government.

At the same time there were people on both sides ready to cooperate in changing the nature of the conflict. For the Sandinistas, the fear of an invasion, the recognition of failure to gain Miskito allegiance after the relocation to Tasba Pri, the stalemate and continuing hardship caused by the guerrilla action on the coast, had all amounted to a powerful lesson. They were now willing, as a result, to try an alternative approach, a political solution that would represent a greater awareness of the indigenous situation and demands. It was also an attempt at a viable alternative to a centralized military policy. For their part, some Miskito insurgents, lacking material support, internally divided, with little comprehension from other contra groups, were also open to a new alternative: negotiations with the Sandinistas.

V. Negotiations and Autonomy

In a speech at the U.N. in September 1984, Pres. Daniel Ortega extended a clear invitation to Brooklyn Rivera to enter a dialogue with the government. With help from Sen. Edward Kennedy's office, Rivera's response was positive and after receiving assurances that included the presence of observers, guarantees of freedom of movement, and personal security, Rivera returned to Nicaragua in late October and stayed for 10 days. During that time, he had a chance to travel on the Atlantic Coast and publicly address audiences, mostly in the Miskito areas. He was generally well received and appears to have taken the trip as an indication of good faith by the Sandinistas.

The trip culminated in a series of high-level meetings in early November, 1984, in Managua. Although no statement was issued at that time, it appeared that some basis for future negotiations were established then. On November 22, Rivera left for Honduras to speak to the Miskitos in the southeast part of the country. Rivera hoped to learn from them if there was willingness to reach a negotiated solution under his leadership. He was prevented from entering Honduras, however, and he and his party were detained at the airport in Tegucigalpa, interrogated, arrested, and finally expelled from the country. What could have meant the beginning of a solution was aborted abruptly, undercutting Rivera's claim that he spoke for the majority of the insurgents and refugees. Competition between Rivera's MISURASATA and Fagoth's MISURA reached high levels of tension at this point. Rivera's move toward negotiations was resisted by the MISURA leadership, which succeeded in attracting some of Rivera's military and political support and condemning him for his "sellout." The Honduran government participated in this conflict by preventing Rivera from going to the Honduran camps to speak to the Miskitos there.

Despite these setbacks, Rivera did partially succeed in his efforts to represent the whole insurgent movement. In December, 1984, a fresh round of talks began between the Nicaraguan government and a Rivera-led MISURASATA delegation. Several MISURA members were also present, as well as observers from Canada, Colombia, France, Holland, Mexico, Sweden, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. The government delegation was led by vice-minister of the interior Luis Carrión and included several Miskitos and representatives of other coastal ethnic groups.

At the first meeting, on December 8, 1984, in Bogotá, Colombia, the government position was expressed in the form of a draft treaty. It reiterated its "recognition that the ethnic groups of the Atlantic Coast must enjoy special rights of autonomy that guarantee their ethnic identity and that must be consigned in the laws of the republic with constitutional rank." All the significant issues—land, resources, education, cultural respect, health, housing, transport and communication—were to be open for negotiations to define mutual rights and responsibilities. In addition, the government proposed a three-month suspension of hostilities, the repatriation of refugees, and called on MISURASATA to repudiate "non-Nicaraguan forces."

On December 5, a few days before the Bogotá meetings began, the government named a national commission to

27. Interview with Armstrong Wiggins, MISURASATA, Washington.
work on an autonomy statute. By so doing it made plain its intention that the international meetings constituted a parallel process to the one taking place within the country. By relating the other substantive topics, especially land tenure and political rights, to the autonomy statute and to a cease-fire, it also described a comprehensive package for the resolution of the coastal problem. Both the draft agreement and the internal autonomy process initiated by the government represented a considerable shift in policy toward the Atlantic Coast. Especially compared to the 1981 "Declaration of Principles" (discussed in the "Early Conflict" section), these efforts showed more openness to discuss autonomy and negotiate land rights.

The MISURASATA document submitted at the December 1984 meeting reiterated earlier demands for sovereignty. It calls for the government to recognize the Miskito, Sumo, and Rama populations as sovereign indigenous peoples. . . with the natural right to freely determine their own political, economic, social, and cultural development in accord with their values and traditions. It further calls for the demilitarization of the region, indemnification of communities for damages suffered, formal recognition of MISURASATA, and a cease fire, which is to follow the withdrawal of Sandinista troops from almost all communities on the coast. The Sandinista Army was to be replaced by MISURASATA troops who were to be in the communities as "the only military force there." To oversee compliance, MISURASATA asked for a tripartite commission consisting of two government delegates, two from MISURASATA, and three delegates from the guarantor nations present. 30

These international negotiations proceeded with a second session in Bogotá in January 1985, a third in Mexico City in April and a fourth in Bogotá in May. The only substantive agreement actually put into practice was in April when both parties agreed "not [to] initiate offensive actions." This cease-fire was further supported by agreements concerning the relaxation of restrictions on population movements, identification, and supplying the communities with medicine and food. Although there were at least two serious incidents during May—a MISURASATA attack on Bluefields, and a confrontation in Alamikamba between the Sandinista Army and MISURASATA troops—neither side cited them as reason to break the accords at the time. During the May Bogotá meeting, however, relations chilled considerably and ended with a MISURASATA walkout. Both sides blamed the other. At that meeting, the government presented a list of MISURASATA violations of the April accord, including incidents that appear to have occurred prior to the accord. It demanded a recognition of these events and a statement assuring that they would not recur. MISURASATA felt that the open mention of this was a provocation and was not willing to offer assurances. They perceived this as a hardening of the Sandinista position and Rivera walked out, claiming that talk was not possible at that time. Both sides called it a suspension and stated that the negotiations could be resumed at any moment. 31 As of this writing (February 1986), there has not been a resumption of talks.

Since Rivera's visit to Nicaragua in October 1984, there have been significant international developments. As 1985 began, Congress was ambivalent about funding the contras and in April it defeated the administrations' request for $14 million in military aid. In May, Reagan imposed an embargo against Nicaragua after using executive power to declare that the U.S. was in a condition of "national emergency" because of the "threat to national security and foreign policy" that Nicaragua represented. But by June, presumably because of Pres. Daniel Ortega's trip to the Soviet Union, Congress approved $27 million in "humanitarian aid" to the same contras amid a new wave of anti-Sandinista sentiment strongly supported by the White House. So, when discussions were suspended in Bogotá, it occurred at a time when U.S. pressure on the Nicaraguan government was newly increased.

When the LASA Task Force interviewed Michael Joyce, the political officer at the United States Embassy in Managua in August, he made it clear that the U.S. saw the indigenous insurgency only in relation to its overall support for the contras in Nicaragua. He said that the U.S. favors reconciliation between indigenous groups and the Sandinista government only as part of the U.S.-proposed "dialogue" between the contras and the Sandinista government, mediated by the Catholic church hierarchy, a demand formulated by the contras themselves in 1984.

Another significant event was a meeting in Miami in early June that brought together both MUSA and MISURASATA into a new organization called ASLA ("unity" in Miskito). This meeting called for an assembly to be held in late August or early September during which the organizational leadership would be elected. Both the walkout from the Bogotá meeting and the formation of ASLA may have been to "protest their [the Sandinistas'] unilateral action in forming their own commission to consider how to grant the Indians a measure of self-government." 32

Rivera's group hoped the Honduras assembly would be the occasion for strengthening his hand in future negotiations with the Sandinistas. Armstrong Wiggins, Rivera's principal spokesman and a member of the Indian Law Research Center in Washington, felt confident that Fagot would be expelled at that time and Rivera would

become the major Indian leader. ASLA would then name a political-diplomatic, military, and autonomy commission. The resulting structure would have greater standing and unanimity among all Indian factions. It would also buttress Rivera’s demand that the autonomy plans be scrapped. It would unite all the armed opponents of the government under one banner. Rivera could then reopen talks from a much stronger position, politically and militarily, than before.

The assembly convened in Honduras on September 1, 2, and 3. Wiggins was confident that there would be adequate representation of all coastal people. Many were said to be arriving from Nicaragua across the Río Coco. Days before, Fagoth apparently mounted a military attack on the community of Rus Rus, where the assembly was held. He was taken into custody by the Honduran Army and expelled from the country again. At the same time, Rivera’s advisors and guarantors, on the eve of his departure to Honduras, informed him that his security could not be assured; so once again he was not able to go to Honduras.

The meeting, now dominated by MISURA, quickly assumed an anti-ASLA tone. Instead of creating a unity organization to strengthen Rivera’s negotiating position, it assumed an anti-Sandinista, pro-contras position. It disbanded ASLA and founded yet another organization, KISAN (Nicaraguan Coast Indian Unity), whose stated goals were to continue the war and to defeat the Sandinistas. The assembly was opposed to dialogue with the Sandinistas and instead favored formally entering UNO, the blanket contra organization that was founded in San Salvador in May 1985 by Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, and Adolfo Calero. There was mention of a $300,000 down payment for KISAN that was to come from UNO from the $27 million that Congress had approved in June. The Honduras meeting took the direction opposite to the one Rivera was hoping for and instead allied itself with the FDN, the contra military force.33

The Autonomy Document

During this period, the government-initiated autonomy project proceeded apace. The national commission met and drew up a draft document. In July, 1985, over one hundred coastal leaders assembled in Managua to discuss and modify this document. This assembly, after considerable discussion, ratified the document that would become the basis for the present public consultation on autonomy. It was called “Principles and Policies for the

33. We are grateful to Peter Ford, a British journalist, who attended the meeting.

Exercise of Autonomy Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Communities of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.” Many Nicaraguans we interviewed felt that the document reflected a broad consensus of those at the assembly. Most described it not as a predesigned statement that would be mechanically ratified but rather as something for discussion and modification. While in the crucial areas of land ownership and resource control it was somewhat vague, it was the most comprehensive government statement to date. It was divided into three parts: general considerations and historical antecedents; principles and objectives of regional autonomy; and organization and functions of the autonomous regional government and of the national government of Nicaragua.

The first section explains the unique conditions and status of the coastal population and the need to devise specific legal provisions for it. The second section locates autonomy within the guidelines of the Sandinista revolution (sovereignty, anti-imperialist) and stipulates that autonomy is to be exercised in "the geographic area which they (coastal people) traditionally have occupied" (p. 16, par. 7). It states that the material basis necessary for the preservation of ethnic identity involves "collective or individual property rights over lands traditionally occupied" as well as the "use of lands, forests, surface and subterranean and coastal waters." In addition, the revenues from the use of natural resources will be reinvested in the communities.

To "represent and guarantee" the exercise of autonomy, the document calls for the creation of "autonomous regions," each one with a regional government consisting of a regional assembly and a regional executive. The regional government would exercise local police functions, promote participation in national defense, collect taxes, participate in the implementation of economic development plans, and manage all matters relating to land tenure and investment.34

This differs from the 1981 statement primarily in that it states as its goal the achievement of autonomy of the Atlantic Coast. While its statements about land and natural resource use are not very different from the language of the 1981 statement, the political mechanisms, i.e., the regional assemblies, envisioned under this autonomy plan, and the description of it as subject to modification as communities begin to discuss it, offered more possibility to achieve more self-determination than the Atlantic Coast had ever had.

After the Managua meeting that gave rise to this document, regional autonomy commissions were formed,

one for Zelaya norte and one for the south. This initiated the process of consulta (consultation) whereby the regional commissions undertook to promote discussions among the population so as to elicit opinions from as broad a section of the population as possible. The original timetable announced by the government was to have a draft statute available by October 1985 for debate in the National Assembly for ratification in the new constitution. Since then, however, the process has become dependent on the pace of the consultas so that it is now expected to be completed by the end of 1986.

This conjuncture, a sustained cease-fire in spite of the suspension of external negotiations between the government and the insurgents, along with the growing internal process of defining the legal and organizational bases for autonomy, set the stage for the LASA Task Force visit in August 1985.

**Interviewees**

The following is a list of 51 people we interviewed as part of our study. We had, at the very least, a lengthy conversation, and in many cases, several, with each interviewee. We indicate each person’s primary affiliation for purposes of indentification.

