Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua: A Report of the LASA Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom

(Part 2 of a 2-Part Article)

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VI. Internal Processes

Autonomy Process

Atlantic Coast autonomy is a goal desired by virtually all political factions since 1979 and, most probably, since long before that. But support for a given version of autonomy has depended on who appears to be initiating the proposal. Since 1985, the autonomy plan, first proposed by the government, has increasingly become a matter for coastal people to debate. Accordingly, the presence of the central government has been reduced and regional organizations and opinions have moved to center stage. The debate has been spirited, occasionally acrimonious, and involves more and more people and greater diversity of opinions. The goal of the two regional autonomy commissions is to involve all coastal citizens in the autonomy debate.

MISURASATA views this process as one of unilateral imposition of Sandinista ideas and control and argues that the only real autonomy can come after direct negotiations between MISURASATA and the government to establish conditions for genuine participation. MISURASATA feels that without conditions—explicit recognition of nonnegotiable Indian rights, witnessed by external observers and guarantors—the autonomy process will be too much under the control of the Sandinistas.

The position of MISURA and KISAN’s Honduras and Miami leadership is a total repudiation of the autonomy proposal, although several MISURA and KISAN military commanders inside Nicaragua have begun to participate actively in the autonomy discussion.

To date, while there is no universal consensus about autonomy, there is enough suggestive material in the government draft that the population of the coast has begun to take it seriously. In our view, a genuine effort to expand participation was occurring. There was no evidence of coercion or exclusion of participants because of their views or their identification with MISURA, MISURASATA, or even KISAN. Indeed, most people stated that the process could not succeed without the active participation of the insurgents.

While we were there in August, workshops were being held to prepare “promoters” who would organize community discussion and solicit reaction to the

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declaration of principles document. Called "consultations" (\textit{consultas}), these community discussions were being publicized with the popular comic books used for other government programs in health and education. The comics made explicit that the process was on-going and that the declaration of principles was an initial draft and could be modified by the ideas and interests expressed in the \textit{consultas}. The comics, published in English, Spanish, and Miskito, end with an appeal to participate and make one's own views known. The English version says, "Autonomy is a project for everyone, it is not finished and needs the suggestions of all the indigenous people and communities of the Atlantic Coast. This is your project. Let's all participate. Make your point of view known."

In Zelaya Norte, the regional autonomy commission felt the need to reestablish its legitimacy within the Miskito community. The regional commission called an assembly of delegates of the communities to discuss participation in the autonomy process and to submit themselves to election to ratify their representation of the Miskito community. During this assembly, on August 17th and 18th, zonal committees were named, i.e., working groups to cover subregions of Zelaya Norte, within which communities would elect representatives to the commission. A peace commission was also named. Its job was to speak to the combatants and to urge them to participate in the autonomy \textit{consulta}.

In Zelaya Sur, at first the commission was quite open-ended and virtually any interested citizen could participate. Then, in December, a more clearly defined Creole group has emerged. They advocate disenfranchisement of mestizos not born on the coast. This emergent ethnic nationalism is an expected consequence of the autonomy discussion. Thus far, this ethnic advocacy has characterized the Miskitos, but as the process progresses and the ethnic dimension is more overtly acknowledged, we may expect to see a similar posture on the part of the Sumos as well.

During the Fall of 1985, the role of the national autonomy commission was virtually eliminated. Now, the process is in the hands of the two regional commissions. The southern commission is coordinated by Rojas, and the national coordinator is Ray Hooker, member of the original national commission, and a native of Bluefields. So, the structure of the autonomy commissions has become decentralized and completely coastal in membership.

Johnny Hodgson and Yolanda Campbell, another member of the southern regional autonomy commission, stated in January 1986 in Managua, that the \textit{consulta} was finished in the south on November 30, 1985. By the end of the year, the major results were tabulated. The tabulation yielded five major areas that concerned the population. They are, in order of importance: a) the utilization of natural resources, i.e., the need to return proceeds from resource exploitation to the communities; b) the nature and functioning of the proposed regional government, especially with regard to ethnic representation; c) the creation of a center of higher education and the extension of the bilingual education program (English); d) the ability to generate regional self-sufficiency through trade within the Caribbean region; and e) new means of guaranteeing regional security and defense with local people, including the insurgents, who are strongly opposed to the entry of the FDN into southern Zelaya.

The northern commission has not advanced as rapidly in its \textit{consulta} largely due to the fluctuating atmosphere of conflict as well as occasional, local outbreaks of hostilities. Marcelo Zuñiga, a member of the commission, said that the outreach part, i.e., dissemination of the literature, was 90 percent completed in January 1986, but that the actual community discussions through assemblies was only 60 percent done. The least well covered areas are in the mines region (Siuna, Rosita, and Bonanza) because the FDN had entered there trying to create a supply line to its forces in Boaco and Chontales.

René Enríquez, director of the social action arm of the Moravian Church (IDSIM) in Puerto Cabezas, stated that the preliminary indications are that 90-95 percent of the population support some form of autonomy, although there has been criticism of the way the \textit{consulta} has been done.

A more official position, that of Dr. Mirna Cunningham, the regional government minister, and Hazel Lau, a federal deputy for Zelaya Norte, holds that the infrastructure for the \textit{consulta} is completely in place, democratically elected, and has essentially completed its job of involving the community.

Another Moravian church view is that of Superintendent Andy Shogreen. Rev. Shogreen stated in an interview that the government underwent a marked change in its policies toward the coast since 1983 that he characterized as "more diplomatic, more political, and less military." He counseled a patient attitude for the government and felt that the government should slow the pace of the autonomy discussion until it was more widely understood and accepted. He said there was still too much government presence on the commission and that it should become more open to a wider spectrum of opinion.

The differences in view as to the success of the \textit{consulta} are accompanied by vigorous debate and action by the members of the commission. In Zelaya Norte, the issue of the legitimacy of the commission remains important. Therefore, there are a number of statements in circulation criticizing the composition and functioning of the commission. Most recently, representatives of MISATAN (see below), the Moravian church, and
CEPAD, have withdrawn from the commission, each with a similar critique concerning the excessive government presence on the commission. That does not appear to weaken public interest in autonomy, rather, it indicates how intense and important the debate is.

**Noncombatant Indigenous Groups**

MISATAN, a Miskito organization, was created in August 1984. Although it initially began work in 75 communities, it was slow to gain support; it was seen as simply another arm of the Sandinista government or the FSLN. Its leadership was more supportive of Sandinista revolutionary objectives than most of the indigenous population, but it was also critical of past government policies and supported regional autonomy. As government policy itself evolved toward allowing the return to the river and in support of autonomy, MISATAN gained more credibility in the indigenous community. Its major action has been in aiding the return to the river, and this has enhanced MISATAN's legitimacy.

MISATAN is quite open in condemning government actions during 1982-83. Since it is a Miskito organization, its general philosophy focuses on the recovery of the Miskito community and the validation of Miskito culture in the region. Rufino Lucas, in charge of legal matters for MISATAN, stated that MISATAN would become accepted as the principal Miskito organization since it was functioning in communities. It was making sure that supplies reached communities, its members were accompanying the truck convoys taking people back to the river, and it was an active voice of Miskito advocacy. In an interview in Spain, Lucas said that autonomy "gives us the room to recuperate our attributes of identity, the Miskito language may be recognized as an official language, we may reconstruct our communities, organize our work according to our traditions and govern ourselves for the first time in many centuries." 35

In the fluid and changing situation on the coast, it is often hard to identify the individual positions of major local participants. For instance, there are some, like Hazel Lau, who although closely identified with the government and the FSLN have not officially joined the Frente and maintain some distance from the official positions. Lau identifies herself as one of the founders of MISURSATA. There is also a group of Miskito intellectuals who have maintained their neutrality by not joining any established group. There appears to be considerable disagreement among the participants about the position, loyalties, and alliance of the others—some independents being variously viewed simply as government supporters or as representatives of the Miskito people, and some official government supporters viewed as working from within to promote Miskito interests.

The Miskito participants, independents, MISATAN members, and members of the Frente, are all strong supporters of the return to the river, dialogue with the insurgents, and some version of the current autonomy process. To the extent that they have defined positions on the direction the autonomy process should go, the Miskitos seek Miskito control of traditionally occupied lands, and they advocate Miskito as the single "official" language for the Miskito population with Spanish as a second language. They also support bilingual education and the maintenance and development of other indigenous and Creole languages for the other ethnic groups on the Coast. Their demands for political autonomy include the formation of a single autonomous regional government for the whole of Zelaya Department rather than the creation of separate governments for Zelaya Norte and Zelaya Sur. In a broader long-term vision, they talk about the creation of a local university to train Miskito professionals needed by the communities. Unofficially, they advocate a definition of an expanded Mosquitia, that would include that part of Honduras taken from Nicaragua by the World Court decision of 1960.

The second largest indigenous organization, SUKAWALA represents thirty-two Sumo communities, or approximately 8000 people. Reorganized on March 12, 1985, SUKAWALA seeks the return of the Sumo from two resettlement camps in Nicaragua, as well as several thousand Sumo refugees in Honduras to their original communities along the river valleys near the mining towns of Siuna, Rosita, and Bonanza. Since September 1985, the Sumos in Honduras have been actively seeking to return to Nicaragua with guarantees of their safety. In the beginning of 1986, there was steady movement of Sumo people from Honduras to the community of Musawas.

The Sumos are also working to restore their language which has been largely replaced by Miskito. Although Sumos work closely with Miskitos on issues of indigenous rights, they are concerned that their language and culture may be submerged or dominated by the Miskitos. They appear to have successfully encouraged the government to resettle mestizo settlers from some communal Sumo lands. Sumos also seek ethnic and community representation in the proposed regional assembly, fearing that their small numbers would be swamped by other ethnic groups. A long-standing leader of the Sumos, Ronas Dolores, was an active advocate of Sumo rights even under Somoza. Despite not joining the FSLN, Dolores was elected in November 1984 on the FSLN ticket as Hazel Lau's alternate to the National Assembly.

The Sumo vision of autonomy, then, places highest priority on the return to their home communities of those Sumo families who have become refugees in Honduras. It also envisions a broader and undefined restoration of their historical prominence in much of the region, the extension of the use of the Sumo language, and the revival of the

religious practices that existed prior to the Moravian conversions.

The third indigenous group, the Ramas, live in small communities in the Southern Coast near Bluefields and number less than 1000. The Ramas have become highly acculturated over time and at present there are somewhat less than two dozen speakers of Rama. The rest of the Ramas speak Creole. Their central concern appears to be to live undisturbed on Rama Key, an island which has experienced alternate occupation by guerrillas and Sandinista troops. Without their own representative organization, they nevertheless have representatives on the Regional Autonomy Commission. We were not able to interview any Rama representatives, although we did receive information about their situation from Dr. Collette Craig, a linguist, who is studying the Rama language and has recently spent time on Rama Key.

Autonomy is generating a sense of group consciousness among the Creoles and the Sumo. This renewed sense of ethnic identity coexists with a general coastal identity that provides a unity within this diversity. These various identities are the elements of a genuine multiethnic society, something that the Atlantic Coast may well provide an example of for the rest of Latin America.

Nonindigenous Organizations

The Creole population of Zelaya Sur is quite significant in the autonomy discussion (see below). But its social organization is such that there is no one internal organization that speaks for the entire community. Perhaps, the Regional Autonomy Commission of Zelaya Sur would come closest to this description. The Moravian church is deeply involved in community affairs and is one of the community’s representatives as well.

One central problem in the process of autonomy is the role and representation of the large mestizo population on the coast. This population represents a numerical majority, about 65 percent of the coastal population, living a peasant existence in small communities and in isolated homesteads. While the interests of this population are presumably represented by the Sandinista government, these local mestizos, like the Creole community, have ethnic organizations of their own. Nor are they represented well by the more developed mass organizations such as the farmworkers’ association (ATC) or the women’s organization (AMNLAZE).

Religious Organizations

The Moravian church has been an active participant in all the significant issues pertaining to the Atlantic Coast. Since almost all communities have a resident Moravian pastor, the church’s experience with events since the revolution has been direct and intimate. The Rev. Norman Bent is the national director of the social action arm of the church (IDSIM) and expresses the view of the church leadership and of some of the village pastors. In his view, the church supports reconciliation, dialogue, family reunification, and peace—all with maximal community participation. After detailing the heavy-handed Sandinista effort to bring the revolution to the coast, he stated that, of late, the government has acknowledged its errors and is now acting in good faith, in a "courageous and humble" fashion. In August 1985, he felt that the autonomy process was moving faster than local people could absorb it. He felt it necessary to include all factions, including the insurgents. He also pointed out that the church is not a monolith. Village-level pastors are often sympathetic to antigovernment insurgent Miskito fighters and not in agreement with a current in the church akin to the theology of liberation.

Another Moravian pastor, Fernando Colomer, a participant in the talks between the government and MISURASATA in Bogotá, felt that the present moment was full of interesting possibility. He approved of the many talks being conducted with local insurgent groups and saw as a short-term benefit the fact that the government, in accordance with these agreements, is facilitating the movement of goods to communities. In his view, when he was interviewed in January 1986 in Puerto Cabezas, the Indian movement is in some disarray. The jockeying for power he sees among the various leaders is dissipating their strength. With regard to the position of Brooklyn Rivera, he said, "Brooklyn must pick his friends carefully in order to capitalize on the present conjuncture." He, like other Moravian leaders, felt that U.S. influences in the region, especially its support of an armed opposition, "will only bring more suffering to the Miskito family."

North American Moravians support the efforts of the church to help effect peace. They also favor aid to Atlantic Coast refugees in Honduras, Costa Rica, or in other parts of Nicaragua. Most important, though, is their commitment to a solution to the conflict through dialogue among the participants as well as for the solution of the Central American conflict through international mediation efforts such as those of the Contadora group.36

CEPAD, a Protestant development agency working on the coast, has been a principal conduit for international support for local projects and part of the public discussion of autonomy and peace. Rev. Benjamin Cortés, a leader of CEPAD, has also been involved in the MISURASATA negotiations. He indicated many hopeful aspects of the present situation. He dates the change in the government’s attitude from the end of 1983 and its amnesty. Now there is more "humility" on the part of the government. Since May 1985 there has been a 90 percent reduction in the number of military confrontations and that the government

has withdrawn its troops from most of the communities. Further, the government has done everything "humanly possible" to help in the return to the river and in regional reconstruction. He feels that the government now accepts the legitimacy of Indian demands and understands that the Indian fighters enjoy considerable community support. The communities' support for a peaceful solution favors continual dialogue with the insurgents.

The major obstacle to peace is the constant effort to raise the level of armed conflict. KISAN, through its link with UNO and the FDN, has tried to destabilize the situation, most notably by burning the bridge at Sisín, obstructing the movement of people to the river. KISAN, whose leadership Cortés describes as "corrupt," is opposed to a peaceful solution although the Honduran leadership may not be able to control its members once they are inside the country.

The other difficulty in restoring normal life and returning the refugees to their homes is not so much connected to material resources. Rather, it is the "paternalistic" attitude of the government in attending to local needs without more direct participation by local people. Cortés says there is now a need, and an opportunity, to create a plan for "holistic reconstruction" that would be done in partnership with community people. The discussions ("dialogues") now under way between various insurgents and the government are a start toward this "co-gestion," and in this respect, CEPAD is active in trying to promote a renewal of the talks between MISURASATA and the government that broke off in May 1985. Rev. Cortés thinks that the FSLN has not exhausted its possibilities to ensure a resumption of talks. Efforts are also under way to work with coastal refugees in other countries such as sponsoring a trip to Nicaragua for a delegation that would return and report to their communities elsewhere.

All of these noncombatant organizations were quite willing and interested in participating in the autonomy process. All operate both at the political as well as the social service levels. All freely express criticisms of the government's role at the same time they continue to work with the government. At the moment, with the withdrawal from the regional autonomy commission of MISATAN, the Moravian church, and CEPAD, the focus of activities connected to autonomy and peace is in the process of helping communities rebuild and return to the river, as well as in the process of dialogue that is going on on the ground in several places.

In this fluid situation, there is much room for all participants to maneuver as well as abundant possibility for difference among the various groups. The autonomy process has provided an opportunity for indigenous and ethnic groups to question the future, and participate in it, in a more ample manner than ever before. Ethnic and cultural pride and group consciousness are becoming the legitimate basis for political participation at a national level.

Current Military Situation

An important step taken to establish conditions for peace in Zelaya Norte was the agreement signed in Mexico in April 1985 between the Nicaraguan government and MISURASATA. It committed both sides "not to initiate offensive actions" against each other. Although marred by several violent confrontations, the cease fire was a significant beginning in a continuing process.

This agreement only bound MISURASATA and the government, but MISURA, the other, and perhaps larger, indigenous force, also made efforts to abide by the agreement. Indeed, before the international dialogue was broken off in May, the internal chief of staff of MISURA, Eduardo Pantin, initiated negotiations directly with the local representatives of the Ministry of the Interior (MINT) to sign a cease fire in his area of control near the community of Yulo. Mediated by the local representative of the Red Cross, Dr. Eldo Lau, the agreement established territories of respective control, separate hours for each side to use the roads, and bases for continuing negotiations. According to Dr. Lau, Pantin and other members of the internal high command of MISURA, Raúl Finley and Orlando Maclean, reported that their efforts had the approval of the national command of MISURA in Honduras.

Following this agreement, the government announced that the population in the resettlement camps could return to their homes on the Río Coco. The government pledged to assist with transportation and rebuilding as well as to supply the population with basic grains for ten months until it could establish cultivation in the river communities.

MISURA troops maintained undisputed control over parts of the southern littoral and plain, including the towns of Yulo and Sangilaya. They also freely moved through much of the rest of Zelaya Norte. As a result, the opportunities for breaking the cease fire either intentionally or through accidents were numerous. Still, the two armed forces maintained a posture of relatively peaceful coexistence at least through October.

In spite of the occasional reports of violations of the basic cease fire on both sides, there appeared to be a genuine effort to respect the agreements and to treat incidents as exceptions or mistakes rather than as tests of the power or resolve of the opposing force. Sandinista army squads were sent into villages on the Río Coco to deactivate mines that had been placed there during the fighting. MISURA squads also deactivated their mines. Later, when cleanup brigades went to the upper Río Coco villages to cut the brush that had grown there during the past three years, one worker in the community of Santa Fé detonated a still active mine and seven workers were killed.
in the explosion. Even this lamentable incident, however, did not break the truce.

The top army officer in Zelaya Norte, Comandante Antenor Rosales, told us that the Sandinista Army (EPS) has restricted its presence to several communities on the coast and withdrawn from many others. In fact, he said that the EPS had left one coastal community unattended precisely to allow communication between the guerrilla fighters in the country and their external military and political commanders and as a way to send their sick out. This military measure corresponded with the political distinction that held that most of the Indian groups were not contra. Rather, they were seen to be in support of their historical agenda and not focused on the overthrow of the government. Many people in the government stated openly that MISURASATA’s demands of 1980 were legitimate and could now be responded to through negotiation. On the other hand, KISAN, at least its leadership, is seen as a contra group.

MISURA troops also appeared to maintain the cease fire even though their principal negotiator, Eduardo Pantin, died days after the signing. There were reports that the MISURA leader, Steadman Fagoth, opposed the agreements and may have ordered Pantin’s assassination. On the other hand, both MISURA and MISURASATA charged that the Sandinistas felt Pantin was reneging on the agreements and therefore had him killed. Dr. Lau, who examined the body and interviewed the eleven witnesses, is convinced Pantin’s death was an accident in which Pantin’s own gun fell from his belt as he was sitting down to the negotiating table killing him with one shot that passed through his chest and into the ceiling. In spite of Pantin’s death, the leader who replaced him has continued the basic agreements. Lines of communication remain open and talks continue in the effort to extend these agreements. During the Fall of 1985, for example, a further agreement was reached with the insurgents at Yulo concerning the small ferry over the Wawa River at Wawa Boom. The ferry, crucial for all vehicular traffic going south from Puerto Cabezas, was given to MISURA fighters (followers of Pantin). They promised to keep it running, to allow traffic to pass freely, permitting government workers with food and medical attention as well as troops to move in the region. Fearful that KISAN might try to damage the ferry, the insurgents (alzados) asked for military help from the Sandinistas. Now, one bank is controlled by the insurgents and the other by the Sandinista army. The insurgents received new weapons and other military supplies from the army. These insurgents have begun to function more like a local self-defense force than like contra opponents of the government.

Another important example of a local agreement was the handing over of the bridge at Sisin to insurgent troops. The agreement, much like the one at Wawa Boom, involved the insurgents directly in the process of normalization. Here, however, the stakes were higher since all the traffic going to the river must pass over this bridge. KISAN recalled the commander, Wilfredo Martínez, who had signed the agreement, to Honduras and sent in his place "Aguila Negra," as he is known there, who burned the bridge. This was a major setback to the effort to get people back into their communities, one condemned by many leaders in the region.

The government has also continued its amnesty program for detained people—in July the local command released twelve prisoners, and while we were in Puerto Cabezas in August, one MISURA officer turned himself in, exhausted, and in need of medical treatment. In January, more prisoners were to be released.

This effective cease fire has allowed the return to the river and the autonomy process to occur in a relatively peaceful manner. In August, we could not ascertain whether the parties to the cease fire were also using this lull to resupply and prepare for future conflicts. Neither side, however, charged the other with such intentions, suggesting that at least a moderate amount of trust was emerging. But between August and January, with the formation of KISAN, the military threat has increased. KISAN troops, identifiable by their blue uniforms, and well armed, were reported in several places. In the last week of January, KISAN was said to be massing on the Rio Coco, below Waspan. There was also a report that Steadman Fagoth, also with troops, perhaps for the FDN, was threatening upriver from Waspan.

While our task force was in Zelaya Norte in August 1985, the level of tension was low. Civilians and foreign observers moved freely throughout the region and there were no reported incidents of armed confrontation. Evidence of earlier conflict—as many as eight army trucks or tanks blown up by mines—was present along the roads we traveled. In January 1986, however, the tension had returned because of the increased presence of KISAN troops and the general preoccupation that they might be targeting areas where agreements had been reached with Indian fighters.

In Zelaya Norte, although the external threat appeared to be increasing, some armed opponents of the government (alzados) were undergoing experiences leading to a re-
evaluation of their position. Below, we present an account given by one of them.

**Talk with an Alzado**

Reynaldo Reyes, a Miskito, called Comandante Rañaga, was elected the executive chief of the intelligence division of the high command of KISAN in the September meeting. Supportive of the intransigent posture, he was sent into Nicaragua from Honduras to renew the fighting and to collect information on the state of the return to the river. Before joining the rebels, he served in the Sandinista army, was jailed for his disagreement concerning treatment of the Miskito population, and finally escaped from jail and went to Honduras.

In January, in the Hotel Costeño in Puerto Cabezas, he spoke about the "abrupt change" he underwent while on this mission. In the villages of Saupuka, Saklin, Bismona, Kum, Bilwaskarma, and Wasla, he addressed large crowds—sometimes 1000 people—and the response was the same everywhere. Villagers expressed their desire for peace and said they would deny support to the KISAN fighters if they were opposed to negotiations with the government.

Reyes, 37, a minister of the Church of God, was impressed by the possibilities of dialogue he saw in Yulo. With an entourage of heavily armed men, he made contact with the Ministry of the Interior. This led to a trip to Managua and to several conversations with Tomás Borge, the minister of interior. Through these talks, he maintains his status of alzado, i.e., insurgent and keeps his arms.

These talks have been carried out in an atmosphere of mutual respect. Reyes said that dialogue means "a place to listen and to question." He said that Borge responded to his comments favorably and said that all of his demands were reasonable so long as there were no further bloodshed and should not be "two presidents in Nicaragua." Reyes asked for two seats on the regional autonomy commission. Borge offered five.

Reyes is strongly critical of the government's autonomy plan, particularly with respect to its provision concerning land and natural resources. He, like others on the coast, believes that 80 percent of the profits of resource exploitation should be reinvested in the communities there. He supports the demilitarization of the area and the freeing of Miskito prisoners.

Reyes also spoke at length about the leadership of KISAN. Brooklyn Rivera, and the future of KISAN, he said were manipulated by the FDN. He described the maximum leadership as corrupt—intellectually and morally unfit to lead. Reyes also criticized numerous human rights abuses that the insurgents have committed. During our January visit in the Miskito barrio of El Cocal in Puerto Cabezas, he gave a talk and showed a videotape (on equipment given to him by the MINT) in which Rev. Norman Bent appeared. He intends to give this presentation in communities outside of Puerto Cabezas.

Regarding Brooklyn Rivera, Reyes contrasted his own direct experience with people and his awareness of their suffering to Rivera's distance from the struggle over the past years. He said "If the eyes don't see, the heart doesn't feel" ("ojos que no ven, corazón que no siente"). Therefore, he urged Rivera to assume leadership in direct discussions with the government. He felt that Rivera was relying too heavily on foreign advisors and was not attentive enough to conditions on the ground.

Comandante Rañaga represents, in our view, a significant new development toward resolution of the coastal conflict. The process of dialogue, begun in Yulo in May 1985, has continued in spite of the ever present threats to peace. It indicates that the government is genuinely interested in extending the dialogue so as to deal with questions like regional self-defense, peace, and autonomy. It reflects the widespread feeling among the people of exhaustion and opposition to violence. Warfare, as a means of settling differences is less tenable on the Atlantic Coast.

While Rivera gained support from sympathetic groups in Europe, Canada, and the United States, with the suspension of talks with the Nicaraguan government, and the withholding of military supplies by the CIA, MISURASATA was weaker, both politically and militarily, inside Nicaragua than it had been before. Rivera's recent clandestine trip to the Atlantic Coast in January was apparently meant to measure his support among the communities and the armed insurgents, most of whom were affiliated with MISURA or KISAN. Reyes probably asked for a suspension of the various small negotiated cease fires to pressure the government to negotiate directly with him. According to Reyes, however, instead of uniting behind Rivera, the communities voiced the same demand for immediate peaceful negotiations that Reyes had heard the previous October.

Unfortunately, Rivera's trip was perceived not as a diplomatic mission, but rather as a provocation. Rivera was accompanied by Russell Means of the American Indian Movement, Clem Chartier of the WCOIP, and Hank Adams of the Survival of the American Indian Association. Means has stated that he is sending 100 "warriors" to Nicaragua to support the Indian struggle. He also recently gave his view of the issue. He said, "What the MISURASATA is now doing is to look for an alternative to the autonomy issue because of the lack of substantive negotiations from the Sandinistas. And they realize the only alternative to

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autonomy is INDEPENDENCE! So, now they are putting the independence issue to the villages." The Sandinista response to Rivera's "clandestine" trip was to attack Layasiska, the community he was in at the time. The raid, using airplanes, reportedly caused one fatality. 39

At the time this report was written, the autonomy process, dialogue with the insurgents, and demilitarization, were bringing stability to most communities. They are facilitating an orderly return to the river (cf. next section) an intense political ferment centering on autonomy, and the beginning of an indigenous community self-defense mechanism. These processes hold great promise. They have generated pockets of negotiated peace that will spread. But KISAN and the FDN appear ready to destabilize the situation by intensifying the conflict. MISURASATA remains distrustful of the government and it is at present unclear what role it will play in the resolution of differences on the coast. Should Rivera decide to take a more active role with the insurgents inside of Nicaragua, it would no doubt aid the movement toward peace.

The great potential for resolution, developed during the past year or so, requires that the coast remain apart from an East-West geopolitical involvement. Perhaps the most disastrous possibility would be for the U.S., in its support for the contras, to rekindle the military situation through its surrogates, KISAN and Steadman Fagoth.

Unfortunately, the forces of violence have made themselves felt just as this report was going to press. During the first ten days of April, it was reported that fighting had broken out on the Río Coco, between Bilwaskarma and Kum, and thousands of Miskitos, recently returned to their villages from Tasba Pri, were crossing the river into Honduras to become refugees in an apparent repetition of the events of early 1982. This time, however, more information is available and quite a different picture emerges from that of 1982.

Although William Casey, the director of the C.I.A., and Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, described this flight of Miskito people as the result of Sandinista atrocities, independent observers tell a completely different story. Journalists from the Boston Globe and the Philadelphia Inquirer and an Americas Watch observer found that "evidence was lacking of new Sandinista abuses that caused their flight." Rather, they found that "KISAN (successor to MISURA and affiliated with the Unión Nicaragüense de Oposición, UNO) has spread fear as part of a deliberate plan to evacuate the Miskitos from Nicaragua to Honduras." It was further found that, while KISAN was holding Miskitos in staging areas on the border to prepare their stories, the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa planned to fly sixty journalists to the border to record these stories. Inclement weather, however, cancelled this plan, which was described by one foreign official as the "worst public relations job I've ever seen."

Public opinion was prepared for this media show through reports that came from Tegucigalpa, from Roger Herman, KISAN's liaison with the American Embassy, unconfirmed, although printed, until the three observers mentioned above went there. What is most disturbing about this episode is the freedom with which KISAN and the American Embassy utilize the Miskitos to defame the Nicaraguan government. Extensive interviewing with refugees showed that none of them had experienced any brutality, but they had all been coerced and frightened to once again become refugees. False rumors were uncritically published in the press. In addition, during the debate over the $100 million aid to the contras, further funds were earmarked for KISAN. 40

This tragic event, causing further misery for 6,000 people, suggests that the reconciliation process was working too well inside Nicaragua. The external opposition was losing in its effort to discredit the Sandinistas. So, the only response left to them was to rekindle a military situation. Disgracefully, they were aided in this effort by the United States.

VII. Return to the River

One of the demands that Brooklyn Rivera presented in the initial negotiating sessions in Mexico in December 1984 was that the Miskito and Sumo be allowed to return to the original communities from which they had been moved in 1982. Since many of these communities were located along the banks of the Río Coco, this process came to be called the "return to the river," although many communities were in dispersed areas throughout the northeast of Nicaragua.

In the early months of 1985, under the favorable conditions of a tentative cease-fire between the Miskito insurgents and the EPS, the Sandinista government began to move several small communities from their settlements in Tasba Pri back to their original lands. It appears that these communities were chosen because they were near Sandinista military establishments and could be more easily defended (or supervised) should the cease-fire break down.

38. Ibid


The task force visited four communities, two of which had been settled for more than five months. This section will describe the general process of the return to the river that began late in the Spring 1985 when the government authorized clean-up teams from each of several villages to return to their communities and begin preparations for the rest of the community to follow. These teams were to begin clearing away the jungle growth that had rapidly taken over the living and agricultural spaces of the original communities. In preparation for the clean-up teams, both the insurgents and the government agreed to disarm the mines they had placed in communities and roads. The government had planned to provide transportation, some construction materials and food for those returning to the river in an orderly but slow process. This assumed that the bulk of the population was to return to their communities only after the October harvest of rice and beans at Tasba Pri. MISATAN was given major responsibility for the return to the river. Its leaders were to work closely with the communities before and during the move. In this effort, MISATAN often pressured the government to respond more rapidly to the demands of the population.

In May the orderly process as planned by the government accelerated as pressure to return to the river built up within the camps at Tasba Pri and Sangilaya, and in Puerto Cabezas. Encouraged by reports from the returning clean-up teams and by MISATAN organizers, some spontaneous migration began. The government did nothing to stop this movement and by the end of May it recognized that the process had taken its own course. Tomás Borge announced in a speech at the end of May that the government would do all it could to assist the process of the return, but that its resources were limited. It would seek international assistance for transportation, supplies of food, and construction material. Several private voluntary organizations expressed interest in helping in this effort. Oxfam-U.K. sent a representative there, as did a European consortium, the Project Counselling Service for Latin American Refugees.

A special Committee on the Return was formed consisting of representatives of all local organizations in cooperation with the government to facilitate the process. Government vehicles were assigned to transport people and goods to the river. In addition, private truckers were hired at high fees to assist the movement. The effort, however, was limited by the scarcity of functioning vehicles in the region; only twenty-seven large trucks were reported to be in operation when we were there. Government ministries such as MICOIN (Ministry of Commerce and Industry), MITTRAN (Ministry of Transportation), and the public assistance apparatus of INSBBBI were assigned responsibilities for transportation and supplies. Some financial support came from the FACS (Fundo Augusto César Sandino). Special efforts to find sufficient materials—even such small items as hammers and nails—were limited by the general scarcity of tools and supplies in Nicaragua.

Although the International Red Cross has played a crucial role in supplying nutritional programs to many of the communities in contested territory south of Puerto Cabezas, it has played a limited role in the return to the river. It accompanied one truck convoy early in the process and forced it to turn back when EPS (Sandinista Army) trucks were observed in the vicinity, contrary to the agreement that the EPS would avoid contact with the returning population. The Red Cross, however, has not been asked by the government to assist in this process, and it has, therefore, followed its standard policy of not becoming involved without official invitation.

Snapshots

On August 10 and 11, the Task Force visited several communities at different stages of their return to the river. In addition to observing the Miskitos resident in Puerto Cabezas, we also went to Waspan, Biscona, Sangilaya, and briefly, to Bum Sirpi. During this voyage of more than 500 kilometers, we had a good chance to see some of the effect of the relocations, and to get an idea of the process that will occur in the general return of Miskitos to their river communities. We observed Miskitos boarding trucks with their possessions in Puerto Cabezas, the depressing first moments as they reached a devastated Waspan, and the relatively resettled communities of Biscona and Bum Sirpi. Along the route, we saw indicators of the war in destroyed vehicles and several craters in the road. In all places, we had ample opportunity to speak to people. Although there were no restrictions placed on our movements, we did have to report our whereabouts and destinations at various checkpoints in the area. We spent the night in one community, Biscona, and participated in a village assembly where the whole community discussed their problems.

Sangilaya

Sangilaya was a center of relocation in the llano norte region near Puerto Cabezas where residents from several surrounding communities were moved. The government said the camp was formed, for developmental reasons, to make a capital-intensive agricultural project more feasible. The project was poorly planned, however, without attention to soil quality or availability of water. It never prospered.

The government-constructed houses were in traditional style, i.e., one room and a kitchen area elevated on stilts. The materials were superior to the traditionally constructed houses we saw. The lumber was well milled and they all had new zinc roofs. The houses were neatly lined up 20-30 feet apart from each other, a cause of complaint because of the crowding.

Sangilaya is controlled by MISURA troops, some of whom we saw, uniformed and armed, but we were not able to speak to them. Nevertheless, there appears to be some government-
MISURA cooperation here. Government supplies (food, medicine) were arriving there, perhaps from the government welfare agency INSIBI. We also saw government trucks helping people move their possessions back to their villages. Many houses, about one-third, were in various stages of being dismantled. We saw piles of lumber neatly stacked next to the zinc roof sheets, waiting for trucks to move them. It was also reported to us that in Tasba Pri there is the same eagerness to return to the villages.

This keen desire to return home in spite of the expected hardships was accompanied by strong support for the cease-fire. For many people, the "return" takes priority over the autonomy discussion or has come to be thought of as autonomy itself. In Sangilaya several houses were displaying a poster, in Miskito with a picture of Eduardo Pantín and the other signers of the cease-fire.

Waspan

Connected by road from Puerto Cabezas, Waspan is the largest and most important town on the Río Coco. A commercial and governmental center, it is referred to by most people as the "capital of the Río Coco." Two members of our task force had visited Waspan before the relocations of late 1981. Most buildings were made of wood or cement block and there were many services such as banks, government offices, a health clinic, a baseball stadium, several school buildings, a Catholic church, several Moravian churches, and a grass landing strip. Honduran territory is clearly visible on the other side of the river and people freely move between both sides, even now.

The town was evacuated in 1981 and its inhabitants were just returning at the time of our visit. Everywhere the natural vegetation had overwhelmed the land. It was so overgrown with forest that it was hard to visualize the original town. All wooden buildings were badly damaged or totally destroyed. Many concrete block or brick structures, such as the secondary school, were severely damaged too. The roofless charred frame of the Catholic church, the rusted metal bleachers at the baseball field, the faded AeroNica sign, all bore witness to the terrible decline of this once thriving river entropié.

There were about thirty families there who had arrived about two weeks earlier. They were living in lean-tos (champas) made of sheet plastic and pieces of roofing zinc. They had begun receiving government supplies including rice, maize, beans, and other materials such as rubber boots. But their move to Waspan had been done so quickly that all the supplies had not caught up with them yet.

These returnees, camped near the remains of their houses, were confronted with a reality quite different from what they imagined. Here they saw the destruction of the community. People pointed out community landmarks, such as the secondary school, that were once objects of pride and now lay in ruins. Among the squatters were some who were quite bitter toward the government. For them, the Sandinistas were the enemy and they were highly suspicious of any government plan or promise.

We heard a wide range of opinions from the recent returnees. Some expressed bitterness and hostility toward the government. One older man suggested that if he were younger he would have joined the guerrillas; others complained that the government promises of helping with the reconstruction were only partially fulfilled. Still others, while not applauding the government efforts, suggested that much was being done in the face of scarce government resources. Most returnees adopted a wait and see attitude. We felt they were willing to support the government again if it made reconstruction possible. At Waspan, however, the task of reconstruction seemed difficult and long.

The returnees had immediate material needs for the resettlement process. Basic tools such as machetes, hammers, nails, wood for construction, and chain saws or portable sawmills, were all of first importance. In addition, cloth for mosquito netting, canoes, and outboard motors was also immediately needed. Those returning to the river and their representatives, mainly Moravian pastors, gave major emphasis to making this return successful. The general feeling was that this process constituted a minimum test of the Sandinista willingness to participate in a peaceful and constructive end to the violence. The cooperation with transport, supply of materials to reconstruct houses, enough food until the next rice harvest, were seen as the significant elements of rapprochement.

Representatives of Nicaraguan private voluntary development agencies, CEPAD, IDSEM, and others from European groups assessed local needs. Several North American agencies have also made contacts and are in the process of providing support. The FSLN has made a donation of 30 million córdobas toward the reconstruction of the Moravian church and the purchase of a new organ in Waspan. But the most severe bottleneck in obtaining this support is the difficulty in transporting it.

Minister of the Interior Tomás Borge has promised to increase the number of planes that go to Puerto Cabezas. Materials now arrive in Puerto Cabezas, either directly by plane from Managua, overland, or by boat from Managua to Bluefields, and from there by boat to Puerto Cabezas. The logical route would be directly overland to Puerto Cabezas, but the highway from Managua is now unusable because of contra action. Convoys of humanitarian cargo seem to be a natural target for them. Since the contra burning in May 1985 of the "Bluefields Express," the boat that goes between Rama and Bluefields, an important means of supply, has been curtailed. And with the burning of the bridge at Sisin in October 1985 by KISAN, another
important link in regional reconstruction, has been damaged.

In spite of the trauma that Waspan represented, even to us, the people were exhibiting considerable self-reliance. House lots were being cleared and house frameworks were being erected while families were temporarily in makeshift tents. Some families had begun planting cassava, a favorite crop grown near houses. In abandoned fields, there were still some bananas and citrus fruit to be harvested. Some people spoke about crossing the river to get fruit from fields on the Honduran side. They felt that if they crossed prudently, there was minimum danger from the Honduran Army or MISURA fighters. One of the Waspan returnees had visited a nearby village whose people had just come back the past week from Tasba Pri after three years’ absence. The village had not been destroyed, so their job was mainly that of clearing away the overgrowth and repairing the still-standing houses. For them, the priority demand was the replacement of their livestock.

**Bismono**

Bismono is small fishing community about three hours, by jeep, east of Waspan. Its land connection to Puerto Cabezas makes it a half-day trip. It is also possible to go to Puerto Cabezas by boat, through the huge Bismona lagoon, and then on the open sea. The lagoon yields considerable amounts of fish and shrimp and the nearby forests appear to have abundant game.

Along the road to Bismono we saw six burned, overturned military vehicles, victims of the fighting prior to the cease-fire. Just outside the community was a small detachment of the Sandinista army.

Bismono, like Waspan, had been destroyed during the relocation and had to be rebuilt. The return to Bismono took place in February and March 1985, earlier than the present wave of people returning to the other villages. Perhaps this was because Bismono is not directly on the river and the danger of incursions and attacks was less. By August, the time of our visit, the inhabitants of the village had been back from Tasba Pri for over five months.

Bismono’s houses appeared to be almost completely restored to the condition they were in in 1981, when one member of our group visited the community. In some cases, the new houses, next the old ones, used some makeshift materials (old zinc panels to repair walls). Some people felt that the previous houses were larger and better outfitted because of the availability of good materials. The village still lacked the large number of wooden sailing canoes needed for the fishing cooperative. The Costa Rica-based delegate for a European relief agency, Project Counselling Service for Latin American Refugees (PCS), was making arrangements to contract canoe makers from other villages to make the needed canoes.