**CIDCA**

Galio Gurdian, director, member, National Autonomy Commission
Charles Hale, researcher, CIDCA, Bluefields
Dr. Susan Norwood, researcher, linguistics, CIDCA, Puerto Cabezas
Miguel Gray, researcher, CIDCA, Bluefields
Antonio Zurita, researcher, CIDCA, Puerto Cabezas
Judy Butler, researcher, CIDCA, Managua

**Autonomy Commission Members**

Ray Hooker, Federal deputy, and
Zelaya Sur, coordinator, Northern and Southern Regional Autonomy Commissions
Hazel Lau, Federal deputy, Zelaya Norte
Manuel Ortega, National Autonomy Commission
Orlando Nunez, National Autonomy Commission
Armando Rojas, coordinator, Regional Autonomy Commission, Puerto Cabezas
Marcelo Zuniga, Regional Autonomy Commission, Puerto Cabezas
Dorotea Wilson, Regional Autonomy Commission, Puerto Cabezas
Leonel Pantin, Regional Autonomy Commission, Puerto Cabezas
Bobby Holmes, Regional Autonomy Commission, Puerto Cabezas
Johnny Hodgson, coordinator, Regional Autonomy Commission, Bluefields

Yolanda Campbell, Regional Autonomy Commission, Bluefields
Alfredo Arana, Regional Autonomy Commission, Bluefields

**Indigenous Organizations**

Brooklyn Rivera, director, MISURASATA
Armstrong Wiggins, MISURASATA, Indian Law Resource Center
Norman Campbell, MISURASATA, Miami
Rufino Lucas, legal affairs director, MISATAN
Murphy Almendariz, SUKAWALA, Sumo organization
Ronas Dolores, SUKAWALA
Reynaldo Reyes, executive chief, G-2, KISAN

**Moravian Church Leaders**

Rev. Andy Shogreen Superintendent, Moravian Church, Puerto Cabezas
Rev. Norman Bent, president, IDSIM
Rene Enriquez, director, IDSIM, Puerto Cabezas
Rev. Fernando Colomer, director, Refugee Program
Rev. Rafael Dixon, pastor
Prof. Faran Dometz, principal, Moravian School, Bluefields

**Development Workers**

Lotte Lauper, International Committee of the Red Cross, Puerto Cabezas
Dr. Eldo Lau, director, Nicaraguan Red Cross, Ministry of Health, Puerto Cabezas
Rev. Benjamin Cortes CEPAD, Managua
Evanor Coleman, CEPAD, Puerto Cabezas
Ronald Brooks, head, Bilingual Education Program, Bluefields
Gordon Hutchison, Project Counselling Service for Latin American Refugees

**Military and Government Personnel**

Dr. Mirna Cunningham, Minister of Government, Puerto Cabezas
Comandante Antenor Rosales, military commander, Zelaya Norte
Lt. Cesar Paiz, Ministry of Interior, Division of State Security
Mirna Taylor, public relations, Government House

**Researchers**

Xavier Gorostiaga, S.J., director, INIES, Managua
Amilcar Turcios, INIES
Dr. Collette Craig, linguist, University of Oregon
Phillipe Bourgois, anthropologist
Susan Meiselas, photojournalist
End of Part I.

Part II will present the findings of the delegation.
provoked by the restrictive policies of the International Monetary Fund and the politico-military intervention of the United States in Central America (Juan Luis Cebrián, writing in El País, January 21, 1985).

American observers as well recognize U.S. complicity in the overall "instability and social convulsion" that affects Latin America. As scholar Lars Schultz wrote several years ago, based on an exhaustive quantitative analysis of U.S. foreign aid data and its destinations, "U.S. military assistance in particular has tended to flow disproportionately to Latin American governments which torture their citizens." ("U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations," Comparative Politics (January 1981) p. 155. On the economic dimension, another analyst has written more recently:

The strategy the [Reagan] administration has followed until now also has directly threatened American economic and political interests. On the economic side, developing-country austerity has cost the United States more than 3 million man-years of employment in export industries. In political terms, it threatens the re-emergence of democracy in Latin America, one of the most hopeful signs of the recent period" (John W. Sewell, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 27, 1985; our emphasis).

The above considerations—economic instability, social injustice, militarism beyond civilian control, latent violence, potential outright guerrilla warfare, and civil war often fed by external forces—augur poorly for the future of political democracy in Latin America.

In this report, we make no attempt to analyze the data from the most recent Image-Index survey of political democracy in Latin America. We do compare the countries' relative rankings on two indices from 1980 to 1985 and leave it to the reader to draw conclusions. Not unexpectedly, some countries during those years experienced a change in their reputational democratic status during the quinquennium.

We are grateful to the many scholars who continue to use these data in their research, despite the limitations inherent in the method, which have been recognized and analyzed elsewhere.1 We also appreciate the honorable mention given this continuing survey by Federico G. Gil on the occasion of his acceptance of the Kalman Silvert LASA President's Prize at LASA's most recent meeting.2

We rank the countries reputationally, using a panel of experts whose names appear at the end of the report. Two indices for ranking are used, the first of which contains all the fifteen substantive criteria (which contain unavoidable built-in overlap) and the second of which employs five select criteria of a more clearly political nature. These indices appear in Table A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantive Criteria for Evaluation</th>
<th>Select Criteria for Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Educational level</td>
<td>6. Freedom of press, speech, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Standard of living</td>
<td>7. Free elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Internal unity</td>
<td>8. Freedom of political organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Political maturity</td>
<td>9. Independent judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Freedom from foreign domination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Freedom of press, speech, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Free elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Freedom of political organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Independent judiciary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Handling of governmental funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Social legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Degree of civilian supremacy</td>
<td>12. Degree of civilian supremacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Freedom from ecclesiastical domination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Governmental administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Local governmental autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. See the article by Kenneth Johnson in Wilkie and Ruddle, eds., Methodology in Quantitative Latin American Studies (Los Angeles: UCLA Center for Latin American Studies, 1976); and also Johnson and Williams, Democracy, Power, and Intervention (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona State University, Center for Latin American Studies, 1978).


Table B
Image-Index, 1980: Country Rank Orderings 
By Raw Score Totals on Two Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Criteria</th>
<th>Select Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4855</td>
<td>1752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Venezuela</td>
<td>2. Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4511</td>
<td>1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mexico</td>
<td>3. Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3981</td>
<td>1482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Colombia</td>
<td>4. Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3865</td>
<td>1364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Peru</td>
<td>5. Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3565</td>
<td>1319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cuba</td>
<td>6. Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3455</td>
<td>1270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nicaragua</td>
<td>7. Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3385</td>
<td>1204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dominican Republic</td>
<td>8. Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3362</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ecuador</td>
<td>9. Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3298</td>
<td>992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3263</td>
<td>879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Argentina</td>
<td>11. Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3204</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Brazil</td>
<td>12. Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3195</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3131</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2916</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Honduras</td>
<td>15. Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2614</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2336</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Guatemala</td>
<td>17. Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2255</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Bolivia</td>
<td>18. Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2114</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Paraguay</td>
<td>19. Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2103</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Haiti</td>
<td>20. Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C
Image-Index, 1985: Country Rank Orderings by Raw Score 
Totals on Two Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Substantive Criteria</th>
<th>Select Criteria Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Democratic Countries</td>
<td>Reputationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Costa Rica</td>
<td>(4932)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Venezuela</td>
<td>(4683)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Argentina</td>
<td>(4297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Uruguay</td>
<td>(4073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Colonies</td>
<td>(4046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mexico</td>
<td>(4037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Brazil</td>
<td>(3842)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Peru</td>
<td>(3628)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Panama</td>
<td>(3623)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Cuba</td>
<td>(3597)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ecuador</td>
<td>(3588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nicaragua</td>
<td>(3550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Dominican Republic</td>
<td>(3518)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Chile</td>
<td>(2876)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Honduras</td>
<td>(2857)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Bolivia</td>
<td>(2741)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. El Salvador</td>
<td>(2458)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Paraguay</td>
<td>(2334)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Guatemala</td>
<td>(2274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Haiti</td>
<td>(1783)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Least Democratic Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reputationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Democratic Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputationally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rho = .90 and is significant beyond the .01 level.

Rho = .88 and is significantly beyond the .01 level.

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4. Ibid., p. 199.
As stated above, we make no effort here to analyze this data, but let the reader draw his/her own conclusions. Suffice it to say that there was considerable shift in the reputational rankings of several countries between 1980 and 1985. The value of Spearman’s Rho calculated for the 1985 data in Table C indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the rank ordering on either set of criteria. The same prevails when the select rank orderings are compared ordinarily for 1980 and 1985. Upon inspection, however, the reader will notice some major shifts between those five years for some countries. Argentina and Uruguay improved their reputational status notably, which corresponds with the return of what are at least ostensibly democratic practices in those countries. In contrast, Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua suffered the greatest reputational declines in political democracy during the 1980-1985 quinquennium.5

Panel Participants for the 1985 Democracy Image-Index Survey

Diego Abente (Miami University); Ricardo Aguilar Melantón (University of Texas at El Paso); Marvin Alisky (Arizona State University); Andrés Avellaneda (University of Florida); Enrique Baloyra Herp (University of North Carolina); J. W. Barchfield (University of Guanajuato); C. Richard Bath (University of Texas at El Paso); Marvin D. Bernstein (State University of New York at Buffalo); Robert Biles (Sam Houston State University); Jan Knippers Black (University of New Mexico); George Blanksten (Northwestern University); John A. Booth (North Texas State University); Robert Buckman (University of Texas at Austin); Winfield J. Burggraaff (University of Missouri); David Bushnell (University of Florida); Roderic A. Camp (Central University of Iowa); Richard L. Clinton (Oregon State University); Thomas M. Davies, Jr. (San Diego State University); Juan M. del Aguila (Emory University); Edward C. Epstein (University of Utah); Judith Ewell (College of William and Mary); Gaston A. Fernández (St. Olaf College); Gaston F. Fernández (University of Arkansas); Julio A. Fernandez (State University of New York at Cortland); Charles Fleener (St. Louis University); Cornelia Flora (Kansas State University); David W. Foster (Arizona State University); Fernando García Núñez (University of Texas at El Paso); John F. Garganigo (Washington University, St. Louis); Federico Gil (University of North Carolina); Dennis Gilbert (Hamilton College); Stephen Haber (University of California at Los Angeles); Kenneth F. Johnson (University of Missouri at St. Louis); Philip Kelly (Emporia State University); Michael Kryzanek (Bridgewater State College); William LeoGrande (American University); Thomas M. Leonard (University of North Florida); Naomi Lindstrom (University of Texas at Austin); Sheldon B. Liss (University of Akron); Donald J. Mabry (Mississippi State University); John D. Martz (Pennsylvania State University); Ronald H. McDonald (Syracuse University); James W. McKenney (Wichita State University); Robert A. Monson (University of Arkansas); Tommy Sue Montgomery (Dickinson College); Steven P. Mumme (Colorado State University); David J. Myers (Pennsylvania State University); Martin C. Needler (University of New Mexico); Federick M. Nunn (Portland State University); Robert Oppenheimer (University of Kansas); Connie Patton (Emporia State University); Neale J. Pearson (Texas Tech University); Adam Perkal (University of Miami); Mark Ruhl (Dickinson College); James Sandos (University of Redlands); Lars Schoultz (University of North Carolina); Mitchell A. Seligson (University of Arizona); Peter G. Snow (University of Iowa); Charles L. Stansifer (University of Kansas); Dale Story (University of Texas at Arlington); Robert Tomesek (University of Kansas); Antonio Vera (William Jewell College); Roberto Villareal (University of Texas at El Paso); Jon S. Vincent (University of Kansas); Brian F. Wallace (Capitol University); Richard J. Walter (Washington University, St. Louis); Robert Wesson (Hoover Institution); W. Marvin Will (University of Tulsa); Edward J. Williams (University of Arizona); Miles Williams (Central Missouri State University); R. L. Woodward, Jr. (Tulane University); Jordan M. Young (Pace University).

The OAS and Technical Cooperation

(3 Part of a 3-Part Series)

by

L. Ronald Scheman*

Whether the problems of the OAS require the magic wand of charter reform or difficult, practical measures is most apparent in the development assistance programs. OAS technical assistance and training programs fill a small but unique niche in hemispheric development cooperation. The magnitude of the programs, approximately $80 million annually, is marginal in the development assistance picture in which over $7 billion annually is disbursed for Latin America and the Caribbean by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, not including bilateral government flows. The OAS role, however, concentrates on human resource development, an area that is largely unattended by the other agencies. Conceptually, if we con-

sider the development equation as having two factors, money and people, it could be said that the banks deal with the money, the OAS focuses on skills and people.