This was one of the two pressing problems they told us about. The other problem was that of marketing the shrimp. They said that, under normal conditions, it was possible to obtain 5,000 pounds of shrimp in one night’s fishing. But without a dependable means of transporting them to Puerto Cabezas and some assurance of buyers, this resource was useless. Another related question was a refrigerated storage facility to hold the shrimp and fish until a truck or boat would come. The government had supplied one prior to the move, but it was now destroyed.

We observed and participated in a village assembly held in the community chapel. The assembly was called to reach agreement about the PCS role in providing canoes. Opinions were heard from the Moravian pastor (a Miskito, resident of the village), several leaders (not identified as elders), the lieutenant from the local army detachment, the CEPAD representative, and the PCS worker. The villagers were extremely articulate in their discussion of the various factors that were necessary to their economic development: transport, canoes, storage, and marketing. The tools for fishing, canoes, line, etc., seemed easily arranged. The other bottlenecks were not a matter of the present turmoil, but rather of the traditional state of underdevelopment of the coast.

The presence of the EPS officer did not appear to deter anyone from speaking. His comments at the meeting were intended to urge cooperation between the EPS and the community. He noted that they had already built several bridges together. The pastor also praised the support of the EPS for community projects. The most severe criticism at the meeting was directed against the government for its slowness in meeting community needs.

In general, there was still a wait-and-see attitude toward the government, much as in Waspan, but in Bismono the general level of well being seemed quite high. Along with the villagers we feasted on shrimp, fish, oranges, venison, corn bread, cassava, good water, and coconuts. This abundance is owed to the favored ecological position of the community. But now, after three years of turmoil and uprootedness, they are once again facing the perennial problems of underdevelopment. As they said, for them autonomy meant an end to the fighting and greater support from the government for the development effort that had barely begun when fighting engulfed their region.

While these community "snapshots" are sketchy evidence at best, they perhaps serve to place the "return to the river" into a suggestive progression, from the initial phases in the camps, through the dislocation and shock of the first days back at the river to a suggestion of a return to some sort of normality after five months of rebuilding. Of course, restoring a small fishing village like Bismono is an easier task than rebuilding a more complex commercial center like Waspan. Nonetheless, it does provide some grounds for optimism that the tasks of rebuilding can be
done and can give way to the longer-range tasks of development.

Reconstruction Plans

The effort to rebuild is shared by various government agencies, local development groups, and foreign private voluntary agencies contributing money to help in this effort. The Special Projects office of the government house in Puerto Cabezas, headed by Marcelo Zúñiga, coordinates these efforts. In general, foreign agencies contribute the cash needed to buy materials that are not available in the country such as hardware (tools, zinc roofing material), motors, vehicles, and spare parts. Locally, the effort to install adequate medical facilities is handled by the Ministry of Health (MINSA). Presently, there are plans to rebuild the Moravian hospital at Bilwaskarma that was destroyed by the insurgents. A medical center is planned for Waspan and a small hospital at Tronquera. In addition, mobile medical units are needed to follow the population back to their villages. These would be canoes outfitted with necessary equipment for emergency surgery, first aid, and medicine to care for patients in their villages. Dr. Eldo Lau, the MINSA director for Zelaya Norte, is in charge of this effort.

CEPAD and IDSIM have coordinated their efforts. CEPAD is focusing on the river above Waspan and IDSIM has projects in ten communities on the river below Waspan. CEPAD is concentrating on helping communities resettle and supplying them with the most urgently needed items, some of which are supplied by PCS. IDSIM has drawn up a plan for the communities in its zone.

As explained by René Enriquez, the director of IDSIM, the first stage is to reconstruct housing. This is being done in conjunction with the Ministry of Housing (MINVA) that is supplying training in the use of tools and the efficient use of materials. Zinc for roofs is also supplied. The Ministry of Education (MED) has drawn up plans for school construction that will be built by people in the villages. With contributions from Holland (ICCO), two clinics are being built to serve the communities in this zone, between Bilwaskarma and Kum. This activity is supervised by the MINSA.

After the initial settling-in has finished, the next stage involves restarting agriculture and animal husbandry. While this is taking place, the plan calls for supplying families with basic foodstuffs for one year. This consists of items such as rice, rice seed, maize, beans. Also included are household implements such as plates and cooking utensils. Banana cuttings are supplied to each community as well as ten cows to begin their herds. These communities have had experience in cooperatives and this structure will continue. Two trucks, one of 8- and the other of 1.5-ton capacity will be shared by the ten communities and at the end of one year the 8-ton truck will go to Kum and the other to Bilwaskarma. The area under discussion has been victimized by KISAN and the future of this particular project is in jeopardy.

In addition to these focused projects, the Committee of the Return (Comité de Retorno) has been functioning for the past nine months to facilitate the movement of people and goods toward the river. It also acts as a conduit for materials that arrive from the government or through international contributions. MISATAN is another participant in the reconstruction process. It has received funding from Oxfam-U.K. and Oxfam-Canada as well as from the government. Perhaps MISATAN's withdrawal from the regional autonomy commission and its more intense involvement reflects its judgement that the return and reconstruction are presently more important than shaping the autonomy statute.

The insurgent groups are important in this process as passive or negative participants. Thus far, through negotiations on the ground, the return has had the agreement of most of the insurgents. Since the movement of people is not done with the EPS, the truck convey is vulnerable to attack. Incidents of attacks (threats and beatings) by MISURA were reported by Rev. Fernando Colomer of IDSIM, in Saklin, Waspan, Saupuka, and Bilwaskarma during the last six months. But, in general, such incidents can be settled through negotiated agreements. With the burning of the bridge at Sisin, however, it appears that a successful return of Miskitos to their river communities is threatening, particularly to KISAN.

The government's support for the return conflicts with the insurgent account of the imprisonment of the Miskito people in "concentration camps." Further, the political costs of attacking newly settled Miskito communities are apparently too high. So, impeding the return, or hindering the support of returned communities, is one tactic being used. The tactic of attacking the return and reconstruction process is called part of a "reactionary attitude" by Enriquez.

While the autonomy process, with its questions of participation and land rights, was of some interest for the returning Miskitos, the prime issue was the immediate material possibilities of rebuilding under peaceful conditions. People were anticipating this support—hammers, nails, mosquito netting, outboard motors—as the acid test of Sandinista good faith. For their part, the Sandinistas, the military, the political apparatus, and other parts of the bureaucracy, were trying to supply these resources, along with transportation and food supplies. On the other hand, it was also clear that the return to the river alone would not be a "quick fix" to restore Miskito support for the national government. Although there was evidence of gratitude for the change in policy and many expressed a "wait-and-see" attitude, strong suspicions remain.
If the return is successfully accomplished, if the Sandinista promises are paid off, and if the autonomy statutes are developed to general satisfaction, then the Miskito population will have a chance, perhaps for the first time, to attempt to solve the perennial problems of underdevelopment and powerlessness, under decent conditions.

VIII. Zelaya Sur

Zelaya Sur, or Special Zone 2, shares some of the special quality of Zelaya Norte, but has its own historical and cultural traditions. The Zelaya Sur population may be divided into four rather clearly defined strata. A peasantry, living along the major rivers, is mostly mestizo, many of whom have migrated from the Pacific side of the country. They tend to live in dispersed homesteads and depend on a mixture of economic activities, including farming, fishing, and wage labor. The Creole population constitutes the working class of Bluefields. They are the fishermen, stevedores, and seamen. There are many Creoles, too, who work in craft production that includes carpentry, fishing ("artesanal"), and boatbuilding. The fourth category is a group that carries out the administrative, commercial, and transport functions of this region. They include many professionals, often educated abroad, many of them Afro-Americans, or Creoles, but they include mestizos as well. This stratum is largely concentrated in the city of Bluefields.

The city of Bluefields is the most important community in the southern part of the department of Zelaya, Special Zone 2. Bluefields is on a large bay, and maritime activities have always been of utmost importance. Its population has been dedicated to merchant shipping, offshore fishing, lagoon fishing and oyster farming, and to the many associated commercial offshoots of these activities. It is a city that has prospered from its trade with ports in the U.S. and other countries. Before 1979 its fortunes had declined considerably and, in the present moment, the questions of autonomy, peace, and regional representation are as pressing for its future as they are for all the other populations of the Atlantic Coast. The municipality of Bluefields, including the city and its environs, is largely Creole in ethnic composition (over 56 percent) with a small number of other groups (Miskito, Sumu, Rama, and Garifuna). Mestizos tend to live in more rural settings. As a region, this may be broadly characterized as a Creole city and a mestizo hinterland.41

Bluefields, with its English-speaking population, has evolved a very different style of life from the rest of Nicaragua. During the period of foreign interests in the Atlantic Coast, American, Honduran, and Colombian ships frequently called at the port. People from Bluefields visited Costa Rica and Honduras. Working as crew on merchant ships was a way of life for many men and it is not uncommon for a man to have been away working for 25 or 30 years and to return to Bluefields to retire with savings earned on the job. In fact, many Bluefields people have migrated and their families at home receive remittances, much as in other Caribbean countries. Perhaps 25 percent of the Creole community lives outside of the country. During the last three years, many young men have gone to Costa Rica, particularly to Puerto Limón, often to escape the draft.

Prior to the revolution, in the 1970s, employment was available at high wages and there were dollars to be made. Turtles, lobsters, shrimp, and oysters were sold for cash to boats that came for the purpose. In the stores of Bluefields people bought Corn Flakes, Quaker Oats, Pet Milk, Carnation Milk, Del Monte canned goods, and many other United States products that came on the ships. One of the constant complaints heard now is that the selection of consumer goods is considerably smaller than before. With the added restrictions caused by the contra war, these shortages are perceived as even more acute. The government is making an effort to satisfy this demand, but cannot possibly match the previous times of plenty.

As in the North, there was little insurrectionary activity in Zelaya Sur during the struggle against Somoza. In fact, many people in Bluefields only learned of Somoza’s defeat from Costa Rican television reports. As in Zelaya Norte, the initial efforts of the Sandinistas to establish their presence were not warmly received here either. The Cuban teachers who came to help organize the literacy crusade became the object of serious demonstrations in 1980. The perceived reduction in the level of living was blamed on the revolution. While not formulated in as clear a manner as in Zelaya Norte, there nevertheless was a growing tension and hostility toward the Sandinistas in Zelaya Sur.

Bluefields, like many other Nicaraguan communities, had little experience in representing itself on a national level before the revolution. The representation of the population of southern Zelaya did not grow out of ethnic organizations like MISURASATA in the north, since no equivalent exists there. The various churches, most importantly the Moravian, as well as business groups and labor unions, constitute the most enduring and stable organizations.

When the autonomy process began, a regional commission, with about thirty members, was created for Zelaya Sur. As in the case of Zelaya Norte, there was local representation on the national commission and on the regional commission there were a mix of Creoles and mestizos. One member told us that anyone could participate since entry into the commission was simply a matter of attending meetings.

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41. CIERA-MIDINRA, "Diagnóstico Integral Zona Especial II, Documento Base, Tomo II " (Managua:CIERA-MIDINRA,July 1984).
The autonomy draft statute suggests the possibility of creating separate "autonomous regions," presumably one for the north and another for the south. In the south, there is support for two zones and considerable thought has been given to establishing a boundary between the north and the south. The southern commission places the northern limit of their zone at La Cruz del Río Grande de Matagalpa, a major river north of Bluefields. It also wishes to expand the zone westward to include considerable territory in the departments of Boaco and Chontales to provide a hinterland for Bluefields. This new zone, with the agriculture necessary to feed the city, as well as hardwood forests that could be part of an export lumber industry, would be economically viable. It would also contain the river port of Rama that flows to Bluefields. All the elements for balanced development would be in place: food, export material, transport routes, and access to foreign trade. With the deep water port currently being constructed at El Bluff, Bluefields would be the most important port in the country. One community leader expressed the reason for this thinking this way: "We have 95 percent of the fisheries here but only 5 percent of the decision-making."

In addition to the desire for a separate and expanded economic region, there are indications that the southern commission would prefer a separate political autonomy rather than being included in a single autonomous region with the north. While northern sentiment leans toward one assembly for the entire coast, arguing that it would have more weight nationally than a series of regional assemblies, the south prefers two, citing the economic integrity and greater ease of administration. Behind this, there seems to be some wariness that a single assembly might be dominated by Miskito interests.

Despite these differences, there is a basic agreement with the north on cultural issues. A bilingual, bicultural education program would be part of autonomy for the whole coast. One of the difficulties concerns the status of Creole as either a genuine language or a variant of English. Some educated sectors of Bluefields feel that Creole is merely an English dialect, or "poorly spoken" English and the language of instruction for bilingual programs should be standard English. Others feel that many children speak Creole as their only language and if they receive instruction in standard English it will be a foreign language for them. This issue is far from resolved at the moment but is being seriously addressed. In January 1986, workshops organized by North American specialists in bilingual education were held in Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields. As a result, in Bluefields, the teachers themselves are developing the skills to address this question.

Given the concentration of the population in Bluefields compared to the more dispersed north, the mechanism for the autonomy’s consulta has been through door-to-door canvassing rather than community assemblies. A group of promoters were trained to initiate conversations with people after first leaving the draft autonomy document with each family. In August, this door-to-door technique was just beginning. By January, however, the door-to-door consulta was complete and the results were being tabulated.

Southern Zelaya has seen less military activity than the north. Troops from MISURASATA and ARDE (Edén Pastora’s Democratic Revolutionary Alliance) have operated along the San Juan River that separates Nicaragua from Costa Rica. Pastora, however, concentrated his forces on the Pacific side, while MISURASATA, focusing on the Atlantic side, concentrated its operations north of Bluefields. While we were there, there were unconfirmed reports that the FDN, usually only active on the Pacific side, had begun attacks in southern Zelaya. Bluefields was relatively free from military pressure until it was attacked by MISURASATA in May 1985 and about twenty attackers were killed.

A little-known group called the Southern Indigenous Creole Community (SICC), now allied to KISAN, has been fighting the Sandinista army, but it appears to be extremely small and seems to enjoy little support. The principal of the Moravian School, Faran Dometz told us, "SICC is sick."

Southern Zelaya, because of its different background, has reacted to autonomy in a distinct manner from the north. In Bluefields, the major concerns were centered on the economic and development of the new zone and the importance of acquiring the political characteristics of the new autonomous region. Given the ethnic composition, mostly Creole and mestizo, with few indigenous elements, the questions of indigenous "nationhood" were not salient.

Southern Zelaya, especially Bluefields, has historically functioned like a free port, open to the Caribbean. Although this region has contributed several important members of the Sandinista government, in general people seemed to be distant from the revolution, and the fervor, seen in the Pacific part of Nicaragua, is reduced here. Autonomy in southern Zelaya, both the process and the outcome, must reflect this condition.

IX. Conclusions

The situation we observed in August and the subsequent follow-up we have done suggest that the autonomy process is in flux with no clear and determined conclusion in sight. It is, however, one of the more optimistic processes among the many conflictual issues that Nicaragua presently faces. It is the only area of conflict in which both insurgents and the government have established an enduring cease-fire and the basis for a negotiated redress of grievances. Both sides appear willing to take risks to achieve peace and to establish a unique settlement to satisfy indigenous aspirations for rights, power, and autonomy within the
Nicaraguan state.

The conflict itself would not be easy to resolve in the best of circumstances. A long history of mistrust, misunderstanding, and malign neglect characterize the history of relations between the Atlantic coast and the national governments of the Pacific side. The Sandinistas inherited this situation when they came to power in 1979. The already existing process of development on the coast along with the Sandinista enthusiasm for integrating their "brothers" into the Revolution only exaggerated the misunderstandings and provoked even greater resistance to what was perceived as a threat to the unique culture and social heritage of the indigenous and Creole peoples. The Sandinista government was as insensitive to this situation as most other governments have been.

This conflict was complicated, however, by the immediate threat to Nicaragua posed by military units created, trained, and financed by the U.S. The external conflict created a context in which Miskito demands for self-determination were seen by the Sandinistas as separatist and related to U.S. efforts to overthrow the government by arming indigenous insurgents and by attempting to turn world opinion against the Sandinistas through false accusations of "genocide." This tense context heightened the internal conflict and contributed to the relocation to Tasba Pri on the one hand, and the growing insurgency on the other.

After three years, both the resettlement policy of the government and the violent struggle of the indigenous forces failed to achieve a lasting settlement. Both sides have taken steps toward a peaceful resolution of the resettlement and the insurgency. The external negotiations between MISURASATA and the government and the internal cease-fire arrangements with MISURA'S Eduardo Pantín and other armed opponents of the government set the basis for the return to the river, all of which reduced the tension in the region. The autonomy process, when ratified within the new constitution, could become the legal guarantee of the satisfaction of the historic grievances of the coastal peoples. But the cease-fire must last and the external negotiation must become a part of the internal autonomy discussion in order for this process to succeed.

Since the breakdown of talks with MISURASATA, the government has successfully engaged Indian insurgents to sign small, territorially limited agreements. This has transformed the military dimension into a political one and has legitimized the insurgents as a self-defense force in protection of their communities. It is within this context that fundamental aspects of autonomy are being discussed. These agreements are enabling the autonomy process to function even better.

The risks are obviously great for both sides. The MISURASATA negotiators are afraid that the government is manipulating its autonomy process only to neutralize the Atlantic coast in order to more easily fight the contra on the Pacific side. For their part, the Sandinistas fear that the return to the river, and the handing over of strategic points to the insurgents, could become a new base of support for insurgency encouraged by "humanitarian" or more lethal aid from the U.S. But these efforts at negotiation carry indications of good faith as well. MISURASATA's willingness to negotiate alienates it from the more intransigent elements of the insurgents while the return to the river, a security nightmare itself, recognizes the importance to the Miskito and Sumo of their communities.

The risks are obviously great for both sides. But the alternatives to achieving peace and autonomy will be disastrous for both sides. While we were there, all the Miskitos we spoke to were opposed to the renewal of the fighting. Many resist further identification with and dependence on the mestizo-dominated FDN and the U.S. and see some kind of bargain with the Sandinistas as the best available alternative—better than anything even a successful counter-revolution could offer. Indigenous people have less to gain from an overthrow of the Sandinistas than from a successful negotiation with them.

For the Sandinistas, the alternative to a genuine autonomy statute is a return to the costly, military stalemate, implying a diversion of resources that are needed for other, more useful, projects.

As was pointed out in the LASA report on the November 1984 Nicaraguan elections, there is great potential for internal compromise and settlement among contending forces in Nicaragua. It is the outside forces, in particular the U.S. government efforts to support the contra war, that make compromise more difficult. In this case, by encouraging insurgency rather than negotiations and autonomy, the U.S. may be sacrificing the human rights of the very people whose cause it has publicly adopted. Equally significant, it may undermine the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the historical conflict between the Miskitos and the Nicaraguan nation-state, a settlement that could provide a model for the resolution of such conflicts in other Latin American countries.

The autonomy process merits continuing attention, precisely for its implications for all multiethnic societies. The future will require creative responses to the endemic tension between indigenous peoples and nation-states. In Nicaragua there is much left to be resolved. The autonomy process is an effort to develop a democratic solution to these problems. We observed an emerging tension between the Miskito-dominated north Coast and the Creole-dominated south. There was also the unresolved problem of large numbers of mestizos who constitute a majority of the population and who are widely distributed throughout the region. The interests of Creoles and mestizos as non-indigenous ethnic groups are clearly different from those of the Miskitos, Sumus, and Ramas.
Among the indigenous groups, too, there appears to be a differentiation of interests along with more intense group identity. The autonomy process itself is fomenting consciousness of ethnic and indigenous identity. Within the present outlines of autonomy, multiple identities will set the stage for self-rule. That is, within the regional assembly, representatives will have to juggle interests that reflect their identities as members of ethnic groups, as coastal people, and as citizens of Nicaragua. The autonomy process, then, will have to develop clear and creative mechanisms for defining separate ethnic rights to language, culture, land, and natural resources as well as forms of representation in an autonomous legislative body that can satisfy and negotiate the various constituent needs.

The most challenging task, of course, will be to define the scope of autonomous rights and powers vis-à-vis the nation state. As we have seen, these areas are currently only vaguely defined with a considerable distance between the Sandinista government’s proposals and those of Brooklyn Rivera. The internal autonomy process also has only begun to seek a definition of the scope of separate rights and powers. The challenge of peace and autonomy is yet to be achieved, but this unusual process holds hope for a unique resolution of the historical conflicts. Indeed, as one astute observer of Nicaragua, has reflected, it could, and should, be the basis for a "second Nicaraguan revolution."

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**Defending Freedom of Inquiry:**

**LASA**

**vs.**

**The U.S. Customs Service**

by Wayne A. Cornelius

President of LASA

Over the past year and a half, a growing number of scholars, journalists, and public health professionals returning to the United States from Nicaragua have been subjected to highly intrusive searches and interrogations by U.S. Customs and FBI agents. Some of these searches have included the temporary seizure of books, newspapers, and other research materials; some have included photocopying of personal address books and notebooks; all have involved Customs agents reading through personal papers and research materials. Several of these incidents are described in a recent *New York Times* article by Anthony Lewis, which is reprinted below.

These illegal searches and seizures have been far from random occurrences. Persons who have traveled to Nicaragua for legitimate research purposes have been targeted. At least half of the victims known to us have been university professors, including three members of LASA’s Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua (Charles Stansifer, Michael Conroy, and Thomas Walker). The searches and seizures have occurred in at least five different ports of entry across the United States, suggesting that these are not isolated incidents, but part of a nationwide practice.

FBI Director Webster, in congressional testimony last fall, justified the actions of his agents and the Customs Service as a legitimate "foreign counter-intelligence" activity. But whether the objective is intelligence gathering, harassment, or intimidation, it is clearly unrelated to any legitimate Customs law enforcement purpose.

Last November, LASA was approached by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), one of the country’s leading public interest law firms, based in New York, to join a class-action suit aimed at halting such practices by U.S. Customs and FBI agents. LASA’s Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua recommended to the Executive Council that LASA become one of several organizational co-plaintiffs in this litigation. After several months of deliberation and background research, the Executive Council decided (by a vote of 6-3) to join the CCR suit, contingent upon the signing of an acceptable representation agreement to limit LASA’s potential liabilities and to give the Association a strong voice in decisions affecting the conduct of the litigation. Such an agreement with the Center for Constitutional Rights has been worked out, absolving LASA of any current or future financial liabilities. The litigation will be financed entirely by CCR, which is supported by grants and donations from foundations, individuals, and church groups.

In considering this matter, the Executive Council agreed unanimously that the practice at issue here is an appropriate object of concern for LASA. All but one member of the Council believed that there was a need for litigation, both to halt the current practice and to prevent similar government misconduct in the future, and that LASA’s participation in litigation would be the most effective way for the Association to contribute to a resolution of the problem. Two other Executive Council members endorsed the principle of pursuing a remedy through litigation, but had reservations about joining the particular suit being prepared by the Center for Constitutional Rights.

LASA’s representation agreement with CCR stipulates that “this lawsuit is primarily designed to protect the free flow of information into this country, and to assure the right of citizens to travel freely to, and to return with written materials and notes from, Nicaragua.” LASA’s claim for relief will be that both the Association’s work and its members’ individual work are threatened by the intrusion on confidentiality and protected expression that the recent Customs-FBI practice causes.
Regardless of our individual views on the current government in Nicaragua (and on this score there remains a healthy diversity among LASA members), I believe that we can all agree on the need to protect scholars returning from Nicaragua from unlawfully intrusive searches. It is important that a broadly applicable legal precedent be set. If we can no longer guarantee the confidentiality of our field notes and interview sources, our ability and that of our students to conduct effective field research in any Latin American country is directly threatened.

The LASA Executive Council realizes that the litigation in which we are participating will be difficult, and we do not expect miracles. Since the government up to now has cited national security ("foreign counter-intelligence") as the justification for its actions, we expect that the courts eventually will be asked to decide whether scholars' research activities in Nicaragua relate closely enough to U.S. national security interests to justify the government's practices, and to determine whether scholars' First Amendment rights outweigh the government's interests in protecting national security. If the issue is drawn in this way, a ruling favorable to the scholarly community seems unlikely. However, the Executive Council believes that, at minimum, the litigation will have significant educational value (for Congress, the general public, and the media) and that the bringing of a class-action suit may exert some deterrent effect upon Customs/FBI behavior toward scholars. We are, of course, convinced that the actions at issue in this litigation have nothing to do with the defense of legitimate U.S. national security interests.

Future issues of the *LASA Forum* will contain reports on the progress of the CCR lawsuit and its final outcome. Any member of LASA who has had a personal experience that may be relevant to the lawsuit should communicate with Mr. David Cole, staff attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights, 853 Broadway, 14th Floor, New York, NY 10003. Telephone: 212-674-3303.

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*The following article is reprinted, by permission, from the New York Times, April 28, 1986.*

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**Policing Our Thoughts**

by Anthony Lewis

Michael Conroy is a professor of economics at the University of Texas. He is active in the Latin American Studies Association, the leading scholarly group on the subject in the country.

Last spring Professor Conroy spent a week in Nicaragua. He returned to the Houston airport on June 2.

There a U.S. Customs officer went through his luggage, saying that he was looking for subversive material. He took out books, academic papers and Professor Conroy's notes of interviews. He asked Mr. Conroy about the people he had interviewed in Nicaragua.

A second Customs official who could read Spanish was called over to look at the material. He told Professor Conroy that one book might be "subversive" because it "attacks the United States."

Last month Professor Conroy made another visit to Nicaragua. This time his return flight was to San Antonio. When an immigration officer typed his name into the computer, the officer looked up in alarm and directed him to Customs. There, again, his papers, notes, letters, books and newspapers were examined.

Americans who believe what they have been taught about freedom of thought in their country must be surprised to know that Customs officers in Texas searched the luggage of an American returning from Nicaragua for "subversive" ideas. Surely that must be highly unusual. But it is not.

Alice Heidy is a registered nurse who lives in Santa Monica, Calif. She has done a good deal of health-care work in Nicaragua. On April 2, 1985, she returned from an eight-month stay there, landing at the New Orleans airport.

Customs officers searched Miss Heidy's luggage and her purse. They took her address book and notes about a proposal for relationships between Nicaragua and U.S. hospitals, and photocopied them. They opened and read sealed personal letters that she was taking to Americans. While doing all this the officers asked her hostile questions about why she went to Nicaragua.

Sima Rabinowitz is a professor of Spanish at Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania. She spent two weeks in Nicaragua in 1984, returning to the Miami airport.

There Customs agents took about 30 books and pamphlets from her luggage. They would be sent to the FBI, the agents said, because they were subversive and not allowed. Professor Rabinowitz protested that many of the books were in American libraries. The agents were unimpressed.

When she got home Professor Rabinowitz telephoned a Customs office. She was told to write a letter. Ten days later some of the seized books were mailed back to her. The rest were sent later to a fellow passenger who had protested her treatment at the airport.

These are among many such incidents, at airports all around this country. Together they make clear that Customs officers and others make a practice of harassing Americans who have been to Nicaragua, examining their papers and books, copying addresses and other personal
material.

Some months ago I wrote about one American who had been harassed by Customs and F.B.I. agents, Edward Haase. A suit was brought on his behalf by the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York.

A Federal judge in Washington ordered the F.B.I. to return everything its agents had taken from Mr. Haase. But the judge refused to order Customs and the F.B.I. to stop such practices generally, saying that he thought this was an isolated incident, unlikely to be repeated. That case is on appeal.

Now the Center for Constitutional Rights has brought a suit on behalf of 10 Americans whose papers were scrutinized, seized and copied on return from Nicaragua, and on behalf of organizations and other individuals interested in Nicaragua. The suit asks the Federal court in Los Angeles to enjoin such practices generally.

No doubt it is naivete on my part, but I continue to be shocked that officials of the United States government openly carry on such un-American activities. Do they have so little confidence in the American system that they think it is threatened by foreign books? Do they have so little knowledge of our Constitution that they think they can punish and intimidate people who disagree with Government policy?

The Reagan Administration officials involved in this pathetic, repellent policy should learn by heart a few words written by Justice Holmes 60 years ago. "If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other," he said, "it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate."

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**Viewpoints**


(Editor's Note: On April 9, 1986, the Inter-American Dialogue issued its third report. Abe Lowenthal, the Dialogue's executive director, has given the LASA Forum permission to publish the Executive Summary, part of the Preface, and Chapter 1 on the debt crisis. For a complete report, contact the Inter-American Dialogue, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Suite 1070, Washington, D.C. 20036. Telephone: 202/466-6410.)

- **Executive Summary**

  **Overview**

  - It is a dangerous delusion to think that Latin America's financial crisis has passed. The Baker plan is a welcome step in the right direction, but it is not sufficient to get Latin America very far on the road to recovery from its worst depression since the 1930s. We propose a comprehensive program of inter-American economic cooperation to bring Latin America's massive debt under control and restore economic health to the region. (Chapter 1)

  - We believe that verifiable and enforceable security arrangements can be achieved in Central America. Such arrangements would be far more effective in protecting the region's security than efforts to alter the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua by force. All military and paramilitary support for the contras should be ended, including so-called humanitarian assistance that helps the contras wage war. This aid to the contras obstructs progress toward a negotiated settlement in Central America, as do Nicaragua's increasing ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. (Chapter 2)

  - The crucial political challenge in Latin America today is how the region's fragile democratic openings can be consolidated. The major obstacles are economic stagnation regionwide, and violent conflict in Central America. Hemispheric cooperation is needed to help remove these obstacles and to advance democracy more directly. (Chapter 3)

  - The drug trade is a tragedy of immense proportions for our hemisphere. Growing awareness, North and South, of the deadly consequences of drug abuse must now be turned into a shared inter-American commitment to confront narcotics trafficking. Stronger programs of education, eradication, and enforcement are all needed; selective legalization is an idea that should be studied as well. (Chapter 4)

**Chapter 1: Facing up to the Crisis of Debt and Growth**

Latin America remains mired in deep depression. Since the onset of the debt crisis four years ago, Latin American countries have drastically cut domestic consumption and imports in order to pay interest charges. Most countries have made major changes in the management of their
economies. Recovery, however, continues to be frustrated by large outflows of capital. The region’s huge debt burden is compounded by stagnant export earnings, limited access to commercial credit, and low investment. Since 1981, Latin American nations have been getting poorer, reversing two earlier decades of economic progress.

The drop in international petroleum prices has exacerbated the economic problems of Mexico and other regional oil exporters. Latin America’s economies remain distressingly vulnerable to external events beyond their control. Even Brazil has been forced recently to enact a series of tough economic measures to confront large budget deficits and high inflation.

Latin American governments face a double bind. They are committed to repaying their debts in fulfillment of their international obligations. But they must also fulfill their obligations to their own citizens who are demanding economic growth, jobs, and social equity. Most countries cannot simultaneously repay their debts and invest for growth with the limited resources they now command. If economic health is not restored soon, confidence in democratic institutions may weaken.

The plan advanced late last year by U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker was a welcome initiative to deal with the crisis of debt and growth. But, even if fully implemented, it would not be enough to get Latin America’s economies very far down the road to recovery.

We propose a comprehensive, long-term program of economic cooperation, on a scale unprecedented in the Americas. Concerted efforts are needed by all relevant actors: the Latin American countries, the United States and other industrial nations, the multilateral financial institutions, and the commercial banks.

This program of economic cooperation must accomplish five critical tasks:

First, Latin America’s debt must be restructured so that it can be more effectively managed. The debt of a few countries may have to be written down.

Second, agreement must be reached among all parties on Latin America’s financial needs. A joint declaration of such a target figure would be important in gaining funding commitments from the different financial institutions.

Third, the necessary additional funds—some $20 billion each year for the next five years—must be mobilized through a combination of reduced interest payments, increased lending from private and official sources, and new investments. Most of the money will have to be generated from the commercial banks. The rest must come from the multilateral financial institutions, official bilateral lending agencies, increased foreign investment, and returned capital flight.

Fourth, the Latin American countries must continue to improve the management of their economies by sustaining efforts to reduce public sector deficits; divest themselves of inefficient state enterprises; strengthen their private sectors; expand national savings and investment; and promote exports and more efficient import-substitution. These measures have to be tailored to the economic and political circumstances of each country, and they must be accompanied by adequate levels of external financing.

Fifth, the industrial countries must undertake policies to reduce international interest rates and expand world trade. The United States must adopt sound policies to reduce its fiscal deficit and continue to resist pressures for new import controls.

To achieve the coordination required to accomplish this five-point program, a standing group of high-level representatives from debtor and creditor governments and from the various financial institutions should be established.

Chapter 2: Central America: The Search for a Secure Peace

Central America’s civil wars take thousands of lives each year, displace hundreds of thousands from their homes, and lay waste to the region’s economics. No end to these conflicts is in sight. Every effort must be devoted to negotiating solutions to Central America’s wars before they become more destructive. Political solutions—not military victories—are the realistic alternatives to protracted war in Central America.

The struggle in Nicaragua between the Sandinista government and the anti-Sandinista rebels (the contras) is particularly dangerous because it is a focal point of East-West confrontation. The present course of both Nicaragua and the United States could produce U.S. military intervention. Unilateral U.S. intervention would alienate the democratic leaders now dominant in most of Latin America and isolate the United States from its friends in the region. It must be avoided.

The internal situation in Nicaragua and the international behavior of the Sandinista regime are both disturbing, but the U.S. response to Nicaragua’s challenge is ineffective and counterproductive. Escalating U.S. pressure has diminished the Nicaragua government’s incentive to compromise because that pressure increasingly appears aimed at overthrowing the Sandinista regime rather than achieving a peaceful settlement.

All military and paramilitary support for the contras’ campaign against the Sandinista government should be ended, including so-called humanitarian assistance that helps the contras wage war. Such aid to the contras offers no solution to the security problems posed by Nicaragua, and it obstructs progress toward a negotiated settlement that could protect all of Central America.
By the same token, Nicaragua must renounce its support for insurgents in El Salvador and elsewhere. It should also reduce its military ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union by withdrawing Soviet and Cuban military personnel and restricting its arms acquisitions from those countries.

Under current circumstances, essential steps toward peace are unlikely to be taken as unilateral initiatives by either the United States or Nicaragua. They can, however, be accomplished within the framework offered by the Contadora process, the diplomatic initiative undertaken by Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama.

All countries in the hemisphere, and particularly the United States and Nicaragua, must give wholehearted support to the Contadora efforts through their actions—not merely their words. Contadora cannot succeed as long as the United States insists on fundamental changes in the Sandinista regime as a prior condition for agreement on security matters.

It is important for the United States and other countries of the hemisphere to press Nicaragua to move toward internal reconciliation, political pluralism, and democracy. Nicaragua should end its state of emergency, lift restrictions on freedom of the press and association, respect the rights of minorities, and begin an active dialogue with the full range of opposition. But efforts to achieve workable regional security arrangement should not be held hostage to the accomplishment of internal political reform in Nicaragua.

Neither democracy nor security in the hemisphere would be jeopardized by a carefully framed and verifiable peace treaty with the government of Nicaragua. The alternative is protracted warfare, which would, indeed, threaten the security of all countries in the Americas.

Although overshadowed by the conflict in Nicaragua, civil war still rages in El Salvador, taking a terrible toll of casualties, refugees, and economic destruction. The struggle will not end with decisive military victory for either side. The best hope for peace and reconciliation in El Salvador lies in negotiations between the government and the armed opposition. Renewed talks could lay the groundwork for a gradual de-escalation of the fighting and eventually for fashioning arrangements under which all parties can participate securely in free elections. The precise nature of these arrangements should emerge from negotiations; they cannot be prescribed in advance.

Chapter 3: Consolidating Democracy in the Americas

Democracy is gaining ground throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. In country after country, undemocratic regimes have been yielding to constitutional governments. The brutal years of repression in Latin America underscored the value of democracy to most people in the region. The central political issue in Latin America today is whether the region's turn toward democracy will endure.

The obstacles to consolidating Latin America's fragile new democracies are daunting. If democratic governments cannot produce economic growth and foster social equity, they could lose credibility. Populist demagogues may press for more radical policies. Armed forces might again intervene.

An historic opportunity now exists to strengthen democracy and help it take firm root. The main tasks in building democracy are internal to each nation, but there is important scope for international support.

The single best external contribution to strengthening democracy in Latin America would be relief from the region's debt burden. Democratic governments should be helped to overcome their tough economic problems, not taught lessons about particular economic orthodoxies. A secure peace would do most to improve democratic prospects in Central America.

Concrete measures that governments should undertake to help foster democracy are: public diplomacy in favor of democratic movements; a halt to economic and military assistance to regimes that systematically violate human rights; initiatives to strengthen legislatures, judicial, and law enforcement systems, and nongovernmental civic institutions; steadfast promotion of freedom of the press; efforts to establish and preserve civilian control of the military; and aid to address the fundamental problems of inequality and injustice that breed revolution and repression.

Chapter 4: Controlling the Narcotics Trade

Drug traffic in the hemisphere has reached immense and dangerous proportions. In the United States, drug-related crime and corruption are pervasive; in Latin America, drug corruption is weakening fragile democracies. North American levels of drug abuse, with all their disastrous social consequences, have come to plague parts of Latin America. The drug trade remains a major source of conflict between the United States and those Latin American and Caribbean countries where drugs are grown and processed.

Changing attitudes both in Latin America and the United States offer an opportunity to confront the drug problem more forcefully than has been possible so far. Latin American governments now see drugs as a threat to their own citizens and sovereignty. People in the United States are beginning to recognize that curbing the demand for drugs is as important as trying to stamp out the supply. Both "supply-side" and "demand-side" solutions are needed.

An inter-American strategy to deal more effectively
with drugs should include three key elements:

1. Much more serious drug education and rehabilitation efforts by the United States.

2. Stepped-up eradication programs in Latin America. As Latin American governments commit themselves to expand the eradication and seizure of drugs, the United States should respond positively to requests for assistance.

3. Sustained high-priority to the narcotics issues in the hemisphere, plus readiness to explore fresh approaches, including some not now on the political agenda. Continuing attention and joint resolve are essential to avoid backsliding by Latin American countries or the United States.

A regional body, on the model of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, should be established to collect and share information on the narcotics trade, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of different means of combating it, and to explore new approaches. Because narcotics is such a formidable problem, the widest range of alternatives must be examined, including selective legalization, which could reduce the vice and corruption associated with drug trafficking.

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**Preface**

This report has one central message: It is time to rebuild inter-American cooperation.

The Americas in 1986 are troubled. Economic, political, and social problems are mounting. The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean must work closely with the United States and Canada to face these issues.

Most of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean remain mired in depression, with no sustained relief in sight. The region's capacity to manage its debt and to resume growth has been eroding. The economies of the United States and Canada are directly hurt by Latin America's plight.

Central America's destructive wars grind on, causing immense human suffering and undermining that region's future. Conditions in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas have been deteriorating. The danger of military confrontation between Nicaragua and the United States has grown.

The deadly narcotics trade is an old problem that has returned with new virulence in the 1980s. Drug abuse and associated corruption and crime are harming people and weakening governments throughout the Americas.

These three problems are grave, and they demand urgent attention. We believe there is now an unusual opportunity for the peoples and governments of the Americas to join together to confront these serious challenges.

The most heartening change in Latin America during the 1980s has been its democratic renewal. Through the region, military regimes have been giving way to civilian governments committed to reconstructing democratic politics.

Moderate and pragmatic leaders have come to power who are ready to work with each other to solve hemispheric problems. Through their involvement in the Cartagena group, they are seeking responses to the crisis of debt, growth, and trade. Through their involvement in the support of the Contadora process, they are trying to bring peace to Central America. These initiatives should be supported.

The opportunity for rebuilding hemispheric cooperation also reflects changing attitudes in the United States. The "Baker Plan"—the suggestions put forward by Secretary of the Treasury James Baker last October—represents a new appreciation in the United States that Latin America's economic crisis can only be resolved through inter-American efforts.

It is also becoming increasingly understood in the United States that dealing effectively with the drug trade will require cooperative action, and that peace in Central America will require regional accord.

Two years ago, the Dialogue warned that Latin America's economic problems would worsen and Central America's wars would escalate if the nations of the Americas, North and South, could not work together to resolve them. Unfortunately, our predictions proved to be all too accurate.

The members of the Dialogue—men and women who care deeply about the hemisphere we share—call for cooperative approaches to the four issues our report addresses: restoring growth to Latin America's economies, building a secure peace in Central America, consolidating democracy in the Americas, and controlling the deadly trade in drugs. We also appeal to the governments of the Americas to commit themselves to the strengthening of inter-American institutions. We must find the will to rebuild the Organization of American States before it is too late.

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**Chapter I: Facing up to the Crisis of Debt and Growth**

The idea that Latin America's debt crisis has passed is a dangerous delusion. With few exceptions, Latin American nations are less able to manage their debt today than they
were when the financial crisis first erupted in 1982.