The OAS development programs are divided into three major areas—the economic-social programs which have their conceptual origin in the Alliance for Progress; and two regional programs, one in science and technology and the other in education, both established by the Meeting of the Presidents in Punta del Este in 1967. The projects are primarily small, highly directed technical assistance missions and training programs. Over 3,000 persons are trained annually in a wide range of subjects from genetic engineering to education curriculum improvement.

Many accomplishments over recent decades demonstrate the potential effectiveness of international cooperation in the Americas. The statistical improvement program in the 1950s, the tax reform efforts of the 1960s, and the capital markets development program in the early 1970s were all models in their field. Today, a highly reputed natural resources regional development program assists the development of border areas between nations; the education and science and technology programs help to strengthen centers of excellence and conduct training for the smaller nations far more economically than they could do on their

5. Prepared in November, 1985 at Wichita State University, on the basis of earlier work done by Professors Johnson and Kelly.

* Dr. Scheman is director of the Center of Advanced Studies of the Americas. He was assistant secretary for management of the Organization of American States and president of the Pan American Development Foundation.
own.

But there are problems. The OAS programs are self-contained, not well coordinated with other development efforts in the hemisphere. The programming machinery is cumbersome and subject to easy manipulation by seasoned bureaucrats, both in the countries and in the OAS. The governing bodies are nontechnical, allowing too much room for political influence rather than merit. The financial base is dependent upon the 66 percent U.S. contribution, which raises troubling questions: do the countries finance the program because they want them to, or do they want them because they are financed?

Before getting involved in rewriting charters, several basic issues must be addressed in order to set the philosophical basis for the reform.

• What is the real nature of the role of international agencies in promoting cooperation among nations?

• What can the agencies accomplish for the nations which they cannot do for themselves?

• What kind of international development system can most effectively interact with the national institutions and keep international bureaucracy at a minimum?

• What kind of governing machinery will keep political interference to a minimum?

These questions have no easy answers. They affect international organizations everywhere. But the OAS has a unique role: it is small enough and the cultural patterns of the member nations are similar enough to enable it to be a pioneer in new experiments to make international organization work.

The first task is to define what we want from international cooperation to supplement the development activities of the nations. Many activities, by definition, are international in scope: trade, finance, control of the environment and pollution, harmonization of legislation, drug traffic, refugee relief. Similarly, there are many areas in an increasingly specialized technological world in which it is impossible for the smaller nations individually to provide adequate training for their people. Here, international organization can play an enormously useful role providing foreign expertise that is not available within a nation and by joining institutions of two or more nations to share experience and facilities. It is important that international agencies limit themselves to what they alone can do, and then do it well.

Another major requirement of the inter-American community is setting development policy and coordinating technical assistance programs. Effective development policymaking machinery, similar to the OECD, would meet a prime need for the hemisphere. The nations of the OAS have demonstrated that they are able to establish and maintain such activities without charter reform, as they did with the system of country reviews in the 1960s that were very close to the OECD concept. The OAS General Assembly already has a mandate to assure coordination of the policies of various inter-American agencies. There is nothing in the charter to prevent it from inviting the Inter-American Bank and CEPAL to present observations and reports on matters within their competence. The oft-repeated goal of uniting the separate technical councils of the OAS, CIES and CIECC, into one development council can be achieved by having the two councils meet at the same time. Secretariat programs can also be coordinated by appointing the same person to the dual post of executive secretary of CIES and CIECC, doing more for the integral development of OAS programs than all the resolutions of the General Assembly. It is a pragmatic way to determine whether the idea works before going to reform.

Improving interaction between international and national institutions at this stage of development calls for a major revision of the way the OAS does business with the countries. The present approach is a highly centralized management style in which every piece of paper involved in program execution passes through Washington. This anachronism dates back to a time when conventional wisdom held that there were insufficient qualified technicians in Latin America so that programs had to be run from abroad. If it was ever true, it is certainly no longer the reality. Over 80 percent of OAS staff are from the Latin American and Caribbean countries themselves.

What is needed are better procedures to enable national institutions to execute the programs, as does the Inter-American Development Bank. Just as no national government can run a country without delegating responsibility to different levels of authority, such as states and cities, so the OAS cannot effectively manage from Washington everything that goes on in over 600 projects in 30 nations. If the OAS provided better information on technical experts in various fields, the nations could hire their own with greater confidence. A central, well-maintained register of prequalified consultants can provide the nations with information they cannot easily get for themselves or without costly duplication. Considering the high cost of OAS staff due to international salary scales, direct hire by the countries of prequalified international experts could enable them to obtain more than double the services for the same cost.

The last issue is that of governance. Regardless of the words of the Charter, the representatives of the foreign ministries who sit in Washington have a decisive influence in designing the technical programs. Managing technical assistance is almost like running a business. The issue is how to get maximum benefit to the member countries at the lowest possible cost. Nothing in the training of foreign service officers prepares them to oversee this kind of operation.
The reality is that technicians know technical problems best. Trade experts should be making decisions for trade programs and educators for educational programs. The U.N. deals with the issues through its specialized organizations. The OAS has never come to grips with the issue mostly because the organization is too small to achieve the necessary critical mass of operations in a large number of separate agencies.

A parallel problem that arises from the permanent sitting council of nontechnical foreign ministry people and infects the entire programming process is the incestuous relationship between staff and delegations. Secretariat jobs are lucrative, offering an unnecessary temptation to many country representatives, U.S. included, to curry favor with senior Secretariat officials. Without deprecating the fine sense of service of those who seek to work in the OAS out of genuine dedication to inter-American cooperation, the attractive employment conditions too often interfere with hard decisions on technical programs.

Political and technical responsibilities must be separated even if it means the physical removal of OAS operations away from Washington and establishing a new OAS technical operations center in one of the other member countries. The U.N. maintains dual headquarters in New York and Geneva. So might the OAS. Financially, it is feasible. A study of the cost of moving the Secretariat ten years ago indicated that the income derived from vacating the Secretariat office building, located in prime Washington real estate, would more than compensate the cost of the move plus separation costs for those employees who did not wish to go. The opportunity to reinvigorate the technical programs, clear the Secretariat of staff who are motivated predominantly by Washington living, and identify the OAS as genuinely closer to the thinking of the Americas, could do more than all the word changes in the Charter to make the OAS more relevant to the needs and perceptions of the people of the Americas.

In sum, the suggestions are these:

1. Reinvigorate the policymaking functions of the technical bodies by having them assume a role of monitoring and coordinating technical assistance among the pattern of the OECD.
2. Revise OAS operating procedures to execute all projects through national institutions according to the approved projects, similar to the way the Inter-American Development Bank finances infrastructure projects.
3. Establish an Inter-American Bank of technical experts, prequalifying technicians, and consultants upon whom the member states could draw to execute the projects approved by OAS funds and by others.
4. Require the member states to staff the technical governing bodies with experts from the technical areas with which they deal.
5. Place an absolute prohibition for two years on any government delegate taking any job in the Secretariat.
6. Move the entire technical operation of the OAS to a location in Latin America.

It is, indeed, time for the nations to sit down in a genuine effort to determine whether and to what degree political will exists for inter-American cooperation. The OAS is the living example of the realities of hemispheric cooperation. To pretend that we can achieve such cooperation outside of the OAS, through *contadora*, Cartagena, or any other procedure, is a contradiction in logic. The same reason it is not happening in the OAS will prevent its happening elsewhere. The issue today is how to make the OAS relevant and practical. When we are able to do that, there will be time enough for an effort to conform the words to the practice.

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**LASA’s Election Coverage: Reflections and Suggestions**

by Daniel C. Levy, SUNY-Albany

What guidance can LASA derive from the experience of its pioneering delegation to Nicaragua in 1984? LASA president Wayne Cornelius’s article in the last *LASA Forum* (Winter 1986) responds to critiques (including mine) of the delegation’s report and apparently concludes that future missions should follow the standard which that delegation set. At least, Prof. Cornelius identifies nothing that the delegation should have done differently. At no point does his detailed and often informative article advise any future delegation to benefit from an honest error in judgment or from a lesson recognized in hindsight. In contrast, I believe that we must learn from and improve upon the efforts made by a delegation that confronted uncharted and difficult challenges. Our contrasting conclusions are particularly relevant as LASA’s Executive Council contemplates prospective missions to study elections.

Although Prof. Cornelius graciously terms my written critique of the original report "thoughtful and specific," he

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1. Wayne A. Cornelius, "The 1984 Nicaraguan Elections Revisited," *LASA Forum*, Winter 1986, pp. 22-28. The delegation’s original report can be found in the Winter 1985 issue, with my critical letter to the editor appearing in the following issue (Spring 1985). Ideally, a response to my critique would have been forthcoming soon after. Given the actual time lapse, I have not submitted a more textually specific response to Prof. Cornelius’ article; nevertheless, I would be happy to share a draft of that response with interested LASA members.
proceeds to portray it as impecable; he tends to exaggerate my criticisms into propositions to which no delegation could appropriately be held accountable. In reality, my critique treated the delegation’s report as a useful and in many ways accurate, commendable, and significant contribution, but as one which raises troubling questions about delegation guidelines and as one which has certain serious—yet remediable—flaws. For a few salient issues, therefore, I will try to distinguish between unreasonable and reasonable alternatives to approaches taken by the LASA delegation to Nicaragua.

Representativeness

To what standards should a delegation aspire in representing the positions of parties in conflict? In terms of whom it interviewed and whom and what it chose to quote, the delegation to Nicaragua overwhelmingly represented the Sandinistas’ positions. Prof. Cornelius suggests that my proposed alternatives would necessitate some sort of numerical balancing and keeping score. Obviously, no such simplistic solution could be considered. Instead, we can look toward responsible alternatives to the imbalanced analysis found in the delegation’s report.

A delegation that finds itself leaning strongly toward one position should make every practical effort to discuss its impressions with advocates of other positions. Where such efforts encounter insurmountable obstacles, delegations should then explain, more than the delegation to Nicaragua did, how they tried and why they failed. Prof. Cornelius’s article provides additional information, which would have been useful in the original report, regarding attempts to talk with the principal association of private business owners. But even the article does not adequately explain how the delegation handled other problems with representativeness. For example, to point to interviews with clerics at the grass roots is no response to the question of why only one top church leader was interviewed. The report itself told us that significant differences exist between the hierarchy and many clerics at the grass roots. A church hierarchy that was anti-Somoza and is now anti-Sandinista deserves more attention. Finally, a delegation that under very trying circumstances simply cannot reach as representative a sampling of partisans as it would like to should acknowledge, as this delegation did not, that limited representativeness could well affect the impressions it gets and the conclusions it draws.

Similarly, if a delegation is to sustain one side’s positions strongly and continually and if it is to use quotations much more (in frequency, context, and length) to support than question that side, then the delegation should at a minimum acknowledge and justify that usage. For example, why bother to quote a Sandinista leader on how Mexican elections have never been discredited in the United States and not at least follow by noting that the statement is demonstrably false for the scholarly community from which the delegation itself is drawn? In short, some degree of numerical imbalance in the choice of interviewees and quotation use is legitimate—and we can reasonably differ on what degree is present and what degree is legitimate—but it should be accompanied by much more acknowledgment and explanation than that found in the report from which we seek guidance here.

Alternative Explanations

How should a delegation deal with explanations of behavior that do not support its basic theses? The report on Nicaragua rarely granted legitimacy to, or even identified, explanations of Sandista behavior unflattering to the Sandinista regime. Prof. Cornelius apparently believes that introducing such alternative explanations would require unrealistic efforts—either reading minds to ascertain the hidden motivations of political actors or allocating a much greater amount of time for field research and textual elaboration. On the contrary, feasible guidelines can be formulated.

Obviously, delegations should not presume to read minds. The delegation to Nicaragua errs precisely where it seems to have divined what Sandinista motivations have been when, in reality, various interpretations are plausible. Thus, for example, the delegation tells us that unsavory political restrictions result from U.S. pressure and that political liberalization would likely arise if such pressure were lifted. To be fair and credible, delegations should acknowledge where observable actions leave open questions of actors’ motivations, values, and likely behavior under different circumstances.

Prof. Cornelius dismisses my call to elaborate alternatives as optimally useful yet unrealistic. But forget optimal. Optimality offers no serious guideline and

2. However inadvertently, Prof. Cornelius does not adequately differentiate my critique from truly impecable U.S. government critiques and does not make clear that I explicitly accepted many of the report’s findings. Additionally, I did not assert that the delegation set out consistently to minimize Sandinista wrongs, but that its preoccupation with counterbalancing false U.S. impressions contributed to such minimizing. Cornelius’s article confirms that the delegation emphasized counterbalance; we differ on whether that emphasis undercut the report’s objectivity.

3. Prof. Cornelius’s assertion about how the delegation’s conclusions were corroborated by virtually all other non-governmental observers appears to exaggerate a mostly accurate point. (All the conclusions? By the responsible foreign media?) But even consensus does not obviate the importance of scrutiny.

4. Prof. Cornelius and I obviously continue to disagree on the degree of numerical imbalance. But even if one sets aside several doubts and accepts the count given in Cornelius’s article, the delegation interviewed nearly twice as many Sandinista supporters as opponents. Regarding quotations, I explicitly acknowledged that other readers could count them somewhat differently from the way I did, but I believe that any reasonable count would find an overwhelming asymmetry.

5. I say rarely, not never. Nor have I asserted that the delegation completely ignored the influence of external pressure; I have criticized the delegation’s analysis of that influence.
deflects attention from plausible standards. In fact, the
dlegation to Nicaragua did an extraordinary amount of
work (including plenty of textual elaboration) in its allotted
time. It would take almost no more time for delegations to
note that the evidence from even very credible investigation often allows for alternative, legitimate,
unproven interpretations.

Condemning Transgressions

Important questions arise over a delegation's responsibility to condemn relevant transgressions by all
sides, including those with which it generally sympathizes.
It might appear that Prof. Cornelius and I agree on an
appropriate guideline for delegations: no punches should
be pulled in condemning transgressions. 6 The evidence
suggests, however, that we understand that guideline
differently. Cornelius believes that the delegation's report
condemned Sandinista censorship unequivocally. But—
demonstrably—all but one of the paragraphs he cites as
condemnatory do equivocate, and not just marginally.
They blame censorship on opposition activities, endorse
government criticisms of the censored, and minimize the
impact of censorship on the free flow of ideas.

It seems to me that the proper way to treat transgressions is to acknowledge them squarely. 7 Where it
is appropriate to give reasons for the transgressions or to
delimit their impact, such factors should not be emphasized
above the transgressions themselves. Nor should those
factors be treated as excuses. The transgressions of all
sides should be condemned with equal resolve. If a
delegation sees fit to adopt different standards, it should
forthrightly identify and defend them.

Further Suggestions

The experience in Nicaragua raises other important
dilemmas relevant to future missions. While naturally I do
not know precisely what guidelines ought to be arrived at,
some discussion appears warranted.

One dilemma concerns trade-offs between focusing on a
particular event and on the context in which that event
occurs. In response to criticisms about giving too little
attention to general Sandinista wrongs, Prof. Cornelius
understandably points out that LASA mandated a portrayal
of an election, not of a regime. But he properly adds that
the analysis was to highlight environmental factors
constraining the electoral process. In fact, the report
devoted considerable attention to some contextual features
and reached conclusions that went well beyond the
elections themselves. At a minimum, then, such a report
should inform its readership as to how and where it draws
the lines in studying specific events and their contexts. In
addition, such a report ought to note that contextual factors,
like censorship and restrictions on university autonomy, can
seriously undermine the environment necessary for a truly
free election. 8 Moreover, a delegation should explicitly
recognize that its inability to analyze certain relevant
contextual factors places limits on what it can conclude
about the particular event under investigation.

A second dilemma involves the way a delegation ought
to deal with its own heterogeneity. Prof. Cornelius asserts
that the delegation to Nicaragua was ideologically diverse,
yet both impartial and prepared to work hard to produce a
document acceptable to all its members. To the extent that
a delegation strives to affect the public policy debate, it
may want to emphasize a claim to such diversity, impartiality, and unanimity. But to present a scholarly
report to a professional academic organization may warrant
a different emphasis. Ideological diversity, for example,
might be identified as reflective of the LASA membership
and not of the most formidable political positions under
study; the delegation to Nicaragua was probably the former
and not the latter. Regarding impartiality, I wonder
whether all those on the delegation to Nicaragua would
accept the appropriateness or even possibility of impartial
approaches; I know that at least a few delegation members
thought some of their colleagues were very partial (to the
Sandinistas). Finally, while the delegation achieved an
impressive unanimity in drafting its report, it is also true
that delegation members lacked consensus on some
substantive matters (including how to assess my critique).
I believe that a scholarly audience is deprived of much
when it is not informed about important differences in
approaches, perceptions, and conclusions. 9

A third dilemma relates more generally to trade-offs
between scholarship and impact (on both public opinion
and policy). Prof. Cornelius reaches interesting and, for
me, mostly reasonable conclusions concerning the
delegation's success on these counts. But if I read him

6. But two LASA members who read my letter to the editor, one of
whom regarded its points as accurate, told me of their reluctance
publicly to criticize progressive movements illegitimately threatened by
U.S. might. Should readers be apprised if LASA delegations include
members guided by such reluctance?
7. Unlike what Prof. Cornelius may suggest, at no point did I imply that
the delegation's failure to accept opposition charges at face value
amounted to rationalizing censorship. I continue to believe, however,
that the report's word usage was notably biased. Even on the one
to which he responds, Cornelius apparently misses my point:
not whether La Prensa was "virulently partisan," but why that
characterization was juxtaposed with the characterization of
government newspapers as "equally ardent partisans."
8. This is not a simple Left-Center or Left-Right concern and it emerged
in commentary on the Salvadoran elections. See James F. Petras's
letter to the editor, LASA Newsletter, Fall 1982, pp. 18-19.
9. Prof. Cornelius's article provides some interesting information on
divisions over whether to have undertaken the mission but not on other
differences. My point is not to minimize the substantial consensus that
emerged within the delegation; on the contrary, a factor in my
acceptance of many of the report's findings was that delegation
members whose judgment I respect dropped their initial skepticism
concerning how the Sandinistas would run the elections.
correctly, he does not identify any dilemma in pursuing scholarship and policy impact simultaneously. What should delegations do when they do not perceive a conveniently complete overlap between the two desired objectives? At a minimum, their reports should apprise readers about how they chose between the two. Beyond that, LASA should acknowledge that such trade-offs exist and seriously discuss how much—if at all—we are prepared to pursue impact at the expense of scholarly norms.

I hope that neither general satisfaction with the LASA report on Nicaragua nor justified revulsion over distortions propagated by the U.S. government will preclude a continuing and constructive exploration of how future delegations might be guided.

-Response by Wayne Cornelius
President, LASA

It is obvious from Professor Levy’s most recent letter that his critique of the LASA report on the 1984 Nicaraguan elections and the process that led to it has reached the nit-picking stage. All of the major issues that divide us have been thoroughly aired, and Levy’s latest communication breaks no new ground.

Levy continues to imply that scholarly norms were sacrificed by the LASA delegation, in its haste to write a report that would have an impact on public policy and opinion (see his discussion of "trade-offs between scholarship and impact"). I and, I believe, all other members of the 1984 delegation would vigorously reject such a contention. While our report was addressed to a broad constituency, extending beyond the academic community, it was also intended to meet the needs of LASA members for a thorough, empirically-grounded, dispassionate analysis of a complex, controversial political event, and to reduce the dependence of our members upon official sources of information about this event.

It seems ludicrous to debate "how much" a scholarly organization like LASA should be "prepared to pursue [public] impact at the expense of scholarly norms." There are numerous advocacy groups, not constrained by the usual standards of evidence and inference, that can and do report on critical elections in Latin America. The role that LASA can potentially play in illuminating such events is qualitatively different. If "scholarship" and "impact" cannot be pursued simultaneously in observing and reporting an election, with no compromise of scholarly norms, then LASA should not undertake such missions.

Professor Levy suggests that valuable lessons could still be learned from the "flawed" experience of the 1984 election observation in Nicaragua if only the LASA delegation would recognize and publically admit its alleged mistakes. In particular, he implies that the delegation’s conclusions might have been different if we had succeeded in interviewing approximately equal numbers of FSLN and opposition representatives. In fact, there was not a single significant opposition viewpoint or accusation to which the delegation was not exposed, repeatedly, during the course of our fieldwork.

Levy apparently believes that "truth" might have emerged from some sort of random sampling of Nicaragua’s political elite, with the opposition stratum upweighted in our analysis of the responses. Our charge was to investigate how the electoral campaign, balloting, and reporting of results were being conducted, why, and with what impact on the outcome. In a country like Nicaragua, where the ruling party has an overwhelming presence in the party system and where the machinery of elections at all levels is controlled by government-appointed commissions, it is far more important to identify the choices made by officials responsible for the electoral process and to force them the explain those choices than to sample more exhaustively the preferences and perceptions of opposition forces. As our report demonstrates, the LASA delegation devoted considerable time to trying to document the complaints made by opposition leaders in our interviews with them through archival research. Our time had to be allocated very carefully to accomplish our objectives. It is unlikely that chasing after a second, or a third, high-ranking Church leader to hear the same set of accusations about Sandinista behavior would have gotten us closer to the "truth" that Professor Levy finds so elusive.

Plan Now to Attend

LASA’s 20th Anniversary

Celebration in Boston

October 23-25, 1986
Who's Counting?

by

Merilee S. Grindle*
Harvard Institute for International Development

In the mid-1980s, few could question the important contributions of women scholars to Latin American studies. Women have long composed a significant portion of professionals in the field; they hold an increasing number of senior positions within academic institutions; a plethora of high-quality books and articles attest to their scholarly accomplishments; and their efforts in advancing the teaching of subjects related to Latin America are widely evident. In short, women appear to be well integrated into the field of Latin American studies.

Nevertheless, there is reason to question whether women are receiving the recognition they merit for their contributions. In particular, many positions of influence and leadership within the Latin American studies field continue to be male preserves. While this condition persists, women scholars will continue to be excluded from

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Total Members</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Not** Identified</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov./Pol.Sci.</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. Rel./History</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/Literature</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total LASA Membership</td>
<td>2079</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.4%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *A number of members in the directory did not list a discipline or they listed ones with small total populations. Data on these groups were not included.

**Not Identified. The directory lists 2079 individuals and 87 organizations as members. Of the individuals, 31.4 percent could be identified as women, 67.4 percent as men, and 1.2 percent could not be identified on the basis of name.

* I wish to acknowledge the helpful research assistance of Andrés Fajardo of Harvard College in the preparation of this piece.
roles that give them visibility, influence, and responsibility corresponding to their contributions.

According to the LASA handbook and directory for 1984-1985, 31.4 percent of the membership of the association is composed of women. Table 1 presents data on the gender distribution of LASA's members in the major disciplines represented. It is apparent that gender distribution varies widely by discipline, with high percentages of women found in languages and literature and anthropology, and low percentages reported in economics and geography. Percentages of women in education, political science, history, and sociology conform roughly to that in the overall LASA membership. These figures can be compared to data on how well a number of elected and appointive positions have been distributed among Latin American studies scholars. In some cases, the distribution of such positions suggests the contributions of women are well recognized; in other cases, there is cause for considerable concern.

As an organization, the Latin American Studies Association appears to have been relatively unbiased in the selection of elective officials. The past president of the association, as well as two of its six current executive council members are women. In terms of appointive positions, the record is also acceptable. LASA currently has eight task forces; three of them are chaired or cochaired by women. As is evident in Table 2, the editorial board of the journal of the association, the Latin American Research Review, is composed of sixteen men and nine women, a proportion of women (36 percent) slightly higher than that in the total membership.