Latin America has now suffered through four years of its worst economic depression since the 1930s. For most countries and people in the region, no relief is yet in sight. Latin America is currently unable either to earn or borrow the capital it needs for economic recovery. Latin American nations are getting poorer, reversing two earlier decades of economic progress.

Since the onset of the debt crisis, Latin American countries have drastically curtailed domestic consumption and imports to pay the interest due on their debts. Most countries have introduced major changes in management of their economies to correct past policy mistakes and adjust to a more difficult international economic environment. The large drain of capital resulting from their debt burdens, however, frustrates efforts to resume growth and remains a serious barrier to economic reform.

After three years of economic decline, the region registered modest gains in 1984. But most countries suffered new reverses in 1985. In recent months, the economies of Mexico, Venezuela, and several smaller oil exporters have been further strained by plummeting international petroleum prices. Although the drop in oil prices has benefited some countries, it has on balance hurt the region, which is a new exporter of energy.

Brazil has been a notable exception to Latin America’s otherwise dismal economic picture. Since mid-1984, Brazil has expanded its exports significantly and produced the growth that has eluded other countries. Last year, Brazil increased its gross domestic product by more than seven percent, while the rest of Latin America grew by less than one percent. But even Brazil has recently had to enact tough economic measures to deal with persistent problems of large budget deficits, high inflation, and low rates of investment.

Latin American governments face a double bind. They are committed to fulfilling their international obligations and to repaying their debts. But they must also respond to their own citizens, who demand economic growth, jobs, and social equity. It has become clear that most countries cannot simultaneously repay their debts and restore growth with the limited resources they now command.

Democratic progress in Latin America, as well as financial stability worldwide, requires the region’s leaders and their private and official creditors to chart a new course. The current course, which deprives Latin America of the resources it needs for recovery, is likely to backfire over the longer term. Latin American countries today are struggling to meet their interest payments by forgoing investments essential for future growth, and then scrambling for whatever new loans they can obtain to meet inevitable shortfalls.

Latin America is falling deeper into debt, but without building its capacity for subsequent repayment; it has been putting off, not preventing, the day of reckoning. Four years of this debt management strategy have left Latin America’s economies distressingly vulnerable to external events beyond their control. Just two years ago, Mexico was considered well on the way to recovery; now that country’s already troubled economy has been plunged into crisis by declining oil prices. Another shock in the international economy next year could well expose other countries to similar devastating setbacks.

Declining international interest rates will reduce the burden of Latin America’s debt payments. Moreover, lower interest rates, combined with the oil price drop, should spur growth in the industrial countries. This, in turn, will bolster Latin America’s exports. But these favorable trends are not sure to last. Even if they do, they will not, by themselves, be enough to assure sustained recovery in the region. A new approach must be found to end Latin America’s economic ordeal—to resolve the problem of debt, growth, and trade.

The Baker initiative is a welcome step in the right direction. It recognizes the need for new capital infusions and emphasizes growth rather than austerity. If carried out, his recommendations would address some of the problems that Latin America will face within the next two or three years. But these measures, even if fully implemented, will not be enough to promote Latin America’s recovery. That task demands a far more comprehensive effort.

To restore Latin America’s economic health, we propose a five point program of sustained economic cooperation among Latin American governments, the United States and other creditor nations, the commercial banks, and the multilateral financing agencies. Jointly formulated and managed, the program we envision would aim to revive economic and social dynamism in Latin America. It would also strengthen international finance and trade and reestablish sound economic relations between Latin America and the rest of the world economy.

Latin America’s Economic Decline

Latin America’s current economic and social problems have their roots in the 1960s and 1970s, a period of unprecedented growth for the region. In two decades of uninterrupted expansion, overall production more than tripled in real terms. Per capita income rose by an average of 3.3 percent per year, faster than in most other regions and twice as fast as in the United States. Latin America emerged as a dynamic actor in the world economy. Brazil led the region’s growth and became the eighth largest market economy in the world.

Not all countries shared equally in this economic
expansion. There remained great disparities in income and wealth among the nations of the region. Income distribution within most countries, already far from equitable, became even more skewed. Middle and upper income groups captured most of the new wealth while the bottom 60 percent of the population advanced slowly, if at all. But expectations for material progress were high in all countries and among all income groups. Those expectations were shattered in the 1980s—for nearly everyone, everywhere—as economic growth came to an abrupt halt.

Over the past five years, every Latin American country has lost ground. For the region as a whole, per capita income has receded by 12 to 15 percent, and now stands at what it was a decade ago. In many countries—including Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador—per capita income has declined to levels of the early to mid-1960s. This reversal has been especially hard on the region’s lowest income groups.

Social justice has become an empty phrase for most of the region’s poor. Deprivation has visibly expanded in Latin America’s overcrowded cities and poverty-stricken countryside. Inadequate housing, deteriorating public services, food shortages, and street crime have all worsened. Infant mortality, after years of decline, is on the rise again in many places.

Unemployment rates have never been higher in most countries. Many millions of part-time, low paid workers are living at the margin of subsistence. Upwards of 40 percent of the region’s workers lack regular jobs or are out of work completely. The employed, too, are suffering. Real wages have dropped in many countries, and most workers are worried about losing their jobs. The hardships caused by unemployment and low wages have been compounded by deep cuts in public expenditures for health, housing, education, and social security. Malnutrition, poor health, and substandard education are depleting Latin America of its single most critical resource—the potential of its young people.

In the 1970s, Latin America’s economic expansion was fueled by external financing, particularly by massive commercial borrowing that was spurred by very low international interest rates. In this climate of rapid growth and easy credit, the region’s indebtedness grew more than ten-fold between 1970 and 1982, from $27 billion to about $300 billion.

During the early 1980s, debt obligations soared as interest rates skyrocketed to record levels. At the same time, Latin America’s capacity to meet those obligations dropped precipitously when global recession cut deeply into export earnings and the region’s access to commercial credit was sharply curtailed. This vicious scissors effect was the immediate cause of the regionwide debt crisis.

The problems were made worse by a legacy of economic mismanagement from the period of high growth. Public sectors throughout Latin America were bloated; inefficient state enterprises were operating at large losses. Many private firms became dependent on cheap credit and other government subsidies. In some countries, military spending added to the drain on government budgets. Overvalued exchange rates discouraged the growth of export industries.

The debt crisis burst into public view in August 1982 when Mexico announced that it could not meet its external financial obligations. Default by Mexico or any of Latin America’s large debtors threatened to undermine international financial markets because of the magnitude of the region’s debt to commercial banks worldwide.

Latin America’s creditors devised a three-pronged strategy to assure that the countries would continue to meet their interest obligations. First, Latin American countries were called upon to impose stringent austerity measures in order to reduce domestic consumption and expand income from trade. Second, creditor banks and governments agreed to reschedule loans to push principal payments into the future. Third, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other official agencies, and the commercial banks provided some new loans to cover shortfalls in interest payments.

The strategy was partially successful. Private banks did not suffer major losses, and avoided any widespread writing down of the debt. The Latin American countries generated a large trade surplus by squeezing imports to 60 percent of pre-crisis levels. Most managed to pare their budget deficits. But the main problems were not solved. The strategy did not reanimate growth, expand export earnings, or renew access to commercial credit.

The debt burden itself continues to be the primary obstacle to Latin America’s economic recovery. Each year since 1982, interest payments have absorbed some $35 billion out of the region’s export earnings of $90 to $100 billion per year. Without significant new commercial lending, Latin America has had to extract those payments directly from domestic savings, stripping away capital needed for investment and growth. Huge resources have been transferred out of the private sector to permit servicing of the public debt. Real interest rates have come down in the past year, but they remain far above the rates of the 1960s and 1970s. Adding to the problem have been the sharp decline in foreign investment and the flight of domestic capital, both largely due to the depressed state of Latin America’s economies. Overall investment in the region is now less than 70 percent of what it was in 1980-82. Latin America is not investing enough to provide for future growth. Instead of rebuilding their economies, Latin American countries are living hand-to-mouth.

A sluggish global economy has seriously complicated
recovery efforts. Slow growth in the industrial countries has meant slack demand and low prices for Latin America's exports, and has led to increased pressure for trade restrictions. Over the past five years, Latin America managed to expand the volume of its exports by 24 percent, but earnings today are barely above their 1980 level because of falling commodity prices. The losses resulting from this drop in commodity values have been far greater than the savings from declining interest rates.

To generate foreign exchange, Latin American countries have had to maintain a tight lid on imports. In most countries imports had been excessive, but the steep decline—from $100 billion in 1980 to $60 billion in each of the past three years—has created a serious bottleneck in domestic production. Shortages have occurred in spare parts, equipment, raw materials, and intermediary goods that previously were imported and for which no domestic substitutes are available.

Adjustment programs have also slowed domestic production in Latin America. By dampening demand and forcing up internal interest rates, they have dramatically weakened industry, commerce, and agriculture. Latin America is running down its industrial base and economic infrastructure.

Austerity has been associated, paradoxically, with the highest inflation rates in the region's history. Even excluding Bolivia's hyperinflation of 10,000-plus percent, inflation overall in the region jumped from 60 percent in 1980 to an average of approximately 150 percent in the past two years. In 1985, inflation topped 100 percent in five countries, and exceeded 20 percent in ten others. This inflation is a source of great instability in Latin America's economies.

Thus far Latin American countries have, by and large, complied with the strategy devised by their creditors. They cannot do so much longer. Political pressures are mounting throughout the region for renewed growth and an end to austerity. The sacrifices and hardship demanded of Latin America's people have produced surprisingly little political turmoil to date. Discontent, however, is becoming widespread and potentially dangerous. The people of Latin America justifiably expect their sacrifices to produce results.

We fear that economic discontent may increase the appeal of undemocratic solutions of the extreme left and right. Unless elected leaders can provide relief for their citizens, they will almost certainly lose popular support. In some countries, military rule may once again replace civilian authority; in others, more nationalistic, populist, and radical governments may emerge. Consolidating stable democracies in Latin America requires that the region's economic depression be brought to an end. If it is not, our best hope for developing a community of democratic nations in the hemisphere could be lost.

A New Program of Economic Cooperation

In our 1984 report, we concluded that "a cooperative effort at the global level" was needed to confront the economic and financial crisis afflicting Latin America. During the past two years, the region's economic problems have intensified and now openly threatened the stability of both democratic governments and international financial arrangements. Concerted action is even more urgently needed.

This view is increasingly shared not only by Latin American debtor countries, but also by the United States and other industrial nations, the commercial banks, and the multilateral financing agencies. All these parties now agree on three critical issues. First, economic growth must be revived and sustained in Latin America. Second, new infusions of capital are required to promote that growth. Third, economic policy reform must continue in Latin America to remove domestic obstacles to development.

Cooperation from many different parties will be needed to alleviate Latin America's economic crisis. Additional lending is required from the commercial banks, as are larger disbursements from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Latin American countries must further cut public deficits, encourage public and private investment, and bolster exports. The industrial countries should expand their economies more rapidly, open their markets more widely to Latin American products, and work to reduce international interest rates even further.

The Baker proposals reflect this shared assessment of Latin American economic problems and of the steps that must be taken to deal with them. We are encouraged by the promise of leadership from the United States on the debt issue. We urge the Latin American countries to work closely with the commercial banks and multilateral agencies to take advantage of the new credits proposed in the Baker plan.

But the time has come to undertake a far more comprehensive effort. We call upon Latin America and its creditors now to work jointly to develop and implement a broad, long-term program of economic cooperation. Five critical tasks must be accomplished in order to confront the obstacles to economic growth in Latin America.

1. Latin America's debt must be restructured;
2. Agreement must be reached among all parties on the real magnitude of the region's financial needs;
3. The funds required for sustained growth in the region must be made available through a combination of reduced interest payments, increased lending from private and official sources, and new investment;
4. Latin American countries must persist in efforts to reform their economies;
5. World trade must be expanded and the international economy strengthened.

1. Restructuring Latin America’s Debt

Latin America’s debt obligations must be restructured so they can be effectively managed. This would eliminate the prolonged negotiations and crisis atmosphere that characterize repeated debt reschedulings. It would also establish long-term contractual arrangements that would be more realistic and thus more likely to be fulfilled.

Several countries have already had large portions of their loans rescheduled. The bulk of the region’s debt, however, is still short-term and will eventually have to be renegotiated. All of Latin America’s outstanding debts, public and private, should now be restructured under the most favorable conditions the commercial banks and official creditors can offer. Repayment periods in most cases should be extended to 15 years or longer, commission fees waived, interest surcharges held to an absolute minimum, and payments on principal deferred for at least five years.

Most countries in Latin America are meeting their debt obligations, albeit with great sacrifice. A few countries, however, are clearly overloaded with debt. No matter how restructured, their debt burdens will remain too high a percentage of gross domestic product and too great a multiple of annual export revenues ever to be soundly managed. In those cases, a portion of the debt may have to be written off to restore order to the countries’ financial transactions. This expedient should be used with care, as continued activity by private lenders and investors is to Latin America’s long-term benefit.

We encourage the commercial banks, together with their government regulators, to take the lead in developing procedures for dealing with such unmanageable debts. Limited write-downs have already occurred in a few countries, but more are necessary. The number of cases should be kept small and regulatory changes introduced to allow the banks to absorb the losses over several years.

Overall, the restructuring of Latin America’s debt would serve to enhance the quality of the banks’ loan portfolios, as it would improve the borrowers’ ability to pay. Since a majority of countries are not currently paying principal on their loans, restructurings would not free large resources for the countries. It would, however, help to alleviate the disorder and uncertainty that characterize Latin America’s financial relationship with its creditors. For both the banks and the countries, it would create a sounder and more credible basis for economic planning and management.

2. Reaching Agreement on Latin America’s Financial Needs

Prior to 1982, Latin America was a large importer of capital. Net transfers to the region exceeded $5 billion in 1980 and again in 1981—as then seemed appropriate to the development needs of a middle-income, industrializing region. This vital flow has been drastically reversed since 1982. In each of the past three years, some $35 billion was transferred out of the region—about 6 percent of the region’s gross domestic product and over 35 percent of its annual exports. An outflow of these proportions cannot be sustained: it forecloses growth prospects, undermines Latin America’s future capacity to service its debt, and is politically untenable. Latin America cannot continue to send abroad the resources it needs for recovery at home.

If fully implemented, the Baker proposals would provide to 15 of the third world’s largest debtors about $10 billion more capital per year than has been available to them over the past several years. Perhaps $7 to $8 billion of this would go to the ten Latin American countries on the Baker list. Unless interest rates decline dramatically and the region’s export earnings expand sharply (neither of which is probable), this amount will not be sufficient. The Baker plan does not offer enough funds to get Latin America very far down the road to recovery.

We call upon the Latin American countries and their creditors jointly to establish a realistic target figure for reducing the outflow of funds from the region. The target should allow for long-term growth rates of at least four to five percent per year—which would begin to drive down unemployment levels. A jointly established target figure would signal that all parties agree on the full dimensions of Latin America’s economic problems. This would be an important step toward gaining eventual funding commitments from the different financial institutions. Agreement on Latin America’s financial needs is essential for broader cooperation.

To achieve four to five percent growth, we estimate that Latin America will need approximately $20 billion of new capital each year for the next five years. This amount would enable the region to step up imports it needs to revive domestic production. The net drain of funds would be reduced from six to approximately three percent of the gross national product. This would still be a burdensome loss, but it would be compatible with growth rates of four to five percent if the Latin American countries pursue needed economic reforms, particularly those that encourage national savings.

The flow of funds should be reversed. Latin America should once again become a net importer of capital. But this will happen only when the commercial banks resume voluntary lending to the region and foreign investment is restored to pre-crisis levels. These are major objectives of the recovery program we propose.
3. Mobilizing the Funds

Decreasing the annual net transfer of funds from Latin America by $20 billion is a formidable task that must be shared by many different financial institutions. The multilateral agencies (the World Bank, IDB, and IMF) will have to expand their lending, as will government agencies in the United States and other industrial countries. Foreign investment is another source that must be tapped, and capital flight from the region must be turned around. The largest share of funding will have to come from the commercial banks.

The Commercial Banks: To meet a $20 billion target, we estimate that $12 billion per year will have to be generated from commercial banks in the United States, Europe, and Japan. No other source can provide this level of funds. It should be possible to obtain such a major commitment from the commercial banks, for they have at stake the far larger amounts they lent previously. It would be to their advantage to make this additional effort as part of a larger program to promote economic recovery in Latin America.

New lending is one way to make the funds available; another is for the banks to defer current interest collections and add the unpaid amounts to existing loans (i.e., interest capitalization). Under current regulations, capitalizing interest payments is far more costly to U.S. banks than providing the same amount through new loans. Operating under different rules, many European banks prefer to capitalize interest. Combining these two approaches will be necessary to assure the participation of lenders from different countries. Once an overall target for bank financing is established, each national banking community should participate in the way it finds most prudent. We urge removal of regulatory obstacles that prevent or discourage banks in any country from joining in this effort. U.S. banks in particular may require greater flexibility in dealing with overseas debtors. Changes in the rules under which loans are classified as nonperforming would be helpful, for example.

We also encourage both commercial banks and Latin American countries to give greater attention to possibilities of trading debt for equity. Rather than extending new loans or deferring interest payments, there may be attractive opportunities for banks to invest a portion of interest payments in the countries from which they are collected. This has already been happening to a limited extent. Banks have occasionally been willing to accept ownership shares in private businesses in lieu of interest payments on loans.

The banks clearly stand to benefit from improvements in the economies of the debtor nations. They will, however, understandably resist placing large amounts of new capital at risk. Official agencies, bilateral and multilateral, will have to accept some of that risk—by supporting, directly or indirectly, portions of capitalized interest, new loans, or restructured debt, and by expanding their own lending. Such cooperation is the only way to ensure adequate funding; it is, indeed, the backbone of the program proposed here.

The Multilateral Financial Agencies: The IMF, the World Bank, and the IDB must be centrally involved in Latin America's economic recovery. This will require larger contributions from member governments as well as some changes in the operating policies and procedures of these international financial institutions.

Since 1982, the IMF's lending to Latin America has exceeded that of the commercial banks and of other official agencies. In 1986, however, the IMF is slated to become a net recipient rather than a provider of funds as debtor country repayments will begin to exceed new loans. We urge participating governments to assure that the IMF is able to maintain its current contribution to Latin America of at least $5 billion per year; longer-term lending should be encouraged as well. We also recommend an expansion of the IMF's present program for compensatory export credit to protect countries against commodity price fluctuations. We favor the creation of a new program to provide similar protection against variations in interest rates. Finally, we foresee the need for a new issue of Special Drawing Rights to build up the depleted international reserves of many Latin American countries.

The World Bank and the IDB have both expanded their lending to Latin America since 1982. Disbursements of the two banks rose from $3.2 billion in 1981 to nearly $6.0 billion by 1985. This sum must now be increased by another $4.0 billion per year if the $20 billion target we estimate necessary for Latin America's recovery is to be met. New funding on this order from the multilateral banks is crucial for obtaining the larger amounts asked of the commercial banks; it would reassure them that the financial burden is appropriately being shared by official agencies. It is imperative that the United States and other member governments increase their commitments to the World Bank and IDB.

In the past several years, the development banks have been making funds available more quickly through faster-disbursing loans. The banks should also step up disbursements on existing loans, mainly by assuming even more of the costs of the projects they finance. Moreover, we encourage expanded use of private loan guarantees and more co-financing with commercial lenders. Risk-sharing with commercial banks is essential to mobilizing their resources. The importance of official backing for private lenders cannot be overemphasized; it is crucial to the program.

Direct Bilateral Lending: Official export credit agencies, like the U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), are now the
main sources of bilateral official lending to Latin America. The amounts, however, have declined from $2.6 billion in 1982 to about $1.0 billion in 1985, reflecting in part the drop in exports to the region which are financed through official credits. We urge the industrial country governments to increase the financing available to Latin America from these agencies by $1.5 billion. The additional resources would allow for a needed expansion in the region’s imports.

Bilateral U.S. development assistance, once a main source of foreign exchange for all of Latin America, has declined markedly from its peak in the mid-1960s and is now restricted to Caribbean and Central American countries and a few of the poorer Andean nations. A major increase in such support would be welcome, but that is unlikely in view of U.S. budget constraints and efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit. We strongly urge that current levels of development assistance at least be maintained. The burden of debt, aggravated by low commodity prices, has been particularly onerous for many of the small countries that are still eligible for bilateral aid.