Turning to the distribution of appointive positions in the Latin American studies field more broadly, the picture is much less positive. Recent issues of major journals in the field indicate a number of editorial boards that are seriously biased by gender. These data are presented in Table 2. While the composition of the boards of Latin American Perspectives, Hispam, Revista Iberoamericana, and LARR indicate little gender bias, Hispanic Journal, Hispanic American Historical Review, The Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Hispanic Review, The Journal of Latin American Studies, and Latin American Literary Review seriously underrepresent women; Hispanic Journal, Hispanic Review, and the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs had no women on their editorial boards for the issue reviewed, a condition that is hard to justify on any grounds. Of the thirteen journals listed, eleven are edited by men, one by a woman, and one by a mixed board. A similarly disturbing figure is that all sixteen Title VI Area and Language Centers in Latin American studies are directed by men. These advisory and leadership positions are important. Editorial boards have considerable influence over the selection of articles and reviews that will appear in the journals, and board members gain significant visibility because selection implies prominence as scholars in their respective fields. Leadership roles involve setting priorities for institute activities, influence in staffing decisions, and control over budgetary expenditures.

Gender bias in leadership positions can result in the exclusion of women as contributors to seminars and publication series, and as holders of fellowships or scholarly positions. In some cases, such gender bias appears to make a difference. For example, a newsletter from an institute of Latin American studies for fall/winter 1985 listed an all-male faculty. Interestingly, no women appeared in the newsletter as presenters of papers of participants in seminars or workshops. Another well-known institute has an all-male board of directors and a poor record of inviting women to participate in seminars or to accept visiting-scholar positions. One of the journals listed in Table 2 has published one article authored by a woman and one coauthored by a woman out of a total of twenty-two articles in the first three issues of its most recent volume. There are doubtless many more such examples. The point to be emphasized is that exclusion from important advisory and leadership positions also means considerable potential for being "networked out" of important professional opportunities.

Given the significant proportion of women who are active in fields related to Latin American studies, there is evidence of the persistence of male "clubs" in a number of institutes and journals. The process of bringing greater equity and representativeness to the institutes presents a considerable challenge to those concerned about promoting such changes; with the journals, however, consumer pressure can be brought to bear quite directly and effectively. It is to be hoped that the potential for such action will encourage change in the selection process of those journals that have been reluctant to acknowledge the contributions of women in Latin American studies.
### TABLE 2

**Editorial Boards**

*Selected Journals in the Latin American Studies Field†*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Board</th>
<th>Total Members</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispania</td>
<td>Winter 85</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.</td>
<td>August 85</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic J.</td>
<td>Fall 84</td>
<td>Advisory</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic R.</td>
<td>Summer 85</td>
<td>Advisory</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterAmerican Economic Affairs J. of Hispanic Philology</td>
<td>Fall 85</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. of Interm. Wor. Affairs</td>
<td>Summer 85</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. of Latin Am. Lore</td>
<td>Winter 84</td>
<td>Advisory</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. of Lat. Am. Studies</td>
<td>Fall 85</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Am. Literary R.</td>
<td>Fall 85</td>
<td>Advisory</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Am. Perspectives</td>
<td>Sum. 85</td>
<td>Participating eds Collective of coordinating eds.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin Am. Research R. Revista Iberoamer.</td>
<td>Fall 85</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring 85</td>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† These data were taken from the most recent issues of the journals available in Harvard University libraries.

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**Letters to the Editor**

**Editor’s note:** At the Business Meeting in Albuquerque last April and in a mail ballot of the LASA membership, resolutions were passed that called for an end to U.S. support for the anti-Sandinista contra, substantial changes in current U.S. policy in Central America, and legislation to protect Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees now in the U.S. The following letters were among those received from U.S. officials in response to the resolutions.

- - -

Dear Mr. Sinkin:

Thank you for your letter and the enclosed resolutions regarding U.S. policy in Central America. I read with interest the resolutions passed by the Latin American Studies Association. I appreciate this opportunity to address some of the recommendations made in the resolutions.

In the resolution on our overall policy in Central America, I noted the concern that the United States' policy is emphasizing military solutions. I can assure you this is not the case. Through two administrations, the United States has supported dialogue and negotiations as a means of achieving our principal goals: economic development, genuine democracy, and enhanced U.S. and regional security.

We continue to back our commitment to economic development with resources. Over two-thirds of U.S. assistance to Central America in recent years has been economic rather than military. Through the Kissinger
Commission recommendations, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Foreign Assistance bills that have followed, the Reagan Administration has launched the broadest regional development initiative since President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress a generation ago. I support that emphasis.

We seek political stability and the emergence of moderate and democratic governments in the region. Frankly, I do not agree with the contention (included in the resolution against U.S. aid to anti-Sandinista forces) that the elections "augur well for the future of political pluralism in Nicaragua." Indispensable elements of truly democratic elections are freedom of press and speech, competing parties and ideas, safeguards to allow broad participation by the population, and the willingness of the authorities to relinquish power if the vote should go against them. These conditions do not exist in Nicaragua at the present time, nor did they exist during the contests of November 4, 1984.

We must respond to threats to the security of Central American nations—which challenge our basic national interests, as well. Our security assistance is geared toward preventing nations from exporting terrorism to their neighbors. This type of assistance, though on a smaller scale than our developmental aid to the region, is an essential complement to our efforts to achieve economic progress and political reform in the region.

The United States has not closed the door on a negotiated settlement. As I mentioned earlier, we have supported dialogue and negotiations as a means of solving the region’s myriad problems. Regrettably, well-intentioned efforts toward understanding and persuasion have been unavailing, forcing us to adopt stronger measures to convince the Sandinistas to respect the democratic processes to which they were pledged and to discontinue their aggressive and destabilizing behavior. In the interest of U.S. and regional security we are determined to encourage real changes in the policies of the Nicaraguan government.

Let me underscore that U.S. policy is designed to obviate the need for more direct American involvement and, if possible, to promote a peaceful settlement of the differences that exist among the region’s governments.

Sincerely,

Richard G. Lugar, Chairman
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Dear Editors:

I am writing concerning the LASA Report on the Nicaraguan elections and the commentary by Professor Wayne Cornelius. The Report is to be commended for its thoroughness and objectivity; and Professor Cornelius for his thoughtful reflections and response to the critics. There is, however, a major concern which is not adequately considered in either the Report or the commentary in discussing the issue of civil liberties and that is the war emergency. All democracies have restricted, repressed or censored under wartime conditions—in most cases far more severely for much less of a threat than Nicaragua faces today. Washington, Lincoln, Wilson, and FDR did more than censor supporters of their wartime enemies—they were jailed, tarred and feathered, interned—and (except for the Civil War) the U.S. was not even invaded. A good book for Latin Americanists to read is Peter Irons' Justice at War (Oxford University Press, 1983)—a thoroughly researched account of the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. It is highly instructive to Sandinista critics in LASA who are not knowledgedable about the state of civil liberties in the U.S. under wartime (WW II) conditions.

It is useful to reread Oliver Wendell Holmes' "clear and present danger" doctrine before LASA’s critics demand that the Sandinistas make further concessions to their enemies.

From the point of view of national security, the Sandinistas will need to enhance their security needs and furth-
er restrict those civilian groups who refuse to defend the foundations of sovereignty and democracy against overt great power aggression—including the $100 million Reagan military request for the contras.

No one in the U.S. would tolerate proponents of negotiation and power sharing with a Soviet-backed mercenary force invading from Canada; they would be jailed indefinitely if they were lucky. In sum, the electoral issues and political constraints must be placed into a comparative historical-security context to be meaningful.

Sincerely,
James Petras, visiting professor
Political Science, Haverford College

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**Task Force Reports**

**Report from the Program Committee**
**XIII International Congress**
**Boston, Massachusetts**
**October 23-25, 1986**

The Program Committee is currently completing the task of organizing the program for LASA/86. The meeting in Boston will feature over 180 organized sessions and numerous special events such as an important plenary address, the LASA business meeting, a reception for all LASA members, a dance, and birthday banquet, a major book exhibit, film festival and film exhibit, and other events to look forward to. In addition, the Boston meeting will feature special late afternoon sessions in which topics of broad concern to LASA’s multidisciplinary membership will be discussed. Two sessions are scheduled for each day of the meeting; of the six sessions, three will consider the state of the art of important interdisciplinary topics and three will consider current issues and controversies in Latin American studies.

The program for LASA/86 will reflect a number of trends that have developed in the association over a period of years—more participation by Latin Americans, greater integration of women as participating scholars, and greater representation of literature and the arts. The Program Committee believes that LASA/86 will be a diverse and stimulating meeting and we are pleased to have benefited from the active interest of a large number of members in our planning efforts. We hope you are looking forward to the Boston congress with as much anticipation as we are.

We wish to remind session organizers that all participants must be members of LASA. We ask each of you to canvass those who will participate in your session to ensure that they have joined the organization. Session organizers should also contact Reid Andrews (Department of History, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15213) immediately if they wish to apply for LASA’s limited travel funding for participants residing abroad. If you have questions about your responsibilities, please call Merilee S. Grindle (617) 495-1872.

The Program Committee for the 1986 meeting consists of Merilee S. Grindle (Chair), Harvard University; G. Reid Andrews, University of Pittsburgh; Viviane Márquez, El Colegio de México; Jaime Concha, University of California at San Diego; Florencia E. Mallon, University of Wisconsin; and LaVonne C. Poteet (Film Council coordinator), Bucknell University.

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**Report of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba**

To: Executive Committee,
Latin American Studies Association
From: Van R. Whiting, Jr., Brown University
Re: Interim Report of the LASA Task Force on Cuba

1. **Presidential proclamation and letter to the Department of State.** The most important issue to date has been the restrictions on travel imposed by the U.S. government on Cuban government officials and/or employees, ostensibly in retaliation for the suspension of the immigration agreement last spring. This ban has a chilling effect on academic exchanges. The text of the proclamation and a copy of a letter to Kenneth Skoug reaffirming LASA’s position on exchanges follow this report. Members of LASA are encouraged to write Mr. Skoug, the president, or members of Congress to express their opinions on this matter.

2. **Status of U.S. regulations.** Because of the recent changes in the U.S. interpretation of existing regulations, the Task Force presents a summary statement of U.S. policy on exchanges with Cuba as expressed by the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury. The respective offices explained current policy to me verbally; these statements are the basis for my summaries, which I

* Editor’s Note: Van R. Whiting, Jr. (Brown University), cochair with Helen Safa (Florida University), submitted the following material regarding the Task Force’s recent activities to the LASA Executive Council and requested that it be published in the LASA Forum.
checked again with each office. However, neither State nor Treasury would distribute a written statement on their policies; they emphasized the case-by-case treatment of dealings with Cuba.

3. As part of the general crackdown, the Surgeon General issued detailed instructions restricting contacts with Cuba by those under his authority. This was brought to our attention by Wayne Smith, who drafted a response, a revised version of which was sent to the surgeon general. The LASA response is attached.

4. Human rights. Although most human rights matters fall to the Task Force on Human Rights, when specific cases are brought to our attention, this Task Force decided to respond. Enclosed is a copy of a letter to Ramón Sánchez Parodi (head of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington) in response to a letter to the editor regarding the case of the jailed Cuban writer, Ariel Hidalgo [see LASA Forum, 16: 1 (Spring 1985): 6].

5. Networking. The Task Force supports efforts to collect and circulate information on current research and exchanges with Cuba. The main source of information on research and publications has been Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos, which henceforth will be published as an annual. Information should be sent in immediately, although the official deadline for inclusion in the next issue is passed, to Gerard M. LaForgia, Center for Latin American Studies, 4EO4 Forbes Quadraangle, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

6. LASA/CEA exchange. In spite of government restrictions, Helen Saffa has been able to maintain the contacts for the LASA/CEA exchange, which is supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation. The first conference on international migration in the Americas will take place in May in Havana. The Cubans have taken the initial steps for participation in the next LASA meeting in Boston. We have not yet found a home for the book exchange, but expect to resolve that shortly. Because of the present limitations on visits to the U.S. by Cuban scholars, the second conference will probably not be held in this country as initially planned.

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Presidential Documents:1
Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants
by Officers of Employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba

by the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

In light of the current state of relations between the United States and Cuba, including the May 20, 1985, statement that the Government of Cuba had decided "to suspend all types of procedures regarding the execution" of the December 14, 1984, immigration agreement between the United States and Cuba, thereby disrupting normal migration procedures between the two countries, I have determined that it is in the interest of the United States to impose certain restrictions on entry into the United States of officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), having found that the unrestricted entry of officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba into the United States would, except as provided in Section 2, be detrimental to the interests of the United States, do proclaim that:

Section 1. Entry of the following classes of Cuban nationals as nonimmigrants is hereby suspended: (a) officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba holding diplomatic or official passports; and (b) individuals who, notwithstanding the type of passport that they hold, are considered by the Secretary of State or his designee to be officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba.