**Foreign Investment:** In the past two years, foreign direct investment in Latin America has averaged about $2.5 billion, sharply down from an average of more than $6.0 billion for the 1980-82 period. Many companies have been divesting their holdings in the region. The overall business climate mitigates against a large immediate increase in foreign investment. Once growth is rekindled, however, outside investment should expand rapidly.

In the meantime, over the next few years, most countries could still attract additional investment, with the aim of removing burdensome restrictions and providing new incentives where appropriate. Particular attention should be given to easing limitations on foreign ownership, special performance requirements, restraints on local borrowing, and regulations to affect specific sectors and industries. Adopting and maintaining suitable exchange rates may be the single most important initiative that countries can undertake to attract overseas investment.

Latin America should aim to expand foreign investment by $1.0 billion per year in the near term. To reach this goal, local efforts must be effectively reinforced by the lending, insurance, and technical assistance activities of such agencies as the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) and its new Multilateral Investment Corporation. With the necessary financing from member governments, these agencies can help stimulate investment by issuing guarantees against non-commercial risks, providing policy advice to governments, helping to structure projects, disseminating information about investment opportunities, and participating directly as investors in some cases.

**Capital Flight:** Latin Americans currently hold more than $100 billion in assets outside the region. Much of the capital flight occurred in the early 1980s; the amounts now being sent overseas appear to have tapered off for most countries. But the bulk of the money held abroad will not be returned until there is clear evidence of sustained improvements in economic policy and performance and in the climate for private business.

Mobilizing even a small portion of these assets for reinvestment in the region would contribute importantly to Latin America’s economic recovery. A reasonable goal would be to attract the return of $1.0 to $2.0 billion per year. Measures that promote foreign investment will provide incentives for the return of local capital, particularly maintaining realistic exchange rates and curtailting inflation. Sound domestic tax and interest rate policies would help as well.

We also encourage consideration of more specific inducements. One idea that should be examined is the creation of a mutual fund, perhaps under the auspices of the World Bank or IDB, to attract flight capital and other funds for reinvestment in Latin American countries. Commercial banks might be more willing to reinvest some portion of their claims in Latin America if such a mechanism were available.

**Latin America will not recover unless the massive outflow of resources from the region is reversed. This will take the combined efforts of many institutions, public and private:** approximately $12 billion per year from commercial banks, $4 billion from the multilateral agencies, $1 to $1.5 billion each from foreign direct investment and from bilateral lending, and $1 to $2 billion in recaptured flight capital. If these amounts are mobilized, Latin America’s economic depression could be ended and healthy growth resumed. The region would then be able to meet its debt obligations without sacrificing the material and social progress of its citizens.

### 4. Economic Policy in Latin America

To create a solid basis for long-term, stable growth, the countries of Latin America must continue to improve the management of their economies. Since 1982, most countries have introduced important economic reforms. But past policy mistakes are still exacting a high cost, and further improvements are needed.

Latin American countries must sustain efforts to reduce their public sector deficits; divest themselves of inefficient state enterprises; bring inflation under control; curtail subsidies, price controls, and automatic wage increases; strengthen their private sectors; expand both public and private investment; and promote both exports and more efficient import-substitution.

The content and timing of these measures must be consistent with economic growth and social equity, and they must be tailored to the needs of each country. Policy
reforms must be directed to reviving domestic agriculture and industry, to increasing national savings, and to overcoming problems of unemployment, low wages, and absolute poverty. External financing is essential to achieve these aims. Better economic policies can remove domestic obstacles to growth, but that growth will occur only if Latin America has adequate access to capital. Economic reform alone will not lead to recovery; without sufficient resources, it will only prolong austerity.

Conditions will, and should, be placed on Latin American countries in exchange for new financing, but we believe that creditor institutions should be flexible in pressuring for sounder economic policies in the debtor countries. Each country should devise its own development strategy that gives appropriate attention to needed policy improvements, requirements for external financing, and arrangements for servicing debt obligations. Governments, particularly democratic governments, must retain the capacity to manage their own economies.

5. Strengthening the World Economy

The economic policies of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe critically affect Latin America’s prospects for recovery. The industrial countries must undertake policy measures to reduce international interest rates further and to expand world trade. Such policies would serve their own interests as well as those of Latin America.

Global interest rates have dropped over the past year, but are still too high. Concerted action among the industrial countries can lead to further reductions, thereby diminishing the yearly interest burden of Latin America. Lowering interest rates would also contribute to industrial country growth, and hence to expanded markets for Latin American products. It would, in addition, reduce incentives for capital flight. We urge the United States to adopt sound policies to reduce its fiscal deficit. The deficit is now financed by international borrowing which sustains high interest rates throughout the world.

Exports will remain the major source of foreign exchange for Latin America. Since 1981, Latin American countries have built up sizeable trade surpluses, but largely through sharp reductions in imports. Some growth in imports is now essential to restore domestic production and bolster exports. The continued squeezing of imports is self-defeating. Expanding exports is ultimately the only way the region can repay its foreign debt.

Most Latin American countries have been struggling to expand their export earnings. They still have to do more, especially in the area of tariff reform, but they have made progress toward establishing appropriate exchange rates, reducing subsidies for domestic consumption, and promoting investment in both export and import-substituting industries. Their efforts, however, continue to be frustrated by low commodity prices, depressed markets, and trade restrictions—all factors outside their control. Higher growth rates, on the order of three or four percent a year, are needed in the United States, Europe, and Japan to increase the demand for Latin America’s exports and to reverse the downward trend in commodity prices.

We commend the U.S. government for resisting domestic pressures for new import controls, and call on other industrial countries to open their markets more widely. Expanded trade is in everyone’s benefit, as is recovery in Latin America. They go hand in hand.

Multilateral Coordination

We have outlined five key priorities for a new cooperative program to promote Latin America’s economic recovery and reestablish a sound basis for hemispheric development. All of these priorities must be addressed in concert if the program is to succeed. Combined action that confronts the full range of problems must replace piecemeal, step-by-step approaches. If not, emergency situations, like that facing Mexico today, will almost certainly arise in other countries of Latin America in the future. Measures to address Mexico’s situation must be taken promptly—but these should be the start of a broader program to deal with problems of economic instability and stagnation in every country of the region.

The program must be built on the collective efforts of the Latin American countries, the United States and other industrial nations, the international financial organizations, and the commercial banks. They must all work jointly to resolve outstanding issues, overcome the inertia that has impeded progress so far, and construct a truly multilateral approach. Unilateral policy statements such as the Baker plan, no matter how well conceived, cannot produce the commitment required.

To achieve the coordination needed, we advocate the creation of a standing group of high-level representatives from debtor and creditor governments and the financial institutions. Such a group would meet regularly to provide continuing direction to the cooperative program for Latin America’s recovery.

The group’s initial tasks would be to develop an overarching strategy, gain agreement on it, and then formulate specific proposals for action. The group would also establish criteria and procedures for measuring results and for reconciling differences as they arise. The recommendations of the standing group would be advisory and non-binding on the participating entities. Each would have to take responsibility for assuming its share of the burden, but would do so as part of a collective effort with the confidence that other participants are also doing their share.

The case-by-case approach should not be abandoned, but it should be carried out within a jointly-developed strategy. The countries themselves will still have to devise
and implement their own plans for adjustment and growth and negotiate their own arrangements with their creditors. The proposed program of multilateral cooperation would provide the needed framework for resolving the individual problems of each Latin American country.

Ending Latin America’s economic crisis requires a shared sense of commitment to common objectives, agreement on the responsibilities of each party, and effective coordination among them.

Promoting Recovery

There is no more important or urgent challenge for the hemisphere than to revive the damaged economies of Latin America and the Caribbean. The challenge will not be met by stumbling from crisis to crisis. The region must not be depleted of the resources it needs for sustained recovery. Prolonging the present course will leave Latin America economically stagnant, socially regressive, and politically unstable. The region’s economic problems will imperil world financial arrangements.

We call for a cooperative effort—on a scale unprecedented in the hemisphere—to reconstruct Latin America’s economies. Nothing less will be enough to bring the massive debt under control, to promote sustained growth, to foster social equity, and ultimately to build a solid foundation for democracy in the Americas.

THE BOSTON CONGRESS

SPECIAL AIRFARES

The LASA Secretariat has negotiated special airline rates for travel to the XIII International Congress in Boston on October 23-26, 1986. We have two official carriers, American Airlines and Piedmont Airlines, but we are using a single 800 number for reservations. It is extremely important that LASA members use the 800 number indicated below to make reservations. The Association—and you!—will benefit substantially from your use of this special arrangement:

1. Decide on your travel plans. Fill out the advance registration forms that were mailed to you and are also available in this issue of the Forum.
2. Call 1-800-433-1790.
3. Ask for account number 91479. This is the LASA account.

SPECIAL CAR RENTAL

If you want to rent a car during your stay in Boston, we have arranged for special discounts with Avis:

1. Decide on your travel plans.
2. Call 1-800-331-1600.
3. Ask for account number AW049004. This is the LASA account for the Boston meeting.

Child Care

The following list of child care agencies is provided as a service to participants, but it is not endorsed by LASA-86, particularly since these facilities have not been inspected by the LASA-86 staff. Interested participants should write or call in advance for reservations and information about the service and rates.


- University Home Health Services, 670 Center Street, Jamaica Plain, MA 02130. Telephone: 617/524-1900. Ask for Aruna Koka.

- Additional information may be obtained by writing to Child Care Resource Center, Inc., 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139.

Sight-Seeing Tours

Sight-seeing tours by bus to points of interest in the Greater Boston Area have been arranged with a local firm. Please note that not all trips include lunch. The days these trips are available are indicated in the descriptions. Participants should be aware that a minimum of 30 persons is required for each trip, and that if sufficient interest is not shown in advance, a particular trip may be canceled and prepayments refunded to participants. The firm has provided the following descriptions of its tours:


  In Boston’s Back Bay, we’ll walk into the "center of the Earth" at the Mapparium and pass by Copley Place (Boston’s newest and most expensive shopping area). Then, we will drive up Beacon Hill and follow the narrow winding streets of "the Freedom Trail." History
comes alive when we visit the lovely Old North Church where the famous lanterns were hung the night of Paul Revere's ride. We'll pass the interesting Faneuil Hall Marketplace with its over 200 shops, carts, and restaurants. We will conclude the tour by visiting the country's oldest warship, the USS Constitution.

Depart: 9 a.m.  Return: 12:30 p.m.
Cost: $12.50 (includes transportation, tour guide).


We'll drive through Harvard Square and pass the elegant mansions on "Tory Row" as we head for Lexington. This tour will take us through the lovely New England countryside with its small farms, old taverns, graceful church spires, and stone walls. We'll trace a part of Paul Revere's ride as he raced to warn the colonists "The British are coming." In Lexington, we'll stop to visit the Battle Green and its adjacent Visitors' Center. The statue of the Minuteman guards the peaceful green where 77 colonists faced 400 British soldiers.

Proceeding along the Battle Road to Concord, we'll see the homes of the literary giants—Emerson, Hawthorne, and the Alcotts. At the North Bridge we'll see where the minute men crossed under British fire and started the American Revolution on that fateful morning, April 19, 1775.

Depart: 1:30 p.m.  Return: 5:00 p.m.
Cost: $12.50 (includes transportation, tour guide).

- Tour C: Plymouth Tour, Friday, October 24, 1986.

Heading south to Plymouth, our first stop will be Cranberry World, where we'll see a miniature cranberry bog and taste some cranberry juice. Next, we'll visit Plymouth Rock, where the Pilgrims landed.

We will explore Plymouth Plantation, a living recreation of the original colony as it was in 1627, with persons dressed in costumes of the period participating in crafts and chores of those times.

We will lunch together at the beautiful new Plymouth Room, with a panoramic view of Plymouth Harbor, in the 1620 Restaurant. The menu will offer a choice of baked scrod, fried chicken, or roast beef, as well as salad or chowder, vegetables, potato, rolls, dessert, and coffee or tea. Tax and gratuity are included in the price quoted.

Then we'll go on board the Mayflower II, where the crew speaks the King's English of 1620. We will tour Commonwealth Winery, which produces highly regarded wines, and end the day with a wine tasting.

Depart: 9 a.m.  Return: 4:30 p.m.
Cost: $40.00 (includes transportation, guide, admissions, lunch, gratuities, tax).

- Tour D: North Shore Tour, Saturday, October 25, 1986.

We'll leave Boston to head north along the coast. We'll see the beautiful homes on Marblehead Neck and stop to see the ocean views from Castle Rock. We'll tour Salem, the Witch City, where we'll learn about the witch hysteria of 1692. We'll visit the 17th century House of Seven Gables made famous by writer Nathaniel Hawthorne. Pickering Wharf has several restaurants and fast food places from which to choose lunch.

We'll continue our picturesque coastal tour passing more beautiful waterfront estates and even a castle on our way to Cape Ann. We'll stop for pictures at the Fisherman Statue on Gloucester Harbour, the oldest fishing village in New England.

Then, we'll move on to the charming art colony of Rockport. We'll have time to browse and explore Bearskin Neck with its tiny, quaint shops and interesting galleries.

Depart: 9 a.m.  Return: 5:00 p.m.
Cost: $29.00 (includes transportation, tour guide, admissions, but not lunch).

Pre-LASA Policy Meeting in Washington

The Progressive Latin Americanist Network (PLAN), the Washington Office on Latin America, the Commission on U.S.-Central American Relations, and the Center for International Policy are organizing a pre-LASA meeting in Washington, D.C., for the evening of October 21 and the day of October 22. The meeting has two objectives: (a) establishing closer links between academic Latin Americanists and Congress—the members of Congress themselves, their staff, and staff of congressional committees with a Latin American responsibility—in hopes of improving the knowledge base on which Latin American—and especially Central American—policy is based; and (b) strengthening ties between academics and policy-oriented organizations in Washington such as the Central America network organizations, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, and the above cosponsors of this conference, so that those organizations can make fuller use of academic resources in the effort to influence Latin American legislation.

PLAN would like to receive expressions of interest in participating from LASA members by July 7, if possible. If you have particular expertise and skills which could contribute to a successful conference, please indicate those in writing to Jan L. Flora, Department of Sociology, Waters Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506. Also indicate if you do not have access to reasonable housing in Washington.
SELECTION FORM—SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

You are urged to preregister for tours in which you are interested by filling out this Selection Form, and sending it with your check (made payable to Discovery) to: Discovery of Boston, 171 Sargent Street, Newton, MA 02158.

You may pick up your tickets from the Discovery representative in the registration area at the Boston Park Plaza Hotel. (You may also register at the Congress, but, if you wait until the last moment, the tour may be sold out or canceled because of insufficient pre-registration.) If there is a registration of less than 30 for a specific tour, Discovery may have to cancel the tour. If so, Discovery will refund money received in preregistration either at the Discovery Desk in the registration area or will mail to registrants.

Tour A, Thursday, October 23, BOSTON

seats at $12.50

Total: $

Tour B, Thursday, October 23, CAMLEXCON

seats at $12.50

Total: $

Tour C, Friday, October 24, PLYMOUTH

seats at $40.00

Total: $

Tour D, Saturday, October 25, NORTH SHORE

seats at $29.00

Total: $

TOTAL: $

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Report from the Program Committee
XIII International Congress
Boston, Massachusetts
October 23-25, 1986

The Program Committee is pleased to present a list of the panels, workshops, breakfast roundtables, meetings, and special events that are scheduled for LASA/86. This list, representing our planning efforts up to May 1, will be amended to include a few additional sessions for which information was not fully available in mid-spring. We hope you will agree with us that the program for the October meeting promises to be diverse and stimulating and to reflect the important themes that characterize Latin American studies in the 1980s.

We especially wish to draw your attention to the major interdisciplinary sessions on the state-of-the art for important themes in current scholarship and on current issues and controversies that have stimulated debate among Latin Americanists. In addition to these sessions, which will convene each afternoon of the Congress, a very special panel is scheduled to focus on the work and contributions of Albert O. Hirschman. Professor Hirschman will present a paper entitled, "How Much Change in Latin America? Looking Back over Four Decades." Another significant event scheduled for the meeting is the series of panels and workshops organized by the New England Council of Latin American Studies (NECLAS). NECLAS is holding its annual meeting jointly with LASA and is the host institution for the Congress. A major book exhibit, a film festival, the twentieth anniversary banquet, and an important plenary address are also planned. We hope these special events will encourage you to make plans to attend LASA/86 in October.

Session organizers are reminded that it is their responsibility to ensure that all participants on their panels, workshops, or meetings are members of LASA. The names of individuals who are not members of the
organization will not be listed in the program.

The Program Committee for the 1986 meeting consists of Merilee S. Grindle (Chair), Harvard University; G. Reid Andrews, University of Pittsburgh; Viviane Márquez, El Colegio de México; Jaime Concha, University of California-San Diego; Florencia E. Mallon, University of Wisconsin; and LaVonne C. Poteet (Film Festival Coordinator), Bucknell University.

* Preliminary Program Outline

Multidisciplinary Sessions

State-of-the-Art

**Whither Theory? Theory of Change in Latin America**
Chairperson: Peter Klarén, George Washington University
Presenters: Peter Evans, Brown University; Ian Roxborough, London School of Economics and Political Science
Discussants: Guillermo O'Donnell, Notre Dame University; Nora Hamilton University of Southern California

**Peasant Studies: Obstacles to Theoretical Advances**
Chairperson: Ann Craig, University of California-San Diego
Presenters: Carmen Diana Deere, University of Massachusetts-Amherst; Arturo Warman
Discussant: David Lehmann, Cambridge University

**Feminist Criticism and the Problem of Marginality**
Chairperson: Elizabeth Garrels, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Presenter: Jean Franco, Columbia University
Discussants: George Yudice, Hunter College; Francine Masiello, University of California-Berkeley

Current Issues and Controversies

**State and Society**
Chairperson: Maurice Zeitlin, University of California-Los Angeles
Presenters: Florencia Mallon, University of Wisconsin-Madison; Alfred Stepan, Columbia University
Discussant: Maurice Zeitlin, University of California-Los Angeles

**Puerto Rico: Claims of the Past and Hope for the Future**
Chairperson: Arcadio Díaz-Quíñones, Princeton University

Presenters: Arcadio Díaz-Quíñones, Princeton University; Marcia Rivera, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriqueña; José Luis Sánchez, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Río Piedras
Discussants: Richard Morse, The Wilson Center; Frank Bonilla, Hunter College

Meetings and Special Events*

LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba
Open Meeting of the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba
LASA Task Force on Women
LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Spain
LASA Task Force on the Mass Media
Reception of the New York State Latin Americanists Association
Joint Reception of the Progressive Latin Americanists Network and the Guatemala Scholars Network
Reception for the South America Today Seminar I Reunion
Progressive Latin Americanists Network
Editorial Board, Latin American Perspectives
Guatemala Scholars Network Membership Meeting
Orientation to the Progressive Latin Americanists Network Washington Seminar
Policy Alternatives for Central America
Asociación de Trabajadores e Investigadores del Nuevo Teatro
Society for Iberian and Latin American Thought

Breakfast Roundtables

Technocratic Beliefs in the Policy Process/La tecnocracia en la política gubernamental 101R
Contemporary Central American Fiction/La narrativa contemporánea centroamericana 102R
The Urgent Need for U.S.-Cuban Diplomatic Relations/La urgencia de establecer relaciones diplomáticas entre los EE.UU. y Cuba 104R
Pictures as Documents: Finding and Using Picture Sources in Latin America/Identificación y uso de fuentes de imágenes visuales en América Latina 105R
Scholarly Relations with Spain/Relaciones académicas con España 106R
The Role of Literature in Teaching Latin American Social Sciences Courses/El papel de la literatura en la enseñanza de cursos sobre América Latina en las ciencias sociales 107R
Studies on Women in Latin America and the United States: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approaches/Os

* Please note that some meetings are listed separately as breakfast roundtables.
estudos da mulher na América Latina e nos Estados Unidos: Abordagens comparativas e interdisciplinarias 201R
Border Problems in Mexican-United States Relations/Problemas fronterizos en las relaciones mexicanas-norteamericanas 202R
The Peruvian Economy: The First Fifteen Months of President García’s Administration/La economía peruana: Los primeros quince meses del gobierno del Presidente García 203R
The Application of New Technologies for Latin American Studies/El uso de nuevas tecnologías en estudios latinoamericanos 204R
Diplomatic Styles of Latin American States/Los estilos diplomáticos de los estados latinoamericanos 205R
Foreign Investment in Central America/La inversión extranjera en Centro América 206R
Polarization of Debate in Nicaragua: Is Dialogue Possible?/La polarización del debate en Nicaragua: ¿Es el diálogo posible? 207R
Class, State, and the Nationalization of the Mexican Banks/Las clases, el estado, y la nacionalización de los bancos en México 208R
Media Credibility: An International Crisis?/La credibilidad de los medios de comunicación: ¿Una crisis internacional? 209R
Projects in Cultural Conservation/Proyectos de conservación de la cultura 210R
Decision Making in the Public and Private Sectors: Responses to Austerity/La toma de decisiones en los sectores público y privado: Reacciones ante la austeridad 301R
Race, Class, and Repression in Central America/Raza, clase social, y represión en Centroamérica 302R
Government-Media Relations in Latin America/Relaciones entre el gobierno y los medios de comunicación en América Latina 303R
Public Policy and Structural Reforms in the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Peruvian Case/Política gubernamental y reformas 304R
The First Three Years of the de la Madrid Government/Los tres primeros años del gobierno de Miguel de la Madrid 305R
New Approaches to the Introductory Course/Nuevas propuestas para el curso introductorio 306R
Meeting of Committee on Regional (CORE) 307R
The Multinationals in Puerto Rico II/Las multinacionales en Puerto Rico II 308R

Special Twentieth Anniversary Panel

This special panel focuses on the lifetime contributions of Albert O. Hirschman to the disciplines of economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, and history.

Organizer: Wayne A. Cornelius, University of California-San Diego; President of LASA
Presenter: Albert O. Hirschman, Princeton University:

"How Much Change in Latin America? Looking Back Over Four Decades"
Discussants: Alejandro Foxley, Kellogg Institute and CIEPLAN, Santiago de Chile; Gilbert Merkx, University of New Mexico and editor of Latin American Research Review; Christopher Mitchell, New York University; June Nash, City College of New York; Thomas E. Skidmore, University of Wisconsin-Madison

New England Council of Latin American Studies (NECLAS):
Panels and Workshops

Differential Urban Patterns in a National State: The Case of Brazil/Padrões diferenciais urbanos no estado nacional: O caso do Brasil
The Andean Oral Tradition: Peru and Ecuador/La tradición oral andina: Perú y Ecuador
The Historical Homeless: Comparative Studies in Social History/Los desamparados tradicionales: Estudios comparativos en historia social
Trends in Funding Women in Development: A Review of the Past Decade, Projections for the Future/Tendencias en el financiamiento de estudios de las mujeres y el desarrollo: Una retrospectiva y proyección para el futuro
The Politics of Curriculum Development: Interdepartmental Offerings at the Secondary Level/La polémica en el proceso del desarrollo del currículo: Los cursos interdepartamentales al nivel secundaria
The Psychology of Repression and Resistance in Contemporary Latin America/La psicología de la represión y la resistencia en la América Latina contemporánea
Culture and Democratization in Latin America/La cultura y la democratización en América Latina
Afro-Latin American Religious Traditions in Latin America: Continuity and Change/Tradiciones religiosas africanas-latinoamericanas en América Latina: Continuidad y cambio

LASA Panels

Political Participation and Protest in Peru/Participación política en el Perú
History and Fiction: Recent Events in Chilean Literature/Historia y ficción: Los sucesos recientes de Chile en la literatura
Recent Approaches to the Study of Labor in Latin America/Perspectivas recientes para el estudio de los sindicatos en América Latina
Malnutrition and Infant Mortality Issues/Temas de desnutrición y mortalidad infantil
Public-Private Sector Relations in Latin America/El sector público y el sector privado en América Latina
State, Workers, and Management in Nicaragua/Estado, trabajadores, y administración en Nicaragua
Education and Democracy in Brazil Today/Educação e democracia no Brasil atual
Migrant and Refugee Movements in the Caribbean/Movimientos de refugiados y migrantes en el Caribe
Narrative Forms in the Latin American Enlightenment: Satire and Literary Odyssey/Formas narrativas en la ilustración latinoamericana: La sátira y la odisea literaria
Latin American Philosophy of Liberation/Filosofía latinoamericana de la liberación
New Cultural Forms in Central America/Nuevas formas culturales en Centroamérica
Economic Development and Political Change in Puerto Rico During the Postwar Era/Desarrollo económico y cambios políticos en el Puerto Rico de la pos-guerra
Latin American Intellectual History at the Turn of the Century/Historia intelectual latinoamericana a finales del siglo XIX y al comienzo del siglo XX
The Place of Smallholders in Latin America/La posición de pequeños propietarios en América Latina
Chile: Reality and Prospects/Chile: Realidad y perspectivas
Literary and Pictorial Correspondence: The Mexican Example/Correspondencias literarias y pictóricas: El ejemplo mexicano
Life and Work in the Debt Crisis I: The IMF and Production in the Debtor Countries/Vida y trabajo en la crisis I: El FMI y producción en los países en crisis
Life and Work in the Debt Crisis II: A View from the Andes/Vida y trabajo en la crisis II: El punto de vista andino
The Uncertain Future of Puerto Rico: The Colonial Situation Revisited/El futuro incierto de Puerto Rico: Reevaluando la problemática colonial
Central America and the Middle East: Internationalization of the Crisis/Centroamérica y el Medio Oriente: Internacionalización de las crisis
Crisis in Venezuela: Causes, Consequences, and Cures/La crisis en Venezuela: Causas, consecuencias, y remedios
Caribbean Migrants in Metropolis/Migrantes del Caribe en las áreas metropolitanas
Celebrating the 500th Anniversary of the Discovery of the Americas: Projects, Ideas, and Priorities/La celebración del quinto centenario del descubrimiento de las Américas: Proyectos, ideas, y prioridades
Economic Development and Social Change in Central America and the Caribbean/Desarrollo económico y cambio social en Centroamérica y el Caribe
U.S. Economy, Latin America, and Catholic Social Teachings/La economía de los E.E.U.U., América Latina, y la enseñanza social católica
New Trends in Bolivian and Peruvian Literatures: Traditions and Social Change/Nuevas tendencias en la literatura de Bolivia y Perú: Tradiciones y cambio social
Patriarchal Romance and Nationhood: Prescriptive Histories or Necessary Foundations/?El romance patriarcal: Historias prescriptivas o fundaciones necesarias?
Alternative Development Strategies for Mexico in the Next Sexenio/Estrategias alternativas para el desarrollo de México en el próximo sexenio
Dissemination of Technological Knowledge in Latin America: Trends, Politics, and Perspectives/Diseminación de la educación técnica superior en América Latina: Tendencias, políticas, y perspectivas
Higher Education in the Dominican Republic: Institutional Change, Faculty Development, and Foreign Training/Educación superior en la República Dominicana: Cambios institucionales, desarrollo docente, y entrenamiento en el extranjero
A New Era of American Hegemony/?Una nueva era de hegemónia norteamericana
The State of Studies of Cuba/El estado de los estudios sobre Cuba
Feminist Literary Practice and History/La práctica literaria feminista y la historia
The Undeclared War on Nicaragua: Non-Military Aspects, Impact, and Implications/La guerra no-declarada contra Nicaragua: Aspectos no-militares, impacto, e implicaciones
Women and Politics: The Mothers' Groups in Latin America/Las mujeres y la política: Los grupos de madres en América Latina
Historical Development of APRA and the Insurgent Left in Peru/Desarrollo histórico del APRA y de la izquierda insurgente en el Perú
Research Possibilities on the Mexico-U.S. Border/Posibilidades de investigación en la frontera de México y los Estados Unidos
Central American Migrants and Refugees/Migrantes y refugiados centroamericanos
The Ibero-American Triangle: Spain's New Role in Hemispheric Relations/El triángulo iberoamericano: el papel nuevo de España en las relaciones hemisféricas
Government and Business in Mexico/El gobierno y el sector privado en México
Post-Military Brazil: Recent Political and Economic Developments in Brazil/O Brasil pós-militar: Desenvolvimento económico e político recente
The Rise and Consequences of Nineteenth-Century "Free Trade" Regimes/Los orígenes y las consecuencias de los regímenes de "comercio libre" en la América Latina del siglo XIX
Conditions of Mexican Accession to the GATT, 1986/Condiciones de adhesión de México al acuerdo general, 1986
Mexican Feminist Narrative, 1910-1980/La narrativa feminina mexicana, 1910-1980
The Mixed Economy and the Process of Transition in
Nicaragua/La economía mixta y el proceso de la transición en Nicaragua

Women and Political Strategies for the Year 2000/Mulheres e estratégias políticas para o ano 2000

Economic Boom and Economic Policies in Ecuador/Bonanza económica y las políticas en el Ecuador

Culture and Politics in Working Class Brazil I: Social Movements, Labor, and Religion/Cultura e política na classe trabalhadora brasileira I: Movimentos sociais, trabalho, e religião

Culture and Politics in Working Class Brazil II: Daily Life, Mass Culture, and Politics/Cultura e política na classe trabalhadora brasileira II: Vida diária, cultura das massas, e política

The Concept of Philosophical Vocation in Some Contemporary Chilean Philosophers/El concepto de la vocación en algunos filósofos contemporáneos de Chile

The Literary Aspect of the Latin American Socio-Political Essay/El aspecto literario del ensayo político-social latinoamericano

The Essay, "El hombre que está solo y espera": An Interdisciplinary Reading/El ensayo, "El hombre que está solo y espera": Una lectura interdisciplinaria

Recent Studies on the Cuban Economy/Nuevos estudios sobre la economía cubana

Economics, Ideology, and Consciousness in Popular Mobilization/Economía, ideología, y conciencia en la movilización popular

Research on Chicanas and Mexicanas: Recent Trends/Investigaciones sobre chicanas y mexicanas: Tendencias recientes

Lecturing and Research Opportunities for U.S. and Latin American Scholars/Oportunidades para investigación y enseñanza para profesores norteamericanos y latinoamericanos

Culture in Cuba: Inventory and Prognosis for the 1980s/La cultura en Cuba: Recuento y pronóstico de los años 1980

The Church of Liberation: A New Economic and Political Project/La iglesia de liberación: Un nuevo proyecto económico y político

Life and Literature from the Colonial Convent/Vida y escritura en la vida conventual de la colonia

The Question of Transition in Slave Societies: Brazil, the United States, and the Caribbean

Latin American Debt: What Policy Choices?/La deuda en América Latina: ¿Alternativas políticas?

Public Policy and State Management in Brazil/Estado e política governamental no Brasil

Religion and Health in Northeast Brazil/Religião e saúde no Nordeste brasileiro

Indian Perspectives on Revolution in Guatemala/Perspectivas indígenas de la lucha guatemalteca

Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation/Dilemas de la consolidación democrática

Women's Writing in Latin America Today: Definition, Evaluation, and Criticism/Sobre la nueva escritura feminina latinoamericana: Definición y crítica

Regional Inequalities, Capitalist Accumulation, and the New Social Order/Desequilibrio regional, acumulación capitalista, y el nuevo orden social

Historiography and Literature in the Conquest of America: Old Texts, New Perspectives/Historiografía y literatura en la conquista de América: Viejos textos, nuevas perspectivas

Current Issues in Research and Conceptualization of the Urban Informal Sector/Problemática de la investigación y conceptualización del sector informal urbano

Interrelations of Contemporary Latin American Song/Inter-relaciones de la canción latinoamericana contemporánea

Regional Politics in Contemporary Mexico/Política regional en el México contemporáneo


Environmental Policy and Issues in Mexico/Los problemas y política del medio ambiente en México

Private Sector Interest Groups, Political Parties, and Economic Policymaking in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia/Grupos de interés en el sector privado, partidos políticos y la formulación política económica en el Ecuador, el Perú, y Bolivia

Educational Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean/La planificación de la educación en América Latina y el Caribe

Ethnobotany and Ethnopharmacology in Brazil/Etnobotânica e etnofarmacologia no Brasil

Do Regimes Make a Difference? Public Policies under Democracy and Authoritarianism/¿Qué importan los regímenes políticos? Políticas gubernamentales en la democracia y el autoritarismo

Financial and Economic Aspects of Health Care in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s/Aspectos económicos de la atención a la salud en América Latina y el Caribe en los años 1980

Changing Agrarian Structures in Latin America: Causes and Institutional Responses I/Cambios en la estructura agraria latinoamericana: Causas y respuestas institucionales I

Changing Agrarian Structures in Latin America: Causes and Institutional Responses II/Cambios en la estructura agraria latinoamericana: Causas y respuestas institucionales II

Integrated Training and Research for Latin America: The Las Cuevas Project, Dominican Republic/Programa integrado de adiestramiento e investigación para América Latina: Proyecto Las Cuevas, República Dominicana

Latin America's Past as Viewed by Its Indigenous Peoples/La visión del pasado a través del testimonio indígena

The Transition to Socialism in Latin America and the Caribbean/La transición al socialismo en la América Latina
y el Caribe


Nicaragua and the Counterrevolution/Nicaragua y la contrarevolución

Foreign Investment in Brazil and Mexico, 1889-1930/Inversión extranjera en Brasil y México, 1889-1930

Protest and Resistance in Latin America/La protesta y la resistencia en América Latina

From Immigrants to American Ethnicities: Identity and the Case of Chicanos, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans in the United States/De inmigrantes a étnicos americanos: Identidad y el caso de los chicanos, cubanos, y puertorriqueños en los Estados Unidos

The Nicaraguan Food System/El sistema alimentario nicaragüense

Andean Paths of Capitalist Development and Peasant Response/El desarrollo del capitalismo en los Andes y la respuesta campesina

Literary Discourse and Anthropological Discourse/Discurso literario y discurso antropológico

The Theory of Sectoral Clashes and Coalitions Revisited/Una revisión de la teoría de los conflictos sectoriales y las coaliciones

Caribbean Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice/Política exterior del Caribe: teoría y práctica

Social Classes and Rebellion in Mexican Regional History/Clases sociales y sublevaciones en la historia regional de México

Art and Politics in Latin America: Authoritarian Rulers and Art Production/Ante e política na América Latina: Gobernadores autoritarios e producción artística


Population Migration in Colonial Latin America/La migración de la población en América Latina colonial

El Salvador and Nicaragua: Parallels and Contrasts/El Salvador y Nicaragua: Congruencias y contrastes

Public Policy and State Management in Brazil/Estado e política pública no Brasil

Political Parties and Popular Movements in the Brazilian Transition/Partidos políticos y movimientos populares en la transición brasileña

The Rise and Consequences of Nineteenth-Century "Free Trade" Regimes/Los orígenes y las consecuencias de los regímenes de "comercio libre" en la América Latina del siglo XIX

Economic and Social Development of Cuba/El desarrollo económico y social de Cuba

Popular Organization and Political Participation in Urban Brazil/Organizações populares e participación política no Brasil urbano

Different Approaches to the Study of Public Policy in Latin America/Diferentes enfoques al estudio de la política gubernamental en América Latina

New Developments in Labor Markets in Urban Latin America/Nuevas tendencias en las fuentes de trabajo en áreas urbanas de América Latina

The Dilemmas of Restricted Democracies: Contrasting Responses to the Current Crisis in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico/Los dilemas de las democracias restringidas: Respuestas contrastantes a la crisis actual en Argentina, Brasil, y México

Migrant and Refugee Movements in the Caribbean/Los movimientos de refugiados y migrantes en el Caribe

Human Rights, Law, and Democracy in Latin America/Derechos humanos, la ley, y la democracia en Latinoamérica

Artistic and Socio-Political Crises in Twentieth-Century Southern Cone Literature/Crisis artísticas y sociopolíticas en la literatura del Cono Sur del siglo XX

Reflections on Our Craft: Filmmakers Discuss Latin American Film/Reflexiones de nuestro arte: Polémica cinematográfico latinoamericana

Communications and Cultural Policies in Post-Transition Brazil/Comunicaciones à política cultural no Brasil da pós-abertura

Projects in Cultural Conservation/Proyectos de conservación cultura

Labor Movements in Transition toward Democracy: Analysis and Perspectives/Movimientos laborales en transiciones hacia la democracia: Análisis y perspectivas

Foreign Debt and Domestic Poverty: Some Long-Run Considerations/Deuda externa y pobreza: Consideraciones de larga plazo

The Press and Foreign Policy: Facing an International Credibility Crisis/La prensa y la política internacional: Confrontando una crisis internacional de credibilidad

Studies in the Evolution of the Nicaraguan Public Sector/Análisis de la evolución del sector público en Nicaragua

Great Power Relations with the Southern Cone States/Las relaciones de las grandes potencias con los estados del Cono Sur

The World System Approach to Labor in Latin America/La perspectiva "world system" de los movimientos laborales en Latinoamérica


Actors and Processes of Transition to Democracy in Latin America/Personajes y procesos de la transición a la democracia en América Latina

Scholars and the Foreign Policy Process/Académicos y el desarrollo de la política externa

The State, Finance, and Capital Accumulation in Latin America/El estado, finanzas, y acumulación de capital en América Latina

Border Studies in the Americas: A Comparative
Perspective/Estudios fronterizos de las Américas en una perspectiva de comparación

Recent Central American Elections and the Prospects for Democracy/Elecciones recientes en Centroamérica y las perspectivas para la democracia

Literature and Culture in the Nicaraguan Revolution/La literatura y la cultura en la revolución nicaragüense

Interstate Conflict and Cooperation in the Southern Cone and Antarctica/Conflicto y cooperación interestatal en el Cono Sur y la Antártica

Science, Technology, and Development in Latin America: Case Studies/Ciencia, tecnología, y desarrollo en América Latina: Estudios de casos

Characteristics of Andean Economies: Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru/Características de las economías: Colombia, Ecuador, y Perú

State Intervention and Regime Transformation: The Case of Mexico/Intervención estatal y transformación del régimen político: El caso de México

Dissemination and Reception of Latin American Literature: Problem Areas/La difusión y la aceptación de la literatura latinoamericana: Areas problemáticas

Themes in Colombian Social History: Sources from Popular Culture/Temas de la historia social de Colombia: Bases en la cultura popular

Conflict Resolution in Venezuela: An Illusion of Harmony?/La resolución de conflictos en Venezuela: ¿Una ilusión de armonía?

Redemocratization in Latin America: The Role of "Political Learning"/La transición hacia la democracia en América Latina: El papel de "aprendizaje político"


The Prospects for Rural Democratization in Latin America/Perspectivas sobre la democratización del campo en América Latina

Philosophy and Anthropology as Alternative Perspectives on Latin American Culture/Filosofía y antropología como perspectivas alternativas de la cultura latinoamericana

Paraguay: From Economic Boom to Political Disarray/Paraguay: Del boom económico a la crisis política Liberal, Conservative and Positivist Thought in the Development of Modern Latin America/El pensamiento liberal, conservador, y positivista en el desarrollo de América Latina moderna

Workers and Populism: New Approaches to the Study of Latin American Labor/Obres y populismo: Nuevos enfoques para el estudio de los obreros latinoamericanos

Popular Culture in Latin America: A Multidisciplinary Approach/La cultura popular en América Latina desde un punto de vista multidisciplinario

State Development and Economic Development in Latin America/Desarrollo estatal y desarrollo económico en América Latina

The Spanish American Writer in Exile/El escritor latinoamericano frente al exilio

Nonprofit Organizations (PVOs) and Grassroots Development in Latin America/Organizaciones no-gubernamentales (ONGs) y desarrollo socioeconómico de abajo en América Latina

The Contributions of Bryce Wood to the Field of Latin American Studies/Las contribuciones de Bryce Wood en el campo de estudios latinoamericanos

U.S. Policymaking towards Latin America/La formación de la política de los Estados Unidos hacia América Latina

The United States and Latin American External Debt/Los E.E.U.U. y la deuda externa de América Latina

The New Theater and Traditions of Popular Theater in Latin America/El nuevo teatro y las tradiciones del teatro popular en América Latina

Scholars and the Foreign Policy Process/Académicos y el desarrollo de la política externa

Political Forces and Indian Peoples of Latin America/La política y los pueblos indígenas de América Latina

U.S. Involvement in Belize/Intrincamiento norteamericano en Belice

Landscape Ecology and Resource Management in Spatial Perspective/Ecología del paisaje e administración dos recursos en perspectiva espacial

Central American Historiography: An Assessment/Historiografía de Centro América: Una evaluación

Ethnic Group Autonomy and the State in Nicaragua/Una autonomía de grupos étnicos y el estado en Nicaragua

Public Opinion and the Transition to Democracy/La opinión pública y la transición hacia la democracia

Letters to the Editor

Dear LASA Colleagues:

Beginning September 1986, the Center for Advanced Studies of the Americas (CASA) in Washington will be sponsoring a computer-based information service for Latin American Studies Programs throughout the U.S.