Sec. 2. The suspension of entry as nonimmigrants set forth in Section 1 shall not apply to officers or employees of the Government of Cuba or the Communist Party of Cuba: (a) entering for the exclusive purpose of conducting official business at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington; at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York; or at the United Nations in New York when, in the judgment of the Secretary of State or his designee, entry for such purpose is required by the United Nations Headquarters Agreement; (b) in the case of experts on a mission of the United States on official United Nations business as representatives of nongovernmental organizations when in the judgment of the Secretary of State or his designee, entry for such purpose is required by the United Nations Headquarters Agreement; or (c) in such other cases or

categories of cases as may be designated from time to time by the Secretary of State or his designee.

Sec. 3. This Proclamation shall be effective immediately.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of Oct., in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and tenth.

Ronald Reagan

23 December 1985

Mr. Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr.
Head, Office of Cuban Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Skoug:

The Latin American Studies Association (LASA) has long been committed to the free exchange of ideas and information between peoples and countries. As members of the Cuba Task Force of LASA, we are especially concerned about the recent proclamation of the president barring travel to the United States by Cuban government officials and/or employees. Since bona fide scholars from Cuba usually travel on official passports, this proclamation imposes a serious restriction on scholarly research; in effect, it prevents U.S. scholars from hosting Cuban scholars. This will probably have a chilling effect on scholarly exchanges in both directions. As President Reagan has demonstrated in his overtures to the Soviet Union, scholarly and cultural exchanges should be a mechanism for increasing the understanding of peoples from different cultures and political systems.

Freedom of ideas and information is a basic principle of a democracy. We believe that it is counter-productive to respond to restrictions elsewhere by emulating them. But this proclamation goes far beyond reciprocity. Cuba does not impose all-inclusive prohibitions on travel by U.S. government officials, employees, or academics. It is most disturbing when the government of the United States is more restrictive than the government of Cuba.

Linkage of policies across issues areas always entails costs. By compromising our commitment to the free flow of scholarly information, we sacrifice a principle more dear than any short-term leverage we might gain.

Let us take this opportunity to reiterate the long-standing principles of the Latin American Studies Association. LASA:

— strongly supports academic and cultural exchanges between the United States and Cuba
— opposes any restriction on the free flow of information, including licensing requirements or outright censorship by either government
— opposes any restriction on the travel of artists, scholars, or other academic or cultural figures from one country to the other
— opposes the subjection of cultural and academic exchanges to the foreign policy needs of either government
— strongly supports visits to each country by academics, scholars and artists
— strongly supports policies by either country that contribute to the maintenance and expansion of cultural and academic exchanges, including the exchange of books, journals, periodicals, papers, records, tapes, films, art works, and other academic or cultural product.

Given our commitment to and encouragement of scholarly exchanges between the United States and Cuba, we urge the President to lift the restrictions announced in the proclamation. In the meantime, we urge you to use the authority granted to the Department of State to treat scholarly and cultural exchanges as exceptions to the travel ban.

Thank you for your attention to this important concern. In the defense of freedom and information, let us lead by example.

Sincerely yours,

Van R. Whiting, Jr.
Cochair, LASA Task Force on Cuba

December 30, 1985

Current Status of U.S. Regulations of Exchanges with Cuba

Under the current policy of the United States, travel by Americans to Cuba and exchanges of publications with Cuba are both regulated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Travel by Cubans to the United States is regulated by the Department of State, which must approve visa applications.

The Treasury Department is authorized to grant permission for academic research and exchanges under a
general license; no special application is needed if the terms of the general license are met. With the exceptions noted below travel transactions are approved automatically for full-time professional academics, conducting research related to Cuba, who intend to disseminate the results of their research.

Graduate students may be included under this general license, but should clear their trip with the Treasury at least by telephone. (The trip should be related to course work or degree requirements.) Undergraduate students are not included under this general license, and are not usually granted specific licenses.

A specific license must be applied for if travel is part of a contractual relationship with Cuba, or if any services, or anything else of value, are to be provided to Cuba. (This means not only no consulting but also no teaching without a specific license. A one time specific license may be granted for delivery of a lecture.) The U.S. government is especially concerned that no commercially-relevant technology be transferred to Cuba, and that applies to "human embodied" technology. Specific regulations prohibit such data transfers.

For book exchanges, again an automatic general or blanket license applies unless a contractual relationship exists (in which case a specific license will be considered upon submission of the contract to the Office of Foreign Asset Control). U.S. scholars or institutions may send to Cuba unlimited numbers of any book or journal commercially or freely available in the United States. Single copies of Cuban publications may be imported under the terms of the general license. Multiple copies, copies for re-sale, or copies supplied in fulfillment of a contractual agreement may be sent only after authorization of a specific license. Single copies of various publications may be shipped together for convenience.

In general, individual book exchanges and scholarly visits to Cuba may proceed unhindered by Treasury regulations, under the conditions stated above. For further information, contact Katherine Mann at Treasury: (202) 376-0395.

U.S. Regulations of Visits of Cubans to the United States

Under the terms of a recent Presidential Proclamation, the interpretation of regulations on travel by Cubans to the United States has been substantially tightened. In general, no Cuban government official and/or employee nor any member of the Cuban Communist Party will be granted a visa to visit the United States. Because Cuban academics normally use official passports, this effectively bars academic exchanges of scholars unless specific permission is granted by the Department of State.

The State Department is authorized to approve exceptions to the travel ban. However, according to he Office of Cuban Affairs, each request for visa will be considered individually by the visa office of the Department of State, in consultation with other offices of the U.S. government. There are no general exemptions for academics.

Under these regulations, no general exemption will be granted for Cuban academics to reciprocate the visits of U.S. scholars to Cuba. Any given visa application may be approved or denied. For more information contact: Kenneth Skoug, Director, or Catherine Barry, Consular Officer, Office of Cuban Affairs, Department of State, (202) 632-9272.

November 25, 1985
C. Everett Koop, M.D.
The Surgeon General
Office of International Health
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Koop:
The Latin American Studies Association (LASA) is the national association of scholars in all disciplines working on Latin America. The LASA Task Force on Cuba, with a mandate to encourage scholarly exchanges between the United States and Cuba, has received a copy of your memo of July 11, 1985 (attached). The policy you announce therein is of deep concern to us. We hope you will consider the medical and scientific implications of this policy. Does "linkage" of activities under your control to general foreign policy goals under the control of the Department of State result in either good science or good medicine? We think not.

We do not challenge your authority to demand that all Public Health Service employees clear with you any exchanges or other activities related to Cuba. Our concerns are two: first, the substance of the policy (namely, to inhibit professional contacts between the United States and Cuba); and second, the process of subjecting professional scientific pursuits to political review by the Department of State, thereby accepting the primacy of those political ends.

The clear implication of your memorandum is to discourage contacts with Cuba in the health field. The policy is apparently based on the Department of State's assertion that health, as it applies to Cuba, is not an apolitical field. The basis for this assertion is weak. The State Department's only justification is, in effect, that Cuba publicizes its accomplishments in the health field "to attract third world appreciation of the 'Cuban model'. . ." Yet virtually every government points to the most successful areas of its national endeavors in order to enhance its own prestige in the eyes of the world. Is this sufficient reason
to inhibit scientific and medical research by Americans and Cubans?

The process of review that you propose is also troublesome. You seem to accept unquestioningly the subordination of the legitimate scientific and medical research concerns under your authority to the decisions of the Department of State, whose criteria are inherently political. Are medical and scientific exchanges a threat to the national security of the United States? If not, what other criteria do you accept as more important than the advancement of science? As you yourself point out, the Department of State makes a political decision on a case-by-case basis. Since there are no specified criteria for approval, long term and sustained scientific and medical research is inhibited. Do you accept without question the imposition of unspecified non-medical political criteria on the work of those under your authority?

The Department of State accuses the Cubans of promoting the advancement of health and medicine for political ends. We hope that the United States government will not inhibit the advancement of medical and health related research and cooperation for political ends.

We welcome your responses.

Sincerely yours,

Helen Safa
Cochair

Van R. Whiting, Jr.
Cochair, LASA Task Force on Cuba

December 30, 1985

Ramón Sánchez Parodi
Head, Cuban Interest Section
2360 16th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

Dear Mr. Sánchez Parodi:

As you know, the LASA Task Force on Cuba is committed to the improvement of scholarly relations between the United States and Cuba.

We are also charged with monitoring the conditions of human rights in Cuba, especially with relation to the scholarly community. For the most part, this function falls to another LASA group, the Task Force on Human Rights. But when a specific case is brought to our attention, we must demand a clarification.

The case of Ariel Hidalgo is a case in point. The enclosed letter, published in the LASA Forum, raises serious concerns about the conditions for academic freedom and for judicial process in Cuba. Freedom of opinion is essential for open scholarly endeavors. If the description contained in the enclosed letter is accurate, Ariel Hidalgo was convicted for expressing his opinions, not for taking any subversive action. The conditions of his trial suggest that he was not allowed to present an adequate defense. Finally, the conditions of his imprisonment seem unjustifiably harsh.

We ask that you make immediate inquiries into the case of Ariel Hidalgo. Given the conditions stated in Samuel Farber's letter, we call upon the Cuban government to release Ariel Hidalgo.

Let us take this opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to academic freedom, as well as our continued commitment to the expansion and improvement of contact between the scholarly communities of Cuba and the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Van R. Whiting, Jr.
Cochair, LASA Task Force on Cuba

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**Conferences**

**Central America: Global Perspectives:** On April 18-19, 1986, SUNY-Albany will sponsor a major conference entitled, "Central America and the United States: Global and Regional Perspectives." Costa Rican scholars Manuel Araya, Hugo Murillo, and Ronald Fernández will be among the guest speakers. Other guest speakers include Eldon Kenworthy from Cornell University, a representative of the U.S. State Department, and Carlos Astiz, Robert Carmack, Jorge Klor de Alva, and Daniel Levy from SUNY-Albany. For more information, contact Dr. Daniel Levy, Conference Chair, Dept. of Educational Administration and Policy Studies, SUNY-Albany, Albany, N.Y. 12222, or call 518/442-4890.

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**North Central Council of Latin Americanists (NCCLA):** NCCLA is soliciting papers for its annual fall meeting to be held at Viterbo College in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, on October 2-4, 1986. Papers are invited from any academic field, and multidisciplinary topics are encouraged. This year, the NCCLA will hold a special panel on "Latin America and the Transition to Democracy," and interdisciplinary papers are especially welcomed. The NCCLA is a regional group of faculty and
students of Latin American studies in the upper midwest of the United States. Participation from Latin Americanists outside the region covered by the NCCLA is always invited. Those interested in presenting a paper should send an abstract to the program chair, before May 1, 1986: Harold E. Hinds, Jr., Division of Social Sciences, University of Minnesota-Morris, MN 56267. Telephone: 612/589-4753. Individuals seeking information about the organization should contact NCCLA Secretariat, Center for Latin America, P.O. Box 413, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Telephone: 414/963-5986. All members who present papers at the conference are eligible for the NCCLA Research and Teaching Awards.

Minnesota Association for Latin American Studies: The 1986 annual meeting of the Midwest Association for Latin American Studies will convene at St. Louis University and Washington University in St. Louis September 25-27. The conference theme will be "War and Peace in Latin America." Proposals for papers or completely organized sessions on this topic (broadly defined) are welcome. Requests are solicited from all disciplines. For information contact Charles Fleener, Department of History, St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO.

Society for Ethnomusicology: The 31st annual meeting of the Society for Ethnomusicology will be held October 16-19, 1986 at the Eastman School of Music, Rochester, New York. There will be a preconference symposium on Native American music, October 15. For information contact Stephen Blum, Music Department, York University, 4700 Keele St., Downsview, Ont. M3J 1P3.

The Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies will meet April 2-5, 1986, at Stanley Hotel, Estes Park, Colorado. For information contact Robert Ferry, University of Colorado. Telephone: 303/492-6683.

The New England Council of Latin American Studies will cohost the LASA Congress, October 23-25, 1986, to be held at Park Plaza Hotel, Boston, Mass. Contact the LASA Secretariat for more information.

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**Announcements**

**Corrections**

Please note the following corrections in Alfred Saulnier's article, "The Peruvian President's Economic Dilemmas," appearing in the Winter, 1986 LASA Forum.

p. 18: "Currently, automotive and transport equipment manufacturing has recovered its 1978 level. Reactivation of the remaining most depressed manufacturing subsectors..."

p. 19: Balance of Payments (Millions of dollars): Change in net reserves (-increase)

p. 21: "Third, the early weeks of the new administration were marked by a rash of apparent policy inconsistencies. As an example, on August 1, the agriculture minister announced a price freeze on 10 basic food items; this was followed by the prime minister's announcement of a generalized price freeze, followed in turn by price hikes for public enterprise products; the list of basic foodstuffs was expanded on August 9, the same day that the freeze was rescinded for perishable food items. Certainly, much initial confusion arises from transitional administrative friction as new lines of authority evolve."

**Comparative Politics:** Deadline for this position at the University of Pennsylvania (LASA Forum, Winter 1986) is past. The search committee asks that no further applications be submitted.

**ScholarNet Academic Computing Network:** ScholarNet is a new electronic networking service for scholars in the humanities and social sciences. Through this telecommunications network, scholars in 65 countries can communicate readily with each other.

ScholarNet initially consists of PoliNet, for political scientists and public administrators, and HumaNet, for scholars in the humanities. Thanks to these services, researchers can communicate quickly and inexpensively with their peers around the world via electronic mail. Joint research projects will be greatly facilitated. The networks will provide news specific to many scholarly disciplines. National and international organizations can post newsletters, meeting schedules, job openings, and the like, electronically.

The network effectively extends the range of a professor's colleagues from those within a single department to anywhere served by the electronic system. Each network includes a variety of forums, targeted at specific topics and interest within the various disciplines. Scholars wishing to serve as online editors for a special forum (such as the Bicentennial of the Constitution; U.S.-Central Amer-
ican policy; software simulations, etc.) should contact the ScholarNet.

An initial subscription to PoliNet or HumaNet costs $29.95 for an individual or $100 for an academic department. For departmental accounts, a number of subaccounts may be administered with individual billing. Online fees are $9 per hour during off-hours, and $18 from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. on weekdays. Subscribers must have a microcomputer or terminal, communications software, telephone line, and modem (no extra charge for 1200 baud). Access with 2400 baud modems is also supported with a surcharge.

The subscription fee also provides access to all services of Delphi, host system for ScholarNet. A service of General Videotex Corporation, Delphi includes recreational and business features and a convenient gateway to the databases of Dialog Information Services. In addition, PoliNet subscribers can access HumaNet and vice versa. Subscribers will also have access to future networks planned for other disciplines.

For further information, contact Richard W. Slatta, ScholarNet, North Carolina State University, Raleigh NC 27695-8101. Telephone: 919-737-7908. Send electronic mail to CompuServe 70156,404 or Delphi "ScholarNet." Send subscription requests directly to Delphi, General Videotex Corp., 3 Blackstone St., Cambridge MA 02139; telephone: 800-544-4005.

Scholars’ Information Network on Chile: A scholars' network on Chile was formed during the Allende period and continued its activities for several years after the Pinochet coup d'état. The Chile Network was initially involved in countering the distortions and disinformation concerning developments under the democratic socialist government as well as actively and vigorously opposing the interventionism of the U.S. government. Through writing and speeches, public meetings and conferences, the Chile Network sought to provide the U.S. public with information relevant to the formulation of a democratic foreign policy. The Network intensified its activities subsequent to the military's intervention. Members of the Chile Network were prominent in a broad range of activities from organizing meetings to defend human rights to participating in congressional hearings, opposing aid to the military dictatorship.

The long duration of the Pinochet regime and the decline of public opposition made it difficult for the members of the Chile Network to sustain public concern for events in Chile. Human rights organizations continued to monitor abuses and some headway was made in securing congressional restrictions on U.S. aid to the dictatorship. However, in the absence of a highly visible and vocal opposition in Chile and with the immediacy of events in Central America, many members of the Chile Network moved on to new activities.

Since 1981, the situation in Chile has changed dramatically. The foreign credit-induced economic boom of 1977-1981 collapsed. Social and political discontent became generalized; middle-class professionals as well as industrialists and even landlords who formerly embraced the military dictatorship joined in demanding a return to democracy. Mass demonstrations by labor unions, students and neighborhood organizations have defied the state of siege. The level of popular activity has intensified, the scope has widened to include the great majority of the labor force—and the regime has increased its use of torture, disappearances, and jailings.

As the conflict in Chile intensifies, there is an increasing need to re-establish a network of scholars capable of providing the American public with informed analysis of the rapidly changing situation. This letter is to invite you to join with us in establishing the CHILE INFORMATION NETWORK. Activities of the network could include conferences, publications, a speakers' service, ideas for new research on the impact of the military dictatorship, as well as the distribution of literature, films, and videotapes coming from today's Chile.

We invite all interested scholars, writers, and activists to join in establishing the Chile Information Network. Through our common efforts we can work toward creating a movement in the United States in support of the Chilean people's struggle for democracy.

For further information, contact David J. Kalke, James Petras, or Victor Wallis, Chile Center for Education & Development, P.O. Box 20179, Cathedral Finance Station, New York, NY 10025.

Study/Travel for Undergraduates: Films and Politics: In 1986-1987, a semester in Latin America will be included for the first time by the International Honors Program (IHP). The IHP has a 25-year tradition of travel-study programs consisting of an interdisciplinary curriculum taught by each year's faculty in a number of different countries. The program is most commonly taken in the junior year; credit for it has been granted by many U.S. universities. The overall title of the 1986-1987 program is "Film and Politics in Europe and Latin America." The Latin American semester (January-May, 1987) will include 7 weeks in Brazil and 3 weeks each in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico. It will be jointly taught by Robert Stam (Department of Cinema Studies, New York University), and Victor Wallis (Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Indianapolis). The European semester
(September-December, 1986) will include stays in England, France, Germany, Hungary, and Italy. It will be jointly taught by Eric Rentschler (Film Studies Program, University of California, Irving) and Victor Wallis. For catalogue and application contact Victor Wallis, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN 46202. Telephone: 317/264-4066.

**tecNICA**, a project of technical assistance in Nicaragua, is recruiting volunteers to spend two weeks in Nicaragua providing technical assistance in areas of engineering, agronomy, communications, medicine, chemicals, and computers. The volunteers pay for all their expenses, including airfare, and administrative fees. tecNICA arranges job placements, housing, meals, transportation, weekend activities, and interviews with representatives of various sectors within Nicaraguan society and political life. For more information and applications, contact tecNIC, 110 Brookside Dr., Berkeley, CA 94705. Telephone: 415/654-7768.

**Fulbright Awards:** The Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES) has announced the opening of competition for the 1987-1988 Fulbright grants. CIES participates with the U.S. Information Agency in administering the Fulbright Scholar Awards in research and university lecturing abroad. The basic eligibility requirements for a Fulbright Award are U.S. citizenship; Ph.D. or comparable professional qualifications; university or college teaching experience; and, for selected assignment, proficiency in a foreign language. Application deadlines for the awards are June 15, 1986, Latin America and the Caribbean, and February 1, 1987, for Spain research fellowships. For more information and applications, call or write Council for International Exchange of Scholars, Eleven Dupont Circle N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-1257. Telephone: 202/939-5401.

**Manuscripts Invited:** The Foreign and Comparative Studies Program of Syracuse University is seeking manuscripts for possible publication in its Latin American monograph series. The editorial committee will consider manuscripts longer than journal articles, but shorter than book length. Prospective authors should send the table of contents, the preface or introductory chapter, a brief description and indication of length, and curriculum vita to FACS PUBLICATIONS, attn: Mary Beth Ritter, 119 College Place, Syracuse, NY 13244.

**Call for Manuscripts:** The Latin American monograph series at Ohio University is currently soliciting scholarly works in all disciplines related to Latin America. Manuscripts should range between 80 and 150 single-spaced, typed pages (or equivalent for other manners of spacing). Final selection will be on the basis of quality of scholarship, clarity of expression, and the estimated importance of the topic to the scholarly community. Manuscripts (with self-addressed, stamped envelope for return) or inquiries should be sent to Thomas W. Walker, Editor, Latin American Monograph Series, Center for International Studies, Burson House, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701.

**Research Findings on 1980 Cuban and Haitian Migrants Announced:** Popular opinion to the contrary, recent waves of Cuban and Haitian refugees arrived in the U.S. with significant levels of experience. Despite such characteristics, however, the experience of these groups here has been one of economic hardship and overt discrimination.

These are the conclusions emerging from a major new study by sociologists Alejandro Portes of Johns Hopkins University, Juan Clark of Miami-Dade Community College, and FIU anthropologist Alex Stepick. The three researchers presented their preliminary findings at a press conference at Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center on October 3, 1985.

Data were collected through extensive surveys of the two refugee populations carried out in late 1983 and early 1984, approximately three years after their arrival in the U.S. For each group, interviews were sought at every household with at least one refugee member on randomly selected blocks within areas of high Cuban and Haitian population in South Florida. In all, 514 Cubans and 499 Haitians were interviewed.

The Cuban sample was 64 percent male and had a median age of 34, while the Haitian respondents were 41 percent male with a median age of 29. In terms of background, the 1980 (or "Mariel") Cubans were found to have slightly greater educational achievement, urban experience, and occupational status at the time of their entry than those documented by previous research for Cuban immigrants in the early 1970s. The Haitian refugees ranked significantly lower in these categories than the Cubans, but substantially above the national averages for Haiti. Thus, neither group conformed to the popular U.S. image of them as the impoverished dregs of their respective societies.

Nonetheless, both groups were found to suffer profound economic disadvantages here in the U.S. Male unemployment at the time of interviews was 26 percent for
Mariel refugees, as compared with rates of 14 percent for the 1970 Cubans three years after their arrival and 7 percent for the U.S. Cuban population nationwide. Male Haitian refugees fared even worse, suffering 39 percent unemployment versus a rate of 12 percent for the overall U.S. Haitian population. Meanwhile, 26 percent of Mariel Cuban households fell below the poverty level, more than three times the compared figure of the preceding immigrant group. Fully 61 percent of Haitian refugee households were below poverty level, more than double the figure for all U.S. Haitian households.

These problems were compounded by the refugees' perception of discrimination against them, particularly the Mariel group. A surprising finding here was that prejudice was perceived to be much worse on the part of other Cubans than along the "Anglo" population. Fifty-two percent of the Mariel refugees reported experiencing discrimination by earlier Cuban immigrants, while 23 percent said they had been discriminated against by Anglos. In contrast, 20 percent of the Haitian refugees reported discrimination against them by black Americans.

Portes, Clark, and Stepick offer a number of explanations for the relative and absolute economic difficulties faced by the recent immigrant groups. For one thing, unlike the earlier Cuban waves, neither Mariel Cubans nor the Haitians were classified as political refugees in the U.S., thus depriving them of various assistance programs. For another, neither group possessed the extensive kin and friendship networks here in the U.S. that facilitated the adjustment of earlier Cuban immigrants. Where the 1970 Cuban wave had an average of 10.2 friends and family, members awaiting their arrival in the U.S., the Mariel Cubans averaged only 3.0 and the Haitians only 1.5 for their relations.

In part, the severity of the Haitians' problems is attributed to their lower educational and other status attributes with respect to the Mariel group. However, the researchers place more emphasis on the lack of a Haitian economic enclave comparable to Miami's Cuban community. Notwithstanding the discriminatory attitudes toward the Mariel group within the latter enclave, it serves them as a very important source of employment, particularly in initial periods, where the lack of knowledge of English may hamper immigrant access to other labor markets.

The three researchers recommend increased Federal and local government action in the areas of job and language training, support for small businesses, and employment creation as means toward alleviating refugee difficulties. They also would seek to dispel prejudicial attitudes toward these refugees among the U.S. population at large and within the Cuban community in particular as partly unjustified and partly self-fulfilling.

A new series of interviews with both refugee groups is scheduled to get under way in early 1986 in order to further chart their progress, or lack thereof, in adapting to their new country of residence. The research project is supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation and is administered by the Johns Hopkins University, in association with the FIU Latin American and Caribbean Center.