The daily wire is intended to provide you with complete information regarding conferences and seminars going on throughout the country, latest information and itineraries of visiting scholars, latest news from the Latin American wire services, specific updates on income, trade, and other economic data from the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as a number of items of interest for Latin American Studies faculty, researchers, scholars, and students. In addition, a special menu will carry job placement opportunities for your students.

The service will use the BITNET facilities, which already include almost 300 universities throughout the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Accordingly, if you are interested in
participating it will be important for you to determine whether your university can receive information through BITNET. This can be done simply by calling the computer office at your university or contacting this office, where all participating universities are listed.

At this stage we are interested in learning, on a preliminary basis, whether you are interested in participating in the service. We will run test patterns for those universities that respond positively from April to September 1986. At this time, we will experiment with the format and content of the information. It will also be possible for you to send information and messages to us through the "electronic mail box" facility of BITNET. Such information would then be reproduced and sent to all subscribing members.

The financial structure planned by CASA for this service simply recovers costs. Accordingly, we are setting the nominal sum of $100 per year for the participating universities. It is anticipated that this cost would be adjusted upward or downward depending upon the number of universities that respond favorably. We will let you know in ample time before you need to make a definite commitment.

If you believe your university would be interested in participating in the program, we would appreciate your contacting us at the CASA address. Your only requirements are access to a personal computer at your university and a special "mail box" reserved for you by the BITNET coordinating office at your university. Participants will receive more specific information regarding the methods of operation prior to the initiation of the test patterns in April.

I look forward to hearing from you and working with you to make this service something that will enhance Latin American and Caribbean Studies programs in all of our universities.

Very truly yours,

L. Ronald Scheman, Director
Center for Advanced Studies of the Americas
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 104
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/462-3000

Conferences

Midwest International Studies Association: The annual conference of the International Studies Association/Midwest will be held in Indianapolis, November 7-8, 1986. Those interested in presenting a paper, serving as a panel discussant, or round table participant should contact the program chair immediately. Graduate students are encouraged to participate; this year there will be a $200 award for the best paper presented by a graduate student. For further information, contact Prof.

David S. Mason, ISA/M Program Chair, Department of Political Science, Butler University, Indianapolis, IN 46208. Telephone: 317/283-9682.

Law Schools and Latin American Studies Conference: UCLA's Latin American Center and School of Law will jointly convene a national conference of law teachers whose courses or research are related to Latin America. The November 13 and 14 Los Angeles meeting will include panel discussions on such topics as socialist legal systems in the Western Hemisphere, land reform and redistribution of wealth, law and development, and human rights in left- and right-wing regimes. In addition to substantive issues, the conference will also consider pedagogical and research concerns as well as interaction and cooperation between law professors and other Latin Americans.

"There has been a surge of interest in Latin American studies in law schools that compares with that of the Alianza epoch," Henry McGee, conference coordinator, said. "This interest demands a reassessment and revitalization of law school curricula," he continued. "Latin American legal systems provide a convenient way to appreciate the civil law tradition while exploring questions of comparative and international law in the context of a region of increasing national concern," McGee said. While legal scholars have continued to teach and conduct research in Latin American studies, the field remains fragmented and could benefit from increased exchanges of information and ideas, like that provided by Louisiana State University's Latin America Link, according to McGee. Conference topics and panelists are still in formation and inquiries may be made to Prof. Henry McGee, UCLA School of Law, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

Call for Papers: The 1986 National Conference of the Association of Voluntary Action Scholars, Pennsylvania State University, will be held October 1-4. The conference title is "Alternative Health Models for Health and Human Services in the Nonprofit Sector." The nonprofit sector and voluntary action have taken on increasing importance as public programs are realigned and budgets are cut. The Association of Voluntary Action Scholars solicits proposals for papers, panels, and workshops which examine research, action, and theoretical models in this vital and growing field. Themes of conflict vs. consensus, public vs. private, theory vs. action, tradition vs. modern, lay vs. professional, and ideal vs. real permeate debate throughout the field. Paper sessions and panels will include Sectoral Interdependence in Health, Justice and Human Services; System Science vs. Humanism in the Third Sector; Public Policy in Health, Justice, and Human Services; Interorganizational Theory and Research on the Nonprofit Sector; Management Issues in Nonprofit Organizations; the
Impact of the Nonprofit Sector on Service Delivery Systems; Productivity Improvement in the Nonprofit Sector; Financing Voluntary Sector Involvement—the Role of Pecuniary and Nonpecuniary Incentives; Issues in Marketing Health and Human Services; For-Profits vs. Not-for-Profits: The Consequences of Commercialization; Initiation and Implementation: Voluntary Groups as Change Agents; Social Costs and Benefits of the Use of Volunteers; Toward the Year 2000: Issues in Volunteering; and other areas of voluntarism, participation, philanthropy and social change. Deadline for panel proposals is past. Please submit completed papers to AVAS National Conference, c/o Kurt Parkum and Drew Hyman, The Pennsylvania State University, S-126 Henderson Bldg., University Park, PA 16802 by August 1, 1986.

Call for Papers: The University of Florida at Gainesville and the Latin American Jewish Studies Association (LAJSA) announce a conference on "The Jewish Presence in Latin America" to be held February 23-27, 1987, in Gainesville. Co-sponsors are LAJSA, the University of Florida's Center for Latin American Studies, and UF's Center for Jewish Studies. Proposals for participation in the conference are invited, especially those which address the following themes: The Latin American Jewish Response to Anti-Semitism; Jewish Intellectual Life in Latin America; Preserving Historical Memory in Communities; Latin America and the State of Israel; Problems in Bibliography. Other suggestions for papers and panels are welcome. Letters of interest and four copies of abstracts of papers (100 words, double spaced) should be sent by October 1, 1986, to Dr. Judith Laikin Elkin, LAJSA, 2104 Georgetown Blvd., Ann Arbor, MI 48105. Telephone: 313/996-2880.

Call for Papers: The Latin American Indian Literatures Association (LAILA)/Asociación de Literaturas Indígenas Latinoamericanas (ALILA) announces the LAILA V International Symposium, June 3-6, 1987, at Cornell University. Papers are invited on indigenous literature of Latin America or affiliated groups, but all approaches (anthropological, archaeological, art, astronomical, ethnohistorical, linguistic, etc.). Five copies of abstracts (150-200 words, typewritten, double spaced, with name, address, and phone) must be mailed to the Symposium Chairman no later than October 15, 1986. Presentation time should be 30 minutes; discussion time, 10 minutes. Selection Committee will evaluate and notify participants by November 15, 1986. Three copies of the final paper must be submitted no later than February 1, 1987. Papers may not exceed 12 pages, typewritten, double spaced. If final papers do not meet the expectations of the abstract received, the selection committee holds the right to cancel the paper. Individuals are encouraged to organize sessions. Organizers are responsible for submitting abstracts and fees for the entire panel. Moderators should notify the Symposia Chairman of their intent by November 15, 1986. Send abstracts to Dr. Richard Luxton, LAILA/ALILA Symposia Chairman, P.O. Box 163553, Sacramento, CA 95816.

Call for Papers: The Renaissance Society of America's national conference will be hosted by the Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies and held at Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, March 12-14, 1987. Possible paper topics include Methodology: New Directions across the Disciplines; Periodization: Geographical and Temporal; The Patronage System; History of Science and Technology; Renaissance and Reformation. Deadline for submitting papers is September 1, 1986. For further information contact Jeanie R. Brink, Director, Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287. Telephone: 602/965-5900.

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**Announcements**

**Prize: Spain & America in the Quincentennial of the Discovery:** The "Program of Cooperation of the Spanish Ministry of Culture and the Universities of the United States" has begun sponsoring a yearly competition for best book-length manuscripts dealing with the Spanish contribution to the independence and development of the U.S. For unpublished works, the prize will be $6,000 (first prize), and $3,000 (second prize). In the case of published works, the prize will be divided between author and publisher. For competition guidelines, write to Cultural Office, Embassy of Spain, 4200 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Suite 520, Washington, D.C. 20016.

**Researchers Wanted to Study Colonialization of Alabama & Southeast:** The State of Alabama recently formed a De Soto Commission to further studies on the era of conquest and colonization in Alabama and the Southeast in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While the Commission is particularly interested in the DeSoto entrada into Alabama, they are planning a five-year research effort to include not only DeSoto, but other entradas made into Alabama and the Southeast. The Commission is interested in scholars who be may be willing to work with the Commission on a grant or contractual basis for any periods of time on certain topics which have already been defined, others related to the year of exploration and conquest which they might suggest as appropriate to the Commission. Topics identified with particular interest for historians are as follows: (1) maritime exploration and native contacts on the northeastern Gulf coast, sixteenth-and seventeenth-centuries; (2) social history of the Hernando de Soto expedition; (3) the composition of DeSoto's army; (4) the outfitting of
the DeSoto expedition; (5) the expedition of Tristan de Luna y Arrellano; (6) the expedition of Marcos Delgado; (7) a bibliography of Hernando de Soto. Other suggestions are solicited. Funding is still pending, but the Commission would like to correspond with scholars interested in any of the above subjects as the project develops. Please write Dr. Douglas E. Jones, Chairman, De Soto Commission, Alabama Museum of Natural History, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35466. Telephone: 205/348-5270.

VCR Documentary Using Archival Photos of 19th-Century L.A. Available: A 25-minute videotaped documentary, "Images of Kingdoms," produced by Robert M. Levine at the University of Miami, Coral Gables is available in English and Spanish narrated versions. The program explores the visual world created by photographers of nineteenth-century Latin America. The documentary uses more than 350 photographs, many never published before, from archives in Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Peru, Mexico, and Colombia. It examines the ways in which photographers, reflecting the values and outlook of local elites, portrayed modernization, women, indigenous people, the poor, and slaves. Information about the videotape may be obtained from South American Resources, Inc., 40 East 62nd Street, New York, NY 10021. Telephone: 212/838-1732.

The Howard Heinz Endowment announces a competition for grants on current issues in Latin American politics, economics, or social development. Deadline for submission of proposals is September 22, 1986. For details contact Ms. Muetzel, Office of the Howard Heinz Endowment, 301 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15222.

Employment Opportunities

Ibero-American Bibliographer: The University of Minnesota Libraries, Twin Cities Campus, seeks applications for the position of Ibero-American Bibliographer. Required qualifications are a master's degree in library science, an advanced degree in a discipline related to Latin American or Iberian studies, experience in collection management and development at a professional level in a research library, knowledge of the scholarly literature in Ibero-American Studies, and proficiency in spoken and written Spanish. Other desired qualifications include experience in Ibero-American collection development, reading knowledge of other Ibero-American or modern European languages, teaching experience, experience in bibliographic instruction, and good communication skills. The minimum salary is $22,000. The appointment will be at the rank of Assistant Librarian. To apply, send a letter of application addressing in detail the requirements of this position [write for detailed job description], a resume, and names of three references to Barbara Doyle, Personnel Officer, University Libraries, 453 Wilson Library, 309 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455-0414. Identify with No. UL 141. Applications must be postmarked no later than July 30, 1986.

Assistant Director: The Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Florida is now taking applications for this position. Date of hire is August, 1987. Duties include coordinating the public outreach program; advising undergraduates; grant writing; assisting the Director in managing the Center, with six faculty and 95 affiliate faculty; and limited teaching. Applicants should have experience and interest in academic administration, a strong interdisciplinary orientation, Latin American training and experience, and a working knowledge of Spanish and/or Portuguese. A Ph.D. in the social sciences or humanities is desirable. This is a permanent 12-month appointment with a salary range of $25,000-$35,000, depending on qualifications. Send letter of application, curriculum vitae and names and addresses of three references to: Chair, Assistant Director Search Committee, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611. Deadline for application is October 15, 1986.

Publications

Nicaraguan National Bibliography, 1800-1978: A comprehensive bibliography of works published in Nicaragua, of works by Nicaraguan authors (regardless of where published), and of works on Nicaragua (regardless of where published), these volumes include broadsides, rare imprints, annuals, and irregular serials. Also included are materials on William Walker, Nicaragua Canal, Rubén Darío, and revolutionary pamphlets and broadsides from Sandino to 1978. Over 20,000 entries are organized by main entry, with author index, title index, and subject indexes in Spanish and English. Over 100 libraries and private collections are surveyed in the United States, Nicaragua, and Europe. Location codes show holding libraries. 3 volumes, cloth. Approximately 3,000 pages. Published on acid-free paper. Limited to 1,000 copies. $350 per set to September 30, 1986. $450 per set thereafter. Contact Latin American Bibliographic Foundation. P.O. Box 1103, Redlands, CA 92373. Telephone: 714/793-7842.

On the Road to Democracy? A Chronology on Human Rights and U.S.-Guatemalan Relations: January 1978-April 1985 documents seven years of Guatemalan government's policies toward its people, as well as U.S. policies toward that country under the Carter and Reagan administrations. Phillip Berryman calls the chronology "a necessary resource for those working on Guatemala."
With *On the Road to Democracy?* scholars can understand the background of the problems facing the newly inaugurated civilian president because events are separated into three easy-to-read columns: Official U.S. and Guatemalan Statements and Actions; Events in Guatemala; and International Opinion. Each citation is sourced for those doing follow-up research. *On the Road to Democracy?* is a 66-page report, available for U.S. $5 each in the U.S. and Canada (U.S. $7 elsewhere). Send checks, payable to the Central American Historical Institute, to CAHI, Intercultural Center, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057. Canadian dollars not accepted.

**National Directory of Latin Americanists:** The third edition of the *National Directory of Latin Americanists* has just been published by the Library of Congress. This new 1,011-page clothbound directory, compiled in the Library’s Hispanic Division and edited by Inge Maria Harmon, brings together in one volume biographic and bibliographic data on 4,915 individuals with specialized knowledge of Latin America. The listings emphasize the humanities and social sciences, historians, specialists in Latin American literature, anthropologists, economists, and political scientists represented in the largest numbers. The directory also includes geographers, sociologists, linguists, and specialists in education, library science, language, art, business, women’s studies, psychology, urban planning, law, public administration, musicology, religion, communication journalism, architecture, philosophy, and computer science. Extensive geographic and subject area indexes make this compendium particularly useful as a catalog of current bibliography of current research, teaching, and work related to Latin America, and it provides a composite view of the field of Latin American studies in the United States. The *National Directory of Latin Americanists*, third edition, may be purchased for $34 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. To order, refer to stock number S/N 030-013-00009-3. Make check or money order payable to Superintendent of Documents. Major credit cards accepted. Mail to Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Plan Now to Attend
LASA’s 20th Anniversary Celebration in Boston
October 23-25, 1986
ADVANCE REGISTRATION: To advance register, complete and return the enclosed forms. Registration receipts will be mailed before the congress. Badges, programs, and tickets to subscription events, when ordered, will be distributed at the meeting in exchange for the registration receipt.

DEADLINE: September 30, 1986. Forms received after that date will be returned.

CANCELLATIONS: Requests for refunds will be honored if received in writing by September 30, 1986. Subscription events (Baile, Breakfast Round Tables) are not refundable.

MEMBERSHIP FEES: There is a substantial difference in the fee for registering as a nonmember of LASA. If you wish to take advantage of the lower member’s rate, use the advance registration form to join LASA or renew your membership for 1986.

ROUND TABLES: Enclosed is a numbered list of the breakfast round tables. Please indicate your preferences on the advance registration form. You may sign up for Thursday, Friday, and Saturday but for only one round table per day. There will be only 10 participants per breakfast round table. Each breakfast costs $12 U.S. and begins at 7:00 a.m.

GRAN BAILE DE SALSA: There will be a Gran Baile de Salsa on Friday evening, October 24, beginning at 9:00 p.m. in the Park Plaza Hotel. Cost of admission will be $5 U.S. per person and there will be cash bars. Since space in the ballroom is limited, you are urged to advance register for this event.

MEETING REGISTRATION: The registration desks will be open from noon to 8 p.m. on Wednesday, October 22, and from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Thursday and Friday. The registration desks are located in the mezzanine of the Park Plaza Hotel. Since onsite registration is significantly more expensive, you are urged to advance register at the reduced rates.

TRANSPORTATION: AMERICAN and PIEDMONT AIRLINES have established a special service for LASA in order to provide the lowest possible air fares. To obtain these fares, CALL TOLL FREE 1-800-433-1790 from anywhere in the continental United States. Give the LASA account number, 91479. Ground transportation is readily available at the Boston airport. AVIS car rental is also offering a special discount to LASA members during the congress. Please call TOLL FREE 1-800-331-1600 and ask for account number AW049004.

HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS: Sessions, book exhibits, social events, and special events are at the Park Plaza Hotel. LASA has arranged a special Congress room rate of $83 (singles), $97 (double), or $109 (triple). But there is a LIMITED NUMBER OF ROOMS AVAILABLE at that rate, so you are urged to reserve your room immediately. Rooms will be filled on a first come basis. Enclosed is a self-addressed hotel registration form that should be completed and returned to the Park Plaza Hotel as soon as possible. The LASA Secretariat is NOT responsible for hotel reservations.

CHILD CARE: If you need child care services, please consult the enclosed information.

FURTHER INFORMATION: Please contact the LASA Secretariat, William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

RETURN THE REGISTRATION FORM AND PAYMENT TO:
LASA Secretariat
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

FORMS RECEIVED AFTER SEPTEMBER 30 WILL BE RETURNED.
REGISTRATION FORM
SOLICITUD PARA INSCRIBIRSE

Latin American Studies Association
XIII International Congress

Boston, Massachusetts
October 23-25, 1986

Please print/Letra de molde

Last name/Apellido  First name/Nombre  Initial/Inicial

Mailing address (for registration receipt/Dirección (para recibo de inscripción)

Street or Post Office Box/Calle o Apartado Postal

City/Ciudad  State/Estado  Country/Pais  Zip/Zona Postal

Telephone numbers/Números de teléfono

Home/Domicilio  Office/Oficina

Institution (employer) for badge/Institución (companía) para identificación

REGISTRATION FEES/TARIFAS DE INSCRIPCION
(No advance registration accepted after September 30.)

Advance: Member/Miembro ($30)  Nonmember/No miembro ($40)  Student/Esudiante ($15)  $_____

Regular: Member/Miembro ($40)  Nonmember/No miembro ($55)  Student/Esudiante ($20)  $_____

SUBSCRIPTION EVENTS (cannot be refunded)
Breakfast Round Tables/Mesas redondas

(Please check the breakfast round table you want to attend. Roundtables are $12.00 each.)

_____101R  _____105R  _____201R  _____206R  _____301R  _____305R

_____102R  _____106R  _____202R  _____207R  _____302R  _____306R

_____103R  _____107R  _____203R  _____208R  _____303R  _____307R

_____104R  _____204R  _____209R  _____304R  _____308R

_____205R  _____210R

Total roundtables  X $12.00 = $_____

GRAN BAILE DE SALSA (Friday, October 24 at 9:00 p.m.)

$5.00 per person/por persona

1986 MEMBERSHIP FEES/TARIFAS—1986
(in U.S. Dollars)

To join the association, please check the appropriate box, and add the amount to your registration payment./Para inscribirse como miembro de la asociación, marque la categoría correspondiente, y pague la tarifa indicada además de la tarifa de inscripción al congreso.

—Introductory/Introductoria  $20.00

—Latin American, Caribbean, and Puerto Rico  $20.00

—Regular:

Under $20,000 annual income/Menos de $20,000 ingresos anuales  $26.00

Between $20,000 and $29,999 annual income/Entre $20,000 y $29,999 ingresos anuales  $30.00

Between $30,000 and $39,999 annual income/Entre $30,000 y $39,999 ingresos anuales  $35.00

Over $40,000 annual income/Más de $40,000 ingresos anuales  $40.00

—Joint Membership/Inscripción conjunta para dos individuos  $12.00

—Emeritus/Para personal docente jubilado  $17.00

—Student/Estudiante  $17.00

Total

Address/Dirección:  LASA Secretariat, William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Deadline/Fecha de Limite: September 30, 1986
Latin American Studies Association

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Vice-president: Cole Blasier (University of Pittsburgh)

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Published in the winter, spring, summer, and fall. All contributions and correspondence should be directed to the Editor, LASA Forum, William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Opinions expressed herein are those of individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Latin American Studies Association or of its officers. Copy deadline for the Fall 1986 LASA Forum is September 1, 1986.