U.S.-Mexico Project of the Overseas Development Council: The U.S.-Mexico Project has provided a forum for the exchange of ideas among key actors of the bilateral relationship for the past six years. The main objective is to encourage communication among leading policymakers from both the public and private sectors of the United States and Mexico. The project has held eight major binational meetings, establishing a network of contacts among academicians, government officials, and the private sector in Mexico and the United States; created a permanent forum in Washington, D.C., for off-the-record discussion of key mutual problems; and disseminated the results of its policy-related research in both countries through publications, meetings, and press conferences. In October 1986, the project will be publishing a volume entitled, *The U.S. and Mexico: Face to Face with New Technology*, highlighting the linkages between development issues and global technological change. The focus will be on the options available to public and private sector policymakers in the United States and Mexico. For more information on the project or the volume, please write to Cathryn Thorup, Director, U.S.-Mexico Project, Overseas Development Council, 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

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**Research & Study Opportunities**

**LASA Field Seminar in Nicaragua:** The LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua will conduct a second two-week field seminar for LASA members in Nicaragua during the first two weeks of August of this year. As was the case with the first such seminar in June 1985, this one is designed to introduce established Latin Americans and advanced graduate students who have not worked previously in Nicaragua to some of the variety of institutions, people, resources, protocols, and methods for studying Nicaragua, teaching about it, and doing research there. Participants will be exposed to various social science "think tanks," academic institutions, and research facilities.
A second objective will be to give LASA scholars a close-up view of the multifaceted reality of revolutionary Nicaragua. The group will have discussion and interview sessions with important political and social actors from across the political spectrum, including representatives of the church, the mass media, the business community, the mass organizations, the diplomatic community, the government, the military, etc.

Though much of the time will be spent in Managua, trips outside of the city to a variety of rural communities are also envisioned. Throughout the seminar an effort will be made to accommodate individual interests through special interviews.

Unless there are unforeseen price changes, the entire seminar, including living expenses, in-country transportation, round-trip group airfare between Miami (or New Orleans or Houston) and Managua, will cost $1200 per person. (Bona fide graduate students will receive $200 discount.) The group will be limited to 15-18 participants plus the co-coordinators. Participants must be Spanish-speaking LASA members. All philosophical and political points of view are welcomed.

Each applicant must submit a current résumé, a 250-500 word letter of application explaining what she or he expects to gain professionally from the seminar, and a deposit of $100. The participants will be selected primarily on the basis of the potential relevance of the seminar to their professional plans as outlined in that letter. An effort will also be made to balance the group in terms of gender, discipline, and region of origin. The deadline for the first round of selection is June 2. Qualified late applicants will be included if space permits. Since graduate students and professors are normally exempt from U.S. travel bans, it is expected that the seminar will take place even in the event that the U.S. breaks diplomatic relations and imposes a Cuba-style travel ban.

The co-coordinators of the seminar will be Tom Walker and Nola Reinhardt. For more information write or call Prof. Nola Reinhardt, Dept. of Economics, Smith College, Northampton, MA 01063 (413/584-2700, ext. 3617), or Prof. Thomas W. Walker, Dept. of Political Science, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701 (614/594-5495, or 5626).

Global Education Summer Institute on Latin America: The Department of Puerto Rican, Latin American, and Caribbean Studies at SUNY-Albany is sponsoring a two-week, 6 credit, Global Education Institute on Latin America to be held at the Albany campus July 7-18, 1986. The main objective of the institute is to provide teachers and others interested educators with information, methodology, strategies, activities, and resources for introducing Latin American cultural and linguistic diversity into the classroom. For more information contact: Dept. of PRLACS, SUNY-Albany, Albany, NY 12222. Telephone: 518/442-4890.

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**Employment Opportunities**

**Economics:** California State Polytechnic University-Pomona invites applications for the position of assistant professor, Economics. Salary range is $26,496 to $29,064 per academic year, depending on qualifications and experience. Teaching load is 12 weighted teaching units per quarter (normally three courses per quarter). Teaching areas must include principles of economics and intermediate economic theory. In addition, the candidate should have a concentration in two or more of the following fields: business & government/industrial organization; labor/manpower economics; transportation & public utilities. Academic advising of students is also required, as is participation in departmental, school, and university matters, including appropriate committees. Teaching responsibilities will include both undergraduate and graduate, day and evening courses. The candidate must have a Ph.D. in economics (by date of application). Candidates will be expected to demonstrate (1) substantial preparation in business & government/industrial organization; labor/manpower economics; transportation and public utilities; (2) ability to teach principles and intermediate economics; and (3) ability to teach in two or more of the following fields: business & government/industrial organization; labor/manpower economics; and transportation & public utilities. One or more years of university teaching or professional experience is preferred (related to specialized fields listed above). Please request an application form from Mr. James E. Sutton, Chair, Search Committee, Economics Department, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, 3801 W. Temple Avenue, Pomona, CA 91768. Telephone: 714/598-4563. Deadline for completed application is April 4, 1986.

**Dean, International Relations:** The University of California, San Diego invites applications for the position of dean of the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, effective July 1, 1986. The school is to be a major center for professional graduate education, research, and public information on international relations with a focus on the Pacific Basin, particularly East Asia and Latin America. Emphasis will be placed on international economics and management, international politics and public policy, and comparative studies of the Pacific Basin region. Two-year master’s degree, doctoral degree, and mid-career certificate programs are currently being planned. It is hoped that the first students will be admitted for fall 1987. It is anticipated that by 1992 the school will have 400 students and 35 FTE faculty positions. Candidates should have strong academic credentials in teaching and research, demonstrated administrative ability, and a commitment to building a substantial new program. Salary
is commensurate with qualifications and should be submitted by March 1, 1986, to Dr. William McGill, Chair, Search Committee, Office of Academic Affairs, Q001, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093.

**Director:** The School of Education, University of Pittsburgh, is seeking a senior faculty member to serve as director of the Institute for International Studies in Education. The responsibilities of the director include working with faculty and students to develop and fund research proposals; establishing linkage with universities and research institutes worldwide; maintaining contacts with international donor and funding agencies; and supervising the programs of the Institute, including workshops for foreign educators and academics. The director is also expected to teach courses in one of the three academic departments in the school—Administrative and Policy Studies, Learning and Instruction, Psychology in Education. Candidates for the position should have a distinguished record of international research and service as well as sufficient publications and teaching experience to merit appointment with tenure. Experience in working with major public and private international funding agencies and familiarity with their educational assistance policies are also expected. Interested individuals should write to Prof. Don Adams, Chairman, Search Committee, 5T01 Forbes Quadrangle, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Copies of a curriculum vita and names of several potential references should be included. Applications from qualified women, minorities, and Third World scholars are particularly encouraged. Submissions are due by April 30, 1986. The University of Pittsburgh is an affirmative action, equal opportunity employer.

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**Professor of Latin American Studies:** The University of New Mexico invites applications and nominations for a senior faculty position in Latin American studies. Applicants may represent any discipline contributing to Latin American studies. The position will carry tenure in the appropriate department with half-time teaching duties and a half-time research appointment in the Latin American Institute. Salary and date of appointment are negotiable. The position is contingent on the availability of funding. The University of New Mexico has an enrollment of 24,000 students and a faculty of over 1,100 persons. Its 26 degree programs of Latin American concentration attract about 8,000 course enrollments annually. The Latin American Institute is a federally-funded National Resource Center for Latin America, has 150 affiliated faculty, and published the *Latin American Research Review*. The UNM Latin American library collection has approximately 235,000 volumes. UMN is an affirmative action, equal opportunity employer. Please send letters of nomination or application, along with supporting materials and names of references by June 1, 1986, to Chair, Search Committee for Professor of Latin American Studies, Latin American Institute, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131.

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**Publications**

*Public Enterprise: An International Bibliography*:
Compiled by Alfred H. Sautners. Austin: Office of Public Sector Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1986. 469 pp. Indexed. Printed on acid-free paper. $24.95 paper (ISBN 0-86728-013-X). $37.50 cloth (ISBN 0-86728-014-X). Public enterprises produce or sell goods or services and have become public for a variety of reasons, including ideological predilection, national security, natural and economic disasters, or rescue failing private forms, and sheer accident. Many of them head the large company rankings in their country. Neglected as a topic of academic research until recently, public enterprises are increasingly subject to serious academic and politically motivated scrutiny. This bibliography was prepared specifically to help promote study of the topic. It includes a heavy dose of recent, often unpublished material and should serve as a useful reference tool for scholars, researchers, government officials, and international advisers. For information on this and other titles in Latin American studies, write to the Publications Office, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, Sid Richardson Hall 1.310, Austin, Texas 78712.

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**Bibliography of Latin American and Caribbean Bibliographies, 1984-1985.** SALALM Bibliography and Reference Series, 15. (February 1986, 128 pp., 613 entries) was compiled by Lionel Loroha. Please order from the SALALM Secretariat, Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706. Price is $8
(U.S.), plus $2 (U.S.) for postage and handling. Prepayment is requested and checks must be in U.S. currency and made payable to the SALALM Secretariat. (Please do not make checks payable to the University of Wisconsin.)

The Testaments of Culhuacan: Recently the UCLA Latin American Center published, as the first number of a series, under the general editorship of James Lockhart, The Testaments of Culhuacan (281 pp.), edited by S. L. Cline and Miguel León-Portilla. Quite rough in external appearance (the volume's shoestring budget included nothing for promotion), the edition nevertheless contains reliable, authentic transcriptions and state-of-the-art translations of the largest known homogeneous body of mundane texts in older Nahua. Aside from the broad subject matter and consequent huge potential of the texts, their repeating formulas make them excellent practice material for beginning students of the language. The book costs $17, plus $1.27 postage, and can be ordered from the UCLA Latin American Center, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

Bibliography on Women in Spanish America: The Office of Women in International Development at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign has prepared an annotated bibliography of Spanish-language materials on women in Spanish America. It is intended for researchers, policymakers, and course instructors, and for students wishing to incorporate Spanish language materials in preparing research papers. It is part of a series of publications on women in the developing world prepared with support from the U.S. Department of Education. The bibliography exists in a "Student's Version"—with annotations in Spanish—and in an "Instructor's Version"—annotated in English. It is available for $3.50 (including U.S. postage or surface mail postage outside the U.S.) from the Office of Women in International Development, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 324 Coble Hall, 801 South Wright Street, Champaign, IL 61820.

Recent Publications from Florida International University/Tinker Foundation Central American Research Program—Occasional Papers Series:

OPS 10 **Crosby, Benjamin L. "Divided We Stand, Divided We Fall: Public-Private Sector Relations in Central America." May 1985.

* also available in English translation
** also available in Spanish translation

Occasional Papers are available at $4.00 each. Make checks payable to "Latin American and Caribbean Center," and send to Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, Tamiami Campus, Miami, Florida 33199.

Hoy Internacional, the Bolivian daily, publishes a weekly summary of the news for air mail delivery. The weekly news gives timely statistics and focuses on economic and political matters. Editorials and columns by such personages as Augusto César and Carlos Serrate provide analyses of the country's affairs. The subscription in the Americas is $90 annually, $8 monthly, or $2 an issue. For Europe, Asia, and Africa, the respective rates are $110, $10, and $2. To subscribe, write to Hoy Internacional, Casilla 477, La Paz, Bolivia.

Medieval Iberian Tradition: What is the nature of the great hacienda debate which produced the subspecialty of Mexican rural history? Why is the hacienda so difficult for scholars to define and understand? What are the medieval Iberian and Mesoamerican origins of the great estate? What are the origins of common lands in Mexico? Should peasant economies be defined by their commercial functions rather than by an absence of commercial function? How do social norms direct capital investment? What are the economic functions of the Iberian testamentary system and how does it relate to Hispanic commercial kinship patterns? These are some of the issues investigated in Medieval Iberian Tradition and the Development of the Mexican Hacienda, by William Schell, Jr. This book, the eighth volume in the Latin American Series published by Syracuse University's Foreign and Comparative Studies Program, represents an attempt to synthesize the last 20 years of hacienda studies. It is the latest contribution to a long historiographic debate which has involved Magnus Mörner, James Lockhart, D. A. Brading, William Taylor, Eric Van Young, and many other scholars, and does much to revive the thesis of the great historian whose work began it all—François Chevalier. Single copies are available for $11.50 postpaid/prepaid from FACS Publications, 119 College Place, Syracuse, New York 13244.
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